Online research in philosophy

The authors first address two paradoxes in the theory of possible worlds and propositions stemming from Russell and Kaplan and show that these paradoxes don't affect the object-theoretic analysis of worlds and propositions. However, Kit Fine has formulated an object theoretic version of Kaplan's paradox that threatens to show that object theory is, after all, no better off. The initial, most straightforward version of the paradox is blocked by theoretical restrictions specific to object theory, but the paradox can be revised (...) so as to comport with these restrictions by redefining one of the terms in an essential premise. The authors then argue that the premise that results given the new definition is entirely implausible if propositions are understood, as they are in object theory, to be fine-grained intensional entities rather than sets of possible worlds. Object theory, therefore, can block the revised paradox as well. (shrink)

Second-order logic has a number of attractive features, in particular the strong expressive resources it offers, and the possibility of articulating categorical mathematical theories (such as arithmetic and analysis). But it also has its costs. Five major charges have been launched against second-order logic: (1) It is not axiomatizable; as opposed to first-order logic, it is inherently incomplete. (2) It also has several semantics, and there is no criterion to choose between them (Putnam, J Symbol Logic 45:464–482, 1980 ). Therefore, (...) it is not clear how this logic should be interpreted. (3) Second-order logic also has strong ontological commitments: (a) it is ontologically committed to classes (Resnik, J Phil 85:75–87, 1988 ), and (b) according to Quine (Philosophy of logic, Prentice-Hall: Englewood Cliffs, 1970 ), it is nothing more than “set theory in sheep’s clothing”. (4) It is also not better than its first-order counterpart, in the following sense: if first-order logic does not characterize adequately mathematical systems, given the existence of non - isomorphic first-order interpretations, second-order logic does not characterize them either, given the existence of different interpretations of second-order theories (Melia, Analysis 55:127–134, 1995 ). (5) Finally, as opposed to what is claimed by defenders of second-order logic [such as Shapiro (J Symbol Logic 50:714–742, 1985 )], this logic does not solve the problem of referential access to mathematical objects (Azzouni, Metaphysical myths, mathematical practice: the logic and epistemology of the exact sciences, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994 ). In this paper, I argue that the second-order theorist can solve each of these difficulties. As a result, second-order logic provides the benefits of a rich framework without the associated costs. (shrink)

Perceptual experiences provide an important source of information about the world. It is clear that having the capacity of undergoing such experiences yields an evolutionary advantage. But why should humans have developed not only the ability of simply seeing, but also of seeing that something is thus and so? In this paper, I explore the significance of distinguishing perception from conception for the development of the kind of minds that creatures such as humans typically have. As will become clear, it (...) is crucial to pay careful attention to the different kinds of information that are involved in perceiving and conceiving (including the way such information is gathered and transmitted). By identifying such kinds of information and the role they play, we can then understand an important feature of why creatures like us have the kind of consciousness and mental processes we do. (shrink)

The physics and metaphysics of identity and individuality Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9463-7 Authors Don Howard, Department of Philosophy and Graduate Program in History and Philosophy of Science, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556, USA Bas C. van Fraassen, Philosophy Department, San Francisco State University, 1600 Holloway Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94132, USA Otávio Bueno, Department of Philosophy, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL 33124, USA Elena Castellani, Department of Philosophy, University of Florence, Via Bolognese 52, 50139 (...) Florence, Italy Laura Crosilla, Department of Pure Mathematics, School of Mathematics, University of Leeds, Leeds, LS2 9JT UK Steven French, Department of Philosophy, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK Décio Krause, Department of Philosophy, Federal University of Santa Catarina, 88040-900 Campus Trindade, Florianópolis, SC Brazil Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796. (shrink)

It is easy to show that in many natural axiomatic formulations of physical and even mathematical theories, there are many superfluous concepts usually assumed as primitive. This happens mainly when these theories are formulated in the language of standard set theories, such as Zermelo–Fraenkel’s. In 1925, John von Neumann created a set theory where sets are definable by means of functions. We provide a reformulation of von Neumann’s set theory and show that it can be used to formulate physical and (...) mathematical theories with a lower number of primitive concepts very naturally. Our basic proposal is to offer a new kind of set-theoretic language that offers advantages with respect to the standard approaches, since it doesn’t introduce dispensable primitive concepts. We show how the proposal works by considering significant physical theories, such as non-relativistic classical particle mechanics and classical field theories, as well as a well-known mathematical theory, namely, group theory. This is a first step of a research program we intend to pursue. (shrink)

In this paper, I provide an easy road to nominalism which does not rely on a Field-type nominalization strategy for mathematics (Field 1980). According to this proposal, applications of mathematics to science, and alleged mathematical explanations of physical phenomena, only emerge when suitable physical interpretations of the mathematical formalism are advanced. And since these interpretations are rarely distinguished from the mathematical formalism, the impression arises that mathematical explanations derive from the mathematical formalism alone. I correct this misimpression by pointing out, (...) in the cases recently discussed by Mark Colyvan (2010), exactly where the interpretations of the formalism were invoked and the function they played in the resulting explanations. A viable form of easy-road nominalism, which is also sensitive to scientific practice, then arises. (shrink)

Batterman ([2010]) raises a number of concerns for the inferential conception of the applicability of mathematics advocated by Bueno and Colyvan ([2011]). Here, we distinguish the various concerns, and indicate how they can be assuaged by paying attention to the nature of the mappings involved and emphasizing the significance of interpretation in this context. We also indicate how this conception can accommodate the examples that Batterman draws upon in his critique. Our conclusion is that ‘asymptotic reasoning’ can be straightforwardly accommodated (...) within the inferential conception. (shrink)

Nominalism and the application of mathematics Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 1-4 DOI 10.1007/s11016-012-9653-6 Authors Otávio Bueno, Department of Philosophy, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL 33124, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.

