Kelly Trogdon Virginia Tech
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  • Faculty, Virginia Tech
  • PhD, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 2009.

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  1. Trogdon Kelly (forthcoming). Grounding: Necessary or Contingent? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Recent interest in the nature of grounding is due in part to the idea that purely modal notions are too coarse-grained to capture what we have in mind when we say that one thing is grounded in another. Grounding not being purely modal in character, however, is compatible with it having modal consequences. Is grounding a necessary relation? In this paper I argue that the answer is ‘yes’ in the sense that propositions corresponding to full grounds modally entail propositions corresponding (...)
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  2. Kelly Trogdon (forthcoming). Geraldine Coggins, Could There Have Been Nothing? Against Metaphysical Nihilism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophy Reviews.
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  3. Kelly Trogdon & Paisley Livingston (2014). The Complete Work. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 72 (3):225-233.
    What is it for a work of art to be complete? In this article, we argue that an artwork is complete just in case the artist has acquired a completion disposition with respect to her work—a disposition grounded in certain cognitive mechanisms to refrain from making significant changes to the work. We begin by explaining why the complete/incomplete distinction with respect to artworks is both practically and philosophically significant. Then we consider and reject two approaches to artwork completion. Finally, we (...)
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  4. Kelly Trogdon (2013). An Introduction to Grounding. In Miguel Hoeltje, Benjamin Schnieder & Alex Steinberg (eds.), Varieties of Dependence: Ontological Dependence, Grounding, Supervenience, Response-Dependence (Basic Philosophical Concepts). Philosophia Verlag. 97-122.
    The primary goal of this chapter is to set out and clarify some of the central issues and disputes concerning grounding (alternatively, the in virtue of relation, priority, metaphysical explanation, and so on). I begin by introducing a taxonomy of positions that proceeds upon a cluster of related issues including, for example, whether our talk of grounding in philosophical discourse is univocal. Then I consider the logical form of grounding statements as well as the structural principles that govern grounding. Next, (...)
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  5. Kelly Trogdon (2013). Grounding: Necessary or Contingent? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):465-485.
    Recent interest in the nature of grounding is due in part to the idea that purely modal notions are too coarse-grained to capture what we have in mind when we say that one thing is grounded in another. Grounding not being purely modal in character, however, is compatible with it having modal consequences. Is grounding a necessary relation? In this article I argue that the answer is ‘yes’ in the sense that propositions corresponding to full grounds modally entail propositions corresponding (...)
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  6. Kelly Trogdon (2010). Intrinsicality for Monists (and Pluralists). Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):555-558.
    Two competing views in sparse ontology are monism and pluralism. In Trogdon 2009 I propose an account of intrinsicality that I argue is both compatible with monism and pluralism and independently plausible. Skiles 2009 argues that my account fails on both fronts. In this note I respond to his two objections.
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  7. Joseph Levine & Kelly Trogdon (2009). The Modal Status of Materialism. Philosophical Studies 145 (3):351 - 362.
    Materialism, as traditionally conceived, has a contingent side and a necessary side. The necessity of materialism is reflected by the metaphysics of realization, while its contingency is a matter of accepting the possibility of Cartesian worlds, worlds in which our minds are roughly as Descartes describes them. In this paper we argue that the necessity and the contingency of materialism are in conflict. In particular, we claim that if mental properties are realized by physical properties in the actual world, Cartesian (...)
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  8. Kelly Trogdon (2009). Daniel Stoljar, Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 118 (2).
    Stoljar’s book has three parts. In the first part, he discusses the “problem of experience”: though we have experiences, it isn’t clear that the experiential fits into the actual world, given that the actual world is fundamentally non-experiential. Stoljar focuses on what he views as one facet of the problem of experience, the “logical problem”, which consists of three jointly inconsistent claims: (T1) there are experiential truths; (T2) if there are experiential truths, every experiential truth is entailed by some non-experiential (...)
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  9. Kelly Trogdon (2009). Daniel Stoljar, Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 118 (2):269-273.
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  10. Kelly Trogdon (2009). Monism and Intrinsicality. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):127 – 148.
    Central to the programme of sparse ontology is a hierarchical view of reality; the basic entities form the sparse structure of being, while the derivative entities form the abundant superstructure. Priority pluralism and priority monism are both theses of sparse ontology. Roughly speaking, the priority pluralist claims that wholes and their properties ontologically depend on parts and their properties, while the priority monist claims that it goes the other way around. In this paper I focus on Ted Sider's recent argument (...)
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  11. Kelly Trogdon (2009). Physicalsim and Sparse Ontology. Philosophical Studies 143 (2):147-165.
    A major stumbling block for non-reductive physicalism is Kim’s disjunctive property objection. In this paper I bring certain issues in sparse ontology to bear on the objection, in particular the theses of priority monism and priority pluralism. Priority pluralism (or something close to it, anyway) is a common ontological background assumption, so in the first part of the paper I consider whether the disjunctive property objection applies with equal force to non-reductive physicalism on the assumption that priority monism is instead (...)
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  12. D. Gene Witmer, William Butchard & Kelly Trogdon (2005). Intrinsicality Without Naturalness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):326–350.
    Rae Langton and David Lewis have proposed an account of "intrinsic property" that makes use of two notions: being independent of accompaniment and being natural. We find the appeal to the first of these promising; the second notion, however, we find mystifying. In this paper we argue that the appeal to naturalness is not acceptable and offer an alternative definition of intrinsicality. The alternative definition makes crucial use of a notion commonly used by philosophers, namely, the notion of one property (...)
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  13. Kelly Trogdon, Phenomenal Acquaintance.
    Chapter 1 of Phenomenal Acquaintance is devoted to taking care of some preliminary issues. I begin by distinguishing those states of awareness in virtue of which we’re acquainted with the phenomenal characters of our experiences from those states of awareness some claim are at the very nature of experience. Then I reconcile the idea that experience is transparent with the claim that we can be acquainted with phenomenal character. In Chapter 2 I set up a dilemma that is the primary (...)
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