Michael McKinsey Wayne State University
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  • Faculty, Wayne State University
  • PhD, Indiana University, 1976.

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  1. Michael McKinsey (2010). Understanding Proper Names. Linguistics and Philosophy 33 (4):325-354.
    There is a fairly general consensus that names are Millian (or Russellian) genuine terms, that is, are singular terms whose sole semantic function is to introduce a referent into the propositions expressed by sentences containing the term. This answers the question as to what sort of proposition is expressed by use of sentences containing names. But there is a second serious semantic problem about proper names, that of how the referents of proper names are determined. This is the question that (...)
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  2. Michael Mckinsey (2009). Thought by Description. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):83-102.
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  3. Michael Mckinsey (2008). Chapter oclw 1. In Aloysius Martinich (ed.), The Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press. 51--297.
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  4. J. L. Austin, Anthony Brueckner, Noam Chomsky, Donald Davidson, Keith Donnellan, Michael Dummett, Gareth Evans, Gottlob Frege, H. P. Grice, Paul Horwich, David Kaplan, Saul Kripke, David Lewis, John McDowell, Michael McKinsey, Ruth Millikan, Stephen Neale, Hilary Putnam, W. V. Quine, Bertrand Russell, Nathan Salmon, Stephen Schiffer, John Searle, P. F. Strawson, Alfred Tarski & Ludwig Wittgenstein (2007). Philosophy of Language: The Central Topics. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
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  5. Michael McKinsey (2007). 14 A Refutation of Qualia-Physicalism. In Michael O'Rourke Corey Washington (ed.), Situating Semantics: Essays on the Philosophy of John Perry. 469.
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  6. Michael McKinsey (2007). Externalism and Privileged Access Are Inconsistent. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
     
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  7. Michael McKinsey (2006). Direct Reference and Logical Truth: A Reply to Lasonen-Aamio. Dialectica 60 (4):447-451.
  8. Michael McKinsey (2005). A Refutation of Qualia Physicalism. In Michael O'Rourke & Corey G. Washington (eds.), Situating Semantics: Essays on the Philosophy of John Perry. Mit Press.
  9. Michael McKinsey (2005). Beyond Rigidity. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):149-168.
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  10. Michael McKinsey (2005). Critical Notice. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):149-168.
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  11. Michael McKinsey (2005). Critical Notice of Scott Soames, Beyond Rigidity. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (1).
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  12. Michael McKinsey (2003). Anti-Individualism and the Privileged Access. In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oup Oxford.
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  13. Michael McKinsey (2003). Transmission of Warrant and Closure of Apriority. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press. 97--116.
    In my 1991 paper, AAnti-Individualism and Privileged Access,@ I argued that externalism in the philosophy of mind is incompatible with the thesis that we have privileged , nonempirical access to the contents of our own thoughts.1 One of the most interesting responses to my argument has been that of Martin Davies (1998, 2000, and Chapter _ above) and Crispin Wright (2000 and Chapter _ above), who describe several types of cases to show that warrant for a premise does not always (...)
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  14. Michael McKinsey (2002). Forms of Externalism and Privileged Access. Philosophical Perspectives 16 (s16):199-224.
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  15. Michael McKinsey (2002). On Knowing Our Own Minds. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):107-16.
    This is an anthology of ?fteen papers concerning various philosophical problems related to the topic of self-knowledge. All but one of the papers were previously unpublished, and all but two are descendants of presentations at a conference on self-knowledge held at the University of St Andrews in 1995. The collection.
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  16. Michael McKinsey (2002). Review: On Knowing Our Own Minds. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):107 - 116.
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  17. Michael McKinsey (2001). The Semantic Basis of Externalism. In J. Campbell, M.O. Rourke & David Shier (eds.), Meaning and Truth. New York: Seven Bridges Press.
    1. The primary evidence and motivation for externalism in the philosophy of mind is provided by the semantic facts that support direct reference theories of names, indexi- cal pronouns, and natural kind terms. But many externalists have forgotten their sem- antic roots, or so I shall contend here. I have become convinced of this by a common reaction among externalists to the main argument of my 1991 paper AAnti-Individual- ism and Privileged Access.@ In that argument, I concluded that externalism is (...)
     
