Nathan Hanna Drexel University
Contact

Affiliations
  • Faculty, Drexel University
  • PhD, Syracuse University, 2008.

Areas of specialization

Areas of interest

My philosophical views


blank
About me
Not much to say..
My works
12 items found.
Sort by:
  1. Nathan Hanna (forthcoming). Facing the Consequences. Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-16.
    According to deterrence justifications of legal punishment, legal punishment is justified at least in part because it deters offenses. These justifications rely on important empirical assumptions, e.g., that non-punitive enforcement can't deter or that it can't deter enough. I’ll challenge these assumptions and argue that extant deterrence justifications of legal punishment fail. In the process, I examine contemporary deterrence research and argue that it provides no support for these justifications.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Nathan Hanna (forthcoming). Moral Luck Defended. Noûs.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Nathan Hanna (2014). Retributivism Revisited. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):473-484.
    I’ll raise a problem for Retributivism, the view that legal punishment is justified on the basis of desert. I’ll focus primarily on Mitchell Berman’s recent defense of the view. He gives one of the most sophisticated and careful statements of it. And his argument is representative, so the problem I’ll raise for it will apply to other versions of Retributivism. His insights about justification also help to make the problem particularly obvious. I’ll also show how the problem extends to non-retributive (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Nathan Hanna (2013). Two Claims About Desert. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):41-56.
    Many philosophers claim that it is always intrinsically good when people get what they deserve and that there is always at least some reason to give people what they deserve. I highlight problems with this view and defend an alternative. I have two aims. First, I want to expose a gap in certain desert-based justifications of punishment. Second, I want to show that those of us who have intuitions at odds with these justifications have an alternative account of desert at (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Nathan Hanna (2012). It's Only Natural: Legal Punishment and the Natural Right to Punish. Social Theory and Practice 38 (4):598-616.
    Some philosophers defend legal punishment by appealing to a natural right to punish wrongdoers, a right people would have in a state of nature. Many of these philosophers argue that legal punishment can be justified by transferring this right to the state. I’ll argue that such a right may not be transferrable to the state because such a right may not survive the transition out of anarchy. A compelling reason for the natural right claim – that in a state of (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Nathan Hanna (2011). Against Phenomenal Conservatism. Acta Analytica 26 (3):213-221.
    Recently, Michael Huemer has defended the Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism: If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p. This principle has potentially far-reaching implications. Huemer uses it to argue against skepticism and to defend a version of ethical intuitionism. I employ a reductio to show that PC is false. If PC is true, beliefs can yield justification for believing their contents in cases (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Nathan Hanna (2010). Cosmic Coincidence and Intuitive Non-Naturalism. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Nathan Hanna (2009). An Argument for Voting Abstention. Public Affairs Quarterly 23 (4):279-286.
    I argue that voting abstention may be obligatory under certain non-trivial conditions. Following recent work on voting ethics, I argue that the obligation to abstain under certain conditions follows from a duty not to vote badly. Whether one votes badly, however, turns on more than one's reasons for wanting a particular candidate elected or policy implemented. On my account, one's reasons for voting at all also matter, and one can be in a position where there is no way to exercise (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Nathan Hanna (2009). Liberalism and the General Justifiability of Punishment. Philosophical Studies 145 (3):325-349.
    I argue that contemporary liberal theory cannot give a general justification for the institution or practice of punishment, i.e., a justification that would hold across a broad range of reasonably realistic conditions. I examine the general justifications offered by three prominent contemporary liberal theorists and show how their justifications fail in light of the possibility of an alternative to punishment. I argue that, because of their common commitments regarding the nature of justification, these theorists have decisive reasons to reject punishment (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Nathan Hanna (2009). The Passions of Punishment. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):232-250.
    I criticize an increasingly popular set of arguments for the justifiability of punishment. Some philosophers try to justify punishment by appealing to what Peter Strawson calls the reactive attitudes – emotions like resentment, indignation, remorse and guilt. These arguments fail. The view that these emotions commit us to punishment rests on unsophisticated views of punishment and of these emotions and their associated behaviors. I offer more sophisticated accounts of punishment, of these emotions and of their associated behaviors that are consistent (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Nathan Hanna (2008). Say What? A Critique of Expressive Retributivism. Law and Philosophy 27 (2):123-150.
    Some philosophers think that the challenge of justifying punishment can be met by a theory that emphasizes the expressive character of punishment. A particular type of theories of this sort - call it Expressive Retributivism [ER] - combines retributivist and expressivist considerations. These theories are retributivist since they justify punishment as an intrinsically appropriate response to wrongdoing, as something wrongdoers deserve, but the expressivist element in these theories seeks to correct for the traditional obscurity of retributivism. Retributivists often rely on (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Nathan Hanna (2007). Socrates and Superiority. Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (2):251-268.
    I propose an alternative interpretation of the Crito. The arguments that are typically taken to be Socrates’ primary arguments against escape are actually supplementary arguments that rely on what I callthe Superiority Thesis, the thesis that the state and its citizens are members of a moral hierarchy where those below are tied by bonds of obligation to those above. I provide evidence that Socrates holds thisthesis, demonstrate how it resolves a number of apparent difficulties, and show why my interpretation is (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
Is this list right?