Colin Marshall University of Washington
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  • Faculty, University of Washington
  • PhD, New York University, 2010.

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21 items found.
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  1.  34
    Colin Marshall (forthcoming). Kant on Impenetrability, Touch, and the Causal Content of Perception. European Journal of Philosophy.
    ABSTRACT: It is well known that Kant claims that causal judgments, including judgments about forces, must have an a priori basis. It is less well known that Kant claims that we can perceive the repulsive force of bodies (their impenetrability) through the sense of touch. Together, these claims present an interpretive puzzle, since they appear to commit Kant to both affirming and denying that we can have perceptions of force. My first aim is to show that both sides of the (...)
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  2.  25
    Colin Marshall (forthcoming). Reason in the Short Treatise. In Yitzhak Melamed (ed.), The Young Spinoza. Oxford University Press
    Spinoza’s account of reason in the Short Treatise has been largely neglected. That account, I argue, has at least four features which distinguish it from that of the Ethics: in the Short Treatise, (1) reason is more sharply distinguished from the faculty of intuitive knowledge, (2) reason deals with things as though they were ‘outside’ us, (3) reason lacks clarity and distinctness, and (4) reason has no power over many types of passions. I argue that these differences have a unified (...)
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  3.  78
    Colin Marshall (forthcoming). Schopenhauer and Non-Cognitivist Moral Realism. Journal of the History of Philosophy.
    Schopenhauer has been consistently ignored by contemporary metaethics, and almost no commentators on his work address the question of whether his metaethics is realist or anti-realist. I argue, however, that Schopenhauer’s views provide a powerful and novel challenge to the widely-held metaethical view that cognitivism about moral judgments is a necessary condition for moral realism. I begin by discussing how the phrase “moral realism” has been intended to characterize the family of anti-skeptical views that goes back at least to Plato. (...)
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  4.  74
    Colin Marshall (2016). Lockean Empathy. Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (1):87-106.
    This paper offers an epistemic defense of empathy, drawing on John Locke's theory of ideas. Locke held that ideas of shape, unlike ideas of color, had a distinctive value: resembling qualities in their objects. I argue that the same is true of empathy, as when someone is pained by someone's pain. This means that empathy has the same epistemic value or objectivity that Locke and other early modern philosophers assigned to veridical perceptions of shape. For this to hold, pain and (...)
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  5.  10
    Colin Marshall (2016). Self, World, and Art: Metaphysical Topics in Kant and Hegel. In Sally Sedgwick & Dina Emundts (eds.), Bewusstsein/Consciousness. De Gruyter 281-285.
  6.  86
    Colin Marshall (2015). Hume Versus the Vulgar on Resistance, Nisus, and the Impression of Power. Philosophical Studies 172 (2):305-319.
    In the first Enquiry, Hume takes the experience of exerting force against a solid body to be a key ingredient of the vulgar idea of power, so that the vulgar take that experience to provide us with an impression of power. Hume provides two arguments against the vulgar on this point: the first concerning our other applications of the idea of power and the second concerning whether that experience yields certainty about distinct events. I argue that, even if we accept (...)
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  7.  3
    Spencer Paulson & Colin Marshall (2015). Julian Wuerth, Kant on Mind, Action, and Ethics Oxford University Press, 2014 Pp. Xvi + 349 ISBN 9780199587629 £50.00. [REVIEW] Kantian Review 20 (3):512-516.
  8. Colin Marshall (2014). Does Kant Demand Explanations for All Synthetic A Priori Claims? Journal of the History of Philosophy 52 (3):549-576.
    in his prolegomena to any future metaphysics, Kant states that “[a]ll metaphysicians are … suspended from their occupations until such a time as they will have satisfactorily answered the question: How are synthetic cognitions a priori possible?” (Prolegomena, 4:278).1 In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant describes the issue of the synthetic a priori as “[t]he real problem of pure reason” (B19), and in the Critique of the Power of Judgment as “the general problem of transcendental philosophy” (Judgment, 5:289). Kant (...)
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  9.  9
    Colin Marshall (2014). Review: Ameriks, Karl, Kant's Elliptical Path. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 34 (1-2):1-3.