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  18. Michael McKinsey (1999). The Semantics of Belief Ascriptions. Noûs 33 (4):519-557.
    nated discussion of the semantics of such verbs. I will call this view.
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  19. Michael McKinsey (1998). The Grammar of Belief. In William J. Rapaport & F. Orilia (eds.), Thought, Language, and Ontology, Essays in Memory of Hector-Neri Castaneda. Kluwer.
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  20. Michael McKinsey (1997). Beyond Formalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):709-713.
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  21. Michael McKinsey (1994). Accepting the Consequences of Anti-Individualism. Analysis 54 (2):124-8.
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  22. Michael McKinsey (1994). Individuating Beliefs. Philosophical Perspectives 8:303-30.
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  23. Michael McKinsey (1993). Curing Folk Psychology of Arthritis. Philosophical Studies 70 (3):323-36.
    Tyler Burge's (1979) famous thought experiment concerning 'arthritis' is commonly assumed to show that all ascriptions of content to beliefs and other attitudes are dependent for their truth upon facts about the agent's social and linguistic environment. It is also commonly claimed that Burge's argument shows that Putnam's (1975) result regarding natural kind terms applies to all general terms whatever, and hence shows that all such terms have wide meanings.1 But I wish to show here, first, that neither Burge's initial (...)
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  24. Michael McKinsey (1991). Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access. Analysis 51 (January):9-16.
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  25. Michael McKinsey (1991). The Internal Basis of Meaning. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (June):143-69.
  26. Michael McKinsey (1987). Apriorism in the Philosophy of Language. Philosophical Studies 52 (July):1-32.
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  27. Michael Mckinsey (1986). Mental Anaphora. Synthese 66 (1):159 - 175.
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  28. N. C. A. Costdaa, David Harrah, Michael Tye, D. S. Clarke, Jeffrey Olen, Robert Young, Richard Campbell, Michael McKinsey, John Peterson, Alex C. Michalos, John Glucker, John T. Blackmore, Eileen Bagus & Barbara Goodwin (1985). Book Reviews. [REVIEW] Philosophia 15 (1-2):279-281.
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  29. Michael Mckinsey (1984). Causality and the Paradox of Names. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):491-515.
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  30. Michael McKinsey (1983). Michael Devitt, Designation Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 3 (3):112-116.
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  31. Michael McKinsey (1983). Psychologism in Semantics. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 13 (1):1 - 25.
    According to grice, Semantic concepts like meaning and reference should be explicated in terms of the propositional attitudes. In this paper, I argue that grice's program is mistaken in principle. I first motivate a gricean strategy for defining denotation, Or semantic reference, In terms of rules that govern what speakers may refer to with the terms they use. I then express three paradigm gricean theories of denotation and introduce considerations which show that these theories are false.
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  32. Michael McKinsey (1981). Causes and Intentions: A Reply. Philosophical Review 90 (3):408-423.
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  33. Michael McKinsey (1981). Obligations to the Starving. Noûs 15 (3):309-323.
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  34. Michael McKinsey (1980). Against a Defence of Cluster Theories. Analysis 40 (1):1 - 5.
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  35. Michael McKinsey (1979). Expressing Mental States. Philosophia 8 (4):657-671.
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  36. Michael McKinsey (1979). Levels of Obligation. Philosophical Studies 35 (4):385 - 395.
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  37. Michael Mckinsey (1979). The Ambiguity of Definite Descriptions. Theoria 45 (2):78-89.
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  38. Michael McKinsey (1978). Kripke's Objections to Description Theories of Names. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):485 - 497.
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  39. Michael McKinsey (1978). Names and Intentionality. Philosophical Review 87 (2):171-200.
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  40. Michael McKinsey (1976). Divided Reference in Causal Theories of Names. Philosophical Studies 30 (4):235 - 242.
    Gareth evans has proposed a type of case which shows that kripke's sketch of a causal theory of proper names is in need of modification. Kripke has himself suggested a way in which the modification might proceed, But I argue that this suggestion leads in the wrong direction. I consider a development of kripke's view by michael devitt which may overcome evans' case, But which is shown false by a different sort of case. The latter kind of case also shows (...)
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  41. Michael McKinsey (1971). Searle on Proper Names. Philosophical Review 80 (2):220-229.
    Searle has proposed a "presupposition-Theory" of proper names in which he maintains that names are not short for descriptions and which, He claims, Solves frege's puzzle as to how an identity-Sentence containing co-Referential names can be informative. Two possible interpretations of searle's view are proposed, And it is argued that neither interpretation can be used to solve frege's puzzle and that, On the most plausible interpretation of his view, Searle is committed to the thesis that names are short for descriptions (...)
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