Joel Krueger University of Exeter
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  • Faculty, University of Exeter
  • PhD, Purdue University, 2007.

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I am a Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Exeter.
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  1. Joel Krueger (forthcoming). Emotions and Other Minds. In Rudiger Campe & Julia Weber (eds.), Interiority/Exteriority: Rethinking Emotion. Walter de Gruyter.
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  2. Joel Krueger (forthcoming). Empathy, Enaction, and Shared Musical Experience. In Tom Cochrane, Bernardino Fantini & Klaus Scherer (eds.), The Emotional Power of Music: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Musical Expression, Arousal and Social Control. Oxford University Press.
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  3. Joel Krueger (forthcoming). Varieties of Extended Emotions. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-23.
    I offer a preliminary defense of the hypothesis of extended emotions (HEE). After discussing some taxonomic considerations, I specify two ways of parsing HEE: the hypothesis of bodily extended emotions (HEBE), and the hypothesis of environmentally extended emotions (HEEE). I argue that, while both HEBE and HEEE are empirically plausible, only HEEE covers instances of genuinely extended emotions. After introducing some further distinctions, I support one form of HEEE by appealing to different streams of empirical research—particularly work on music and (...)
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  4. Joel Krueger & Søren Overgaard (forthcoming). Seeing Subjectivity: Defending a Perceptual Account of Other Minds. ProtoSociology.
    The problem of other minds has a distinguished philosophical history stretching back more than two hundred years. Taken at face value, it is an epistemological question: it concerns how we can have knowledge of, or at least justified belief in, the existence of minds other than our own. In recent decades, philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, anthropologists and primatologists have debated a related question: how we actually go about attributing mental states to others (regardless of whether we ever achieve knowledge or rational (...)
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  5. Joel Krueger (2014). Affordances and the Musically Extended Mind. Frontiers in Psychology 4.
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  6. Joel Krueger, Marco Bernini & Sam Wilkinson (2014). Introspection, Isolation, and Construction: Mentality as Activity. Commentary on Hurlburt, Heavey & Kelsey (2013). “Toward a Phenomenology of Inner Speaking”. Consciousness and Cognition 25:9-10.
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  7. Joel Krueger (2013). Empathy, Enaction, and Shared Musical Experience: Evidence From Infant Cognition. In Tom Cochrane, Bernardino Fantini & Klaus R. Scherer (eds.), The Emotional Power of Music: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Musical Arousal, Expression, and Social Control. Oup Oxford. 177.
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  8. Joel Krueger (2013). Merleau-Ponty on Shared Emotions and the Joint Ownership Thesis. Continental Philosophy Review 46 (4):509-531.
    In “The Child’s Relations with Others,” Merleau-Ponty argues that certain early experiences are jointly owned in that they are numerically single experiences that are nevertheless given to more than one subject (e.g., the infant and caregiver). Call this the “joint ownership thesis” (JT). Drawing upon both Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological analysis, as well as studies of exogenous attention and mutual affect regulation in developmental psychology, I motivate the plausibility of JT. I argue that the phenomenological structure of some early infant–caregiver dyadic exchanges (...)
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  9. Joel Krueger (2013). Watsuji's Phenomenology of Embodiment and Social Space. Philosophy East and West 63 (2):127-152.
    The aim of this essay is to situate the thought of Tetsuro Watsuji within contemporary approaches to social cognition. I argue for Watsuji's current relevance, suggesting that his analysis of embodiment and social space puts him in step with some of the concerns driving ongoing treatments of social cognition in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Yet, as I will show, Watsuji can potentially offer a fruitful contribution to this discussion by lending a phenomenologically informed critical perspective. This is because (...)
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  10. Simon McCarthy-Jones, Joel Krueger, Frank Larøi, Matthew R. Broome & Charles Fernyhough (2013). Stop, Look, Listen: The Need for Philosophical Phenomenological Perspectives on Auditory Verbal Hallucinations. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.
    One of the leading cognitive models of auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) proposes such experiences result from a disturbance in the process by which inner speech is attributed to the self. Research in this area has, however, proceeded in the absence of thorough cognitive and phenomenological investigations of the nature of inner speech, against which AVHs are implicitly or explicitly defined. In this paper we begin by introducing philosophical phenomenology and highlighting its relevance to AVHs, before briefly examining the evolving literature (...)
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  11. Søren Overgaard & Joel Krueger (2013). Social Perception and “Spectator Theories” of Other Minds. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):434 - 435.
    We resist Schilbach et al.’s characterization of the “social perception” approach to social cognition as a “spectator theory” of other minds. We show how the social perception view acknowledges the crucial role interaction plays in enabling social understanding. We also highlight a dilemma Schilbach et al. face in attempting to distinguish their second person approach from the social perception view.