Newton da Costa and Steven French have argued that the concept of partial truth plays an important role in our understanding of significant aspects of scientific practice: from the status of scientific theories through the understanding of inconsistency in science to the nature of induction (see da Costa and French 2003). In this paper, I use the concept of partial truth and the associated framework of partial structures to offer a formulation of the concept of visual evidence, and I examine (...) some of the roles that this notion plays in scientific activity. DOI:10.5007/1808-1711.2011v15n2p249. (shrink)

We argue that standard definitions of ‘vagueness’ prejudice the question of how best to deal with the phenomenon of vagueness. In particular, the usual understanding of ‘vagueness’ in terms of borderline cases, where the latter are thought of as truth-value gaps, begs the question against the subvaluational approach. According to this latter approach, borderline cases are inconsistent (i.e., glutty not gappy). We suggest that a definition of ‘vagueness’ should be general enough to accommodate any genuine contender in the debate over (...) how to best deal with the sorites paradox. Moreover, a definition of ‘vagueness’ must be able to accommodate the variety of forms sorites arguments can take. These include numerical, total-ordered sorites arguments, discrete versions, continuous versions, as well as others without any obvious metric structure at all. After considering the shortcomings of various definitions of ‘vagueness’, we propose a very general non-question-begging definition. (shrink)

A number of people have recently argued for a structural approach to accounting for the applications of mathematics. Such an approach has been called “the mapping account”. According to this view, the applicability of mathematics is fully accounted for by appreciating the relevant structural similarities between the empirical system under study and the mathematics used in the investigation of that system. This account of applications requires the truth of applied mathematical assertions, but it does not require the existence of mathematical (...) objects. In this paper, we discuss the shortcomings of this account, and show how these shortcomings can be overcome by a broader view of the application of mathematics: the inferential conception. (shrink)

An account of scientific representation in terms of partial structures and partial morphisms is further developed. It is argued that the account addresses a variety of difficulties and challenges that have recently been raised against such formal accounts of representation. This allows some useful parallels between representation in science and art to be drawn, particularly with regard to apparently inconsistent representations. These parallels suggest that a unitary account of scientific and artistic representation is possible, and our article can be viewed (...) as laying the groundwork for such an account—although, as we shall acknowledge, significant differences exist between these two forms of representation. (shrink)

Scientific representation: A long journey from pragmatics to pragmatics Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9465-5 Authors James Ladyman, Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, 9 Woodland Rd, Bristol, BS8 1TB UK Otávio Bueno, Department of Philosophy, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL 33124, USA Mauricio Suárez, Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, Complutense University of Madrid, 28040 Madrid, Spain Bas C. van Fraassen, Philosophy Department, San Francisco State University, 1600 Holloway Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94132, USA Journal Metascience Online (...) ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796. (shrink)

We have three goals in this paper. First, we outline an ontology of stance, and explain the role that modes of engagement and styles of reasoning play in the characterization of a stance. Second, we argue that we do enjoy a degree of control over the modes of engagement and styles of reasoning we adopt. Third, we contend that maximizing one’s prospects for change (within the framework of other constraints, e.g., beliefs, one has) also maximizes one’s rationality.

We offer an overview of some ways of examining the connections between stance and rationality, by surveying recent work on four central topics: (a) the very idea of a stance, (b) the relations between stances and voluntarism, (c) the metaphysics and epistemology that emerge once stances are brought to center stage, and (d) the role that emotions and phenomenology play in the empirical stance.

In this paper we show that any reasoning process in which conclusions can be both fallible and corrigible can be formalized in terms of two approaches: (i) syntactically, with the use of defeasible reasoning, according to which reasoning consists in the construction and assessment of arguments for and against a given claim, and (ii) semantically, with the use of partial structures, which allow for the representation of less than conclusive information. We are particularly interested in the formalization of scientific reasoning, (...) along the lines traced by Lakatos’ methodology of scientific research programs. We show how current debates in cosmology could be put into this framework, shedding light on a very controversial topic. (shrink)

In his defense of a coherence theory of truth and knowledge, Donald Davidson insists that (i) we must take the objects of a belief to be the causes of that belief, and (ii) given the nature of beliefs, most of our beliefs are veridical. As result, a response to skepticism is provided. If most of our beliefs turn out to be true, global skepticism is ultimately incoherent. In this paper, I argue that, despite the many attractions that a coherence theory (...) has, a response to skepticism is not among them. After distinguishing three forms of skepticism (global skepticism, Pyrrhonian skepticism and lottery skepticism), I argue that none of them is affected by Davidson’s strategy. (shrink)

In this paper, I develop a new defense of logicism: one that combines logicism and nominalism. First, I defend the logicist approach from recent criticisms; in particular from the charge that a cruciai principie in the logicist reconstruction of arithmetic, Hume's Principle, is not analytic. In order to do that, I argue, it is crucial to understand the overall logicist approach as a nominalist view. I then indicate a way of extending the nominalist logicist approach beyond arithmetic. Finally, I argue (...) that a nominalist can use the resulting approach to provide a nominalization strategy for mathematics. In this way, mathematical structures can be introduced without ontological costs. And so, if this proposal is correct, we can say that ultimately all the nominalist needs is logic (and, rather loosely, ali the logicist needs is nominalism). (shrink)

