Anna Alexandrova Cambridge University
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  • Faculty, Cambridge University
  • PhD, University of California, San Diego, 2006.

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25 items found.
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  1.  9
    Anna Alexandrova (forthcoming). Can the Science of Well-Being Be Objective? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axw027.
    Well–being, health and freedom are some of the many phenomena of interest to science whose definitions rely on a normative standard. Empirical generalizations about them thus present a special case of value-ladenness. I propose the notion of a ‘mixed claim’ to denote such generalizations. Against the prevailing wisdom, I argue that we should not seek to eliminate them from science. Rather, we need to develop principles for their legitimate use. Philosophers of science have already reconciled values with objectivity in several (...)
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  2.  6
    Anna Alexandrova (forthcoming). Is Well-Being Measurable After All? Public Health Ethics:phw015.
    In Valuing Health, Dan Hausman argues that well-being is not measurable, at least not in the way that science and policy would require. His argument depends on a demanding conception of well-being and on a pessimistic verdict upon the existing measures of subjective well-being. Neither of these reasons, I argue, warrant as much skepticism as Hausman professes.
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  3.  30
    Anna Alexandrova (2016). Kristin Shrader-Frechette Tainted: How Philosophy of Science Can Expose Bad Science. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (3):901-905.
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  4. Anna Alexandrova (2015). The Science of Well-Being. In Guy Fletcher (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being. Routledge 389-401.
  5.  38
    Anna Alexandrova (2015). Well‐Being and Philosophy of Science. Philosophy Compass 10 (3):219-231.
    This article is a mutual introduction of the science of well-being to philosophy of science and an explanation of how the two disciplines can benefit each other. In the process, I argue that the science of well-being is not helpfully viewed as a social or a natural, but rather as a mixed, science. Hence, its methodology will have to attend to its specific features. I discuss two of its methodological problems: justifying the role of values, and validating measures. I suggest (...)
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  6. Robert Northcott & A. Alexandrova (2015). Prisoner's Dilemma Doesn't Explain Much. In Martin Peterson (ed.), The Prisoner’s Dilemma. Cambridge 64-84.
    We make the case that the Prisoner’s Dilemma, notwithstanding its fame and the quantity of intellectual resources devoted to it, has largely failed to explain any phenomena of social scientific or biological interest. In the heart of the paper we examine in detail a famous purported example of Prisoner’s Dilemma empirical success, namely Axelrod’s analysis of WWI trench warfare, and argue that this success is greatly overstated. Further, we explain why this negative verdict is likely true generally and not just (...)
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  7.  38
    Anna Alexandrova (2013). Doing Well in the Circumstances. Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (3):307-328.
    Judgments of well-being across different circumstances and spheres of life exhibit a staggering diversity. Depending on the situation, we use different standards of well-being and even treat it as being constituted by different things. This is true of scientific studies as well as of everyday life. How should we interpret this diversity? I consider three ways of doing so: first, denying the legitimacy of this diversity, second, treating well-being as semantically invariant but differentially realizable, and, third, adopting contextualist semantics for (...)
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  8.  63
    Anna Alexandrova & Robert Northcott (2013). It's Just a Feeling: Why Economic Models Do Not Explain. Journal of Economic Methodology 20 (3):262 - 267.
    Julian Reiss correctly identified a trilemma about economic models: we cannot maintain that they are false, but nevertheless explain and that only true accounts explain. In this reply we give reasons to reject the second premise ? that economic models explain. Intuitions to the contrary should be distrusted.
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  9. Daniel M. Haybron & Anna Alexandrova (2013). Paternalism in Economics. In Christian Coons Michael Weber (ed.), Paternalism: Theory and Practice. Cambridge University Press 157--177.
  10. Anna Alexandrova (2012). Values and the Science of Well-Being : A Recipe for Mixing. In Harold Kincaid (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Social Science. Oxford University Press
  11.  87
    Anna Alexandrova (2012). Well-Being as an Object of Science. Philosophy of Science 79 (5):678-689.
    The burgeoning science of well-being makes no secret of being value laden: improvement of well-being is its explicit goal. But in order to achieve this goal its concepts and claims need to be value adequate; that is, they need, among other things, to adequately capture well-being. In this article I consider two ways of securing this adequacy—first, by relying on philosophical theory of prudential value and, second, by the psychometric approach. I argue that neither is fully adequate and explore an (...)
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  12.  12
    Anna Alexandrova & Daniel M. Haybron (2011). 5 High-Fidelity Economics. In J. B. Davis & D. W. Hands (eds.), Elgar Companion to Recent Economic Methodology. Edward Elgar Publishers 94.
  13.  68
    Jay Odenbaugh & Anna Alexandrova (2011). Buyer Beware: Robustness Analyses in Economics and Biology. Biology and Philosophy 26 (5):757-771.
