Ben Bramble Lund University, Trinity College Dublin
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  • Postdoc, Lund University
  • Faculty, Trinity College Dublin
  • PhD, University of Sydney, 2014.

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About me
Postdoctoral Fellow at Lund University.
My works
11 items found.
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  1.  87
    Ben Bramble (forthcoming). A New Defense of Hedonism About Well-Being. Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    According to hedonism about well-being, lives can go well or poorly for us just in virtue of our ability to feel pleasure and pain. Hedonism has had many advocates historically, but has relatively few nowadays. This is mainly due to three highly influential objections to it: The Philosophy of Swine, The Experience Machine, and The Resonance Constraint. In this paper, I attempt to revive hedonism. I begin by giving a precise new definition of it. I then argue that the right (...)
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  2.  88
    Ben Bramble (forthcoming). The Case Against Meat. In Ben Bramble Bob Fischer (ed.), The Moral Complexities of Eating Meat. Oxford University Press
    There is a simple but powerful argument against the human practice of raising and killing animals for food (RKF for short). It goes like this: 1. RKF is extremely bad for animals. 2. RKF is only trivially good for human beings Therefore, 3. RKF should be stopped. While many consider this argument decisive, not everyone is convinced. There have been four main lines of objection to it. In this paper, I provide new responses to these four objections.
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  3.  88
    Ben Bramble (forthcoming). The Role of Pleasure in Well-Being. In Guy Fletcher (ed.), Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Well-Being. Routledge
    What is the role of pleasure in determining a person’s well-being? I start by considering the nature of pleasure (i.e., what pleasure is). I then consider what factors, if any, can affect how much a given pleasure adds to a person’s lifetime well-being other than its degree of pleasurableness (i.e., how pleasurable it is). Finally, I consider whether it is plausible that there is any other way to add to somebody’s lifetime well-being than by giving him some pleasure or helping (...)
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  4.  4
    Ben Bramble (2016). Choosing Tomorrow’s Children: The Ethics of Selective Reproduction, by Stephen Wilkinson. Mind 125 (497):281-284.
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  5. Ben Bramble (2016). The Experience Machine. Philosophy Compass 11 (3):136-145.
    In this paper, I reconstruct Robert Nozick's experience machine objection to hedonism about well-being. I then explain and briefly discuss the most important recent criticisms that have been made of it. Finally, I question the conventional wisdom that the experience machine, while it neatly disposes of hedonism, poses no problem for desire-based theories of well-being.
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  6. Ben Bramble (2015). Consequentialism About Meaning in Life. Utilitas 27 (4):445-459.
    What is it for a life to be meaningful? In this article, I defend what I call Consequentialism about Meaning in Life, the view that one's life is meaningful at time t just in case one's surviving at t would be good in some way, and one's life was meaningful considered as a whole just in case the world was made better in some way for one's having existed.
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  7.  51
    Ben Bramble (2015). On Susan Wolf’s “Good-for-Nothings". Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (5):1071-1081.
    According to welfarism about value, something is good simpliciter just in case it is good for some being or beings. In her recent Presidential Address to the American Philosophical Association, “Good-For-Nothings”, Susan Wolf argues against welfarism by appeal to great works of art, literature, music, and philosophy. Wolf provides three main arguments against this view, which I call The Superfluity Argument, The Explanation of Benefit Argument, and The Welfarist’s Mistake. In this paper, I reconstruct these arguments and explain where, in (...)
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  8.  13
    Ben Bramble & Bob Fischer (eds.) (2015). The Moral Complexities of Eating Meat. Oxford University Press Usa.
    A new collection offering provocative and often counterintuitive conclusions on the ethics of meat eatingIn a world of industralized farming and feed lots, is eating meat ever a morally responsible choice? Is eating organic or free range sufficient to change the moral equation? Is there a moral cost in not eating meat? As billions of animals continue to be raised and killed by human beings for human consumption, affecting the significance and urgency in answering these questions grow.This volume collects twelve (...)
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  9.  31
    Ben Bramble (2014). On William James’s “Is Life Worth Living?”. Ethics 125 (1):217-219,.
  10. Ben Bramble (2014). Whole-Life Welfarism. American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (1):63-74.
    In this paper, I set out and defend a new theory of value, whole-life welfarism. According to this theory, something is good only if it makes somebody better off in some way in his life considered as a whole. By focusing on lifetime, rather than momentary, well-being, a welfarist can solve two of the most vexing puzzles in value theory, The Badness of Death and The Problem of Additive Aggregation.
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  11. Ben Bramble (2013). The Distinctive Feeling Theory of Pleasure. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):201-217.
    In this article, I attempt to resuscitate the perennially unfashionable distinctive feeling theory of pleasure (and pain), according to which for an experience to be pleasant (or unpleasant) is just for it to involve or contain a distinctive kind of feeling. I do this in two ways. First, by offering powerful new arguments against its two chief rivals: attitude theories, on the one hand, and the phenomenological theories of Roger Crisp, Shelly Kagan, and Aaron Smuts, on the other. Second, by (...)
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