Tim Crane Cambridge University
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  • Faculty, Cambridge University
  • PhD, Cambridge University, 1989.

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About me
I'm the Knightbridge Professor of philosophy at the University of Cambridge. I work on the philosophy of mind and metaphysics.
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  1. Peter Achinstein, A. J. Ayer, Tim Crane & Thomas Crisp (2013). Cuneo, Terence 278, 288 Dancy, Jonathan 230, 246 Daniels, Norman 75, 87 David, Marian 152 Dehaene, Stanislas 283, 288. In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. Oup Usa.
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  2. Steinvör Thöll Árnadóttir & Tim Crane (2013). There is No Exclusion Problem. In Sophie C. Gibb & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology. Oxford University Press. 248.
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  3. Tim Crane (2013). Bana Bashour is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the American Uni-Versity of Beirut. Ray Brassier is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the American Uni-Versity of Beirut. In Bana Bashour Hans Muller (ed.), Contemporary Philosophical Naturalism and its Implications. Routledge. 13--195.
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  4. Tim Crane (2013). 9 Human Uniqueness and the Pursuit of Knowledge. In Bana Bashour Hans Muller (ed.), Contemporary Philosophical Naturalism and its Implications. Routledge. 13--139.
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  5. Tim Crane (2013). Philosophie, Logik, Naturwissenschaft, Geschichte. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 61 (1):3-19.
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  6. Tim Crane (ed.) (2013). Routledge Encyclopedia of Philsophy. Routledge.
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  7. Tim Crane (2013). Steinvor Tholl Arnadottir. In Sophie C. Gibb & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology. Oxford University Press. 248.
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  8. Tim Crane (2013). The Objects of Thought. Oup Oxford.
    Tim Crane addresses the ancient question of how it is possible to think about what does not exist. He argues that the representation of the non-existent is a pervasive feature of our thought about the world, and that to understand thought's representational power ('intentionality') we need to understand the representation of the non-existent.
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  9. Tim Crane (2013). Unconscious Belief and Conscious Thought. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oup Usa. 156.
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  10. Tim Crane (2012). Philosophy, Logic, Science, History. Metaphilosophy 43 (1-2):20-37.
    Analytic philosophy is sometimes said to have particularly close connections to logic and to science, and no particularly interesting or close relation to its own history. It is argued here that although the connections to logic and science have been important in the development of analytic philosophy, these connections do not come close to characterizing the nature of analytic philosophy, either as a body of doctrines or as a philosophical method. We will do better to understand analytic philosophy—and its relationship (...)
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  11. Tim Crane (2012). Tye on Acquaintance and the Problem of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):190-198.
  12. Tim Crane (2012). Wittgenstein and Intentionality. The Harvard Review of Philosophy 17 (1):88-104.
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  13. Tim Crane (2012). What is the Problem of Non-Existence? Philosophia 40 (3):417-434.
    It is widely held that there is a problem of talking about or otherwise representing things that not exist. But what exactly is this problem? This paper presents a formulation of the problem in terms of the conflict between the fact that there are truths about non-existent things and the fact that truths must be answerable to reality, how things are. Given this, the problem of singular negative existential statements is no longer the central or most difficult aspect of the (...)
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  14. Tim Crane (2011). Reviews I Drink Therefore I Am A Philosopher's Guide to Wine. By Roger Scruton. London and New York: Continuum, 2009, Pp. 211 ISBN 9781847065087. [REVIEW] Philosophy 86 (1):138-142.
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  15. Tim Crane (2011). I–The Singularity of Singular Thought. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):21-43.
    A singular thought can be characterized as a thought which is directed at just one object. The term ‘thought’ can apply to episodes of thinking, or to the content of the episode (what is thought). This paper argues that episodes of thinking can be just as singular, in the above sense, when they are directed at things that do not exist as when they are directed at things that do exist. In this sense, then, singular thoughts are not object-dependent.
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  16. Tim Crane (2011). Wittgenstein on Intentionality and Mental Representation. In Anne Reboul (ed.), Philosophical papers dedicated to Kevin Mulligan.
