Mitchell Green University of Connecticut
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  • Faculty, University of Connecticut
  • PhD, University of Pittsburgh, 1993.

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About me
I am Professor of Philosophy at the University of Connecticut, having taught at the University of Virginia from 1993 to 2013. I have held fellowships from the Andrew Mellon Foundation, the National Science Foundation, the Virginia Foundation for the Humanities, the National Humanities Center, The Mead Endowment, The University of Pittsburgh’s Center for Philosophy of Science, the Center for Contemplative Mind in Society, the American Council of Learned Societies, the University of Virginia’s Teaching Resource Center, and the University of Virginia’s Shannon Center for Advanced Studies. For 2009-2013 I was a Co-PI (with Dorit Bar-On, UNC) on Grant #0925975 from the National Science Foundation in support of the project: Expression, Communication and the Origins of Meaning. Since 2009 I have directed Project High-Phi, which works to incorporate philosophy into American high schools. My specializations are in Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind, and Aesthetics. I am also interested in Metaphysics, Decision Theory, the Theory of Action, and the history of analytic philosophy. I have advised dissertations on the Philosophy of Language and Aesthetics, and, master's theses in the Philosophy of Law, Epistemology, Aesthetics, Philosophy of Mind, and Philosophy of Language. My current research interests include the evolutionary biology of communication, speech acts and their role in conversation, empathy, self-knowledge, self-expression, and attitude ascription.
My works
51 items found.
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  1.  6
    Mitchell Green (forthcoming). Imagery, Expression, and Metaphor. Philosophical Studies:1-14.
    Metaphorical utterances are construed as falling into two broad categories, in one of which are cases amenable to analysis in terms of semantic content, speaker meaning, and satisfaction conditions, and where image-construction is permissible but not mandatory. I call these image-permitting metaphors, and contrast them with image-demanding metaphors comprising a second category and whose understanding mandates the construction of a mental image. This construction, I suggest, is spontaneous, is not restricted to visual imagery, and its result is typically somatically marked (...)
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  2.  14
    Jana Mohr Lone & Mitchell Green (2013). Philosophy in High Schools. Teaching Philosophy 36 (3):213-215.
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  3.  57
    C. Fox & M. Green (2011). Narratives and Narrators: A Philosophy of Stories * by Gregory Currie. Analysis 71 (4):800-802.
  4. Mitchell Green, Pragmatics: An Annotated Bibliography. Oxford Bibliographies Online.
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  5.  61
    Mitchell S. Green, How to Express Yourself: Refinements and Elaborations on the Central Ideas of Self-Expression. Protosociology Forum.
    This articles gives an overview of the main themes and arguments of _Self-Expression_ (OUP,2007; paper, 2011), and responds to some recent publications in which that book is discussed. In the process of these responses, the article provides refinements and elaborations on some of the book's central claims.
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  6. Mitchell S. Green (2011). Self-Expression. OUP Oxford.
    This systematic philosophical study of self-expression explores the ways in which it reveals our states of thought, feeling, and experience. Green defends striking new theses on such topics as our ability to perceive emotion in others, artistic expression, empathy, expressive language, meaning, facial expression, and speech acts.
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  7. Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (2011). Moore's Paradox, Truth and Accuracy. Acta Analytica 26 (3):243-255.
    G. E. Moore famously observed that to assert ‘I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I do not believe that I did’ would be ‘absurd’. Moore calls it a ‘paradox’ that this absurdity persists despite the fact that what I say about myself might be true. Krista Lawlor and John Perry have proposed an explanation of the absurdity that confines itself to semantic notions while eschewing pragmatic ones. We argue that this explanation faces four objections. We give a better (...)
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  8.  1
    John N. Williams & Mitchell S. Green (2011). Moore’s Paradox, Truth and Accuracy: A Reply to Lawlor and Perry. Acta Analytica 26 (3):243-255.
