Howard Sankey University of Melbourne
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About me
I'm a philosopher of science in the School of Historical and Philosophical Studies at the University of Melbourne. My main interests relate to scientific realism, conceptual change, method and relativism. Outside the philosophy of science, I'm interested in naturalized accounts of epistemic warrant and animal minds. Currently, I'm writing mostly about the relationship between epistemic relativism and scepticism.
My works
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  1. Howard Sankey (forthcoming). Relativism, Particularism and Reflective Equilibrium. Journal for General Philosophy of Science:1-12.
    In previous work, I have sought to show that the basic argument for epistemic relativism derives from the problem of the criterion that stems from ancient Pyrrhonian scepticism. Because epistemic relativism depends upon a sceptical strategy, it is possible to respond to relativism on the basis of an anti-sceptical strategy. I argue that the particularist response to scepticism proposed by Roderick Chisholm may be combined with a naturalistic and reliabilist conception of epistemic warrant as the basis for a satisfactory response (...)
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  2. Howard Sankey (forthcoming). Scepticism, Relativism and a Naturalistic Particularism. Social Epistemology.
    This paper presents a particularist and naturalist response to epistemic relativism. The response is based on an analysis of the source of epistemic relativism, according to which epistemic relativism is closely related to Pyrrhonian scepticism. The paper starts with a characterization of epistemic relativism. Such relativism is explicitly distinguished from epistemological contextualism. Next the paper presents an argument for epistemic relativism that is based on the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion. It then considers a response to the problem of the (...)
     
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  3. Howard Sankey (2014). Chisholm, scepticisme et relativisme. Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique 10 (6).
    Cet article esquisse une réponse particulariste et naturaliste au relativisme épistémique. La réponse est basée sur une analyse spécifique de la source de relativisme épistémique. Selon cette analyse, le relativisme épistémique doit être considérée en lien proche avec le scepticisme pyrrhonien, car le relativisme est basée sur le problème du critère qui a été propose par les ces anciens sceptiques. L’article commence avec une caractérisation du relativisme épistémique. Puis il présente un argument pour le relativisme épistémique sur la base du (...)
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  4. Howard Sankey (2014). On Relativism and Pluralism: Response to Steven Bland. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 47:98-103.
    This paper responds to criticism presented by Steven Bland of my naturalistic approach to epistemic relativism. In my view, the central argument for epistemic relativism derives from the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion. This opens relativism to an anti-sceptical response. I combine Roderick Chisholm’s particularist response to the problem of the criterion with a reliabilist conception of epistemic warrant. A distinction is made between epistemic norms which provide genuine warrant and those which do not. On the basis of this distinction, (...)
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  5. Howard Sankey (2014). Revisiting Structure. [REVIEW] Metascience 23 (1):43-47.
    This is a book review of Vasso Kindi and Theodore Arabatzis (Eds.), Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Revisited.
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  6. Howard Sankey (2014). Scientific Realism and Basic Common Sense. Kairos 10:11-24.
    This paper considers the relationship between science and common sense. It takes as its point of departure, Eddington’s distinction between the table of physics and the table of common sense, as well as Eddington’s suggestion that science shows common sense to be false. Against the suggestion that science shows common sense to be false, it is argued that there is a form of common sense, basic common sense, which is not typically overthrown by scientific research. Such basic common sense is (...)
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  7. Howard Sankey (2013). How the Epistemic Relativist May Use the Sceptic's Strategy: A Reply to Markus Seidel. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (1):140-144.
    This paper is a response to an objection that Markus Seidel has made to my analysis of epistemic relativism. Seidel argues that the epistemic relativist is unable to base a relativist account of justification on the sceptical problem of the criterion in the way that I have suggested in earlier work. In response to Seidel, I distinguish between weak and strong justification, and argue that all the relativist needs is weak justification. In addition, I explain my reasons for employing the (...)
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  8. Howard Sankey (2013). Methodological Incommensurability and Epistemic Relativism. Topoi 32 (1):33-41.
    This paper revisits one of the key ideas developed in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. In particular, it explores the methodological form of incommensurability which may be found in the original edition of Structure. It is argued that such methodological incommensurability leads to a form of epistemic relativism. In later work, Kuhn moved away from the original idea of methodological incommensurability with his idea of a set of epistemic values that provides a basis for rational theory choice, but do not (...)
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  9. Howard Sankey (2013). On Reason and Rationality. [REVIEW] Metascience 22 (3):677-679.