    The concept of intentionality — what Brentano called ‘the mind’s direction on its obj ects’ — has been a preoccupation of many of the most significant twentieth century philosophers. The purpose of this essay is to examine the place of the concept of intentionality in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, and to criticize one aspect of his treatment of intentionality. Although the word ‘intentionality’ is not (to my knowledge) used in Wittgenstein’s philosophical writings, the idea it expresses was central at all stages (...)
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  17. Tim Crane (2010). Cosmic Hermeneutics Vs. Emergence: The Challenge of the Explanatory Gap. In Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Emergence in Mind. Oup Oxford.
  18. Tim Crane (2009). Is Perception a Propositional Attitude? Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):452-469.
    It is widely agreed that perceptual experience is a form of intentionality, i.e., that it has representational content. Many philosophers take this to mean that like belief, experience has propositional content, that it can be true or false. I accept that perceptual experience has intentionality; but I dispute the claim that it has propositional content. This claim does not follow from the fact that experience is intentional, nor does it follow from the fact that experiences are accurate or inaccurate. I (...)
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  19. Tim Crane & Brian P. McLaughlin (2009). Introduction. Synthese 170 (2):211-215.
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  20. Tim Crane (2008). Causation and Determinable Properties : On the Efficacy of Colour, Shape, and Size. In Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation. Oxford University Press.
    This paper presents a puzzle or antinomy about the role of properties in causation. In theories of properties, a distinction is often made between determinable properties, like red, and their determinates, like scarlet (see Armstrong 1978, volume II). Sometimes determinable properties are cited in causal explanations, as when we say that someone stopped at the traffic light because it was red. If we accept that properties can be among the relata of causation, then it can be argued that there are (...)
     
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  21. Tim Crane (2008). Reply to Nes. Analysis 68 (299):215–218.
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  22. Tim Crane (2008). Should Atheists Be Against Religion? Think 6 (17-18):109-119.
    Tim Crane responds to the several recent attacks on religion made by Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, et al.
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  23. Tim Crane (2008). Sainsbury on Thinking About an Object (Sainsbury Sobre Pensar Acerca de Un Objeto). Crítica 40 (120):85 - 95.
    R.M. Sainsbury's account of reference has many compelling and attractive features. But it has the undesirable consequence that sentences of the form "x is thinking about y" can never be true when y is replaced by a non-referring term. Of the two obvious ways to deal with this problem within Sainsbury's framework, I reject one (the analysis of thinking about as a propositional attitude) and endorse the other (treating "thinks about" as akin to an intensional transitive verb). This endorsement is (...)
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  24. Tim Crane & Peter Cave (2008). What on Earth is Humanism? The Philosophers' Magazine 41 (41):55-62.
    Some people clearly do think of humanism as being a kind of creed or value system. The first “humanist manifesto” published in 1933 talked of humanism as a “new religion”. Nowhere does this idea ring more true than at weekend meetings of Ethical Societies in chilly and austere halls which can resemble Methodist chapels or Christian Scientist temples. It’s hard to resist the cheap shot that a lot of what has passed for atheistical humanism has been a kind of non-conformism (...)
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  25. Tim Crane (2007). Artisonething, the Aesthetic Another. Things Can Be Appreciated Aesthetically—for Instance, in Terms of the Traditional Category Ofthebeautiful—Without. In Barry C. Smith (ed.), Questions of Taste: The Philosophy of Wine. Oxford University Press. 141.
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  26. Tim Crane (2007). Czas. Roczniki Filozoficzne 55 (1):249-265.
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  27. Tim Crane (2007). El problema de la percepción en la filosofía analítica. In David P. Chico & Moisés Barroso Ramos (eds.), Pluralidad de la Filosofía Analítica. Plaza y Valdés Editores. 3--217.
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  28. Tim Crane (2007). Intentionalism. In Ansgar Beckermann & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. 474--493.
    The central and defining characteristic of thoughts is that they have objects. The object of a thought is what the thought concerns, or what it is about. Since there cannot be thoughts which are not about anything, or which do not concern anything, there cannot be thoughts without objects. Mental states or events or processes which have objects in this sense are traditionally called ‘intentional,’ and ‘intentionality’ is for this reason the general term for this defining characteristic of thought. Under (...)