  9. Dorit Bar-On & Mitchell Green (2010). Lionspeak: Communication, Expression, and Meaning. In James R. O'Shea & Eric Rubenstein (eds.), Self, Language, and World: Problems From Kant, Sellars, and Rosenberg. Ridgeview Publishing Co. 89--106.
  10.  57
    Mitchell Green (2010). How and What We Can Learn From Fiction. In Garry Hagberg & Walter Jost (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Literature. Wiley-Blackwell
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  11.  18
    Mitchell Green (2010). Language Understanding and Knowledge of Meaning. The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5 (1):4.
    In recent years the view that understanding a language requires knowing what its words and expressions mean has come under attack. One line of attack attempts to show that while knowledge can be undermined by Gettier-style counterexamples, language understanding cannot be. I consider this line of attack, particularly in the work of Pettit and Longworth , and show it to be unpersuasive. I stress, however, that maintaining a link between language understanding and knowledge does not itself vindicate a cognitivist view (...)
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  12. Mitchell Green (2010). Perceiving Emotions. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):45-61.
    I argue that it is possible literally to perceive the emotions of others. This account depends upon the possibility of perceiving a whole by perceiving one or more of its parts, and upon the view that emotions are complexes. After developing this account, I expound and reply to Rowland Stout's challenge to it. Stout is nevertheless sympathetic with the perceivability-of-emotions view. I thus scrutinize Stout's suggestion for a better defence of that view than I have provided, and offer a refinement (...)
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  13.  36
    Mitchell Green (2010). Précis of Self-Expression (Oxford, 2007). Acta Analytica 25 (1):65-69.
    I give a brief overview of the major contentions and methodologies of my book, Self-Expression.
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  14.  82
    Mitchell Green, Speech Acts. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Speech acts are a staple of everyday communicative life, but only became a topic of sustained investigation, at least in the English-speaking world, in the middle of the Twentieth Century.[1] Since that time “speech act theory” has been influential not only within philosophy, but also in linguistics, psychology, legal theory, artificial intelligence, literary theory and many other scholarly disciplines.[2] Recognition of the importance of speech acts has illuminated the ability of language to do other things than describe reality. In the (...)
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  15.  33
    Mitchell S. Green (2010). Replies to Eriksson, Martin and Moore. Acta Analytica 25 (1):105-117.
    I reply to the main criticisms and suggestions for further clarification made by the contributors to this symposium on my book, Self-Expression . These replies are organized into the following sections: (1) What's in the name?, (2) Showing, expressing and indicating, (3) Expressing and signaling, (4) Perceiving emotions, (5) Voluntary/involuntary, (6) Expression and handicaps, (7) Expression and aesthetics, and (8) Looking ahead.
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  16.  28
    Mitchell Green (2009). Aesthetic Creation • by N. Zangwill. Analysis 69 (2):399-401.
    Definitions of art tend to take the phenomenon at face value, with philosophers aspiring to accommodate their theories to the artistic facts no matter how bizarre. The result, as for instance in the work of Dickie, is a definition of art neutral on the questions whether any of it is any good, and why anyone would bother to produce it. Zangwill bucks this trend by insisting that the method of definition-and-counterexample that drives much of the field is out of date, (...)
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  17. Mitchell Green (2009). Language Understanding and Knowledge of Meaning. Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5 (1).
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  18. Mitchell S. Green (2009). Speech Acts, the Handicap Principle and the Expression of Psychological States. Mind and Language 24 (2):139-163.
    Abstract: One oft-cited feature of speech acts is their expressive character: Assertion expresses belief, apology regret, promise intention. Yet expression, or at least sincere expression, is as I argue a form of showing: A sincere expression shows whatever is the state that is the sincerity condition of the expressive act. How, then, can a speech act show a speaker's state of thought or feeling? To answer this question I consider three varieties of showing, and argue that only one of them (...)