Quine has famously put forward the indispensability argument to force belief in the existence of mathematical objects (such as classes) due to their indispensability to our best theories of the world (Quine 1960). Quine has also advocated the indeterminacy of reference argument, according to which reference is dramatically indeterminate: given a language, there’s no unique reference relation for that language (see Quine 1969a). In this paper, I argue that these two arguments are in conflict with each other. Whereas the indispensability (...) argument supports realism about mathematics, the indeterminacy of reference argument, when applied to mathematics, provides a powerful strategy in support of mathematical anti-realism. I conclude the paper by indicating why the indeterminacy of reference phenomenon should be preferred over the considerations regarding indispensability. In the end, even the Quinean shouldn’t be a realist (platonist) about mathematics. (shrink)

Abstract: According to Luciano Floridi (2008) , informational structural realism provides a framework to reconcile the two main versions of realism about structure: the epistemic formulation (according to which all we can know is structure) and the ontic version (according to which structure is all there is). The reconciliation is achieved by introducing suitable levels of abstraction and by articulating a conception of structural objects in information-theoretic terms. In this essay, I argue that the proposed reconciliation works at the expense (...) of realism. I then propose an alternative framework, in terms of partial structures, that offers a way of combining information and structure in a realist setting while still preserving the distinctive features of the two formulations of structural realism. Suitably interpreted, the proposed framework also makes room for an empiricist form of informational structuralism (structural empiricism). Pluralism then emerges. (shrink)

According to the semantic view, a theory is characterized by a class of models. In this paper, we examine critically some of the assumptions that underlie this approach. First, we recall that models are models of something. Thus we cannot leave completely aside the axiomatization of the theories under consideration, nor can we ignore the metamathematics used to elaborate these models, for changes in the metamathematics often impose restrictions on the resulting models. Second, based on a parallel between van Fraassen’s (...) modal interpretation of quantum mechanics and Skolem’s relativism regarding set-theoretic concepts, we introduce a distinction between relative and absolute concepts in the context of the models of a scientific theory. And we discuss the significance of that distinction. Finally, by focusing on contemporary particle physics, we raise the question: since there is no general accepted unification of the parts of the standard model (namely, QED and QCD), we have no theory, in the usual sense of the term. This poses a difficulty: if there is no theory, how can we speak of its models? What are the latter models of? We conclude by noting that it is unclear that the semantic view can be applied to contemporary physical theories. (shrink)

This comprehensive collection of original essays written by an international group of scholars addresses the central themes in Latin American philosophy.

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2009v13n3p269 Neste artigo, examino três modelos de redução. O primeiro, e mais restritivo, foi desenvolvido por Ernest Nagel como parte do programa empirista lógico. O segundo, articulado por Jerry Fodor, embora sendo significativamente mais amplo, é incapaz de dar sentido a uma característica saliente da prática científica. O terceiro modelo, que é também o mais condescendente, é desenvolvido empregando-se a abordagem baseada em estruturas parciais proposta por Newton da Costa e Steven French. Argumento que este terceiro modelo preserva os benefícios (...) da proposta de Fodor e é ainda capaz de acomodar aspectos relevantes da prática científica. Em particular, ele oferece uma concepção de redução sem reducionismo, e descreve a relação entre a teoria que é reduzida e a que reduz por meio de mapeamentos não precisos e estruturas parciais — mesmo na presença de informação incompleta. (shrink)

Abstract: Ernest Sosa has recently articulated an insightful response to skepticism and, in particular, to the dream argument. The response relies on two independent moves. First, Sosa offers the imagination model of dreaming according to which no assertions are ever made in dreams and no beliefs are involved there. As a result, it is possible to distinguish dreaming from being awake, and the dream argument is blocked. Second, Sosa develops a virtue epistemology according to which in appropriately normal conditions our (...) perceptual beliefs will be apt. Hence, in these conditions, we will have at least animal knowledge, and the conclusion of the dream argument is undermined. In this article, I examine various moves that the skeptic can make to resist Sosa's challenge, and I contrast the proposal to a neo-Pyrrhonian stance. In the end, there is surprisingly little disagreement about the status of ordinary perceptual beliefs in the two stances. (shrink)

Thirteen up-and-coming researchers in the philosophy of mathematics have been invited to write on what they take to be the right philosophical account of mathematics, examining along the way where they think the philosophy of mathematics is and ought to be going. A rich and diverse picture emerges. Some broader tendencies can nevertheless be detected: there is increasing attention to the practice, language and psychology of mathematics, a move to reassess the orthodoxy, as well as inspiration from philosophical logic.