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  29. Tim Crane (2007). Review of Gbor Forrai, George Kampis (Eds.), Intentionality: Past and Future. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (1).
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  30. Tim Crane (2007). Wine as an Aesthetic Object. In Barry C. Smith (ed.), Questions of Taste: The Philosophy of Wine. Oxford University Press. 141--156.
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  31. Barry C. Smith & Tim Crane (2007). In Vino Veritas. The Philosophers' Magazine 39 (39):75-78.
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  32. Barry C. Smith & Tim Crane (2007). In Vino Veritas. The Philosophers' Magazine 39 (39):75-78.
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  33. Tim Crane (2006). Brentano's Concept of Intentional Inexistence. In Mark Textor (ed.), The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy. Routledge. 1--20.
    Franz Brentano’s attempt to distinguish mental from physical phenomena by employing the scholastic concept of intentional inexistence is often cited as reintroducing the concept of intentionality into mainstream philosophical discussion. But Brentano’s own claims about intentional inexistence are much misunderstood. In the second half of the 20th century, analytical philosophers in particular have misread Brentano’s views in misleading ways.1 It is important to correct these misunderstandings if we are to come to a proper assessment of Brentano’s worth as a philosopher (...)
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  34. Tim Crane (2006). Comment on Ted Honderich's Radical Externalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 7-8):28-43.
    Ted Honderich's theory of consciousness as existence, which he here calls Radical Externalism, starts with a good phenomenological observation: that perceptual experience appears to involve external things being immediately present to us. As P.F. Strawson once observed, when asked to describe my current perceptual state, it is normally enough simply to describe the things around me (Strawson, 1979, p. 97). But in my view that does not make the whole theory plausible.
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  35. Tim Crane (2006). Intencionalidad. Laguna: Revista de Filosofía 19:9-28.
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  36. Tim Crane (2006). Intentionality and Emotion: Comment on Hutto. In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto.
     
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  37. Tim Crane (2006). Is There a Perceptual Relation? In T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.
    P.F. Strawson argued that ‘mature sensible experience (in general) presents itself as … an immediate consciousness of the existence of things outside us’ (1979: 97). He began his defence of this very natural idea by asking how someone might typically give a description of their current visual experience, and offered this example of such a description: ‘I see the red light of the setting sun filtering through the black and thickly clustered branches of the elms; I see the dappled deer (...)
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  38. Tim Crane (2006). U Čemu Je Problem Opažanja? Filozofska Istraživanja 26 (2):257-282.
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  39. Tim Crane (2006). Is There a Perceptual Relation? In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.
     
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  40. P. Cmorej, D. Kamhal, M. Zouhar, T. Seoová, T. Crane, S. Neale, Grammatical Form, Their Semantics Proper Names, T. Sedová & E. Corazza (2005). Dialogy-Polemiky. Organon F 12 (1-3).
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  41. Tim Crane (2005). Papineau on Phenomenal Concepts. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):155-162.
    Over the past decade or so, David Papineau has given an account of the content and motivation of a physicalist conception of the world with more thoroughness and argumentative defence than many physicalists have thought necessary. In doing this, he has substantially advanced the debate on physicalism, and physicalists and non-physicalists alike should be grateful to him.1 At the heart of Papineau’s defence of physicalism in his recent book (2002) is his theory of phenomenal concepts. Like many physicalists, Papineau diagnoses (...)
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  42. Tim Crane (2005). Qu'est-Ce Que le Problème de la Perception ? Synthesis Philosophica 20 (2):237-264.
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  43. Tim Crane (2005). Review: Papineau on Phenomenal Concepts. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):155 - 162.
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  44. Tim Crane, The Problem of Perception. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Sense-perception—the awareness or apprehension of things by sight, hearing, touch, smell and taste—has long been a preoccupation of philosophers. One pervasive and traditional problem, sometimes called “the problem of perception”, is created by the phenomena of perceptual illusion and hallucination: if these kinds of error are possible, how can perception be what it intuitively seems to be, a direct and immediate access to reality? The present entry is about how these possibilities of error challenge the intelligibility of the phenomenon of (...)
