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• Faculty, University of Birmingham
• PhD, Australian National University, 2004.

• Philosophy of Cognitive Science
• Philosophy of Mind
• Applied Ethics

• Philosophy of Cognitive Science
• Applied Ethics
• Philosophy of Mind

I write about the limitations of human cognition, such as faulty reasoning, delusions, confabulations, irrational beliefs, poor knowledge of the self, distorted memories, unreliable self narratives, and attitude/behaviour inconsistencies. In addition, I am interested in exploring the ethical issues emerging from the contributions of science to society and I focus on the ethics of biomedical research and reproduction. At the University of Birmingham, I am an active member of the Health and Happiness Research Cluster. If you want to know more about my current projects, see my website or follow me on Twitter (@lisabortolotti).

47 items found. Sort by: publication yearfirst authorviewingsaddition date Lisa Bortolotti (2011). Psychiatric Classification and Diagnosis. Delusions and Confabulations. Paradigmi (1):99-112. In psychiatry some disorders of cognition are distinguished from instances of normal cognitive functioning and from other disorders in virtue of their surface features rather than in virtue of the underlying mechanisms responsible for their occurrence. Aetiological considerations often cannot play a significant classificatory and diagnostic role, because there is no sufficient knowledge or consensus about the causal history of many psychiatric disorders. Moreover, it is not always possible to uniquely identify a pathological behaviour as the symptom of a certain (...) disorder, as disorders that are likely to differ both in their causal histories and in their overall manifestations may give rise to very similar patterns of behaviour. -/- Consider delusions as an example. It wouldn’t be correct to define delusions as those beliefs people form as a result of a neurobiological deficit and a hypothesis-evaluation deficit (as some versions of the two-factor theory of delusions suggest), because for some delusions no neurobiological deficit may be found, and reasoning biases and motivational factors may be contributors to the formation of the delusion (e.g. McKay et al., 2005). Moreover, it would be a mistake to define delusions as symptoms of schizophrenia alone, because they occur also in other disorders, including dementia, amnesia, and delusional disorders. Thus, aetiological considerations may appear in the description and analysis of delusions, but do not feature prominently in their definition. -/- In this paper I argue that the surface features used as criteria for the classification and diagnosis of disorders of cognition are often epistemic in character. I shall offer two examples: confabulations and delusions are defined as beliefs or narratives that fail to meet standards of accuracy and justification. Although classifications and diagnoses based on features of people’s observable behaviour are necessary at these early stages of neuropsychiatric research, given the variety of conditions in which certain phenomena appear, I shall attempt to show that current epistemic accounts of confabulations and delusions have limitations. Epistemic criteria can guide both research and clinical practice, but fail to provide sufficient conditions for the identification of delusions and confabulations, and fail to demarcate pathological from non-pathological narratives or beliefs. -/- Another limitation of current epistemic accounts – which I shall not address here – is the excessive focus on epistemic faults of confabulations and delusions at the expense of their epistemically neutral or advantageous features (see Bortolotti and Cox, 2009). This may lead to a misconception of delusions and confabulations, and to an oversimplification in the assessment of the needs of people who require clinical treatment for their psychotic symptoms. (shrink) Delusions in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Philosophy of Psychiatry and Psychopathology, Misc in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Psychiatric Taxonomy in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Lisa Bortolotti (2011). Continuing Commentary: Shaking the Bedrock. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (1):77-87. This feature in Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology (PPP) is intended to provide ongoing commentary on main articles previously published in PPP. The essay by Bortolotti below is a response to John Rhodes and Richard Gipps's paper in PPP (15, no. 4:295-310).Can we understand people who report delusional beliefs? In their thought-provoking paper, "Delusions, Certainty, and the Background", John Rhodes and Richard Gipps (2008) present a novel account of delusions which has two main purposes: (1) offer an explanation of the truly (...) puzzling features of delusional reports and (2) put forward a theory about what is likely to cause delusions. The authors claim that current theories of delusions that appeal to unusual .. (shrink) Delusions in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Lisa Bortolotti (2011). Does Reflection Lead to Wise Choices? Philosophical Explorations 14 (3):297-313. Does conscious reflection lead to good decision-making? Whereas engaging in reflection is traditionally thought to be the best way to make wise choices, recent psychological evidence undermines the role of reflection in lay and expert judgement. The literature suggests that thinking about reasons does not improve the choices people make, and that experts do not engage in reflection, but base their judgements on intuition, often shaped by extensive previous experience. Can we square the traditional accounts of wisdom with the results (...) of these empirical studies? Should we even attempt to? I shall defend the view that philosophy and cognitive sciences genuinely interact in tackling questions such as whether reflection leads to making wise choices. (shrink) Normative and Descriptive Decision Theory in Philosophy of Action Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Lisa Bortolotti (2011). In