Logical pluralism is the view according to which there is more than one relation of logical consequence, even within a given language. A recent articulation of this view has been developed in terms of quantification over different cases: classical logic emerges from consistent and complete cases; constructive logic from consistent and incomplete cases, and paraconsistent logic from inconsistent and complete cases. We argue that this formulation causes pluralism to collapse into either logical nihilism or logical universalism. In its place, we (...) propose a modalist account of logical pluralism that is independently well motivated and that avoids these collapses. (shrink)

This paper provides a rationale for advocating pancritical rationalism. First, it argues that the advocate of critical rationalism may accept (but not be internally justified in accepting) that there is ‘justification’ in an externalist sense, specifically that certain procedures can track truth, and suggest that this recognition should inform practice; that one should try to determine which sources and methods are appropriate for various aspects of inquiry, and to what extent they are. Second, it argues that if there is external (...) justification, then a critical rationalist is better off than a dogmatist from an evolutionary perspective. (shrink)

Philosophers are very fond of making non-factualist claims—claims to the effect that there is no fact of the matter as to whether something is the case. But can these claims be coherently stated in the context of classical logic? Some care is needed here, we argue, otherwise one ends up denying a tautology or embracing a contradiction. In the end, we think there are only two strategies available to someone who wants to be a non-factualist about something, and remain within (...) the province of classical logic. But one of these strategies is rather controversial, and the other requires substantially more work than is often supposed. Being a non-factualist is no easy business, and it may not be the most philosophically perspicuous way to go. (shrink)

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2008v12n2p177 Can a constructive empiricist make sense of scientific representation? Usually, a scientific model is an abstract entity (e.g., formulated in set theory), and scientific representation is conceptualized as an intentional relation between scientific models and certain aspects of the world. On this conception, since both the models and the representation relation are abstract, a constructive empiricist, who is not committed to the existence of abstract entities, would be unable to invoke these notions to make sense of scientific representation. In (...) this paper, instead of understanding representation as a relation between abstract entities, I focus on the activity of representing, and argue that it provides a way of making sense of representation within the boundaries of empiricism. The activity of representing doesn’t deal with abstract entities, but with concrete ones, such as inscriptions, templates, and blueprints. In the end, by examining the practice of representing, rather than an artificially reified product—the representation—the constructive empiricist has the resources to make sense of scientific representation in empiricist terms. (shrink)

Scientific change has two important dimensions: conceptual change and structural change. In this paper, I argue that the existence of conceptual change brings serious difficulties for scientific realism, and the existence of structural change makes structural realism look quite implausible. I then sketch an alternative account of scientific change, in terms of partial structures, that accommodates both conceptual and structural changes. The proposal, however, is not realist, and supports a structuralist version of van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism (structural empiricism).

Current versions of nominalism in the philosophy of mathematics face a significant problem to understand mathematical knowledge. They are unable to characterize mathematical knowledge as knowledge of the objects mathematical theories are taken to be about. Oswaldo Chateaubriand’s insightful reformulation of Platonism (Chateaubriand 2005) avoids this problem by advancing a broader conception of knowledge as justified truth beyond a reasonable doubt, and by introducing a suitable characterization of logical form in which the relevant mathematical facts play an important role in (...) the truth of the corresponding mathematical propositions. In this paper, I contrast Chateaubriand’s proposal with an agnostic form of nominalism that is able to accommodate mathematical knowledge without the commitment to mathematical facts. (shrink)

According to the trivialist, everything is true. But why would anyone believe that? It turns out that trivialism emerges naturally from a certain inconsistency view of language, and it has significant benefits that need to be acknowledged. But trivialism also encounters some troubles along the way. After discussing them, I sketch a couple of alternatives that can preserve the benefits of trivialism without the corresponding costs.

In order to develop an account of scientific rationality, two problems need to be addressed: (i) how to make sense of episodes of theory change in science where the lack of a cumulative development is found, and (ii) how to accommodate cases of scientific change where lack of consistency is involved. In this paper, we sketch a model of scientific rationality that accommodates both problems. We first provide a framework within which it is possible to make sense of scientific revolutions, (...) but which still preserves some (partial) relations between old and new theories. The existence of these relations help to explain why the break between different theories is never too radical as to make it impossible for one to interpret the process in perfectly rational terms. We then defend the view that if scientific theories are taken to be quasi-true, and if the underlying logic is paraconsistent, it's perfectly rational for scientists and mathematicians to entertain inconsistent theories without triviality. As a result, as opposed to what is demanded by traditional approaches to rationality, it's not irrational to entertain inconsistent theories. Finally, we conclude the paper by arguing that the view advanced here provides a new way of thinking about the foundations of science. In particular, it extends in important respects both coherentist and foundationalist approaches to knowledge, without the troubles that plague traditional views of scientific rationality. (shrink)

In this paper, 1 examine the role of the delta function in Dirac’s formulation of quantum mechanics (QM), and I discuss, more generally, the role of mathematics in theory construction. It has been argued that mathematical theories play an indispensable role in physics, particularly in QM [Colyvan, M. (2001). The inrlispensability of mathematics. Oxford University Press: Oxford]. As I argue here, at least in the case of the delta function, Dirac was very clear about its rlispensability. I first discuss the (...) significance of the delta function in Dirac’s work, and explore the strategy that he devised to overcome its use. l then argue that even if mathematical theories turned out to be indispensable, this wouidn’t justify the commitment to the existence of mathematical entities. In fact, even in successful uses of mathematics, such as in Dirac’s discovery of antimatter, there’s no need to believe in the existence of the corresponding mathematical entities. An interesting picture about the application of mathematics emerges from a careful examination of Dirac’s work. (shrink)

Hartry Field has recently examined the question whether our logical and mathematical concepts are referentially indeterminate. In his view, (1) certain logical notions, such as second-order quantification, are indeterminate, but (2) important mathematical notions, such as the notion of finiteness, are not (they are determinate). In this paper, I assess Field's analysis, and argue that claims (1) and (2) turn out to be inconsistent. After all, given that the notion of finiteness can only be adequately characterized in pure secondorder logic, (...) if Field is right in claiming that second-order quantification is indeterminate (see (1)), it follows that finiteness is also indeterminate (contrary to (2)). After arguing that Field is committed to these claims, I provide a diagnosis of why this inconsistency emerged, and I suggest an alternative, consistent picture of the relationship between logical and mathematical indeterminacy. (shrink)