    Theoretical biology and economics are remarkably similar in their reliance on mathematical models, which attempt to represent real world systems using many idealized assumptions. They are also similar in placing a great emphasis on derivational robustness of modeling results. Recently philosophers of biology and economics have argued that robustness analysis can be a method for confirmation of claims about causal mechanisms, despite the significant reliance of these models on patently false assumptions. We argue that the power of robustness analysis has (...)
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  14.  14
    Anna Alexandrova (2010). Adequacy for Purpose. Modern Schoolman 87 (3-4):295-301.
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  15.  21
    Anna Alexandrova (2009). Book Reviews Haybron, Daniel M . The Pursuit of Unhappiness: The Elusive Psychology of Well‐Being . New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. Pp. 357. $55.00 (Cloth). [REVIEW] Ethics 119 (4):773-777.
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  16.  4
    Anna Alexandrova (2009). No Title Available: Reviews. Economics and Philosophy 25 (3):371-378.
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  17.  43
    Anna Alexandrova (2009). The Invisible Hand in Economics: How Economists Explain Unintended Social Consequences , N. Emrah Aydinonat, Routledge, 2008, XVI + 258 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 25 (3):371-378.
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  18.  40
    Anna Alexandrova (2009). When Analytic Narratives Explain. Journal of the Philosophy of History 3 (1):1-24.
    Rational choice modeling originating in economics is sweeping across many areas of social science. This paper examines a popular methodological proposal for integrating formal models from game theory with more traditional narrative explanations of historical phenomena, known as “analytic narratives”. Under what conditions are we justified in thinking that an analytic narrative provides a good explanation? In this paper I criticize the existing criteria and provide a set of my own. Along the way, I address the critique of analytic narratives (...)
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  19.  48
    Anna Alexandrova & Robert Northcott (2009). Progress in Economics: Lessons From the Spectrum Auctions. In Harold Kincaid & Don Ross (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics. Oxford University Press 306--337.
    The 1994 US spectrum auction is now a paradigmatic case of the successful use of microeconomic theory for policy-making. We use a detailed analysis of it to review standard accounts in philosophy of science of how idealized models are connected to messy reality. We show that in order to understand what made the design of the spectrum auction successful, a new such account is required, and we present it here. Of especial interest is the light this sheds on the issue (...)
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  20.  95
    Anna Alexandrova (2008). First-Person Reports and the Measurement of Happiness. Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):571 – 583.
    First-person reports are central to the study of subjective well-being in contemporary psychology, but there is much disagreement about exactly what sort of first-person reports should be used. This paper examines an influential proposal to replace all first-person reports of life satisfaction with introspective reports of affect. I argue against the reasoning behind this proposal, and propose instead a new strategy for deciding what measure is appropriate.
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  21.  89
    Anna Alexandrova (2008). Making Models Count. Philosophy of Science 75 (3):383-404.
    What sort of claims do scientific models make and how do these claims then underwrite empirical successes such as explanations and reliable policy interventions? In this paper I propose answers to these questions for the class of models used throughout the social and biological sciences, namely idealized deductive ones with a causal interpretation. I argue that the two main existing accounts misrepresent how these models are actually used, and propose a new account. *Received July 2006; revised August 2008. †To contact (...)
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  22.  74
    Carl F. Craver & Anna Alexandrova (2008). No Revolution Necessary: Neural Mechanisms for Economics. Economics and Philosophy 24 (3):381-406.
    We argue that neuroeconomics should be a mechanistic science. We defend this view as preferable both to a revolutionary perspective, according to which classical economics is eliminated in favour of neuroeconomics, and to a classical economic perspective, according to which economics is insulated from facts about psychology and neuroscience. We argue that, like other mechanistic sciences, neuroeconomics will earn its keep to the extent that it either reconfigures how economists think about decision-making or how neuroscientists think about brain mechanisms underlying (...)
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  23.  90
    Anna Alexandrova (2006). Connecting Economic Models to the Real World: Game Theory and the Fcc Spectrum Auctions. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (2):173-192.
    Can social phenomena be understood by analyzing their parts? Contemporary economic theory often assumes that they can. The methodology of constructing models which trace the behavior of perfectly rational agents in idealized environments rests on the premise that such models, while restricted, help us isolate tendencies, that is, the stable separate effects of economic causes that can be used to explain and predict economic phenomena. In this paper, I question both the claim that models in economics supply claims about tendencies (...)
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  24. Nancy Cartwright, Anna Alexandrova, Andrew Hamilton Sophia Efstathiou & Ioan Muntean (2005). Laws. In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. Oxford University Press
     
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  25.  23
    Anna Alexandrova & Robert Northcott (2004). The Scientific Study of Society, by Max Steuer. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003, XIII + 464 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 20 (2):375-381.
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