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• Faculty, University of St. Andrews
• PhD, University of St. Andrews, 2002.

• Philosophy of Language
• Logic and Philosophy of Logic
• Epistemology
• Metaphysics

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Patrick is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at St. Andrews University, and is an Associate Fellow of Arché and The Northern Institute for Philosophy. For 2003-4, he was a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the AHRC funded project Vagueness: Its Nature and Logic, at Arché. In 2007-2008 he was a Postdoctoral Research Fellow for the ARC funded Epistemic Warrant project in the Philosophy Programme, RSSS, at The Australian National University. From September 2009 to August 2011, he will be a half-time Research Fellow at the Centre for Time, University of Sydney. He was the UConn Distinguished Visiting Professor for 2010. He received his PhD from St. Andrews in 2002. Before that he taught at the University of Bristol 2000-2002. His main research interests are in the philosophy of logic, the philosophy of language, and epistemology. He has a particular interest in vagueness, the liar paradox, indeterminacy, contextualism, relativism, minimalism, realism, truth, anti-luck epistemology, self-knowledge, basic knowledge, discrimination, assertion, belief, representation, and, the nature of time. He is currently completing a book on indeterminacy. Patrick is also a member of the Marie Curie Initial Training Network PERSPECTIVAL THOUGHTS AND FACTS (PETAF) which is the first research and training network exclusively in philosophy ever to be financed by the European Commission. It aims to serve as a European research and training platform for joint philosophical research on perspectival thought, its linguistic expression and its consequences for our conception of objective, mind-independent reality.

13 items found. Sort by: publication yearfirst authorviewingsaddition date Patrick Greenough (2012). Discrimination and Self-Knowledge. In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press. In this paper I show that a variety of Cartesian Conceptions of the mental are unworkable. In particular, I offer a much weaker conception of limited discrimination than the one advanced by Williamson (2000) and show that this weaker conception, together with some plausible background assumptions, is not only able to undermine the claim that our core mental states are luminous (roughly: if one is in such a state then one is in a position to know that one is) but (...) also the claim that introspection is infallible with respect to our core mental states (where a belief that C obtains is infallible just in case if one believes that C obtains then C obtains). The upshot is a broader and much more powerful case against the Cartesian conception of the mental than has been advanced hitherto. (shrink) Discriminability in Philosophy of Mind Epistemology of Mind, Misc in Philosophy of Mind First-Person Authority and Privileged Access in Philosophy of Mind Infallibility and Incorrigibility In Self-Knowledge in Philosophy of Mind Introspection and Introspectionism in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Luminosity in Epistemology Pain and Pain Experience in Philosophy of Mind Safety and Sensitivity in Epistemology $56.00 used   $59.05 new   $61.67 direct from Amazon   (collection)   Amazon page Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Patrick Greenough (2011). Truthmaker Gaps and the No-No Paradox. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):547-563. Consider the following sentences: The neighbouring sentence is not true. The neighbouring sentence is not true. Call these the no-no sentences. Symmetry considerations dictate that the no-no sentences must both possess the same truth-value. Suppose they are both true. Given Tarski’s truth-schema—if a sentence S says that p then S is true iff p—and given what they say, they are both not true. Contradiction! Conclude: they are not both true. Suppose they are both false. Given Tarski’s falsity-schema—if a sentence S (...) says that p then S is false iff not-p—and given what they say, they are both true, and so not false. Contradiction! Conclude: they are not both false. Thus, despite their symmetry, the no-no sentences must differ in truth-value. Such is the no-no paradox.[1] Sorensen (2001, 2005a, 2005b) has argued that: (1) The no-no paradox is not a version of the liar but rather a cousin of the truth-teller paradox. (2) Even so, the no-no paradox is more paradoxical than the truth-teller. (3) The no-no and truth-teller sentences have groundless truthvalues—they are bivalent but give rise to “truthmaker gaps”. (4) It is metaphysically impossible to know these truth-values. (5) A truthmaker gap response to the no-no paradox provides reason to accept a version of epistemicism. In this paper it is shown that a truthmaker gap solution to the no-no and truth-teller paradoxes runs afoul of the dunno-dunno paradox, the strengthened no-no paradox, and the strengthened truth-teller paradox. In consequence, the no-no paradox is best seen as a