Current versions of nominalism in the philosophy of mathematics have the benefit of avoiding commitment to the existence of mathematical objects. But this comes with the cost of not taking mathematical theories literally. Jody Azzouni's Deflating Existential Consequence has recently challenged this conclusion by formulating a nominalist view that lacks this cost. In this paper, we argue that, as it stands, Azzouni's proposal does not yet succeed. It faces a dilemma to the effect that either the view is not nominalist (...) or it fails to take mathematics literally. After presenting the dilemma, we suggest a possible solution for the nominalist. (shrink)

The blame for the semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes is often placed on self-reference and circularity. Some years ago, Yablo [1985; 1993] challenged this diagnosis, by producing a paradox that's liar-like but does not seem to involve circularity. But is Yablo's paradox really non-circular? In a recent paper, Beall [2001] has suggested that there are no means available to refer to Yablo's paradox without invoking descriptions, and since Priest [1997] has shown that any such description is circular, Beall concludes that Yablo's (...) paradox itself is circular. In this paper, we argue that Beall's conclusion is unwarranted, given that (i) descriptions are not the only way to refer to Yablo's paradox, and (ii) we have no reason to believe that because the description involves self-reference, the denotation of that description is also circular. As a result, for all that's been said so far, we have no reason to believe that Yablo's paradox is circular. (shrink)

Hartry Field (1980) has developed an interesting nominalization strategy for Newtonian gravitation theory—a strategy that reformulates the theory without quantification over abstract entities. According to David Malament (1982), Field's strategy cannot be extended to quantum mechanics (QM), and so it only has a limited scope. In a recent work, Mark Balaguer has responded to Malament's challenge by indicating how QM can be nominalized, and by “doing much of the work needed to provide the nominalization” (Balaguer 1998, 114). In this paper, (...) I critically assess Balaguer's proposal, and argue that it ultimately fails. Balaguer's strategy is incompatible with a number of interpretations of QM, in particular with Bas van Fraassen's version of the modal interpretation. And given that Balaguer's strategy invokes physically real propensities, it is unclear whether it is even compatible with nominalism. I conclude that the nominalization of QM remains a major problem for the nominalist. (shrink)

Hartry Field [1980] has developed an interesting nominalization strategy for Newtonian gravitation theory -- a strategy that reformulates the theory without quantification over abstract entities. According to David Malament [1982], Field’s strategy cannot be extended to quantum mechanics (QM), and so it only has a limited scope. In a recent work, Mark Balaguer has responded to Malament’s challenge, by indicating how QM can be nominalized, and by “doing much of the work needed to provide the nominalization” (Balaguer [1998], 114). In (...) this paper, I critically assess Balaguer’s proposal, and argue that it ultimately fails. Balaguer’s strategy is incompatible with a number of interpretations of QM, in particular with Bas van Fraassen’s version of the modal interpretation. And given that Balaguer’s strategy invokes physically real propensities, it is unclear whether it is even compatible with nominalism. I conclude that the nominalization of QM still remains a major problem for the nominalist. (shrink)

Consider the following denumerably infinite sequence of sentences: (s1) For all k > 1, sk is not true. (s2) For all k > 2, sk is not true. (s3) For all k > 3, sk is not true.

We examine, from the partial structures perspective, two forms of applicability of mathematics: at the “bottom” level, the applicability of theoretical structures to the “appearances”, and at the “top” level, the applicability of mathematical to physical theories. We argue that, to accommodate these two forms of applicability, the partial structures approach needs to be extended to include a notion of “partial homomorphism”. As a case study, we present London's analysis of the superfluid behavior of liquid helium in terms of Bose‐Einstein (...) statistics. This involved both the introduction of group theory at the top level, and some modeling at the “phenomenological” level, and thus provides a nice example of the relationships we are interested in. We conclude with a discussion of the “autonomy” of London's model. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to provide a unified account of scientific and mathematical change in a thoroughly empiricist setting. After providing a formal modelling in terms of embedding, and criticising it for being too restrictive, a second modelling is advanced. It generalises the first, providing a more open-ended pattern of theory development, and is articulated in terms of da Costa and French's partial structures approach. The crucial component of scientific and mathematical change is spelled out in terms of (...) partial embeddings. Finally, an application of this second pattern is made, with the examination of the early formulation of set theory (in particular, the works of Cantor, Zermelo and Skolem). (shrink)

Throughout the last two decades, Newton da Costa and his collaborators have developed some frameworks to help the interpretation of science. Two of them are particularly noteworthy: partial structures and quasi-truth (that provide a way of accommodating the openness and partiality of scientific activity), and quasi-set theory (that allows one to take seriously the idea, put forward by several physicists, that we can't meaningfully apply the notion of identity to quantum particles). In this paper I explore the interconnection between these (...) two frameworks. After reviewing the extant formulations of quasi-truth and quasi-set theory, I suggest a way of combining them, advancing a formulation of quasi-truth in quasi-set theory. In this way, a good sense can be made of the idea that quantum mechanics, if not true, is at least quasi-true. I then explore an application of this combined framework, arguing that it provides a conceptual setting appropriate to overcome two (philosophical) difficulties in van Fraassen's modal interpretation of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

