Stephan Torre Universitat de Barcelona
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Affiliations
  • Postdoc, Universitat de Barcelona
  • PhD, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 2008.

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About me
I am a post-doc with the PERSP project and a senior member of LOGOS at the University of Barcelona. My interests include topics in philosophy of time, self-locating content, persistence and modality.
My works
6 items found.
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  1. Stephan Torre (2011). The Open Future. Philosophy Compass 6 (5):360-373.
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  2. Stephan Torre (2010). Centered Assertion. Philosophical Studies 150 (1):97-114.
    I suggest a way of extending Stalnaker’s account of assertion to allow for centered content. In formulating his account, Stalnaker takes the content of assertion to be uncentered propositions: entities that are evaluated for truth at a possible world. I argue that the content of assertion is sometimes centered: the content is evaluated for truth at something within a possible world. I consider Andy Egan’s proposal for extending Stalnaker’s account to allow for assertions with centered content. I argue that Egan’s (...)
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  3. Stephan Torre (2010). Representing Time: An Essay on Temporality as Modality * By K. M. Jaszczolt. [REVIEW] Analysis 70 (2):385-387.
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  4. Stephan Torre (2010). Tense, Timely Action and Self-Ascription. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):112-132.
    I consider whether the self-ascription theory can succeed in providing a tenseless (B-theoretic) account of tensed belief and timely action. I evaluate an argument given by William Lane Craig for the conclusion that the self-ascription account of tensed belief entails a tensed theory (A-theory) of time. I claim that how one formulates the selfascription account of tensed belief depends upon whether one takes the subject of selfascription to be a momentary person-stage or an enduring person. I provide two different formulations (...)
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  5. Stephan Torre (2009). Truth-Conditions, Truth-Bearers and the New B-Theory of Time. Philosophical Studies 142 (3):325-344.
    In this paper I consider two strategies for providing tenseless truth-conditions for tensed sentences: the token-reflexive theory and the date theory. Both theories have faced a number of objections by prominent A-theorists such as Quentin Smith and William Lane Craig. Traditionally, these two theories have been viewed as rival methods for providing truth-conditions for tensed sentences. I argue that the debate over whether the token-reflexive theory or the date theory is true has arisen from a failure to distinguish between conditions (...)
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  6. Stephan Torre (2006). De Se Knowledge and the Possibility of an Omniscient Being. Faith and Philosophy 23 (2):191-200.
    In this paper I examine an argument that has been made by Patrick Grim for the claim that de se knowledge is incompatible with the existence of an omniscient being. I claim that the success of the argument depends upon whether it is possible for someone else to know what I know in knowing (F), where (F) is a claim involving de se knowledge. I discuss one reply to this argument, proposed by Edward Wierenga, that appeals to first-person propositions and (...)
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