    This article is a book review of: M. C. Amoretti and N. Vassallo (eds.), Reason and Rationality, Metascience 22: 3 (2013), 677-9.
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  10. Howard Sankey (2013). On the Evolution of Criteria of Theory Choice. [REVIEW] Metascience 22 (1):169-172.
    This article is a book review of Anastasios Brenner's book Raison Scientifique et Valeurs Humaines.
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  11. Kim Sawyer, Howard Sankey & Ric Lombardo (2013). Measurability Invariance, Continuity and a Portfolio Representation. Measurement 46 (1):89-96.
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  12. Aaron C. T. Smith & Howard Sankey (2013). Thinking About Religion: Examining Progress in Religious Cognition. In Gregory W. Dawes & James Maclaurin (eds.), A New Science of Religion. Routledge.
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  13. Alexander Bird, B. D. Ellis & Howard Sankey (eds.) (2012). Properties, Powers, and Structures: Issues in the Metaphysics of Realism. Routledge.
    While the phrase "metaphysics of science" has been used from time to time, it has only recently begun to denote a specific research area where metaphysics meets philosophy of science—and the sciences themselves. The essays in this volume demonstrate that metaphysics of science is an innovative field of research in its own right. The principal areas covered are: (1) The modal metaphysics of properties: What is the essential nature of natural properties? Are all properties essentially categorical? Are they all essentially (...)
     
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  14. Howard Sankey (2012). Kuhn, Normativity and History and Philosophy of Science. Epistemologia:103-111.
    This paper addresses the relationship between the history and philosophy of science by way of the issue of epistemic normativity. After brief discussion of the relationship between history and philosophy of science in Kuhn’s own thinking, the paper focuses on the implications of the history of science for epistemic normativity. There may be historical evidence for change of scientific methodology, which may seem to support a position of epistemic relativism. However, the fact that the methods of science undergo variation does (...)
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  15. Howard Sankey (2012). Philosophical Fairytales From Feyerabend. [REVIEW] Metascience 21 (2):471-476.
    This article is a review of Paul Feyerabend's book, The Tyranny of Science.
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  16. Howard Sankey (2012). Reference, Success and Entity Realism. Kairos 5:31-42.
    The paper discusses the version of entity realism presented by Ian Hacking in his book, Representing and Intervening. Hacking holds that an ontological form of scientific realism, entity realism, may be defended on the basis of experimental practices which involve the manipulation of unobservable entities. There is much to be said in favour of the entity realist position that Hacking defends, especially the pragmatist orientation of his approach to realism. But there are problems with the position. The paper explores two (...)
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  17. Howard Sankey (2012). Scepticism, Relativism and the Argument From the Criterion. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1):182-190.
    This article explores the relationship between epistemic relativism and Pyrrhonian scepticism. It is argued that a fundamental argument for contemporary epistemic relativism derives from the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion. Pyrrhonian scepticism is compared and contrasted with Cartesian scepticism about the external world and Humean scepticism about induction. Epistemic relativism is characterized as relativism due to the variation of epistemic norms, and is contrasted with other forms of cognitive relativism, such as truth relativism, conceptual relativism and ontological relativism. An argument (...)
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  18. Howard Sankey (2011). Epistemic Relativism and the Problem of the Criterion. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (4):562-570.
    This paper explores the relationship between scepticism and epistemic relativism in the context of recent history and philosophy of science. More specifically, it seeks to show that significant treatments of epistemic relativism by influential figures in the history and philosophy of science draw upon the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion. The paper begins with a presentation of the problem of the criterion as it occurs in the work of Sextus Empiricus. It is then shown that significant treatments of epistemic relativism (...)
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  19. Howard Sankey (2011). El realismo cientifico y el punto de vista del Ojo de Dios. Revista Disertaciones 2:59-74.
    This article is a Spanish translation of 'Scientific Realism and the God's Eye Point of View'.
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  20. Howard Sankey & Dimitri Ginev (2011). The Scope and Multidimensionality of the Scientific Realism Debate. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 42 (2):263-283.
    At stake in the classical realism-debate is the clash between realist and anti-realist positions. In recent years, the classical form of this debate has undergone a double transformation. On the one hand, the champions of realism began to pay more attention to the interpretative dimensions of scientific research. On the other hand, anti-realists of various sorts realized that the rejection of the hypostatization of a “reality out there” does not imply the denial of working out a philosophically adequate concept of (...)