In this paper we examine Lewis's attempts to provide an epistemology of modality and we argue that he fails to provide an account that properly weds his metaphysics with an epistemology that explains the knowledge of modality that both he and his critics grant. We argue that neither the appeals to acceptable paraphrases of ordinary modal discourse nor parallels with Platonistic theories of mathematics suffice. We conclude that no proper epistemology for modal realism has been provided and that one is (...) needed. (shrink)

A first step is taken towards articulating a constructive empiricist philosophy of mathematics, thus extending van Fraassen's account to this domain. In order to do so, I adapt Field's nominalization program, making it compatible with an empiricist stance. Two changes are introduced: (a) Instead of taking conservativeness as the norm of mathematics, the empiricist countenances the weaker notion of quasi-truth (as formulated by da Costa and French), from which the formal properties of conservativeness are derived; (b) Instead of quantifying over (...) spacetime regions, the empiricist only admits quantification over occupied regions, since this is enough for his or her needs. (shrink)

In this paper a constructive empiricist account of scientific change is put forward. Based on da Costa's and French's partial structures approach, two notions of empirical adequacy are initially advanced (with particular emphasis on the introduction of degrees of empirical adequacy). Using these notions, it is shown how both the informativeness and the empirical adequacy requirements of an empiricist theory of scientific change can then be met. Finally, some philosophical consequences with regard to the role of structures in this context (...) are drawn.Now, we daily see what science is doing for us. This could not be unless it taught us something about reality; the aim of science is not things themselves, as the dogmatists in their simplicity imagine, but the relations between things; outside those relations there is no reality knowable. (shrink)

The partial structures approach has two major components: a broad notion of structure (partial structure) and a weak notion of truth (quasi-truth). In this paper, we discuss the relationship between this approach and free logic. We also compare the model-theoretic analysis supplied by partial structures with the method of supervaluations, which was initially introduced as a technique to provide a semantic analysis of free logic. We then combine the three formal frameworks (partial structures, free logic and supervaluations), and apply the (...) resulting approach to accommodate semantic paradoxes. (shrink)

The partial structures approach has two major components: a broad notion of structure (partial structure) and a weak notion of truth (quasi-truth). In this paper, we discuss the relationship between this approach and free logic. We also compare the model-theoretic analysis supplied by partial structures with the method of supervaluations, which was initially introduced as a technique to provide a semantic analysis of free logic. We then combine the three formal frameworks (partial structures, free logic and supervaluations), and apply the (...) resulting approach to accommodate semantic paradoxes. (shrink)

The issue of what consequences to draw from the existence of non-classical logical systems has been the subject of an interesting debate across a diversity of fields. In this paper the matter of alternative logics is considered with reference to a specific belief system and its propositions :the Azande are said to maintain beliefs about witchcraft which, when expressed propositionally, appear to be inconsistent. When the Azande have been presented with such inconsistencies, they either fail to see them as such (...) or else accept them as non-problematical. Is our knowledge of logical truths a relative and culturally determined phenomenon, or is there some (transcendent) criterion that allows us to adjudicate between alternative logical systems? The authors propose an approach for resolving disputes about the status of Azande reasoning which assumes a paraconsistent framework, thus providing a new perspective on this debate. (shrink)

The mathematical concept of pragmatic truth, first introduced in Mikenberg, da Costa and Chuaqui (1986), has received in the last few years several applications in logic and the philosophy of science. In this paper, we study the logic of pragmatic truth, and show that there are important connections between this logic, modal logic and, in particular, Jaskowski's discussive logic. In order to do so, two systems are put forward so that the notions of pragmatic validity and pragmatic truth can be (...) accommodated. One of the main results of this paper is that the logic of pragmatic truth is paraconsistent. The philosophical import of this result, which justifies the application of pragmatic truth to inconsistent settings, is also discussed. (shrink)

The issue of what consequences to draw from the existence of non-classical logical systems has been the subject of an interesting debate across a diversity of fields. In this paper the matter of alternative logics is considered with reference to a specific belief system and its propositions :the Azande are said to maintain beliefs about witchcraft which, when expressed propositionally, appear to be inconsistent. When the Azande have been presented with such inconsistencies, they either fail to see them as such (...) or else accept them as non-problematical. Is our knowledge of logical truths a relative and culturally determined phenomenon, or is there some (transcendent) criterion that allows us to adjudicate between alternative logical systems? The authors propose an approach for resolving disputes about the status of Azande reasoning which assumes a paraconsistent framework, thus providing a new perspective on this debate. (shrink)

Based on da Costa's and French's notions of partial structures and pragmatic truth, this paper examines two possible characterizations of the concept of empirical adequacy, one depending on the notion of partial isomorphism, the other on the hierarchy of partial models of phenomena, and both compatible with an empiricist view. These formulations can then be employed to illuminate certain aspects of scientific practice.