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  45. Tim Crane (2005). Was ist Das problem der wahrnehmung? Synthesis Philosophica 20 (2):237-264.
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  46. Tim Crane (2005). What is the Problem of Perception? Synthesis Philosophica 2 (40):237-264.
    It will be obvious to anyone with a slight knowledge of twentieth-century analytic philosophy that one of the central themes of this kind of philosophy is the nature of perception: the awareness of the world through the five senses of sight, touch, smell, taste, and hearing. Yet it can seem puzzling, from our twenty-first-century perspective, why there is a distinctively philosophical problem of perception at all. For when philosophers ask ‘what is the nature of perception?’, the question can be confused (...)
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  47. Tim Crane (2004). Book Review of" The Mind's Provisions" by Vincent Descombes. [REVIEW] European Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):399-406.
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  48. Tim Crane (2004). Summary of Elements of Mind and Replies to Critics. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (11):223-240.
    Elements of Mind (EM) has two themes, one major and one minor. The major theme is intentionality, the mind’s direction upon its objects; the other is the mind–body problem. I treat these themes separately: chapters 1, and 3–5 are concerned with intentionality, while chapter 2 is about the mind–body problem. In this summary I will first describe my view of the mind–body problem, and then describe the book’s main theme. Like many philosophers, I see the mind–body problem as containing two (...)
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  49. Tim Crane (2004). Summary of Elements of Mind and Replies to Critics. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):223-240.
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  50. Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.) (2004). Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
    A complete and self-contained introduction to metaphysics, this anthology provides an extensive and varied collection of fifty-four of the best classical and contemporary readings on the subject. The readings are organized into ten sections: God, idealism and realism, being, universals and particulars, necessity and contingency, causation, space and time, identity, mind and body, and freewill and determinism. It features a substantial general introduction and detailed section introductions that set the selections in context and guide readers through them. Discussion questions and (...)
     
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  51. Ray Billington, Jeffrey Bloechl, Rüdiger Bubner, Ann J. Cahill, Jennifer Hansen, Claudia Card, Taylor Carman, William D. Casebeer, David Corfield & Tim Crane (2003). Books for Review and for Listing Here Should Be Addressed to Emily Zakin, Review Editor, Department of Philosophy, Miami University, Oxford, OH 45056. Teaching Philosophy 26 (4):415.
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  52. T. Crane (2003). Review of'In Defence of Pure Reason'by Laurence BonJour. [REVIEW] Mind 112 (447):502-506.
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  53. T. Crane (2003). The Waterfall Illusion. Repr. In York H. Gunther (ed.), Essays on Nonconceptual Content. Mit Press.
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  54. Tim Crane (2003). Mental Substances. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Minds and Persons. Cambridge University Press. 229-250.
    Philosophers of mind typically conduct their discussions in terms of mental events, mental processes, mental properties, mental states – but rarely in terms of minds themselves. Sometimes this neglect is explicitly acknowledged. Donald Davidson, for example, writes that ‘there are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties, which is to say that certain psychological predicates are true of them. These properties are constantly changing, and such changes are mental events’.2 Hilary Putnam agrees, though for somewhat different reasons: (...)
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  55. Tim Crane (2003). Review: In Defense of Pure Reason: A Rationalist Account of a Priori Justification. [REVIEW] Mind 112 (447):502-506.
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  56. Tim Crane (2003). Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor. New York: Routledge.
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  57. Tim Crane (2003). Subjective Facts. In Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor. New York: Routledge.
