- Faculty, University of Connecticut
- PhD, University of Pittsburgh, 1993.
Areas of specialization
Areas of interest
I am Professor of Philosophy at the University of Connecticut, having taught at the University of Virginia from 1993 to 2013. I have held fellowships from the Andrew Mellon Foundation, The Virginia Foundation for the Humanities, the National Humanities Center, The Mead Endowment, The University of Pittsburgh’s Center for Philosophy of Science, the Center for Contemplative Mind in Society, the American Council of Learned Societies, the University of Virginia’s Teaching Resource Center, and the University of Virginia’s Shannon Center for Advanced Studies.
For 2009-2013 I was a Co-PI (with Dorit Bar-On, UNC) on Grant #0925975 from the National Science Foundation in support of the project: Expression, Communication and the Origins of Meaning.
Since 2009-12 I have directed Project High-Phi, which works to incorporate philosophy into American high schools.
My specializations are in Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind, and Aesthetics. I am also interested in Metaphysics, Decision Theory, the Theory of Action, and the history of analytic philosophy. I have advised dissertations on the Philosophy of Language and Aesthetics, and, master's theses in the Philosophy of Law, Epistemology, Aesthetics, Philosophy of Mind, and Philosophy of Language.
My current research interests include the evolutionary biology of communication, speech acts and their role in conversation, empathy, self-knowledge, self-expression, and attitude ascription.
- Jana Mohr Lone & Mitchell Green (2013). Philosophy in High Schools. Teaching Philosophy 36 (3):213-215.
- C. Fox & M. Green (2011). Narratives and Narrators: A Philosophy of Stories * by Gregory Currie. Analysis 71 (4):800-802.
- Mitchell Green, Pragmatics: An Annotated Bibliography. Oxford Bibliographies Online.
- Mitchell S. Green, How to Express Yourself: Refinements and Elaborations on the Central Ideas of Self-Expression. Protosociology Forum.
- Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (2011). Moore's Paradox, Truth and Accuracy. Acta Analytica 26 (3):243-255.
- Dorit Bar-On & Mitchell Green (2010). Lionspeak: Communication, Expression, and Meaning. In James R. O'Shea & Eric Rubenstein (eds.), Self, Language, and World: Problems From Kant, Sellars, and Rosenberg. Ridgeview Publishing Co.. 89--106.
- Mitchell Green (2010). How and What We Can Learn From Fiction. In Garry Hagberg & Walter Jost (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Literature. Wiley-Blackwell.
- Mitchell Green (2010). Language Understanding and Knowledge of Meaning. The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5 (1):4.
- Mitchell Green (2010). Perceiving Emotions. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):45-61.
- Mitchell Green (2010). Précis of Self-Expression (Oxford, 2007). Acta Analytica 25 (1):65-69.
- Mitchell Green, Speech Acts. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Mitchell S. Green (2010). Replies to Eriksson, Martin and Moore. Acta Analytica 25 (1):105-117.
- Mitchell Green (2009). Aesthetic Creation • by N. Zangwill. Analysis 69 (2):399-401.
- Mitchell S. Green (2009). Speech Acts, the Handicap Principle and the Expression of Psychological States. Mind and Language 24 (2):139-163.
- Mitchell Green (2008). Empathy, Expression, and What Artworks Have to Teach. In Garry Hagberg (ed.), Art and Ethical Criticism. Blackwell Pub..
- Mitchell S. Green (2008). Expression, Indication and Showing What's Within. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 137 (3):389 - 398.
- Mitchell Green (2007). How Do Speech Acts Express Psychological States? In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), John Searle's Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning, and Mind. Cambridge University Press.
- Mitchell Green (2007). Moorean Absurdity and Showing What's Within. In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.
- Mitchell S. Green (2007). Direct Reference Empty Names and Implicature. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (3):419-37.
- Mitchell S. Green (2007). Self-Expression. Oxford University Press.
- Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.) (2007). Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.
- Mitchell Green & John N. Williams (2007). Introduction. In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.
- Mitchell S. Green (2006). Engaging Philosophy: A Brief Introduction. Hackett Pub.
- Mitchell S. Green (2005). &Quot;you Don't See with Your Eyes, You Perceive with Your Mind&Quot;: Knowledge and Perception. In D. Darby & T. Shelby (eds.), Hip Hop and Philosophy. Open Court.
- Mitchell S. Green (2002). Intention and Authenticity in the Facial Expression of Pain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (4):460-461.
- Mitchell S. Green (2002). Implicature. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):241-244.
- Mitchell S. Green (2002). The Inferential Significance of Frege's Assertion Sign. Facta Philosophica 4 (2).
- Mitchell S. Green (2000). Illocutionary Force and Semantic Content. Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (5):435-473.
- Mitchell S. Green (2000). The Status of Supposition. Noûs 34 (3):376–399.
- Cristina Bicchieri & Mitchell S. Green (1999). Symmetry Arguments for Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma. In Cristina Bicchieri, Richard C. Jeffrey & Brian Skyrms (eds.), The Logic of Strategy. Oxford University Press. 175.
- Mitchell Green (1999). Illocutions, Implicata, and What a Conversation Requires. Pragmatics and Cognition 7 (1):65-92.
- Mitchell S. Green (1999). Attitude Ascription's Affinity to Measurement. International Journal Of Philosophical Studies 7 (3):323-348.
- Mitchell S. Green (1999). Moore's Many Paradoxes. Philosophical Papers 28 (2):97-109.
- Mitchell S. Green (1998). Direct Reference and Implicature. Philosophical Studies 91 (1):61-90.
- Mitchell S. Green (1997). On the Autonomy of Linguistic Meaning. Mind 106 (422):217-243.
- Mitchell S. Green (1995). Origins of Analytical Philosophy. Philosophical Review 104 (4):613-615.
- Mitchell S. Green (1995). Quantity, Volubility, and Some Varieties of Discourse. Linguistics and Philosophy 18 (1):83 - 112.
- Nuel Belnap & Mitchell Green (1994). Indeterminism and the Thin Red Line. Philosophical Perspectives 8:365 - 388.
- Mitchell S. Green & Christopher R. Hitchcock (1994). Reflections on Reflection: Van Fraassen on Belief. Synthese 98 (2):297 - 324.
- Mitchell S. Green, Review of Frege Making Sense , by Michael Beaney. London, U.K.: Duckworth, 1996. Pp. IX+358. [REVIEW]
- Mitchell S. Green, Truthtelling.
- John Williams & Mitchell S. Green, Introduction to Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality and the First Person.
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