Barry Ward University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
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  • Faculty, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
  • PhD, Rutgers University, 2001.

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  1. Barry Ward (2012). Explanation and the New Riddle of Induction. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):365-385.
    I propose a novel solution to Goodman's new riddle of induction, one on which aspects of scientific methodology preclude significant confirmation of the Grue Hypothesis. The solution appeals to intuitive constraints on the confirmation of explanatory hypotheses, and can be construed as a fragment of a theory of Inference to the Best Explanation. I give it an objective Bayesian formalisation, and contrast it with Goodman's and Sober's solutions, which make appeal to both methodological and non-methodological considerations, and those of Jackson, (...)
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  2. Barry Ward (2012). Laws and Lawmakers: Science, Metaphysics, and the Laws of Nature. [REVIEW] Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 43 (2):155-158.
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  3. Barry Ward (2009). Cartwright, Forces, and Ceteris Paribus Laws. Southwest Philosophy Review 25 (1):55-62.
    This paper proposes a novel response to Nancy Cartwright’s famous argument that fundamental physical laws, such as Newton’s law of gravitation, are ceteris paribus: construing forces instrumentally allows such laws to apply generally, eliminating the need for ceteris paribus clauses. The instrumental construal of forces is motivated, and defended against prominent recent objections. Further, it is argued that such instrumentalism in no way undermines the role of force-laws in scientific practise, and indeed, is compatible with a robust realism about force-laws.
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  4. Barry Ward (2007). Laws, Explanation, Governing, and Generation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):537 – 552.
    Advocates and opponents of Humean Supervenience (HS) have neglected a crucial feature of nomic explanation: laws can explain by generating descriptions of possibilities. Dretske and Armstrong have opposed HS by arguing that laws construed as Humean regularities cannot explain, but their arguments fail precisely because they neglect to consider this generating role of laws. Humeans have dismissed the intuitive violations of HS manifested by John Carroll's Mirror Worlds as erroneous, but distinguishing the laws' generating role from the non-Humean notion that (...)
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  5. Barry Ward (2007). The Natural Kind Analysis of Ceteris Paribus Law Statements. Philosophical Topics 35 (1/2):359-380.
    A novel analysis of Ceteris Paribus (CP) law statements is constructed. It explains how such statements can have determinate, testable content by relating their semantics to the semantics of natural kind terms. Objections are discussed, and the analysis is compared with others. Many philosophers think of the CP clause as a ‘no interference’ clause. However, many non-strict scientific generalizations are clearly not subsumed under this construal. While this analysis accounts interference cases as violating the CP clause, it is applicable to (...)
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  6. Barry Ward (2005). Projecting Chances: A Humean Vindication and Justification of the Principal Principle. Philosophy of Science 72 (1):241-261.
    Faced with the paradox of undermining futures, Humeans have resigned themselves to accounts of chance that severely conflict with our intuitions. However, such resignation is premature: The problem is Humean supervenience (HS), not Humeanism. This paper develops a projectivist Humeanism on which chance claims are understood as normative, rather than fact stating. Rationality constraints on the cotenability of norms and factual claims ground a factual-normative worlds semantics that, in addition to solving the Frege-Geach problem, delivers the intuitive set of possibilia (...)
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  7. Barry Ward (2004). Dretske and Armstrong on Regularity Analyses and Explanation. Southwest Philosophy Review 20 (1):193-200.
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  8. Barry Ward (2003). Sometimes the World is Not Enough: The Pursuit of Explanatory Laws in a Humean World. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (2):175–197.
    A novel motivation for a Humean projectivist construal of our concept of scientific law is provided. The analysis is partially developed and used to explain intuitions that are problematic for a Humean reductionist construal of lawhood. A possible non-Humean rejoinder is discussed and rejected. In an appendix, further intuitions that are problematic for Humean reductionists are explained projectively.
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  9. Barry Ward (2002). Humeanism Without Humean Supervenience: A Projectivist Account of Laws and Possibilities. Philosophical Studies 107 (3):191-208.
    Acceptance of Humean Supervenience and thereductive Humean analyses that entail it leadsto a litany of inadequately explained conflictswith our intuitions regarding laws andpossibilities. However, the non-reductiveHumeanism developed here, on which law claimsare understood as normative rather than factstating, can accommodate those intuitions. Rational constraints on such norms provide aset of consistency relations that ground asemantics formulated in terms offactual-normative worlds, solving theFrege-Geach problem of construing unassertedcontexts. This set of factual-normative worldsincludes exactly the intuitive sets ofnomologically possible worlds associated witheach possible (...)
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