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  12. Somogy Varga & Joel Krueger (2013). Background Emotions, Proximity and Distributed Emotion Regulation. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):271-292.
    In this paper, we draw on developmental findings to provide a nuanced understanding of background emotions, particularly those in depression. We demonstrate how they reflect our basic proximity (feeling of interpersonal connectedness) to others and defend both a phenomenological and a functional claim. First, we substantiate a conjecture by Fonagy & Target (International Journal of Psychoanalysis 88(4):917–937, 2007) that an important phenomenological aspect of depression is the experiential recreation of the infantile loss of proximity to significant others. Second, we argue (...)
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  13. Joel Krueger (2012). Seeing Mind in Action. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):149-173.
    Much recent work on empathy in philosophy of mind and cognitive science has been guided by the assumption that minds are composed of intracranial phenomena, perceptually inaccessible and thus unobservable to everyone but their owners. I challenge this claim. I defend the view that at least some mental states and processes—or at least some parts of some mental states and processes—are at times visible, capable of being directly perceived by others. I further argue that, despite its initial implausibility, this view (...)
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  14. Joel Krueger & John Michael (2012). Gestural Coupling and Social Cognition: Möbius Syndrome as a Case Study. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 6 (81):1-14.
    Social cognition researchers have become increasingly interested in the ways that behavioral, physiological, and neural coupling facilitate social interaction and interpersonal understanding. We distinguish two ways of conceptualizing the role of such coupling processes in social cognition: strong and moderate interactionism. According to strong interactionism (SI), low-level coupling processes are alternatives to higher-level individual cognitive processes; the former at least sometimes render the latter superfluous. Moderate interactionism(MI) on the other hand, is an integrative approach. Its guiding assumption is that higher-level (...)
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  15. Joel Krueger (2011). Doing Things with Music. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):1-22.
    This paper is an exploration of how we do things with music—that is, the way that we use music as an esthetic technology to enact micro-practices of emotion regulation, communicative expression, identity construction, and interpersonal coordination that drive core aspects of our emotional and social existence. The main thesis is: from birth, music is directly perceived as an affordance-laden structure. Music, I argue, affords a sonic world, an exploratory space or nested acoustic environment that further affords possibilities for, among other (...)
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  16. Joel Krueger (2011). Extended Cognition and the Space of Social Interaction. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):643-657.
    The extended mind thesis (EM) asserts that some cognitive processes are (partially) composed of actions consisting of the manipulation and exploitation of environmental structures. Might some processes at the root of social cognition have a similarly extended structure? In this paper, I argue that social cognition is fundamentally an interactive form of space management—the negotiation and management of ‘‘we-space”—and that some of the expressive actions involved in the negotiation and management of we-space (gesture, touch, facial and whole-body expressions) drive basic (...)
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  17. Joel Krueger (2011). The Who and the How of Experience. In Dan Zahavi, Evan Thompson & Mark Siderits (eds.), Self, No Self? Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions. Oxford University Press.
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  18. Joel Krueger (2010). James Austin's Selfless Insight: Zen and the Meditative Transformations of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (9-10):240-244.
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  19. Joel Krueger (2010). Radical Enactivism and Inter-Corporeal Affectivity. In Thomas Fuchs, Heribert Sattel & Peter Heningnsen (eds.), The Embodied Self: Dimensions, Coherence, and Disorders. Schattauer.
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  20. Joel Krueger (2010). The Who and How of Experience. In Mark Siderits, Evan Thompson & Dan Zahavi (eds.), Self, No Self?: Perspectives From Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions. Oup Oxford.
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  21. Joel Krueger (2009). Empathy and the Extended Mind. Zygon 44 (3):675-698.
    I draw upon the conceptual resources of the extended mind thesis (EM) to analyze <span class='Hi'>empathy</span> and interpersonal understanding. Against the dominant mentalistic paradigm, I argue that <span class='Hi'>empathy</span> is fundamentally an extended bodily activity and that much of our social understanding happens outside of the head. First, I look at how the two dominant models of interpersonal understanding, theory theory and simulation theory, portray the cognitive link between folk psychology and <span class='Hi'>empathy</span>. Next, I challenge their internalist orthodoxy and (...)
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  22. Joel Krueger (2009). Enacting Musical Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (2-3):98-123.
    I argue for an enactive account of musical experience — that is, the experience of listening ‘deeply’(i.e., sensitively and under- standingly) to a piece of music. The guiding question is: what do we do when we listen ‘deeply’to music? I argue that these music listening episodes are, in fact, doings. They are instances of active perceiving, robust sensorimotor engagements with and manipulations of sonic structures within musical pieces. Music is thus experiential art, and in Nietzsche’s words, ‘we listen to music (...)
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  23. Joel Krueger (2009). Knowing Through the Body: The Daodejing and Dewey. Journal of Chinese Philosophy 36 (1):31-52.
