David Rose Goldsmiths College, University of London
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  1. Jonathan Livengood, Justin Sytsma & David Rose, Following the FAD: Folk Attributions and Theories of Actual Causation.
    Using structural equations and directed graphs, Christopher Hitchcock (2007a) proposes a theory specifying the circumstances in which counterfactual dependence of one event e on another event c is necessary and sufficient for c to count as an actual cause of e. In this paper, we argue that Hitchcock is committed to a widely-endorsed folk attribution desideratum (FAD) for theories of actual causation. We then show experimentally that Hitchcock’s theory does not satisfy the FAD, and hence, it is in need of (...)
     
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  2. David Rose & Jonathan Schaffer, Folk Mereology Is Teleological.
    When do the folk think that mereological composition occurs? Many metaphysicians have wanted a view of composition that fits with folk intuitions, and yet there has been little agreement about what the folk intuit. We aim to put the tools of experimental philosophy to constructive use. Our studies suggest that folk mereology is teleological: people tend to intuit that composition occurs when the result serves a purpose. We thus conclude that metaphysicians should dismiss folk intuitions, as tied into a benighted (...)
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  3. Edouard Machery & David Rose (forthcoming). Encyclopedia of Mind.
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  4. David Rose (forthcoming). Persistence Through Function Preservation. Synthese.
    When do the folk think that material objects persist? Many metaphysicians have wanted a view which fits with folk intuitions, yet there is little agreement about what the folk intuit. I provide a range of empirical evidence which suggests that the folk operate with a teleological view of persistence: the folk tend to intuit that a material object survives alterations when its function is preserved. Given that the folk operate with a teleological view of persistence, I argue for a debunking (...)
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  5. David Rose, Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri (2014). When Words Speak Louder Than Actions: Delusion, Belief, and the Power of Assertion. Australasian Journal of Philosophy (4):1-18.
    People suffering from severe monothematic delusions, such as Capgras, Fregoli, or Cotard patients, regularly assert extraordinary and unlikely things. For example, some say that their loved ones have been replaced by impostors. A popular view in philosophy and cognitive science is that such monothematic delusions aren't beliefs because they don't guide behaviour and affect in the way that beliefs do. Or, if they are beliefs, they are somehow anomalous, atypical, or marginal beliefs. We present evidence from five studies that folk (...)
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  6. Wesley Buckwalter, David Rose & John Turri (2013). Belief Through Thick and Thin. Noûs 47 (3):n/a-n/a.
    We distinguish between two categories of belief—thin belief and thick belief—and provide evidence that they approximate genuinely distinct categories within folk psychology. We use the distinction to make informative predictions about how laypeople view the relationship between knowledge and belief. More specifically, we show that if the distinction is genuine, then we can make sense of otherwise extremely puzzling recent experimental findings on the entailment thesis (i.e. the widely held philosophical thesis that knowledge entails belief). We also suggest that the (...)
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  7. David Danks, David Rose & Edouard Machery (2013). Demoralizing Causation. Philosophical Studies (2):1-27.
    There have recently been a number of strong claims that normative considerations, broadly construed, influence many philosophically important folk concepts and perhaps are even a constitutive component of various cognitive processes. Many such claims have been made about the influence of such factors on our folk notion of causation. In this paper, we argue that the strong claims found in the recent literature on causal cognition are overstated, as they are based on one narrow type of data about a particular (...)
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  8. Edouard Machery & David Rose (2013). Experimental Philosophy. In Encyclopedia of Mind. Sage.
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  9. David Rose & David Danks (2013). In Defense of a Broad Conception of Experimental Philosophy. Metaphilosophy 44 (4):512-532.
    Experimental philosophy is often presented as a new movement that avoids many of the difficulties that face traditional philosophy. This article distinguishes two views of experimental philosophy: a narrow view in which philosophers conduct empirical investigations of intuitions, and a broad view which says that experimental philosophy is just the colocation in the same body of (i) philosophical naturalism and (ii) the actual practice of cognitive science. These two positions are rarely clearly distinguished in the literature about experimental philosophy, both (...)