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  21. Howard Sankey (2010). A View From Sydney: How to Stove the Enemies of Science. [REVIEW] Metascience 19 (2):289-292.
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  22. Howard Sankey (2010). Ciencia, sentido común y realidad. Discusiones Filosóficas 16 (16):41-58.
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  23. Howard Sankey (2010). Descartes's Language Test and Ape Language Research. Teorema 29 (2):111-123.
    Some philosophers (e.g. Descartes) argue that there is an evidential relationship between language and thought, such that presence of language is indicative of mind. Recent language acquisition research with apes such as chimpanzees and bonobos attempts to demonstrate the capacity of these primates to acquire at least rudimentary linguistic capacity. This paper presents a case study of the ape language research and explores the consequences of the research with respect to the argument that animals lack mind because they fail to (...)
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  24. Howard Sankey (2010). El cambio en el concepto de incommensurabilidad de Kuhn. Cuadernos de Epistemologia 4:11-31.
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  25. Howard Sankey (2010). Science, Common Sense and Reality. Discusiones Filosóficas 11:41-58.
    This paper presents a response to the question of the relationship between science and reality. It rejects the anti-realist claim that we are unable to acquire knowledge of reality in favour of the realist view that science yields knowledge of the external world. But what world is that? Some argue that science leads to the overthrow of our commonsense view of the world. Common sense is “stone-age metaphysics” to be rejected as the false theory of our primitive ancestors. Against such (...)
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  26. Howard Sankey (2010). Witchcraft, Relativism and the Problem of the Criterion. Erkenntnis 72 (1):1 - 16.
    This paper presents a naturalistic response to the challenge of epistemic relativism. The case of the Azande poison oracle is employed as an example of an alternative epistemic norm which may be used to justify beliefs about everyday occurrences. While a distinction is made between scepticism and relativism, an argument in support of epistemic relativism is presented that is based on the sceptical problem of the criterion. A response to the resulting relativistic position is then provided on the basis of (...)
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  27. Howard Sankey (2009). A Curious Disagreement: Response to Hoyningen-Huene and Oberheim. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science A 40 (2):210-212.
    In this response, doubts are expressed relating to the treatment by Hoyningen-Huene and Oberheim of the relation between incommensurability and content comparison. A realist response is presented to their treatment of ontological replacement. Further questions are raised about the coherence of the neo-Kantian idea of the world-in-itself as well as the phenomenal worlds hypothesis. The notion of common sense is clarified. Meta-incommensurability is dismissed as a rhetorical device which obstructs productive discussion.
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  28. Howard Sankey (2009). Review of Stathis Psillos, Philosophy of Science A–Z. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 76 (1):115-117.
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  29. Howard Sankey (2009). Scientific Realism and the Semantic Incommensurability Thesis. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science A 40 (2):196-202.
    This paper reviews the situation with respect to the referential approach to the problem of semantic incommensurability. It argues that the thesis of semantic incommensurability does not pose a significant threat to scientific realism. However, there exists a "non-realist" defence of incommensurability, according to which the referential approach begs the question against advocates of the incommensurability thesis. This defence is criticized, and the basis for a realist response to incommensurability is presented.
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  30. H. Sankey (2008). Commentary on Soler's Paper. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 255:341.
     
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  31. Howard Sankey (2008). Scientific Realism and the Inevitability of Science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2):259-264.
    This paper examines the question of whether scientific realism is committed to the inevitability of science or is consistent with claims of the contingency of science. In order to address this question, a general characterization of the position of scientific realism is presented. It is then argued that scientific realism has no evident implications with regard to the inevitability of science. A historical case study is presented in which contingency plays a significant role, and the appropriate realist response to this (...)
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  32. Howard Sankey (2008). Scientific Realism and the Rationality of Science. Ashgate.
    Scientific realism is the position that the aim of science is to advance on truth and increase knowledge about observable and unobservable aspects of the mind-independent world which we inhabit. This book articulates and defends that position. In presenting a clear formulation and addressing the major arguments for scientific realism Sankey appeals to philosophers beyond the community of, typically Anglo-American, analytic philosophers of science to appreciate and understand the doctrine. The book emphasizes the epistemological aspects of scientific realism and contains (...)
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  33. Lena Soler, Howard Sankey & Paul Hoyningen-Huene (2008). Rethinking Scientific Change and Theory Comparison. Springer.