form of the liar paradox. As such, it cannot provide a case for epistemicism. (shrink) Epistemic Paradoxes in Epistemology Liar Paradox in Logic and Philosophy of Logic Paradoxes, Misc in Logic and Philosophy of Logic Truthmakers in Metaphysics Direct download (6 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Patrick Greenough (2011). Truth-Relativism, Norm-Relativism, and Assertion. In Brown J. & Cappelen H. (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. The main goal in this paper is to outline and defend a form of Relativism, under which truth is absolute but assertibility is not. I dub such a view Norm-Relativism in contrast to the more familiar forms of Truth-Relativism. The key feature of this view is that just what norm of assertion, belief, and action is in play in some context is itself relative to a perspective. In slogan form: there is no fixed, single norm for assertion, belief, and action. (...) Upshot: 'knows' is neither context-sensitive nor perspectival. (shrink) Assertion, Misc in Philosophy of Language Epistemic Contextualism and Invariantism in Epistemology Ethics of Belief in Epistemology Moore's Paradox in Philosophy of Language Norms of Assertion in Philosophy of Language Relativism about Truth in Philosophy of Language The Scope of Context-Dependence in Philosophy of Language Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Jonas Åkerman & Patrick Greenough (2010). Hold the Context Fixed, Vagueness Still Remains. In Sebastiano Moruzzi & Richard Dietz (eds.), Cuts and Clouds. Oxford University Press. Contextualism about vagueness (hereafter ‘Contextualism’) is the view that vagueness consists in a particular species of context-sensitivity and that properly accommodating this fact into our semantic theory will yield a plausible solution to the sorites paradox.[1],[2] But Contextualism, as many commentators have noted, faces the following immediate objection: if we hold the context fixed, vagueness still remains, therefore vagueness is not a species of context-sensitivity. Call this ‘the simple objection’.[3] Absent a convincing reply to the simple objection, Contextualism is in (...) very bad shape. Oddly enough, defenders of Contextualism have said very little in reply. Proponents of the objection have tended to assume that this is because no reply is in the offing—the simple objection is taken to be unassailable. In this short paper, we sketch two replies to the simple objection which result in two very different kinds of Contextualism: Epistemicist Contextualism and Radical Contextualism. With these two theories in hand, the simple objection loses its force. (shrink) Context and Context-Dependence, Misc in Philosophy of Language Contextual Theories of Vagueness in Philosophy of Language Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Patrick Greenough (2010). Deflationism and Truth-Value Gaps. In Nikolaj Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), New Waves inTruth. Palgrave Macmillan. Central to any form of Deflationism concerning truth (hereafter ‘DT’) is the claim that truth has no substantial theoretical role to play. For this reason, DT faces the following immediate challenge: if truth can play no substantial theoretical role then how can we model various prevalent kinds of indeterminacy—such as the indeterminacy exhibited by vague predicates, future contingents, liar sentences, truth-teller sentences, incomplete stipulations, cases of presupposition failure, and such-like? It is too hasty to assume that these phenomena are all (...) to be modelled via some epistemic conception of indeterminacy whereby indeterminacy is just some special species of ignorance which arises because of our limited powers of discrimination. Some non-epistemic model is called for—at least for certain species of indeterminacy. On what is perhaps the most enduring and popular non-epistemic model, indeterminacy gives rise to truth-value gaps. But is DT compatible with the possibility of truth-value gaps? Compatibilism says Yes; Incompatibilism says No. The broad goal of this paper is to defend a form of Incompatibilism. If DT is to make sense of various kinds of indeterminacy then truth-value gaps cannot be invoked to do so. The particular goals of this paper are: (i) To set forth a new form of Compatibilism which can address an argument against truth-value gaps given by Williamson (1994, pp. 187-192). (ii) To offer a new argument against truth-value gaps using principles entailed by DT, thereby undermining Compatibilism. (shrink) Logical Semantics and Logical Truth in Logic and Philosophy of Logic Many-Valued Logic in Logic and Philosophy of Logic Minimalism and Deflationism about Truth in Philosophy of Language Theories of Truth, Misc in Philosophy of Language Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Jonas Åkerman & Patrick Greenough (2009). Vagueness and Non-Indexical Contextualism. In Sarah Sawyer (ed.), New Waves in Philosophy of Language. Palgrave Macmillan. Contextualism concerning vagueness (hereafter ‘CV’) is a popular response to the puzzle of vagueness.