Gary Merrill North Carolina State University
Contact

Affiliations
  • Faculty, North Carolina State University
  • PhD, University of Rochester, 1974.

Areas of specialization

Areas of interest

blank
About me
Out of graduate school, I taught about ten years as an academic philosopher at Loyola University. I then morphed into a software engineer (primarily compilers and software tools) and engineering manager for about fifteen years working at Bell Labs, Lattice, Inc., and SAS Institute. Next I moved into the pharmaceutical industry, working initially as a software engineer (information retrieval, computational linguistics, knowledge based systems, and data mining) on the IT side and then on to more in the areas of information extraction, knowledge exploration, and formal ontologies in biomedicine. I spent about four years with GlaxoWellcome, a year with Novartis, and eight years with GlaxoSmithKline (from which I took early retirement in early 2010). I have now returned to university teaching in philosophy to some degree, and more details can be found on my web site at NC State.
My works
19 items found.
Sort by:
  1. Gary H. Merrill (2011). Ontology, Ontologies, and Science. Topoi.
    Philosophers frequently struggle with the relation of metaphysics to the everyday world, with its practical value, and with its relation to empirical science. This paper distinguishes several different models of the relation between philosophical ontology and applied (scientific) ontology that have been advanced in the history of philosopy. Adoption of a strong participation model for the philosophical ontologist in science is urged, and requirements and consequences of the participation model are explored. This approach provides both a principled view and justification (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  2. Gary H. Merrill (2010). Ontological Realism: Methodology or Misdirection? Applied Ontology 5 (2):79-108.
    In a series of papers over a period of several years Barry Smith andWerner Ceusters have offered a number of cogent criticisms of historical approaches to creating, maintaining, and applying biomedical terminologies and ontologies. And they have urged the adoption of what they refer to as a “realism-based” approach. Indeed, at times they insist that the realism-based approach not only offers clear advantages and a well-founded methodological basis for ontology development and evaluation, but that such a realist perspective is in (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  3. Gary H. Merrill (2010). Realism and Reference Ontologies: Considerations, Reflections, and Problems. Applied Ontology 5 (3-4):189-221.
    In “Ontological realism: Methodology or misdirection?” I offered a detailed critique of the position referred to as “realism” taken by Barry Smith and Werner Ceusters. This position is claimed to serve as the basis for a “realist methodology” that they seek to impose on the development of scientific ontologies, particularly within the biomedical sciences. Here, in part responding to a reply to those criticisms by Smith and Ceusters, I return the focus to an examination of fundamental incoherencies in this realist (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  4. Gary H. Merrill (2009). Concepts and Synonymy in the UMLS Metathesaurus. Journal of Biomedical Discovery and Collaboration 4 (7).
    This paper advances a detailed exploration of the complex relationships among terms, concepts, and synonymy in the UMLS Metathesaurus, and proposes the study and understanding of the Metathesaurus from a model-theoretic perspective. Initial sections provide the background and motivation for such an approach, and a careful informal treatment of these notions is offered as a context and basis for the formal analysis. What emerges from this is a set of puzzles and confusions in the Metathesaurus and its literature pertaining to (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  5. Gary H. Merrill (2008). The MedDRA Paradox. Amia Annu Symp Proc:470-474.
    No categories
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  6. Gary H. Merrill, Patrick B. Ryan & Jeffery L. Painter (2008). Using SNOMED to Normalize and Aggregate Drug References in the SafetyWorks Observational Pharmacovigilance Project. Idamap (Intelligent Data Analysis in Medicine and Pharmacology.
    No categories
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  7. Gary H. Merrill (2006). Engineering a Development Platform for Ontology-Enhanced Knowledge Applications. In Raj Sharman, Rajiv Kishore & Ram Ramesh (eds.), Ontologies: A Handbook of Principles, Concepts and Applications in Information Systems. Springer.
    No categories
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  8. G. H. Merrill (1980). Book Review:Theory of Science George Gale. Philosophy of Science 47 (4):667-.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  9. G. H. Merrill (1980). Moderate Historicism and the Empirical Sense of 'Good Science'. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:223 - 235.
    Unlike the radical historicist and the radical logicist, the moderate historicist in the philosophy of science adopts the position that neither purely a priori (i.e., logical or philosophical) nor purely historical considerations alone determine the acceptability of a philosophical analysis of science. A dilemma arising from the nature of this position is first described and then it is argued that what is perhaps the most plausible way of avoiding this dilemma is doomed to failure. A particular example of this attempt (...)
    No categories
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  10. G. H. Merrill (1980). Three Forms of Realism. American Philosophical Quarterly 17 (3):229 - 235.
    No categories
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  11. G. H. Merrill (1980). The Model-Theoretic Argument Against Realism. Philosophy of Science 47 (1):69-81.
    In "Realism and Reason" Hilary Putnam has offered an apparently strong argument that the position of metaphysical realism provides an incoherent model of the relation of a correct scientific theory to the world. However, although Putnam's attack upon the notion of the "intended" interpretation of a scientific theory is sound, it is shown here that realism may be formulated in such a way that the realist need make no appeal to any "intended" interpretation of such a theory. Consequently, it can (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: jstor.org journals.uchicago.edu dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  12. G. H. Merrill (1979). A Note on Proxies. Erkenntnis 14 (3):371 - 372.
    No categories
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: jstor.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  13. G. H. Merrill (1979). Confirmation and Prediction. Philosophy of Science 46 (1):98-117.
    It is argued that Hempel's original rejection of the prediction criterion of confirmation in [8] (on the grounds that it leads to a circular definition of confirmation) was ill-conceived, and that his own approach exhibits undesirable consequences to the degree that it deviates from this criterion. A version of the prediction criterion is formulated which, in addition to being-non circular, escapes the criticisms advanced against Hempel's satisfaction criterion, offers certain clear advantages over alternative approaches, and may serve as the basis (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: jstor.org journals.uchicago.edu dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  14. G. H. Merrill (1979). On the Uniqueness of the Identity Relation. Analysis 39 (3):133 - 136.
    No categories
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  15. G. H. Merrill (1979). What a Sentence Says. Philosophical Studies 35 (4):405 - 412.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: jstor.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  16. G. H. Merrill (1978). Formalization, Possible Worlds and the Foundations of Modal Logic. Erkenntnis 12 (3):305 - 327.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: jstor.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  17. Gary H. Merrill (1977). On an Enduring Non Sequitur of Quine's. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 18 (4):613-615.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  18. G. H. Merrill (1975). A Free Logic with Intensions as Possible Values of Terms. Journal of Philosophical Logic 4 (4):293 - 326.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: jstor.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  19. G. H. Merrill (1975). Peirce on Probability and Induction. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 11 (2):90 - 109.
    No categories
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
Is this list right?