Online research in philosophy

I argue that Berkeley's distinctive idealism/immaterialism can't support his view that objects of sense, immediately or mediately perceived, are causally inert. (The Passivity of Ideas thesis or PI) Neither appeal to ordinary perception, nor traditional arguments, for example, that causal connections are necessary, and we can't perceive such connections, are helpful. More likely it is theological concerns,e.g., how to have second causes if God upholds by continuously creating the world, that's in the background. This puts Berkeley closer to Malebranche than (...) to Hume. -/- As far the what I call the "first strategy;" defending the passivity of ideas by ordinary introspection, I refer to the work of the French psychologist Albert Michotte,(1940) and those now extending his experiments, to show that (1) there is an immediate and quite robust visual impression of causality, (admitted in fact by Berkeley, Malebranche and Hume) and (2) of more importance, the impression isn't due to projecting into nature expectations gained from experienced regularities. (shrink)

I argue in this article that, contrary to some recent views, Berkeley’s bundle theory of physical objects is incompatible with the thinking that we immediately perceive such objects. Those who argue the contrary view rightly stress that immediate perception of ideas or objects must be non-conceptual for Berkeley, that is, the concept of the object cannot be made use of in the perception, otherwise it would be mediate perception. After a brief look at the texts, I contrast how a direct (...) realist view of immediate perception differs significantly from a bundle theorist’s view. The difference is so great that one rationale for the alternative view, the claim that Berkeley allies himself with common sense by claiming we immediately perceive physical objects, loses plausibility.Je soutiens dans cet article que, contrairement à certaines interprétations récentes, la théorie de Berkeley sur la collection d’idées relatives aux objets matériels (bundle theory) est incompatible avec la pensée que nous percevons ces objets defaçon immédiate. Ceux qui ont soutenu le contraire remarquent à juste titre que la perception immédiate des idées ou des objets doit être non conceptuelle pourBerkeley : le concept de l’objet ne peut servir lors de la perception, car il s’agirait alors d’une perception médiate. Suite à un rapide tour d’horizon des textes pertinents, je fais ressortir à quel point une théorie réaliste sur la perception immédiate differe d’une théorie sur la collection d’idées (bundle theory). Ces positions diffèrent tant et si bien que le principe d’exégèse suivant lequel Berkeley se réclamerait du sens commun en défendant que nous percevons les objets materiels de manière immédiate doit être remis en question. (shrink)