We formulate Suppes predicates for various kinds of space-time: classical Euclidean, Minkowski's, and that of General Relativity. Starting with topological properties, these continua are mathematically constructed with the help of a basic algebra of events; this algebra constitutes a kind of mereology, in the sense of Lesniewski. There are several alternative, possible constructions, depending, for instance, on the use of the common field of reals or of a non-Archimedian field (with infinitesimals). Our approach was inspired by the work of (...) class='Hi'>Whitehead (1919), though our philosophical stance is completely different from his. The structures obtained are idealized constructs underlying extant, physical space-time. (shrink)

We formulate Suppes predicates for various kinds of space-time: classical Euclidean, Minkowski's, and that of General Relativity. Starting with topological properties, these continua are mathematically constructed with the help of a basic algebra of events; this algebra constitutes a kind of mereology, in the sense of Lesniewski. There are several alternative, possible constructions, depending, for instance, on the use of the common field of reals or of a non-Archimedian field (with infinitesimals). Our approach was inspired by the work of Whitehead (...) (1919), though our philosophical stance is completely different from his. The structures obtained are idealized constructs underlying extant, physical space-time. (shrink)

Ask a philosopher what a proof is, and you’re likely to get an answer hii empaszng one or another regimentationl of that notion in terms of a finite sequence of formalized statements, each of which is either an axiom or is derived from an axiom by certain inference rules. (Wecan call this the formal conception of proof) Ask a mathematician what a proof is, and you will rbbl poay get a different-looking answer. Instead of stressing a partic- l uar regimented (...) notion of proof, the answer the mathematician will give ilikl.. (shrink)

Relativism and scepticism are often taken to be incompatible doctrines. After all, the relativist typically attempts to argue that there are no universal standards of assessment between different conceptual schemes – hence the slogan: everything is relative. The sceptic, in turn, is often portrayed as defending the view according to which knowledge is impossible – and thus we cannot even know that the relativist’s claim is true. Despite their incompatibility, both views are taken to be wrong, and for similar self-refuting (...) reasons: they undermine themselves. In his recent book, Relativism and the Foundations of Philosophy, Steven Hales argues that relativism can be defended – as long as it is suitably formulated and restricted to philosophical propositions (Hales, 2006). These propositions are relatively true: true in some contexts (or perspectives) and false in others. In this paper, I defend two main claims. First, Hales’ proposal is not restricted to philosophical propositions, but applies equally well to mathematical ones. Second, with a proper understanding of scepticism, Hales’ proposal would actually be welcomed by the sceptic. Some may take these two claims to amount to a sort of reductio of Hales’ project. Since mathematical claims are typically not taken to be relatively true, and given that scepticism is typically taken to be false, a proposal that leads to these results would be unacceptable. Rather than drawing this conclusion, I think these results show that we need to rethink deeply held assumptions about the nature of mathematics and of scepticism. Hales’ book is an excellent contribution to that. (shrink)

Central to the philosophical understanding of music is the status of musical works. According to the Platonist, musical works are abstract objects; that is, they are not located in space or time, and we have no causal access to them. Moreover, only a particular physical occurrence of these musical works is instantiated when a performance ofthe latter takes place. But even if no performance ever took place, the Platonist insists, the musical work would still exist, since its existence is not (...) tied to spatiotemporal constraints (Kivy [1993], and Dodd [2007]). In this paper, I offer a critical assessment of the Platonist view. I argue that, despite some benefits, Platonism faces significant difficulties in the interpretation of music. In spite ofthe Platonist’s attempt to overcome the problem, the view ultimately doesn’t mesh well with the way we actively respond to performances and fail to respond, in any way similar, to abstract patterns. Platonism also makes knowledge of music something extremely mysterious, given that we have no access to the abstract objects that, according to the Platonist, characterize the musical works. The ability to understand how we respond to musical works is, of course, central to any interpretation of music. This ability is also crucial in explaining the role music plays in various aspects of our culture, Rom bounding with others to music therapy. Given the problems faced by Platonism, it makes more sense to adopt an altemative, non-Platonist view. I conclude the paper by sketching such a non-Platonist proposal. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is two-fold: (1) To contribute to a better knowledge of the method of the Argentinean mathematicians Lia Oubifia and Jorge Bosch to formulate category theory independently of set theory. This method suggests a new ontology of mathematical objects, and has a profound philosophical significance (the underlying logic of the resulting category theory is classical iirst—order predicate calculus with equality). (2) To show in outline how the Oubina-Bosch theory can be modified to give rise to a (...) strong paraconsistent category theory; strong enough to be taken as the basis for a paraconsistent mathematics which encompasses all classical mathematical results. (shrink)

Research at the nanoscale (10 7 to 10 9 meters) raises a number of intriguing philosophical issues. In this paper, I address one of them: the role of what can be called “visual evidence” in the construction and assessment of nanophenomena. First, a clarification is in order regarding the concepts of visual evidence and nanophenomena. It might be thought that the former expresses a redundancy whereas the latter is an oxymoron. After all, at least if we follow its Latin etymology, (...) evidence emerges from what is obvious to the eye (and thus can be seen). In this sense, any evidence should then be visual. However, once the concept of evidence is formulated in the context of certain philosophical views, this immediate link to a visual experience need not be maintained although, ultimately, there will always be such a link. Having said that, breaking the link with the observable is precisely what happens in the case of some of the most influential models of evidence. Rather than keeping a close link to what can be visually perceived, these models stress the way in which evidence supports certain theories in particular, by making more likely that such theories be true. With regard to “nanophenomena”, it may be argued that the word “phenomena”, at least etymologically, stands for what appears, what can be seen. And if we restrict what can be seen to what can be seen without the use of instruments (such as various kinds of microscopes), then simply nothing at the nanoscale could be literally seen. Nanophenomena turn out to be an impossibility. However, once again, if phenomena are understood in the context of certain philosophical conceptions, they need not be tied directly only to what literally appears to our unaided eyes. Phenomena may stand for a certain cluster of events that are stable and regular enough to require some kind of explanation by our theories. Clearly, phenomena will involve something that can be seen: the items with respect to which our theories will be taken to be empirically adequate or not.. (shrink)

