Contact
Affiliations
- Faculty, University of Toronto
- PhD, Stanford University, 1976.
Areas of specialization
Areas of interest
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About me
I am currently a (senior) Canada Research Chair in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Toronto. My most active interests are in philosophy of mind, especially perception, and philosophy of biology. I wrote a book called Seeing, Doing, and Knowing (OUP, 2005) in which I dealt with a wide range of contemporary philosophical issues in perception, treating these in an empirically sensitive way. In philosophy of biology, I have written about teleology, natural selection, and species. Before these rather contemporary concerns occupied me completely, I wrote about ancient philosophy.
My works
- Mohan Matthen, Auditory Objects.
- Jonathan Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.) (2010). Color Ontology and Color Science. Mit Press.
- Jonathan Cohen & Mohan Matthen (2010). Introduction. In Jonathan Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science. Mit Press.
- Mohan Matthen (2010). The Sensory Representation of Color. In Jonathan Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science. Mit Press.
- Mohan Matthen (2010). Is Memory Preservation? Philosophical Studies 148 (1).
- André Ariew & Mohan Matthen (2009). Selection and Causation. Philosophy of Science 76 (2):201-224.
- Mohan Matthen (2009). Chicken, Eggs, and Speciation. Noûs 43 (1):94-115.
- Mohan Matthen (2009). Truly Blue: An Adverbial Aspect of Perceptual Representation. Analysis 69 (1).
- Mohan Matthen (2009). Drift and “Statistically Abstractive Explanation”. Philosophy of Science 76 (4).
- Mohan Matthen & André Ariew (2009). Selection and Causation. Philosophy of Science 76 (2).
- Vincent Bergeron & Mohan Matthen (2008). Assembling the Emotions. In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press.
- Mohan Matthen (2008). Reply to Egan and Clark. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):415–421.
- Mohan Matthen (2008). Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Précis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):392–399.
- Mohan Matthen (2008). Review of Tyler Burge,, Foundations of Mind: Philosophical Essays, Volume 2. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (3).
- Mohan Matthen (2007). Defining Vision: What Homology Thinking Contributes. Biology and Philosophy 22 (5).
- Mohan P. Matthen (2006). Teleosemantics and the Consumer. In Graham F. Macdonald & David Papineau (eds.), Teleosemantics. Oxford University Press.
- Mohan P. Matthen (2006). On Visual Experience of Objects: Comments on John Campbell's Reference and Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 127 (2):195-220.
- Mohan P. Matthen, Our Knowledge of Color.
- Mohan Matthen (2005). Is Color Perception Really Categorical? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):504-505.
- Mohan P. Matthen (2005). Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception. Oxford University Press.
- Mohan Matthen & André Ariew (2005). How to Understand Casual Relations in Natural Selection: Reply to Rosenberg and Bouchard. Biology and Philosophy 20 (2-3).
- Mohan P. Matthen (2004). Features, Places, and Things: Reflections on Austen Clark's Theory of Sentience. Philosophical Psychology 17 (4):497-518.
- Mohan Matthen (2003). Is Sex Really Necessary? And Other Questions for Lewens. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2).
- Mohan Matthen (2003). Review of Benjamin Morison, On Location: Aristotle's Concept of Place. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (2).
- Mohan Matthen (2003). Color Nominalism, Pluralistic Realism, and Color Science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):39-40.
- Mohan P. Matthen (2002). Human Rationality and the Unique Origin Constraint. In André Ariew (ed.), Functions. Oxford University Press.
- Mohan Matthen & André Ariew (2002). Two Ways of Thinking About Fitness and Natural Selection. Journal of Philosophy 99 (2):55-83.
- Mohan Matthen (2001). How (and Why) Darwinian Selection Restricts Environmental Feedback. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (3):545-545.
- Mohan P. Matthen (2001). What Colors? Whose Colors? Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):117-124.
- Mohan P. Matthen (1999). The Disunity of Color. Philosophical Review 108 (1):47-84.
- Mohan Matthen (1998). Biological Universals and the Nature of Fear. Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):105-132.
- Mohan Matthen (1997). Teleology and the Product Analogy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (1):21 – 37.
- Mohan Matthen & R. J. Hankinson (1993). Aristotle's Universe: Its Form and Matter. Synthese 96 (3).
- Mohan Matthen (1991). Naturalism and Teleology. Journal of Philosophy 88 (11):656-657.
- Mohan P. Matthen (1989). Intensionality and Perception: A Reply to Rosenberg. Journal of Philosophy 86 (December):727-733.
- Mohan P. Matthen (1988). Biological Functions and Perceptual Content. Journal of Philosophy 85 (January):5-27.
- Mohan Matthen (1984). Forms and Participants in Plato's Phaedo. Noûs 18 (2):281-297.
- Mohan Matthen & Edwin Levy (1984). Teleology, Error, and the Human Immune System. Journal of Philosophy 81 (7):351-372.
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