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  19. Mitchell Green (2008). Empathy, Expression, and What Artworks Have to Teach. In Garry Hagberg (ed.), Art and Ethical Criticism. Blackwell Pub.
     
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  20.  59
    Mitchell S. Green (2008). Expression, Indication and Showing What's Within. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 137 (3):389 - 398.
    This essay offers a constructive criticism of Part I of Davis’ Meaning, Expression and Thought. After a brief exposition, in Sect. 2, of the main points of the theory that will concern us, I raise a challenge in Sect. 3 for the characterization of expression that is so central to his program. I argue first of all that a sincere expression of a thought, feeling, or mood shows it. Yet attention to this fact reveals that it does not go without (...)
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  21. Mitchell S. Green (2008). Expression, Indication and Showing What’s Within. Philosophical Studies 137 (3):389-398.
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  22.  66
    Mitchell Green (2007). How Do Speech Acts Express Psychological States? In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), John Searle's Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning, and Mind. Cambridge University Press
    forthcoming in S. L. Tsohatzidis (ed.) John Searle’s Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning and Mind (Cambridge).
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  23. Mitchell Green (2007). Moorean Absurdity and Showing What's Within. In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press
    Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the University of Virginia and at Texas A&M University. I thank audiences at both institutions for their insightful comments. Special thanks to John Williams for his illuminating comments on an earlier draft. Research for this paper was supported in part by a Summer Grant from the Vice Provost for Research and Public Service at the University of Virginia. That support is here gratefully acknowledged.
     
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  24. Mitchell S. Green (2007). Direct Reference Empty Names and Implicature. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (3):419-37.
    Angle Grinder Man removes wheel locks from cars in London.1 He is something of a folk hero, saving drivers from enormous parking and towing fi nes, and has succeeded thus far in eluding the authorities. In spite of his cape and lamé tights, he is no fi ction; he’s a real person. By contrast, Pegasus, Zeus and the like are fi ctions. None of them is real. In fact, not only is each of them different from the others, all differ (...)
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  25.  81
    Mitchell S. Green (2007). Self-Expression. Oxford University Press.
    Mitchell S. Green presents a systematic philosophical study of self-expression - a pervasive phenomenon of the everyday life of humans and other species, which has received scant attention in its own right. He explores the ways in which self-expression reveals our states of thought, feeling, and experience, and he defends striking new theses concerning a wide range of fascinating topics: our ability to perceive emotion in others, artistic expression, empathy, expressive language, meaning, facial expression, and speech acts. He draws on (...)
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  26.  77
    Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.) (2007). Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.
    G. E. Moore observed that to assert, 'I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don't believe that I did' would be 'absurd'. Over half a century later, such sayings continue to perplex philosophers. In the definitive treatment of the famous paradox, Green and Williams explain its history and relevance and present new essays by leading thinkers in the area.
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  27. Mitchell Green & John N. Williams (2007). Introduction. In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press
     
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  28.  7
    Mitchell S. Green (2006). Engaging Philosophy: A Brief Introduction. Hackett Pub.
    This brief book introduces students and general readers to philosophy through core questions and topics -- particularly those involving ethics, the existence of God, free will, the relation of mind and body, and what it is to be a person. It also features a chapter on reasoning, both theoretical and practical, that develops an account of both cogent logical reasoning and rational decision-making. Throughout, the emphasis is on initiating newcomers to philosophy through rigorous yet lively consideration of some of the (...)
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  29. Mitchell S. Green (2005). "You Don't See with Your Eyes, You Perceive with Your Mind": Knowledge and Perception. In D. Darby & T. Shelby (eds.), Hip Hop and Philosophy. Open Court
    A major theme in rap lyrics is that the only way to survive is to use your head, be aware, know what’s going on around you. That simple idea packs a lot of background. The most obvious ideas about knowledge turn out if you look at them close up to be pretty questionable. For example: How do we get knowledge about the world? A natural and ancient answer to this question is that much if not all of our knowledge comes (...)