  10.  19
    Ian Blecher, Anil Gomes, Joel Thiago Klien, Alexei N. Krouglov, Samuel Loncar & Colin Marshall (2013). Jahresinhalt Kant-Studien. Kant-Studien 104 (4):563-566.
  11. Colin Marshall (2013). Kant's Appearances and Things in Themselves as Qua‐Objects. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252):520-545.
    The one-world interpretation of Kant's idealism holds that appearances and things in themselves are, in some sense, the same things. Yet this reading faces a number of problems, all arising from the different features Kant seems to assign to appearances and things in themselves. I propose a new way of understanding the appearance/thing in itself distinction via an Aristotelian notion that I call, following Kit Fine, a ‘qua-object.’ Understanding appearances and things in themselves as qua-objects provides a clear sense in (...)
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  12. Colin Marshall (2013). Kant's One Self and the Appearance/Thing-in-Itself Distinction. Kant-Studien 104 (4):421-441.
    Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 104 Heft: 4 Seiten: 421-441.
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  13.  34
    Colin Marshall (2013). Skorupski, John., The Domain of Reasons. Review of Metaphysics 66 (4):852-854.
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  14.  10
    Colin Marshall (2013). Spinoza’s Metaphysics: Substance and Thought, by Yitzhak Melamed. The Leibniz Review 23:187-194.
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  15.  2
    Colin Marshall (2013). Spinoza’s Metaphysics: Substance and Thought, by Yitzhak Melamed. Leibniz Society Review 23:187-194.
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  16.  96
    Colin Marshall (2012). Spinoza on Destroying Passions with Reason. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):139-160.
    Spinoza claims we can control any passion by forming a more clear and distinct idea of it. The interpretive consensus is that Spinoza is either wrong or over-stating his view. I argue that Spinoza’s view is plausible and insightful. After breaking down Spinoza’s characterization of the relevant act, I consider four existing interpretations and conclude that each is unsatisfactory. I then consider a further problem for Spinoza: how his definitions of ‘action’ and ‘passion’ make room for passions becoming action. I (...)
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  17.  24
    Colin Marshall (2011). Review: Kitcher, Kant's Thinker. [REVIEW] British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (6):1226 - 1229.
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy, Volume 19, Issue 6, Page 1226-1229, December 2011.
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  18.  72
    Colin Marshall (2011). Kant's Theory of the Self. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (5):950-952.
    The self for Kant is something real, and yet is neither appearance nor thing in itself, but rather has some third status. Appearances for Kant arise in space and time where these are respectively forms of outer and inner attending (intuition). Melnick explains the "third status" by identifying the self with intellectual action that does not arise in the progression of attending (and so is not appearance), but accompanies and unifies inner attending. As so accompanying, it progresses with that attending (...)
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  19. Colin Marshall (2010). Kant's Metaphysics of the Self. Philosophers' Imprint 10 (8):1-21.
    I argue that Kant's Critique of Pure Reason offers a positive metaphysical account of the thinking self. Previous interpreters have overlooked this account, I believe, because they have held that any metaphysical view of the self would be incompatible with both Kant's insistence on the limitations of cognition and with his project in the Paralogisms. Closer examination, however, shows that neither of those aspects of the Critique precludes a metaphysical account of the self, and that other aspects (namely, the structure (...)
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  20.  32
    Colin Marshall (2009). Review: Forster, Michael, Kant and Skepticism. Journal of the History of Philosophy 47 (2):pp. 319-320.
    Kant's theoretical philosophy is often read as a response to skeptical challenges raised by his predecessors. Yet Kant himself explicitly discusses skepticism in relatively few places in his published work, so Michael Forster's focused examination of Kant's relation to skepticism is a useful addition to the literature. Forster sets out to distinguish different types of skepticism to which Kant might be responding, determine what responses Kant offers, and evaluate the strength of those responses.Perhaps the most valuable part of the book (...)
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  21. Colin R. Marshall (2009). The Mind and the Body as 'One and the Same Thing' in Spinoza. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 17 (5):897-919.
    I argue that, contrary to how he is often read, Spinoza did not believe that the mind and the body were numerically identical. This means that we must find some alternative reading for his claims that they are 'one and the same thing'.
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