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  10. David Rose & Shaun Nichols (2013). The Lesson of Bypassing. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (4):599-619.
    The idea that incompatibilism is intuitive is one of the key motivators for incompatibilism. Not surprisingly, then philosophers who defend incompatibilism often claim that incompatibilism is the natural, commonsense view about free will and moral responsibility (e.g., Pereboom 2001, Kane Journal of Philosophy 96:217–240 1999, Strawson 1986). And a number of recent studies find that people give apparently incompatibilist responses in vignette studies. When participants are presented with a description of a causal deterministic universe, they tend to deny that people (...)
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  11. David Rose & Jonathan Schaffer (2013). Knowledge Entails Dispositional Belief. Philosophical Studies 166 (1):19-50.
    Knowledge is widely thought to entail belief. But Radford has claimed to offer a counterexample: the case of the unconfident examinee. And Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel have claimed empirical vindication of Radford. We argue, in defense of orthodoxy, that the unconfident examinee does indeed have belief, in the epistemically relevant sense of dispositional belief. We buttress this with empirical results showing that when the dispositional conception of belief is specifically elicited, people’s intuitions then conform with the view that knowledge entails (dispositional) (...)
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  12. Mark Alicke, Ellen Gordon & David Rose (2012). Hypocrisy: What Counts? Philosophical Psychology (5):1-29.
    Hypocrisy is a multi-faceted concept that has been studied empirically by psychologists and discussed logically by philosophers. In this study, we pose various behavioral scenarios to research participants and ask them to indicate whether the actor in the scenario behaved hypocritically. We assess many of the components that have been considered to be necessary for hypocrisy (e.g., the intent to deceive, self-deception), factors that may or may not be distinguished from hypocrisy (e.g., weakness of will), and factors that may moderate (...)
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  13. Mark Alicke & David Rose (2012). Culpable Control and Deviant Causal Chains. Personality and Social Psychology Compass 6 (10):723-735.
    Actions that are intended to produce harmful consequences can fail to achieve their desired effects in numerous ways. We refer to action sequences in which harmful intentions are thwarted as deviant causal chains. The culpable control model of blame (CCM)is a useful tool for predicting and explaining the attributions that observers make of the actors whose harmful intentions go awry. In this paper, we describe six types of deviant causal chains; those in which: an actor’s attempt is obviated by the (...)
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  14. David Rose & David Danks (2012). Causation: Empirical Trends and Future Directions. Philosophy Compass 7 (9):643-653.
    Empirical research has recently emerged as a key method for understanding the nature of causation, and our concept of causation. One thread of research aims to test intuitions about the nature of causation in a variety of classic cases. These experiments have principally been used to try to resolve certain debates within analytic philosophy, most notably that between proponents of transference and dependence views of causation. The other major thread of empirical research on our concept of causation has investigated the (...)
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  15. Justin Sytsma, Jonathan Livengood & David Rose (2012). Two Types of Typicality: Rethinking the Role of Statistical Typicality in Ordinary Causal Attributions. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 43 (4):814-820.
    Empirical work on the use of causal language by ordinary people indicates that their causal attributions tend to be sensitive not only to purely descriptive considerations, but also to broadly moral considerations. For example, ordinary causal attributions appear to be highly sensitive to whether a behavior is permissible or impermissible. Recently, however, a consensus view has emerged that situates the role of permissibility information within a broader framework: According to the consensus, ordinary causal attributions are sensitive to whether or not (...)
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  16. Mark Alicke, David Rose & Dori Bloom (2011). Causation, Norm Violation, and Culpable Control. Journal of Philosophy 108 (12):670-696.
    Causation is one of philosophy's most venerable and thoroughly-analyzed concepts. However, the study of how ordinary people make causal judgments is a much more recent addition to the philosophical arsenal. One of the most prominent views of causal explanation, especially in the realm of harmful or potentially harmful behavior, is that unusual or counternormative events are accorded privileged status in ordinary causal explanations. This is a fundamental assumption in psychological theories of counterfactual reasoning, and has been transported to philosophy by (...)
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  17. David Rose, Jonathan Livengood, Justin Sytsma & Edouard Machery (2011). Deep Trouble for the Deep Self. Philosophical Psychology 25 (5):629 - 646.