[1] The goal in this paper is to uncover in what ways vagueness may be a particular species of context-sensitivity. The most promising form of CV turns out to be a version of socalled ‘Non-Indexical Contextualism’.[2] In §2, we sketch a generic form of CV (hereafter ‘GCV’). In §3, we distinguish between Truth CV and Content CV. A non-indexical form of CV is a form of Truth CV, (...) while an indexical form of CV is a form of Content CV. In §4, we argue that the theory of vagueness given in Fara (2000) is crucially incomplete but is best seen as a non-indexical form of CV. In §5, we set forth four kinds of error-theory to which CV might be committed. It turns out that Non-Indexical CV is committed to a weaker, and more plausible, error-theory than Indexical CV. In §6, we address a challenge posed by Keefe (2007) to the effect that CV entails that any speech report of what has been said by a particular vague utterance, where the context of utterance and the reporting context are relevantly different, will almost always be inaccurate. While this challenge is prima facie effective against Indexical CV it proves to be less effective against Non-Indexical CV. In §7, we look at two tests for context-sensitivity and assess whether they can be employed against CV. These tests, if cogent, reveal that the only workable form of CV is Non-Indexical CV. (shrink) Context and Context-Dependence, Misc in Philosophy of Language Contextual Theories of Vagueness in Philosophy of Language The Scope of Context-Dependence in Philosophy of Language $12.00 used   $26.05 new   $32.34 direct from Amazon   (collection)   Amazon page Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Patrick Greenough (2009). On What It is to Be in a Quandary. Synthese 171 (3). A number of serious problems are raised against Crispin Wright’s quandary conception of vagueness. Two alternative conceptions of the quandary view are proposed instead. The first conception retains Wright’s thesis that, for all one knows, a verdict concerning a borderline case constitutes knowledge. However a further problem is seen to beset this conception. The second conception, in response to this further problem, does not enjoin the thesis that, for all one knows, a verdict concerning a borderline case constitutes knowledge. The (...) result is a much simpler and more plausible version of the quandary view. (shrink) Intuitionistic Theories of Vagueness in Philosophy of Language Theories of Vagueness, Misc in Philosophy of Language Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Patrick Greenough, Duncan Pritchard & Timothy Williamson (eds.) (2009). Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford University Press. 16 leading philosophers offer critical assessments of Timothy Williamson's ground-breaking work on knowledge and its impact on philosophy today. Defining Knowledge, Misc in Epistemology Luminosity in Epistemology Primitivism about Knowledge in Epistemology Safety and Sensitivity in Epistemology Self-Knowledge, Misc in Philosophy of Mind Skepticism in Epistemology The KK Principle in Epistemology $17.01 new   $30.68 used   $38.89 direct from Amazon   Amazon page Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Patrick Greenough (2008). Indeterminate Truth. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):213-241. In §2-4, I survey three extant ways of making sense of indeterminate truth and find each of them wanting. All the later sections of the paper are concerned with showing that the most promising way of making sense of indeterminate truth is via either a theory of truthmaker gaps or via a theory of truthmaking gaps. The first intimations of a truthmaker–truthmaking gap theory of indeterminacy are to be found in Quine (1981). In §5, we see how Quine proposes to (...) solve Unger’s problem of the many via positing the possibility of groundless truth. In §6, I elaborate the truthmaker gap model of indeterminacy first sketched by Sorensen (2001, ch.11) and use it to give a reductive analysis of indeterminate truth. In §7, I briefly assess what kind of formal framework can best express the possibility of truthmaker gaps. In §8, I contrast what I dub ‘the ordinary conception of worldly indeterminacy’ with Williamson’s conception of worldly indeterminacy. In §9, I show how one can distinguish linguistic from worldly indeterminacy on a truthmaker gap conception. In §10, I briefly sketch the relationship between truthmaker gaps and ignorance. In §11, I assess whether a truthmaker gap conception of vagueness is really just a form of epistemicism. In §12, I propose that truthmaker gaps can yield a plausible model of (semantic) presupposition failure. In §13, in response to the worry that a truthmaker gap conception of indeterminacy is both parochial and controversial—since it commits us to an implausibly strong theory of truthmaking—I set forth a truthmaking gap conception of indeterminacy. In §14, I answer the worry that groundless truths, of whatever species, are just unacceptably queer. A key part of this answer is that a truthmaker–truthmaking gap model of indeterminacy turns out to be considerably less queer than any model of indeterminacy which gives up on Tarski’s T-schema for truth (and cognate