    An important theme running through D.H. Mellor’s work is his realism, or as I shall call it, his objectivism: the idea that reality as such is how it is, regardless of the way we represent it, and that philosophical error often arises from confusing aspects of our subjective representation of the world with aspects of the world itself. Thus central to Mellor’s work on time has been the claim that the temporal A-series (...)(previously called ‘tense’) is unreal while the B-series (the series of ‘dates’) is real. The A-series is something which is a product of our representation of the world, but not a feature of reality itself. And in other, less central, areas of his work, this kind of theme has been repeated: ‘Objective decision making’ (1980) argues that the right way to understand decision theory is as a theory of what is the objectively correct decision, the one that will actually as a matter of fact achieve your intended goal, rather than the one that is justified purely in terms of what you believe, regardless of whether the belief is true or false. ‘I and now’ (1989) argues against a substantial subjective conception of the self, using analogies between subjective and objective ways of thinking about time and subjective and objective ways of thinking about the self. And in the paper which shall be the focus of my attention here, ‘Nothing like experience’ (1992), Mellor.. (shrink)
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  58. Tim Crane (2003). The Intentional Structure of Consciousness. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. 33-56.
    Newcomers to the philosophy of mind are sometimes resistant to the idea that pain is a mental state. If asked to defend their view, they might say something like this: pain is a physical state, it is a state of the body. A pain in one’s leg feels to be in the leg, not ‘in the mind’. After all, sometimes people distinguish pain which is ‘all in the mind’ from a genuine pain, sometimes because the second is ‘physical’ while the (...)
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  59. Tim Crane (2003). The Mechanical Mind: A Philosophical Introduction to Minds, Machines, and Mental Representation. Routledge.
    This edition has been fully revised and updated, and includes a new chapter on consciousness and a new section on modularity. There are also guides for further reading, and a new glossary of terms such as mentalese, connectionism, and the homunculus fallacy.
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  60. Tim Crane (2002). The New Vanguard. The Philosophers' Magazine 18:41-42.
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  61. Tim Crane (2001). Elements of Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
    Elements of Mind provides a unique introduction to the main problems and debates in contemporary philosophy of mind. Author Tim Crane opposes those currently popular conceptions of the mind that divide mental phenomena into two very different kinds (the intentional and the qualitative) and proposes instead a challenging and unified theory of all the phenomena of mind. In light of this theory, Crane engages students with the central problems of the philosophy of mind--the mind-body problem, the problem of intentionality (or (...)
     
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  62. Tim Crane (2001). Intentional Objects. Ratio 14 (4):298-317.
    Is there, or should there be, any place in contemporary philosophy of mind for the concept of an intentional object? Many philosophers would make short work of this question. In a discussion of what intentional objects are supposed to be, John Searle.
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  63. Tim Crane (2001). Jacob on Mental Causation. Acta Analytica 16 (26):15-21.
     
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  64. Tim Crane (2001). The Significance of Emergence. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.
    This paper is an attempt to understand the content of, and motivation for, a popular form of physicalism, which I call ‘non-reductive physicalism’. Non-reductive physicalism claims although the mind is physical (in some sense), mental properties are nonetheless not identical to (or reducible to) physical properties. This suggests that mental properties are, in earlier terminology, ‘emergent properties’ of physical entities. Yet many non-reductive physicalists have denied this. In what follows, I examine their denial, and I argue that on a plausible (...)
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  65. T. Crane (2000). The Paradox of Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Review 109 (4):624-627.
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  66. Tim Crane (2000). Dualism, Monism, Physicalism. Mind and Society 1 (2):73-85.
    Dualism can be contrasted with monism, and also with physicalism. It is argued here that what is essential to physicalism is not just its denial of dualism, but the epistemological and ontological authority it gives to physical science. A physicalist view of the mind must be reductive in one or both of the following senses: it must identify mental phenomena with physical phenomena (ontological reduction) or it must give an explanation of mental phenomena in physical terms (explanatory or (...)
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  67. Tim Crane (2000). Introspection, Intentionality, and the Transparency of Experience. Philosophical Topics 28 (2):49-67.
    Some philosophers have argued recently that introspective evidence provides direct support for an intentionalist theory of visual experience. An intentionalist theory of visual experience treats experience as an intentional state, a state with an intentional content. (I shall use the word ’state’ in a general way, for any kind of mental phenomenon, and here I shall not distinguish states proper from events, though the distinction is important.) Intentionalist theories characteristically say that the phenomenal character of an experience, what it is (...)