Ask a philosopher what a proof is, and you’re likely to get an answer hii empaszng one or another regimentationl of that notion in terms of a finite sequence of formalized statements, each of which is either an axiom or is derived from an axiom by certain inference rules. (Wecan call this the formal conception of proof) Ask a mathematician what a proof is, and you will rbbl poay get a different-looking answer. Instead of stressing a partic- l uar regimented (...) notion of proof, the answer the mathematician will give ilikl.. (shrink)

Yablo’s paradox is generated by the following (infinite) list of sentences (called the Yablo list): (s1) For all k > 1, sk is not true. (s2) For all k > 2, sk is not true. (s3) For all k > 3, sk is not true. . . . . . . . .

In this paper, we provide a new formulation of a coherence theory of truth using the resources of the partial structures approach -— in particular the notions of partial structure and quasi-truth. After developing this new formulation, we apply the resulting theory to the philosophy of mathematics, and argue that it can be used to develop a new account of nominalism in mathematics. This application illustrates the strength and usefulness of the proposed formulation of a coherence theory of truth.

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According to the semantic view, a theory is characterized by a class of mod- els. In this paper, we examine critically some of the assumptions that underlie this approach. First, we recall that models are models of something. Thus we cannot leave completely aside the axiomatization of the theories under consider- ation, nor can we ignore the metamathematics used to elaborate these models, for changes in the metamathematics often impose restrictions on the resulting models. Second, based on a parallel between (...) van Fraassen’s modal interpre- tation of quantum mechanics and Skolem’s relativism regarding set-theoretic concepts, we introduce a distinction between relative and absolute concepts in the context of the models of a scientific theory. And we discuss the significance of that distinction. Finally, by focusing on contemporary particle physics, we raise the question: since there is no general accepted unification of the parts of the standard model (namely, QED and QCD), we have no theory, in the usual sense of the term. This poses a difficulty: if there is no theory, how can we speak of its models? What are the latter models of? We conclude by noting that it is unclear that the semantic view can be applied to contemporary physical theories. (shrink)

In this first paper of a series of works on the foundations of science, we examine the significance of logical and mathematical frameworks used in foundational studies. In particular, we emphasize the distinction between the order of a language and the order of a structure to prevent confusing models of scientific theories (as set-theoretical structures) with first-order structures (called here order-1 structures), and which are studied in standard (first-order) model theory. All of us are, of course, bound to make abuses (...) of language even in putatively precise contexts. This is not a problem—in fact, it is part of scientific and philosophical practice. But it is important to be sensitive to the dierent uses that structure, model, and language have. In this paper, we examine these topics in the context of classical logic; only in the last section we touch upon briefly on non-classical ones. (shrink)

In this paper, we examine the concept of particle as it appears in quantum field theories (QFT), focusing on a puzzling situation regarding this concept. Although quantum ‘particles’ arise from fields, which form the basic ontology of QFT, and thus a certain concept of ‘particle’ is al- ways available, the properties ascribed to such ‘particles’ are not completely in agreement with the mathematical and logical description of such fields, which should be taken as individuals.

In this paper, I shall discuss the heuristic role of symmetry in the mathematical formulation of quantum mechanics. I shall first set out the scene in terms of Bas van Fraassen’s elegant presentation of how symmetry principles can be used as problem-solving devices (see van Fraassen [1989] and [1991]). I will then examine in what ways Hermann Weyl and John von Neumann have used symmetry principles in their work as a crucial problem-solving tool. Finally, I shall explore one consequence of (...) this situation to recent debates about structural realism (SR) and empiricism in physics (Worrall [1989], Ladyman [1998], and French [1999]). (shrink)

In this paper, I shall provide a defence of second-order logic in the context of its use in the philosophy of mathematics. This shall be done by considering three problems that have been recently posed against this logic: (1) According to Resnik [1988], by adopting second-order quantifiers, we become ontologically committed to classes. (2) As opposed to what is claimed by defenders of second-order logic (such as Shapiro [1985]), the existence of non-standard models of first-order theories does not establish the (...) inadequacy of first—order axiomatisations (Melia [1995]). (3) In contrast with Shapiro’s suggestion (in his [1985]), second-order logic does not help us to establish referential access to mathematical objects (Azzouni [1994]). As I shall argue, each of these problems can be neatly solved by the second-order theorist. As a result, a case for second-order logic can be made. The first two problems will beconsidered rather briefly in the next section. The rest of the paper is dedicate to a discussion of the third. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that symmetry principles in physics (in particular, in quantum mechanics) have a methodological character, rather than an ontological or an epistemological one. First, I provide a framework to address three related issues regarding the notion of symmetry: (i) how the notion can be characterized; (ii) one way of discussing the nature of symmetry principles, and (iii) a tentative account of some types of symmetry in physics. To illustrate how the framework functions, I then consider the (...) case of the early formulation of quantum mechanics, examining the different roles played by symmetry in this context. Finally, I raise difficulties for ontological and purely epistemological interpretations of symmetry principles, and offer a methodological alternative. (shrink)

According to the modal realist, possible worlds exist, and in terms of them, it’s possibl e to articulate a systematic approach to the theory of mo dality (Lewis 1986). Given, however, that we have..