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  24. Joel Krueger & Dorothee Legrand (2009). The Open Body. In Antonella Carassa, Francesca Morganit & Giuseppe Riva (eds.), Enacting Intersubjectivity: Paving the Way for a Dialogue Between Cognitive Science, Social Cognition, and Neuroscience. Università della Svizzera Italiana.
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  25. D. Legrand, T. Grünbaum & J. Krueger (2009). Dimensions of Bodily Subjectivity. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (3):279-283.
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  26. Joel Krueger (2008). Levinasian Reflections on Somaticity and the Ethical Self. Inquiry 51 (6):603 – 626.
    In this article, I attempt to bring some conceptual clarity to several key terms and foundational claims that make up Levinas's body-based conception of ethics. Additionally, I explore ways that Levinas's arguments about the somatic basis of subjectivity and ethical relatedness receive support from recent empirical research. The paper proceeds in this way: First, I clarify Levinas's use of the terms “sensibility”, “subjectivity”, and “proximity” in Otherwise than Being: or Beyond Essence . Next, I argue for an interpretation of Levinas's (...)
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  27. Joel Krueger (2008). Nishida, Agency, and the 'Self-Contradictory' Body. Asian Philosophy 18 (3):213 – 229.
    In this essay, I investigate Kitarō Nishida's characterization of what he refers to as the 'self-contradictory' body. First, I clarify the conceptual relation between the self-contradictory body and Nishida's notion of 'acting-intuition'. I next look at Nishida's analysis of acting-intuition and the self-contradictory body as it pertains to our personal, sensorimotor engagement with the world and things in it, as well as to our bodily immersion within the intersubjective and social world. Along the way, I argue that Nishida develops a (...)
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  28. Joel Krueger (2007). Consciousness. In John Lachs & Robert Talisse (eds.), Encyclopedia of American Philosophy. Routledge.
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  29. Joel Krueger (2007). Stream of Consciousness. In John Lachs & Robert Talisse (eds.), Encyclopedia of American Philosophy. Routledge.
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  30. Joel Krueger (2006). Concrete Consciousness: A Sartrean Critique of Functionalist Accounts of Mind. Sartre Studies International 12 (2):44-60.
    Sartre's notion of pre-reflective consciousness can be summoned to offer a general challenge to contemporary functionalist accounts of mind, broadly construed. In virtue of the challenge Sartre offers these contemporary functionalist accounts and the richness of his phenomenological analysis, I conclude that his voice needs to be included in ongoing debates over the nature of consciousness. First, I look at some of the basic claims motivating functionalist accounts of mind. Next, I look at Sartre's notion of pre-reflective consciousness and discuss (...)
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  31. Joel Krueger (2006). James on Experience and the Extended Mind. Contemporary Pragmatism 3 (1):165-176.
    William James’s characterization of consciousness as a selecting agency can be used to develop and defend an externalist view of mind. The mind – including the content of phenomenal consciousness – is in an important sense distributed beyond the skin and skull of the subject, out into the world of people and things. Moreover, conscious experience is an action, and not simply something that happens to us. Consciousness, perception, and experience are activities – in other words, things that we do.
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  32. Joel Krueger (2006). The Varieties of Pure Experience: William James and Kitaro Nishida on Consciousness and Embodiment. William James Studies 1.
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  33. Joel Krueger, The Phenomenology of Person Perception.
    Recent discussions of social cognition in philosophy of mind and cognitive science have focused on the role of perception in facilitating social understanding. Some theorists, drawing upon phenomenological philosophy, argue that perception is our primary mechanism for understanding others. Call this the “direct perception” (DP) approach to social cognition. DP rests on the claim that, in most circumstances, we have direct perceptual contact with another person’s thoughts, emotions, intentions, etc., within their expressive behavior. DP proponents often frame their view as (...)
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  34. Dorothée Legrand & Joel Krueger, The Open Body.
    In this paper we characterize the body as constitutively open. We fi rst consider the notion of bodily openness at the basic level of its organic constitution. This will provide us a framework relevant for the understanding of the body open to its intersubjective world. We argue that the notion of “bodily openness” captures a constitutive dimension of intersubjectivity. Generally speaking, there are two families of theories intending to characterize the constitutive relation between subjectivity and intersubjectivity: either the self is (...)
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  35. Søren Overgaard & Joel Krueger, Seeing Subjectivity: Defending a Perceptual Account of Other Minds.
    The problem of other minds has a distinguished philosophical history stretching back more than two hundred years. Taken at face value, it is an epistemological question: it concerns how we can have knowledge of, or at least justified belief in, the existence of minds other than our own. In recent decades, philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, anthropologists and primatologists have debated a related question: how we actually go about attributing mental states to others (regardless of whether we ever achieve knowledge or rational (...)
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