    The volume is a collection of essays devoted to the analysis of scientific change and stability. It explores the balance and tension that exist between commensurability and continuity on the one hand, and incommensurability and discontinuity on the other. Moreover, it discusses some central epistemological consequences regarding the nature of scientific progress, rationality and realism. In relation to these topics, it investigates a number of new avenues, and revisits some familiar issues, with a focus on the history and philosophy of (...)
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  34. Howard Sankey (2007). Review of Sherrin Roush, Tracking Truth: Knowledge, Evidence, and Science. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 61 (1):158-159.
     
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  35. Howard Sankey (2006). Why is It Rational to Believe Scientific Theories Are True? In Colin Cheyne & John Worrall (eds.), Rationality and Reality: Conversations with Alan Musgrave. Springer. 109--132.
    Alan Musgrave is one of the foremost contemporary defenders of scientific realism. He is also one of the leading exponents of Karl Popper’s critical rationalist philosophy. In this paper, my main focus will be on Musgrave’s realism. However, I will emphasize epistemological aspects of realism. This will lead me to address aspects of his critical rationalism as well.
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  36. Howard Sankey (2004). Scientific Realism and the God's Eye Point of View. Epistemologia 27 (2):211-226.
    According to scientific realism, the aim of science is to discover the truth about both observable and unobservable aspects of the mind-independent, objective reality, which we inhabit. It has been objected by Putnam and others that such a metaphysically realist position presupposes a God’s Eye point of view, of which no coherent sense can be made. In this paper, I will argue for two claims. First, scientific realism does not require the adoption of a God’s Eye point of view. Instead, (...)
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  37. Howard Sankey (2003). Review of Thomas Nickles, (Ed.), Thomas Kuhn. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (3).
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  38. Paul Hoyningen-Huene & Howard Sankey (2002). Review of T.S. Kuhn, The Road Since ‘Structure’: Philosophical Essays, 1970–1993, with an Autobiographical Interview. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (1):137-142.
  39. Howard Sankey (2002). Qu'est-ce que le realisme scientifique? Reseaux 94:69-82.
    Les tables, les chaises, les gens assis sur des chaises, à des tables sont des objets composés de matière. Selon la science, la matière se compose principalement d'atomes. Les atomes sont faits d'électrons, de neutrons et de protons. Les neutrons et les protons forment un noyau autour duquel orbitent les électrons. Outre ces particules, les physiciens en ont découvert un grand nombre d'autres, comme les photons, les quarks et les neutrinos.
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  40. Howard Sankey (2002). Realism, Method and Truth. In Michele Marsonet (ed.), The Problem of Realism. Ashgate. 64.
    But while it is evident that there is a close relation between method and rational justification, substantive questions remain about the relation between method and truth. For example, are scientists whom method licenses in accepting a theory or experimental result thereby licensed in accepting the theory or result as true? Does use of scientific method lead scientists to discover the truth about the world? Questions such as these are questions about the truth-conduciveness of method. While they relate directly to the (...)
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  41. Paul Hoyningen-Huene & Howard Sankey (eds.) (2001). Incommensurability and Related Matters. Kluwer.
  42. Howard Sankey (2001). Scientific Realism: An Elaboration and a Defence. Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory 98 (98):35-54.
    This paper describes the position of scientific realism and presents the basic lines of argument for the position. Simply put, scientific realism is the view that the aim of science is knowledge of the truth about observable and unobservable aspects of a mind-independent, objective reality. Scientific realism is supported by several distinct lines of argument. It derives from a non-anthropocentric conception of our place in the natural world, and it is grounded in the epistemology and metaphysics of common sense. Further, (...)
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  43. Howard Sankey & Paul Hoyningen-Huene (2001). In the Introduction To: Incommensurability and Related Matters. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 216.
     
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  44. Robert Nola & Howard Sankey (eds.) (2000). After Popper, Kuhn, and Feyerabend: Recent Issues in Theories of Scientific Method. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    Some think that issues to do with scientific method are last century's stale debate; Popper was an advocate of methodology, but Kuhn, Feyerabend, and others are alleged to have brought the debate about its status to an end. The papers in this volume show that issues in methodology are still very much alive. Some of the papers reinvestigate issues in the debate over methodology, while others set out new ways in which the debate has developed in the last decade. The (...)