     
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  30.  14
    Mitchell S. Green (2002). Intention and Authenticity in the Facial Expression of Pain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (4):460-461.
    Williams and the many studies she considers appear to assume that voluntary amplification in facial expression of pain implies dissimulation. In fact, the behavioral ecology model of pain expression is consistent with amplification when subjects in pain are in the presence of others disposed to render aid, and that amplification may well be voluntary.
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  31.  22
    Mitchell S. Green (2002). Implicature. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):241-244.
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  32.  68
    Mitchell S. Green (2002). The Inferential Significance of Frege's Assertion Sign. Facta Philosophica 4 (2).
  33. Mitchell S. Green (2000). Illocutionary Force and Semantic Content. Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (5):435-473.
    Illocutionary force and semantic content are widely held to occupy utterly different categories in at least two ways: Any expression serving as an indicator of illocutionary force must be without semantic content, and no such expression can embed. A refined account of the force/content distinction is offered here that does the explanatory work that the standard distinction does, while, in accounting for the behavior of a range of parenthetical expressions, shows neither nor to be compulsory. The refined account also motivates (...)
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  34.  45
    Mitchell S. Green (2000). The Status of Supposition. Noûs 34 (3):376–399.
    According to many forms of Externalism now popular in the Philosophy of Mind, the contents of our thoughts depend in part upon our physical or social milieu.1 These forms of Externalism leave unchallenged the thesis that the ~non-factive! attitudes we bear towards these contents are independent of physical or social milieu. This paper challenges that thesis. It is argued here that publicly forwarding a content as a supposition for the sake of argument is, under conditions not themselves guaranteeing the (...)
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  35.  12
    Cristina Bicchieri & Mitchell S. Green (1999). Symmetry Arguments for Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma. In Cristina Bicchieri, Richard C. Jeffrey & Brian Skyrms (eds.), The Logic of Strategy. Oxford University Press 175.
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  36.  59
    Mitchell Green (1999). Illocutions, Implicata, and What a Conversation Requires. Pragmatics and Cognition 7 (1):65-92.
    An approach is provided to the prediction and explanation of quantity implicata that, unlike the majority of approaches available, does not construe Quantity as requiring speakers to make the strongest claim that their evidence permits. Central to this treatment is an elaboration of the notion of what a conversation requires as appealed to in the Cooperative Principle and the Quantity maxim. What a conversation requires is construed as depending, at any given point, upon the aim of the conversation taking place, (...)
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  37.  45
    Mitchell S. Green (1999). Attitude Ascription's Affinity to Measurement. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 7 (3):323-348.
    The relation between two systems of attitude ascription that capture all the empirically significant aspects of an agents thought and speech may be analogous to that between two systems of magnitude ascription that are equivalent relative to a transformation of scale. If so, just as an objects weighing eight pounds doesnt relate that object to the number eight (for a different but equally good scale would use a different number), similarly an agents believing that P need not relate her to (...)
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  38. Mitchell S. Green (1999). Illocutions, Implicata, and What a Conversation Requires. Pragmatics and Cognitionpragmatics and Cognition 7 (1):65-91.
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  39.  53
    Mitchell S. Green (1999). Moore's Many Paradoxes. Philosophical Papers 28 (2):97-109.
    Over the last two decades J.N. Williams has developed an account of the absurdity of such utterances as Its raining but I dont believe it that is both intuitively plausible and applicable to a wide variety of forms that this so-called Moorean absurdity can take. His approach is also noteworthy for making only minimal appeal to principles of epistemic or doxastic logic in its account of such absurdity. We first show that Williams places undue emphasis upon assertion and belief: It (...)
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  40.  74
    Mitchell S. Green (1998). Direct Reference and Implicature. Philosophical Studies 91 (1):61-90.
