Colin Marshall University of Washington
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  1. Colin Marshall (forthcoming). Does Kant Demand Explanations for All Synthetic a Priori Claims? Journal of the History of Philosophy.
    Most of Kant's readers have assumed that he demanded explanations for all synthetic a priori claims. I argue that this is not the case, and that Kant accepted some synthetic a priori claims as basic. I further argue that he took himself to be justified in making such claims on the basis of a certain sort of robust reflection. In essence, Kant's method is more like that of the phenomenologists than that of 20th century analytic philosophers.
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  2. Colin Marshall (forthcoming). Hume Versus the Vulgar on Resistance, Nisus, and the Impression of Power. Philosophical Studies.
    In the first Enquiry, Hume takes the experience of exerting force against a solid body to be a key ingredient of the vulgar idea of power, so that the vulgar take that experience to provide us with an impression of power. Hume provides two arguments against the vulgar on this point: the first concerning our other applications of the idea of power and the second concerning whether that experience yields certainty about distinct events. I argue that, even if we accept (...)
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  3. Ian Blecher, Anil Gomes, Joel Thiago Klien, Alexei N. Krouglov, Samuel Loncar & Colin Marshall (2013). Jahresinhalt Kant-Studien. Kant-Studien 104 (4):563-566.
  4. Colin Marshall (2013). Kant's Appearances and Things in Themselves as Qua‐Objects. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252):520-545.
    The one-world interpretation of Kant's idealism holds that appearances and things in themselves are, in some sense, the same things. Yet this reading faces a number of problems, all arising from the different features Kant seems to assign to appearances and things in themselves. I propose a new way of understanding the appearance/thing in itself distinction via an Aristotelian notion that I call, following Kit Fine, a ‘qua-object.’ Understanding appearances and things in themselves as qua-objects provides a clear sense in (...)
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  5. Colin Marshall (2013). Kant's One Self and the Appearance/Thing-in-Itself Distinction. Kant-Studien 104 (4):421-441.
    Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 104 Heft: 4 Seiten: 421-441.
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  6. Colin Marshall (2013). Skorupski, John., The Domain of Reasons. Review of Metaphysics 66 (4):852-854.
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  7. Colin Marshall (2012). Spinoza on Destroying Passions with Reason. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):139-160.
    Spinoza claims we can control any passion by forming a more clear and distinct idea of it. The interpretive consensus is that Spinoza is either wrong or over-stating his view. I argue that Spinoza’s view is plausible and insightful. After breaking down Spinoza’s characterization of the relevant act, I consider four existing interpretations and conclude that each is unsatisfactory. I then consider a further problem for Spinoza: how his definitions of ‘action’ and ‘passion’ make room for passions becoming action. I (...)
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  8. Colin Marshall (2011). Kant's Thinker. [REVIEW] British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (6):1226 - 1229.
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy, Volume 19, Issue 6, Page 1226-1229, December 2011.
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  9. Colin Marshall (2011). Kant's Theory of the Self. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (5):950-952.
    The self for Kant is something real, and yet is neither appearance\nnor thing in itself, but rather has some third status. Appearances\nfor Kant arise in space and time where these are respectively forms\nof outer and inner attending (intuition). Melnick explains the "third\nstatus" by identifying the self with intellectual action that does\nnot arise in the progression of attending (and so is not appearance),\nbut accompanies and unifies inner attending. As so accompanying,\nit progresses with that attending and is therefore temporal--not\na thing in itself. (...)
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  10. Colin Marshall (2010). Kant's Metaphysics of the Self. Philosophers' Imprint 10 (8):1-21.
    I argue that Kant's Critique of Pure Reason offers a positive metaphysical account of the thinking self. Previous interpreters have overlooked this account, I believe, because they have held that any metaphysical view of the self would be incompatible with both Kant's insistence on the limitations of cognition and with his project in the Paralogisms. Closer examination, however, shows that neither of those aspects of the Critique precludes a metaphysical account of the self, and that other aspects (namely, the structure (...)
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  11. Colin Marshall (2009). Kant and Skepticism (Review). Journal of the History of Philosophy 47 (2):pp. 319-320.
  12. Colin R. Marshall (2009). The Mind and the Body as 'One and the Same Thing' in Spinoza. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 17 (5):897-919.
    I argue that, contrary to how he is often read, Spinoza did not believe that the mind and the body were numerically identical. This means that we must find some alternative reading for his claims that they are 'one and the same thing' (I describe three such alternative readings).
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