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  68. Tim Crane (2000). The Origins of Qualia. In Tim Crane & Sarah A. Patterson (eds.), The History of the Mind-Body Problem. Routledge.
    The mind-body problem in contemporary philosophy has two parts: the problem of mental causation and the problem of consciousness. These two parts are not unrelated; in fact, it can be helpful to see them as two horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, the causal interaction between mental and physical phenomena seems to require that all causally efficacious mental phenomena are physical; but on the other hand, the phenomenon of consciousness seems to entail that not all mental phenomena are (...)
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  69. Tim Crane & Sarah Patterson (eds.) (2000). History of the Mind-Body Problem. New York: Routledge.
    This collection of new essays put the debates on the mind-body problem into historical context.
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  70. Sarah Patterson & Tim Crane (eds.) (2000). History of the Mind-Body Problem. Routledge.
    This collection of new essays put the debates on the mind-body problem into historical context. The discussions range from Aristotle, Aquinas and Descartes to the origins of the qualia and intentionality.
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  71. Tim Crane (ed.) (1998). Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
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  72. Tim Crane (1998). How to Define Your (Mental) Terms. Inquiry 41 (3):341-354.
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  73. Tim Crane (1998). Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental. In , Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press. 229-251.
    ‘It is of the very nature of consciousness to be intentional’ said Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘and a consciousness that ceases to be a consciousness of something would ipso facto cease to exist’.1 Sartre here endorses the central doctrine of Husserl’s phenomenology, itself inspired by a famous idea of Brentano’s: that intentionality, the mind’s ‘direction upon its objects’, is what is distinctive of mental phenomena. Brentano’s originality does not lie in pointing out the existence of intentionality, or in inventing the terminology, which (...)
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  74. Tim Crane (1998). The Efficacy of Content: A Functionalist Theory. In J.A.M. Bransen & S.E. Cuypers (eds.), Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 199--223.
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  75. Tim Crane & David Wiggins (1998). Metaphysics. In A. C. Grayling (ed.), Philosophy 1: A Guide Through the Subject. Oup Oxford.
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  76. Tim Crane (1997). Galen Strawson on Mental Reality. Ratio 10 (1):82-90.
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  77. Tim Crane (1997). Reply to Child. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (1):103-108.
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  78. T. Crane (1996). Review: David Owens. Causes and Coincidences. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (1):146-148.
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  79. Tim Crane (1996). All the Difference in the World (1991). In Andrew Pessin & Sanford Goldberg (eds.), The Twin Earth Chronicles: Twenty Years of Reflection on Hilary Putnam's ``the Meaning of `Meaning' ''. M. E. Sharpe. 1-25.
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  80. Tim Crane (ed.) (1996). Dispositions: A Debate. New York: Routledge.
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  81. Tim Crane (1996). David Owens Causes and Coincidences. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47:146-148.
     
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  82. Tim Crane (1996). Review. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (1):146-148.
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  83. Tim Crane (1995). Mental Causation. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 69:211 - 253.
    Keywords: action, dualism, functionalism, materialism, physicalism Contents 1. What is mental causation? 2. History 3. Mental causation as a problem for dualism 4. Mental causation as a problem for physicalism 5. Mental causation and cognitive science..
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  84. Tim Crane (1995). Mental Causation, I. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 69 (69):211-236.
    Keywords: action, dualism, functionalism, materialism, physicalism Contents l. What is mental causation? 2. History 3. Mental causation as a problem for dualism 4. Mental causation as a problem for physicalism 5. Mental causation and cognitive science..
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  85. Tim Crane (1995). The Mental Causation Debate (Mental Causation I). Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 69:211-36.
    This paper is about a puzzle which lies at the heart of contemporary physicalist theories of mind. On the one hand, the original motivation for physicalism was the need to explain the place of mental causation in the physical world. On the other hand, physicalists have recently come to see the explanation of mental causation as one of their major problems. But how can this be? I-low can it be that physicalist theories still have a problem explaining something which their (...)
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  86. Tim Crane (1995). The Mental Causation Debate. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 69.