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  45. Howard Sankey (2000). Est-il rationnel de chercher la vérité? Revue Philosophique De Louvain 98 (3):589-602.
    This paper addresses the question of whether it is rational for scientists to pursue the realist aim of truth. The point of departure is a pair of objections to the aim of truth due to the anti-realist author, Larry Laudan: first, it is not rational to pursue an aim such as truth which we cannot know we have reached; second, truth is not a legitimate aim for science because it cannot be shown to be attained. Against Laudan, it is argued (...)
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  46. Howard Sankey (2000). Kuhn's Ontological Relativism. Science and Education 9 (1-2):59--75.
  47. Howard Sankey (2000). Methodological Pluralism, Normative Naturalism and the Realist Aim of Science. In Howard Sankey & Robert Nola (eds.), After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend: Recent Issues in Theories of Scientific Method.
    There are two chief tasks which confront the philosophy of scientific method. The first task is to specify the methodology which serves as the objective ground for scientific theory appraisal and acceptance. The second task is to explain how application of this methodology leads to advance toward the aim(s) of science. In other words, the goal of the theory of method is to provide an integrated explanation of both rational scientific theory choice and scientific progress.
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  48. Howard Sankey (2000). The Language of Science: Meaning Variance and Theory Comparison. Language Sciences 22 (2):117-136.
    The paper gives an overview of key themes of twentieth century philosophical treatment of the language of science, with special emphasis on the meaning variance of scientific terms and the comparison of alternative theories. These themes are dealt with via discussion of the topics of: (a) the logical positivist principle of verifiability and the problem of the meaning of theoretical terms, (b) the postpositivist thesis of semantic incommensurability, and (c) the scientific realist response to incommensurability based on the causal theory (...)
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  49. Howard Sankey (ed.) (1999). Causation and Laws of Nature. Kluwer.
    Because the book represents a good cross-section of authors currently working on these themes in the Australasian region, it conveys something of the interest ...
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  50. Howard Sankey (1999). The Theory-Dependence of Observation. Cogito 13 (3):201-206.
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  51. Carolyn Wilde, Gordon Reddiford, William Grey, Gary Cox, Michael Durrant, Simon Beck, Dee Carter, Michael Bulley & Howard Sankey (1999). E-Collection. Cogito 13 (3).
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  52. Howard Sankey (1998). Hilary Putnam's Internal Realism. Cogito 12 (1):33-39.
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  53. Howard Sankey (1998). Taxonomic Incommensurability. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 12 (1):7 – 16.
    In a shift of position that has gone largely unnoticed by the great majority of commentators, Thomas Kuhn's version of the incommensurability thesis underwent a major transformation over the last decade and a half of his life. In his later work, Kuhn argued that incommensurability is a relation of translation failure between local subsets of interdefined theoretical terms, which encapsulate the taxonomic structure of a theory. Incommensurability arises because it is impossible to transfer the natural categories employed within one taxonomic (...)
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  54. Howard Sankey (1997). Induction and Natural Kinds. Principia 1 (2):239-254.
    The paper sketches an ontological solution to an epistemological problem in the philosophy of science. Taking the work of Hilary Kornblith and Brian Ellis as a point of departure, it presents a realist solution to the Humean problem of induction, which is based on a scientific essentialist interpretation of the principle of the uniformity of nature. More specifically, it is argued that use of inductive inference in science is rationally justified because of the existence of real, natural kinds of things, (...)
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  55. Howard Sankey (1997). Incommensurability: The Current State of Play. Theoria 12 (3):425-445.
    The incommensurability thesis is the thesis that the content of some alternative scientific theories is incomparable due to translation failure between the vocabulary the theories employ. This paper presents an overview of the main issues which have arisen in the debate about incommensurability. It also briefly outlines a response to the thesis based on a modified causal theory of reference which allows change of reference subsequent to initial baptism, as well as a role to description in the determination of reference. (...)
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  56. Howard Sankey (1997). Rationality, Relativism and Incommensurability. Ashgate.
  57. Howard Sankey (1997). Scientific Realism and the Problem of Progress. Cogito 11 (2):89-94.
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  58. Howard Sankey (1997). Van Fraassen's Constructive Empiricism. Cogito 11 (3):175-181.
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  59. K. R. Sawyer, Clive Beed & H. Sankey (1997). Underdetermination in Economics. The Duhem-Quine Thesis. Economics and Philosophy 13 (1):1-23.