schemas). (shrink) Correspondence Theory of Truth in Philosophy of Language Facts and States of Affairs in Metaphysics Presupposition in Philosophy of Language Problem of the Many in Metaphysics Supervenience, General in Metaphysics The Open Future in Metaphysics Theories of Truth, Misc in Philosophy of Language Theories of Vagueness, Misc in Philosophy of Language Truthmakers in Metaphysics W. V. O. Quine in 20th Century Philosophy Direct download (5 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.) (2006). Truth and Realism. Oxford University Press. Is truth objective or relative? What exists independently of our minds? The essays in this book debate these two questions, which are among the oldest of philosophical issues and have vexed almost every major philosopher, from Plato, to Kant, to Wittgenstein. Fifteen eminent contributors bring fresh perspectives, renewed energy, and original answers to debates of great interest both within philosophy and in the culture at large. Correspondence Theory of Truth in Philosophy of Language Metaphysical Realism in Metaphysics Minimalism and Deflationism about Truth in Philosophy of Language Philosophical Progress in Metaphilosophy Pragmatism about Truth in Philosophy of Language Relativism about Truth in Philosophy of Language Theories of Truth, Misc in Philosophy of Language $30.40 used   $35.91 new   $37.05 direct from Amazon   Amazon page Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Patrick Greenough (2005). Contextualism About Vagueness and Higher-Order Vagueness. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (1):167–190. To get to grips with what Shapiro does and can say about higher-order vagueness, it is first necessary to thoroughly review and evaluate his conception of (first-order) vagueness, a conception which is both rich and suggestive but, as it turns out, not so easy to stabilise. In Sections I–IV, his basic position on vagueness (see Shapiro [2003]) is outlined and assessed. As we go along, I offer some suggestions for improvement. In Sections V–VI, I review two key paradoxes of higher-order (...) vagueness, while in Section VII, I explore a possible line of response to such paradoxes given by Keefe [2000]. In Section VIII, I assess whether which Shapiro might adapt Keefe’s response to combat both paradoxes. (shrink) Contextual Theories of Vagueness in Philosophy of Language Higher-Order Vagueness in Philosophy of Language The Scope of Context-Dependence in Philosophy of Language Direct download (4 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Patrick Greenough (2003). Vagueness: A Minimal Theory. Mind 112 (446):235-281. Vagueness is given a philosophically neutral definition in terms of an epistemic notion of tolerance. Such a notion is intended to capture the thesis that vague terms draw no known boundary across their range of signification and contrasts sharply with the semantic notion of tolerance given by Wright (1975, 1976). This allows us to distinguish vagueness from superficially similar but distinct phenomena such as semantic incompleteness. Two proofs are given which show that vagueness qua epistemic tolerance and vagueness qua borderline (...) cases (when properly construed to exclude terms which are stipulated to give rise to borderline cases) are in fact conceptually equivalent dimensions of vagueness, contrary to what might initially be expected. It is also argued that the common confusion of tolerance and epistemic tolerance has skewed the vagueness debate in favour of indeterminist over epistemic conceptions of vagueness. Clearing up that confusion provides an indirect argument in favour of epistemicism. Finally, given the equation of vagueness with epistemic tolerance, it is shown that there must be radical higher-order vagueness, contrary to what many authors have argued. (shrink) Higher-Order Vagueness in Philosophy of Language Theories of Vagueness, Misc in Philosophy of Language Direct download (5 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Patrick Greenough (2001). Free Assumptions and the Liar Paradox. American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (2):115 - 135. A new solution to the liar paradox is developed using the insight that it is illegitimate to even suppose (let alone assert) that a liar sentence has a truth-status (true or not) on the grounds that supposing this sentence to be true/not-true essentially defeats the telos of supposition in a readily identifiable way. On that basis, the paradox is blocked by restricting the Rule of Assumptions in Gentzen-style presentations of the sequent-calculus. The lesson of the liar is that not all (...) assumptions are for free. One merit of this proposal is that it is free from the revenge problem. (shrink) Assertion, Misc in Philosophy of Language Liar Paradox in Logic and Philosophy of Logic Logical Consequence and Entailment in Logic and Philosophy of Logic Paradoxes, Misc in Logic and Philosophy of Logic Proof Theory in Logic and Philosophy of Logic Speech Acts in Philosophy of Language Direct download (3 more)     My bibliography     Export citation

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