    This paper is about a puzzle which lies at the heart of contemporary physicalist theories of mind. On the one hand, the original motivation for physicalism was the need to explain the place of mental causation in the physical world. On the other hand, physicalists have recently come to see the explanation of mental causation as one of their major problems. But how can this be? How can it be that physicalist theories still have a problem explaining something which their (...)
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  87. Tim Crane & D. H. Mellor (1995). 1 What is Physicalism? In Paul K. Moser & J. D. Trout (eds.), Contemporary Materialism: A Reader. Routledge. 65.
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  88. Tim Crane (1994). Representation, Meaning and Thought. Philosophical Books 35 (2):121-123.
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  89. Tim Crane (1993). Reply to Pettit. Analysis 53 (4):224-27.
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  90. Tim Crane (1993). Book Reviews. [REVIEW] Mind 102 (407):535-538.
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  91. Tim Crane, Lawrence Vogel, Gerardine Meaney & Michael Hampe (1993). Critical Notices. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 1 (2):313 – 353.
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  92. Tim Crane (1992). Introduction. In , The Contents of Experience. Cambridge University Press.
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  93. Tim Crane (1992). Mental Causation and Mental Reality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66 (425):185-202.
    Argues that anomalism and causal closure don't pose problems for mental causation as they are false, and that functional properties can efficacious. States with content may be efficacious, although content itself may not be.
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  94. Tim Crane (1992). Numbers and Propositions: Reply to Melia. Analysis 52 (4):253-256.
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  95. Tim Crane (ed.) (1992). The Contents of Experience: Essays on Perception. Cambridge University Press.
    The nature of perception has long been a central question in philosophy. It is of central importance not just for the philosophy of mind, but also for epistemology, metaphysics, aesthetics, and the philosophy of science. This volume represents the best of the latest research on perception, with contributions from some of the leading philosophers in the area, including Christopher Peacocke, Brian O'Shaughnessy and Michael Tye. As well as discussing traditional problems, the essays also approach the topic in light of recent (...)
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  96. Tim Crane (1992). The Nonconceptual Content of Experience. In , The Contents of Experience. Cambridge University Press.
    Some have claimed that people with very different beliefs literally see the world differently. Thus Thomas Kuhn: ‘what a man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also upon what his previous visual—conceptual experience has taught him to see’ (Kuhn 1970, p. ll3). This view — call it ‘Perceptual Relativism’ — entails that a scientist and a child may look at a cathode ray tube and, in a sense, the first will see it while the second won’t. The (...)
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  97. Tim Crane (1991). All God has to Do. Analysis 51 (October):235-44.
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  98. Tim Crane (1991). All the Difference in the World. Philosophical Quarterly 41 (January):1-25.
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  99. Tim Crane (1991). Why Indeed? Papineau on Supervenience. Analysis 51 (January):32-7.
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  100. Tim Crane (1990). On an Alleged Analogy Between Numbers and Propositions. Analysis 50 (October):224-30.
  101. Tim Crane (1990). The Language of Thought: No Syntax Without Semantics. Mind and Language 5 (3):187-213.
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  102. Tim Crane (1990). Taking Philosophy to the Streets. Cogito 4 (2):128-131.
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  103. Tim Crane & D. H. Mellor (1990). There is No Question of Physicalism. Mind 99 (394):185-206.
    Many philosophers are impressed by the progress achieved by physical sciences. This has had an especially deep effect on their ontological views: it has made many of them physicalists. Physicalists believe that everything is physical: more precisely, that all entities, properties, relations, and facts are those which are studied by physics or other physical sciences. They may not all agree with the spirit of Rutherford's quoted remark that 'there is physics; and there is stamp-collecting',' but they all grant physical science (...)
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  104. Tim Crane (1988). Concepts in Perception. Analysis 48 (June):150-53.
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  105. Tim Crane (1988). The Waterfall Illusion. Analysis 48 (June):142-47.
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  106. Tim Crane (1935). The Criterion of Truth. Analysis 3 (1/2):28-32.
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  107. Tim Crane, Intentionality and Emotion.