    On some formulations of Direct Reference the semantic value, relative to a context of utterance, of a rigid singular term is just its referent. In response to the apparent possibility of a difference in truth value of two sentences just alike save for containing distinct but coreferential rigid singular terms, some proponents of Direct Reference have held that any two such sentences differ only pragmatically. Some have also held, more specifically, that two such sentences differ by conveying distinct conversational implicata, (...)
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  41.  71
    Mitchell S. Green (1997). On the Autonomy of Linguistic Meaning. Mind 106 (422):217-243.
    Frege and many following him, such as Dummett, Geach, Stenius and Hare, have envisaged a role for illocutionary force indicators in a logically perpspicuous notation. Davidson has denied that such expressions are even possible on the ground that any putative force indicator would be used by actors and jokers to heighten the drama of their performances. Davidson infers from this objection a Thesis of the Autonomy of Linguistic Meaning: symbolic representation necessarily breaks any close tie with extra-linguistic purpose. A modified (...)
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  42.  11
    Mitchell S. Green (1995). Origins of Analytical Philosophy. Philosophical Review 104 (4):613-615.
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  43.  38
    Mitchell S. Green (1995). Quantity, Volubility, and Some Varieties of Discourse. Linguistics and Philosophy 18 (1):83 - 112.
    Grice's Quantity maxims have been widely misinterpreted as enjoining a speaker to make the strongest claim that she can, while respecting the other conversational maxims. Although many writers on the topic of conversational implicature interpret the Quantity maxims as enjoining such volubility, so construed the Quantity maxims are unreasonable norms for conversation. Appreciating this calls for attending more closely to the notion of what a conversation requires. When we do so, we see that eschewing an injunction to maximal informativeness need (...)
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  44. Nuel Belnap & Mitchell Green (1994). Indeterminism and the Thin Red Line. Philosophical Perspectives 8:365 - 388.
  45.  82
    Mitchell S. Green & Christopher R. Hitchcock (1994). Reflections on Reflection: Van Fraassen on Belief. Synthese 98 (2):297 - 324.
    In Belief and the Will, van Fraassen employed a diachronic Dutch Book argument to support a counterintuitive principle called Reflection. There and subsequently van Fraassen has put forth Reflection as a linchpin for his views in epistemology and the philosophy of science, and for the voluntarism (first-person reports of subjective probability are undertakings of commitments) that he espouses as an alternative to descriptivism (first-person reports of subjective probability are merely self-descriptions). Christensen and others have attacked Reflection, taking it to have (...)
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  46.  4
    M. Green (1984). The Uruk Lament. Journal of the American Oriental Society 104 (2):253-279.
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  47. M. Green (1983). II. Marx, Utility, and Right. Political Theory 11 (3):433-446.
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  48. M. Green (1976). Book Review. [REVIEW] Journal of the American Oriental Society 96 (2):283-286.
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  49. Mitchell S. Green, Review of Frege Making Sense , by Michael Beaney. London, U.K.: Duckworth, 1996. Pp. IX+358. [REVIEW]
    Purporting to show how Frege's contributions to philosophy of language and philosophical logic were developed with the aim of furthering his logicist programme, the author construes him as more systematic than is often recognized. Centrally, the notion of sense as espoused in Frege's monumental articles of the Nineties had only an ostensible justification as an account of the informativeness of a posteriori identity statements. In fact its rationale was to help articulate the thesis that arithmetical truth is analytic, since, it (...)
     
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  50. Mitchell S. Green, Truthtelling.
    From the point of view of ethics, truthtelling is not a matter of speaking the truth but is rather a matter of speaking what one believes to be the truth. So too liars do not necessarily say what is false; they say what they believe to be false. Further, one can mislead without lying. An executive answering in the affirmative the question whether some employees are in excessive danger on the job will mislead if he knows that in fact most (...)
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  51.  14
    John N. Williams & Mitchell S. Green, Introduction to Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality and the First Person.
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