  60. David Davies, Nenad Mtftevic, Howard Sankey & Michal Tempczyk (1996). International Studies in the Philosophy of Science. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Isps 10:3.
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  61. Howard Sankey (1996). Normative Naturalism and the Challenge of Relativism: Laudan Versus Worrall on the Justification of Methodological Principles. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 10 (1):37 – 51.
    In a recent exchange, John Worrall and Larry Laudan have debated the merits of the model of rational scientific change proposed by Laudan in his book Science and Values. On the model advocated by Laudan, rational change may take place at the level of scientific theory and methodology, as well as at the level of the epistemic aims of science. Moreover, the rationality of a change which occurs at any one of these three levels may be dependent on considerations at (...)
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  62. Howard Sankey (1996). Paul Hoyningen-Huene. Metascience 5 (2):59-70.
    This is an interview of Paul Hoyningen-Huene conducted by Howard Sankey in 1996 in Tuscany.
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  63. David Cockburn & Howard Sankey (1995). Depression and Science. Cogito 9 (1):67-72.
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  64. Howard Sankey (1995). The Problem of Rational Theory-Choice. Epistemologia 18 (2):299-312.
    The problem of rational theory-choice is the problem of whether choice of theory by a scientist may be objectively rational in the absence of an invariant scientific method. In this paper I offer a solution to the problem, but the solution I propose may come as something of a surprise. For I wish to argue that the work of the very authors who have put the rationality of such choice in question, Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, contains all that is (...)
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  65. Howard Sankey (1995). The Semantic Stance of Scientific Entity Realism. Philosophia 24 (3-4):481-482.
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  66. Geoffrey Bowker & Howard Sankey (1994). Scientific Rationality Versus Social Construction. Cogito 8 (1):38-45.
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  67. Howard Sankey (1994). Relativism and Epistemological Anarchism. Cogito 8 (2):158-164.
  68. Howard Sankey (1994). The Incommensurability Thesis. Avebury.
  69. Howard Sankey (1993). Five Varieties of Cognitive Relativisrn. Cogito 7 (2):106-111.
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  70. Howard Sankey (1993). Kuhn's Changing Concept of Incommensurability. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (4):759-774.
    Since 1962 Kuhn's concept of incommensurability has undergone a process of transformation. His current account of incommensurability has little in common with his original account of it. Originally, incommensurability was a relation of methodological, observational and conceptual disparity between paradigms. Later Kuhn restricted the notion to the semantical sphere and assimilated it to the indeterminacy of translation. Recently he has developed an account of it as localized translation failure between subsets of terms employed by theories.
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  71. Howard Sankey (1993). Kuhn's Model of Scientific Theory Change. Cogito 7 (1):18-24.
  72. David Cockburn & Howard Sankey (1992). A Dialogue on Scientific Realism. Cogito 6 (3):163-169.
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  73. Howard Sankey (1992). Translation and Languagehood. Philosophia 21 (3-4):335-337.
  74. Howard Sankey, Brian Ellis & Paul Horwich (1992). Truth and Objectivity.Truth. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (169):496.
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  75. H. Sankey (1991). A Dialogue on Scientific Rationality. Cogito 5 (3):135-140.
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  76. Howard Sankey (1991). Feyerabend and the Description Theory of Reference. Journal of Philosophical Research 16:223-232.
    In his early work Feyerabend argues that certain theories are incommensurable due to semantic variance. In this paper it is argued that Feyerabend relies on a description theory of reference in the course of his argument for incommensurability and in his analysis of the relevant kind of semantic variance. Against this it is objected that such reliance on the description theory eliminates ostensive reference determination and obscures the presence of theoretical conflict.
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  77. Howard Sankey (1991). Incommensurability and the Indeterminacy of Translation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (2):219 – 223.
    In this paper it is argued that the concept of translation failure involved in Kuhn's thesis of incommensurability is distinct from that of translational indeterminacy in Quine's sense. At most, Kuhnian incommensurability constitutes a weak form of indeterminacy, quite distinct from Quine's. There remains, however, a convergence between the two views of translation, namely, that there is no single adequate translation between languages.
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  78. Howard Sankey (1991). Incommensurability, Translation and Understanding. Philosophical Quarterly 41 (165):414-426.
  79. Howard Sankey (1991). Translation Failure Between Theories. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 22 (2):223-236.
  80. Howard Sankey (1990). In Defence of Untranslatability. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):1 – 21.
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