    I am very sympathetic to Dan Hutto’s view that in our experience of the emotions of others “we do not neutrally observe the outward behaviour of another and infer coldly, but on less than certain grounds, that they are in such and such an inner state, as justified by analogy with our own case. Rather we react and feel as we do because it is natural for us to see and be moved by specific expressions of emotion in others” (Hutto (...)
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  108. Tim Crane, Introduction: The Mental and the Physical.
    The theme of these is essays is what might be called, rather ambitiously, the nature of the human mind. Psychologists and philosophers both investigate the nature of the mind, but from rather different angles. Psychologists and neuroscientists investigate the actual mechanisms in the brain, the body and the world which underpin mental events and processes. Philosophers, by contrast, ask more abstract questions: for example, about what makes any process mental at all, or how mental reality fits into the rest of (...)
     
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  109. Tim Crane, Names, Sense I.
    Frege introduced the distinction between sense and reference to account for the information conveyed by identity statements. We can put the point like this: if the meaning of a term is exhausted by what it stands for, then how can 'a =a' and 'a =b' differ in meaning? Yet it seems they do, for someone who understands all the terms involved would not necessarily judge that a =b even though they judged that a =a. It seems that 'a =b' just (...)
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  110. Tim Crane, The Autonomy of Psychology.
    Psychology has been considered to have an autonomy from the other sciences (especially physical science) in at least two ways: in its subject-matter and in its methods. To say that the subject-matter of psychology is autonomous is to say that psychology deals with entities—properties, relations, states—which are not dealt with or not wholly explicable in terms of physical (or any other) science. Contrasted with this is the idea that psychology employs a characteristic method of explanation, which is not shared by (...)
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  111. Tim Crane, The Mind-Body Problem.
    The mind-body problem is the problem of explaining how our mental states, events and processes—like beliefs, actions and thinking—are related to the physical states, events and processes in our bodies. A question of the form, ‘how is A related to B?’ does not by itself pose a philosophical problem. To pose such a problem, there has to be something about A and B which makes the relation between them seem problematic. Many features of mind and body have been cited as (...)
     
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  112. T. Crane, How to Define Your (Mental) Terms: A Critical Notice of Deconstructing the Mind by Stephen P. Stich.
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  113. T. Crane, Intentionality.
    Intentionality is the mind’s capacity to direct itself on things. Mental states like thoughts, beliefs, desires, hopes (and others) exhibit intentionality in the sense that they are always directed on, or at, something: if you hope, believe or desire, you must hope, believe or desire something. Hope, belief, desire and any other mental state which is directed at something, are known as intentional states. Intentionality in this sense has only a peripheral connection to the ordinary ideas of intention and intending. (...)
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  114. T. Crane, Nonconceptual Content.
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  115. T. Crane, Review of The Nature of Consciousness, Ed. N. Block Et Al. [REVIEW]
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  116. T. Crane, Reply to Tanney.
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  117. T. Crane, Critical Notice, 'Mental Reality' by Galen Strawson.
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  118. T. Crane, Review of 'The Mystery of Consciousness' by John Searle. [REVIEW]
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  119. T. Crane, The Crane Discussion.
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  120. Tim Crane, Existence and Quantification Reconsidered.
    The currently standard philosophical conception of existence makes a connection between three things: certain ways of talking about existence and being in natural language; certain natural language idioms of quantification; and the formal representation of these in logical languages. Thus a claim like ‘Prime numbers exist’ is treated as equivalent to ‘There is at least one prime number’ and this is in turn equivalent to ‘Some thing is a prime number’. The verb ‘exist’, the verb phrase ‘there is’ and the (...)
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  121. Tim Crane, The Given.
    In The Mind and the World Order, C.I. Lewis made a famous distinction between the immediate data ‘which are presented or given to the mind’ and the ‘construction or interpretation’ which the mind brings to those data (1929: 52). What the mind receives is the datum – literally, the given – and the interpretation is what happens when we being it ‘under some category or other, select from it, emphasise aspects of it, and relate it in particular and unavoidable ways’ (...)
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