    Chandra Sripada's (2010) Deep Self Concordance Account aims to explain various asymmetries in people's judgments of intentional action. On this account, people distinguish between an agent's active and deep self; attitude attributions to the agent's deep self are then presumed to play a causal role in people's intentionality ascriptions. Two judgments are supposed to play a role in these attributions?a judgment that specifies the attitude at issue and one that indicates that the attitude is robust (Sripada & Konrath, 2011). In (...)
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  18. Mark Alicke & David Rose (2010). Culpable Control or Moral Concepts? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (04):330-331.
    Knobe argues in his target article that asymmetries in intentionality judgments can be explained by the view that concepts such as intentionality are suffused with moral considerations. We believe that the “culpable control” model of blame can account both for Knobe's side effect findings and for findings that do not involve side effects.
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  19. David Danks & David Rose (2010). Diversity in Representations; Uniformity in Learning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):330-331.
    Henrich et al.'s conclusion that psychologists ought not assume uniformity of psychological phenomena depends on their descriptive claim that there is no pattern to the great diversity in psychological phenomena. We argue that there is a pattern: uniformity of learning processes (broadly construed), and diversity of (some) mental contents (broadly construed).
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  20. David Rose (2008). Peter Singer's Hegelianism: The Social Context of Equality. Between the Species 13 (8):5.
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  21. David Rose (2007). Hegel's Theory of Moral Action, its Place in His System and the 'Highest'Right of the Subject. Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 3 (2-3):170-191.
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  22. David Rose (2007). Imagination and Reason : An Ethics of Interpretation for a Cosmopolitan Age. In Diane Morgan & Gary Banham (eds.), Cosmopolitics and the Emergence of a Future. Palgrave Macmillan.
     
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  23. David Rose (2006). Consciousness: Philosophical, Psychological and Neural Theories. Oxford University Press.
    Philosophical approaches -- The history of the mind-body problem -- The philosophy of neuroscience -- Recent advances in functionalism I : homuncular functionalism -- Recent advances in functionalism II : teleological functionalism -- Representation and the physical basis of mental content -- Conscious and unconscious representations -- Brain dynamics, attention and movement -- Memory and perception -- The where and when of visual experience -- Multiple types of consciousness.
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  24. D. Rose (2005). Grammatical Metaphor. In Alex Barber (ed.), Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics. Elsevier.
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  25. David Rose (2003). Sartre and the Problem of Universal Human Nature Revisited. Sartre Studies International 9 (1):1-20.
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  26. D. Rose (2000). Toward a Multi-Level Theory of Intentionality. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):S99 - S100.
     
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  27. D. Rose (1996). Some Reflections on (or By?) Grandmother Cells. In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception. Ridgeview. 25--8.
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  28. David Rose (1989). Many a Slip 'Twixt External and Internal Representation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (1):93.
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  29. V. Dobson & D. Rose (1985). Application of an Explicit Procedure for Model Building in the Visual Cortex. In David Rose & Vernon Dobson (eds.), Models of the Visual Cortex. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 546--560.
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  30. Vernon G. Dobson & David Rose (1985). Models and Metaphysics: The Nature of Explanation Revisited. In David Rose & Vernon Dobson (eds.), Models of the Visual Cortex. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 22--36.
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  31. David Rose (1985). Ub8 3ph, Uk. In David Rose & Vernon Dobson (eds.), Models of the Visual Cortex. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 22.
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  32. David Rose & G. Dobson, Vernon (eds.) (1985). Models of the Visual Cortex. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
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  33. Sydney Levine & David Rose, Harm, Affect and the Moral/Conventional Distinction: Revisited.
    In a recent paper, Shaun Nichols (2002) presents a theory that offers an explanation of the cognitive processes underlying moral judgment. His Affect-Backed Norms theory claims that (i) a set of normative rules coupled with (ii) an affective mechanism elicits a certain response pattern (which we will refer to as the “moral norm response pattern”) when subjects respond to transgressions of those norms. That response pattern differs from the way subjects respond to violations of norms that lack the affective backing (...)
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