Defence of Modest Doxasticism About Delusions. Neuroethics. Here I reply to the main points raised by the commentators on the arguments put forward in my Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs (OUP, 2009). My response is aimed at defending a modest doxastic account of clinical delusions, and is articulated in three sections. First, I consider the view that delusions are inbetween perceptual and doxastic states, defended by Jacob Hohwy and Vivek Rajan, and the view that delusions are failed attempts at believing or not-quitebeliefs, proposed by Eric Schwitzgebel and (...) Maura Tumulty. Then, I address the relationship between the doxastic account of delusions and the role, nature, and prospects of folk psychology, which is discussed by Dominic Murphy, Keith Frankish, and Maura Tumulty in their contributions. In the final remarks, I turn to the continuity thesis and suggest that, although there are important differences between clinical delusions and non-pathological beliefs, these differences cannot be characterised satisfactorily in epistemic terms. (shrink) Delusions in Philosophy of Cognitive Science The Nature of Belief in Philosophy of Mind Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: springerlink.com dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Lisa Bortolotti (2011). Précis of Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs. Neuroethics. Here I summarise the main arguments in Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs [1]. The book addresses the question whether there is a rationality constraint on belief ascription and defends a doxastic account of clinical delusions. Applied Ethics, Misc in Applied Ethics Delusions in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Lisa Bortolotti (2011). The Concept of Scientific Research. In Carlos Maria Romeo Casabona (ed.), Los nuevos horizontes de la investigacion genetica. Camares. Demarcation of Science in General Philosophy of Science Pseudoscience in General Philosophy of Science Rights in Applied Ethics in Applied Ethics Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Lisa Bortolotti, Rochelle Cox & Amanda Barnier (2011). Can We Recreate Delusions in the Laboratory? Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):109 - 131. Clinical delusions are difficult to investigate in the laboratory because they co-occur with other symptoms and with intellectual impairment. Partly for these reasons, researchers have recently begun to use hypnosis with neurologically intact people in order to model clinical delusions. In this paper we describe striking analogies between the behavior of patients with a clinical delusion of mirrored self misidentification, and the behavior of highly hypnotizable subjects who receive a hypnotic suggestion to see a stranger when they look in the (...) mirror. Based on these analogies, we argue that the use of hypnosis is a reliable method to investigate the surface features of clinical delusions. But to what extent can hypnosis successfully recreate delusions? Can it also contribute to a better understanding of delusion formation? Although clinical delusions and hypnotically induced beliefs are different in etiology, some analogies can be identified in the underlying processes that characterise them, based on the two-factor theory of delusion formation. (shrink) Delusions in Philosophy of Cognitive Science States of Consciousness in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: tandfonline.com dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Lisa Bortolotti & Heather Widdows (2011). The Right Not to Know: The Case of Psychiatric Disorders. Journal of Medical Ethics 37 (11):673-676. This paper will consider the right not to know in the context of psychiatric disorders. It will outline the arguments for and against acquiring knowledge about the results of genetic testing for conditions such as breast cancer and Huntington’s disease, and examine whether similar considerations apply to disclosing to clients the results of genetic testing for psychiatric disorders such as depression and Alzheimer’s disease. The right not to know will also be examined in the context of the diagnosis of psychiatric (...) disorders that are associated with stigma or for which there is no effective treatment. (shrink) Health Care Rights in Applied Ethics Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: jme.bmj.com dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Lisa Bortolotti (2010). Agency, Life Extension, and the Meaning of Life. Monist 93 (1):38-56. Contemporary philosophers and bioethicists argue that life extension is bad for the individual. According to the agency objection to life extension, being constrained as an agent adds to the meaningfulness of human life. Life extension removes constraints, and thus it deprives life of meaning. In the paper, I concede that constrained agency contributes to the meaningfulness of human life, but reject the agency objection to life extension in its current form. Even in an extended life, decision-making remains constrained, and many (...) obstacles to the fulfilment of an agent’s goals are preserved. Agents with longer lives are also presented with new challenges: for instance, it might be harder for them to avoid chronic boredom, and sustain their motivation to act in the pursuit of their goals. Although objections from agency and boredom are often used in combination to support the view that a much longer life is likely to bring misery or become meaningless, I argue that the acceptance of the boredom objection undermines the persuasiveness of the agency objection. (shrink) Agency in Philosophy of Action Death and Dying, Misc in Applied Ethics Life Extension in Applied Ethics Motivation in Philosophy of Action The Meaning of Life in Value Theory, Miscellaneous Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Lisa Bortolotti (2010). Can the Subject-of-a-Life Criterion Help Grant Rights to Non-Persons? In Matti Häyry (ed.), Arguments and Analysis in Bioethics. Rodopi. In this paper I compare different criteria for moral status, and assess Regan's notion of a "subject of a life". Animal Rights in Applied Ethics Biomedical Ethics in Applied Ethics Rights in Social and Political Philosophy Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Matthew Broome & Lisa Bortolotti (2010). What's Wrong with 'Mental' Disorders? Psychological Medicine. Commentary on the editorial by D Stein et al.'s "What is a Mental/Psychiatric Disorder? From DSM-IV to DSM-V". Mental Illness in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Philosophy of Psychiatry and Psychopathology, Misc in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Psychiatric Taxonomy in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Matthew Broome, Lisa Bortolotti & Matteo Mameli (2010). Moral Responsibility and Mental Illness: A Case Study. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2 (19):179-187. It is far too early to say what global impact the neurocognitive and neuropsychiatric sciences will have on our intuitions about moral responsibility. And it is far too early to say whether the notion of moral responsibility will survive this impact (and if so, in what form). But it is certainly worth starting to think about the local impact that these sciences can or should have on some of our distinctions and criteria. It might be possible to use some of (...) the tools offered by these sciences in order to refine or revise some of the categories currently used, without – for the time being at least – worrying too much about the fate of the notion of moral responsibility. This is an area where a piecemeal approach might be more productive: only after an evaluation of many distinct cases and situations it will be possible to say something general about the current notion of moral responsibility. In this article, we will focus on a single clinical case: a young man who has been convicted for assault on a neighbour and whose sentence was affected by a pre-existing diagnosis of mental illness. We will use this case, and an analysis of the similarities and differences between this case and other possible cases, in order to raise some (local but important) issues about the implications that discoveries in neuropsychology and neuropsychiatry can have for the way moral responsibility is attributed to agents and, more specifically, to agents with diagnoses of mental illnesses. (shrink) Mental Illness in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Neuroethics, Misc in Applied Ethics Psychopathology in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Psychopathology and Responsibility in Meta-Ethics Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Daniela Cutas & Lisa Bortolotti (2010). Natural Versus Assisted Reproduction. In Search of Fairness. Studies in Ethics, Law and Technology 4 (1):-. Whilst the choice of becoming a parent in the natural way is unregulated all over Europe (and proposals of regulation raise vehement objections), most European countries have (either legal or professional) regulations imposing criteria that people must satisfy if they wish to gain access to assisted reproduction and parenting. These criteria may include relationship status, age, sexual orientation, financial stability, health, and willingness to attend parenting classes. The existence of regulations in this area is largely accepted, and the objections raised (...) usually concern the suitability of specific criteria rather than the legitimacy of imposing criteria at all. The inequality (if unsupported) could be solved by requiring both prospective natural and assisted parents to satisfy the same criteria (with some qualifications specified below) and, more importantly, to be subject to the same degree of monitoring, regardless of the way in which they became parents. Often people argue that proposals to regulate natural reproduction revive dreaded eugenic policies of the past, and that their implementation would violate some of our most cherished interests and rights: in particular the interest in becoming a parent and the right to reproduction and parenting. However, the same interests and rights are not equally safeguarded when one needs assistance to become a parent, and proposals to reduce the extent to which prospective parents requiring assistance are scrutinized are unpopular. In this paper we challenge the alleged justification of the current practices, and we show that there are serious inconsistencies in the treatment of, respectively, people who become parents naturally and people who require assistance to become parents. Thus, we propose that regulation of reproduction and parenting be revised in such a way as to eliminate the inconsistencies. (shrink) Applied Ethics, General Works in Applied Ethics Parenthood in Applied Ethics Reproductive Ethics, Misc in Applied Ethics Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ... L. Bortolotti (2009). Review: Rachel Cooper: Psychiatry and Philosophy of Science. Mind 118 (469):163-166. Philosophy of Psychiatry and Psychopathology, Misc in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Psychiatric Taxonomy in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Lisa Bortolotti (2009). The Epistemic Benefits of Reason Giving. Theory and Psychology 19 (5):1-22. There is an apparent tension in current accounts of the relationship between reason giving and self knowledge. On the one hand, philosophers like Richard Moran (2001) claim that deliberation and justification can give rise to first-person authority over the attitudes that subjects form or defend on the basis of what they take to be their best reasons. On the other hand, the psychological evidence on the introspection effects and the literature on elusive reasons suggest that engaging in explicit deliberation or (...) justification leads subjects to report attitudes that are not consistent with their previous attitudes or with their future behavior. On the basis of these findings, Tim Wilson (2002) argues that analyzing reasons compromises self knowledge. I shall defend a realistic account of the effects of reason giving which is compatible with the empirical findings on introspection and also with the claim that deliberation and justification have epistemic benefits. (shrink) Belief, Misc in Philosophy of Mind Deliberation in Philosophy of Action First-Person Authority and Privileged Access in Philosophy of Mind Justification, Misc in Epistemology Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Lisa Bortolotti, Delusion. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia Entry on Delusions. Delusions in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Philosophy of Psychiatry and Psychopathology, Misc in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Lisa Bortolotti (2009). Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs. Oxford University Press. Delusions are a common symptom of schizophrenia and dementia. Though most English dictionaries define a delusion as a false opinion or belief, there is currently a lively debate about whether delusions are really beliefs and indeed, whether they are even irrational. The book is an interdisciplinary exploration of the nature of delusions. It brings together the psychological literature on the aetiology and the behavioural manifestations of delusions, and the philosophical literature on belief ascription and rationality. The thesis of the book (...) is that delusions are continuous with ordinary beliefs, a thesis that could have important theoretical and practical implications for psychiatric classification and the clinical treatment of subjects with delusions. By bringing together recent work in philosophy of mind, cognitive psychology and psychiatry, the book offers a comprehensive review of the philosophical issues raised by the psychology of normal and abnormal cognition, defends the doxastic conception of delusions, and develops a theory about the role of judgements of rationality and of attributions of self-knowledge in belief ascription. Presenting a highly original analysis of the debate on the nature of delusions, this book will interest philosophers of mind, epistemologists, philosophers of science, cognitive scientists, psychiatrists, and mental health professionals. (shrink) Delusions in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Mental Illness in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Philosophy of Psychiatry and Psychopathology, Misc in Philosophy of Cognitive Science $57.04 new   $61.40 used   $69.95 direct from Amazon   Amazon page Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: ukcatalogue.oup.com   | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Lisa Bortolotti (2009). Do We Have an Obligation to Make Smarter Babies? In T. Takala, P. Herrisone-Kelly & S. Holm (eds.), Cutting Through the Surface. Philosophical Approaches to Bioethics. Rodopi. In this paper I consider some issues concerning cognitive enhancements and the ethics of enhancing in reproduction and parenting. I argue that there are moral reasons to enhance the cognitive capacities of the children one has, or of the children one is going to have, and that these enhancements should not be seen as an alternative to pursuing important changes in society that might also improve one’s own and one’s children’s life. It has been argued that an emphasis on enhancing (...) cognitive capacities might encourage the commodification of children. But this objection seems misplaced. The reasons why one decides to reproduce can be subject to moral approbation or condemnation, as such rea-sons might be indicators of the quality of one’s parenting and the happiness of the future persons one is committed to bringing to life. However, once the decision to reproduce is made, no further harm comes from taking as few risks as possible on behalf of the persons to whom one is giving life with their health, character and cognitive capacities. (shrink) Cognitive Enhancement in Applied Ethics Parenthood in Applied Ethics Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Lisa Bortolotti (2009). Neurophilosophy at Work • by Paul Churchland. Analysis 69 (1):176-178. Neurophilosophy in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: analysis.oxfordjournals.org dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Lisa Bortolotti (2009). Philosophy and Happiness. Palgrave MacMillan. Philosophy and Happiness addresses the need to situate any meaningful discourse about happiness in a wider context of human interests, capacities and circumstances. How is happiness manifested and expressed? Can there be any happiness if no worthy life projects are pursued? How is happiness affected by relationships, illness, or cultural variants? Can it be reduced to preference satisfaction? Is it a temporary feeling or a persistent way of being? Is reflection conducive to happiness? Is mortality necessary for it? These are (...) the questions people ask themselves when they stop and think about how they feel, how their lives are going, and how they would be going if different choices had been made or different values had been prioritized. These are the questions that contributors to this volume begin to answer, adopting different methodologies, among which the analysis of widespread intuitions about imaginary and real-life scenarios, and reflection on the interpretation of the relevant empirical evidence emerging from psychology and economics. (shrink) Death and Dying, Misc in Applied Ethics Happiness in Normative Ethics The Meaning of Life in Value Theory, Miscellaneous Well-Being, Misc in Value Theory, Miscellaneous $68.01 used   $77.45 new   $83.26 direct from Amazon   Amazon page Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Lisa Bortolotti (2009). Review of Evnine, Simon J., Epistemic Dimensions of Personhood, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, Pp. Viii + 176, £32.50 (Cloth). Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):349-352. Belief, Misc in Philosophy of Mind Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome (2009). A Role for Ownership and Authorship in the Analysis of Thought Insertion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2):205-224. Philosophers are interested in the phenomenon of thought insertion because it challenges the common assumption that one can ascribe to oneself the thoughts that one can access first-personally. In the standard philosophical analysis of thought insertion, the subject owns the ‘inserted’ thought but lacks a sense of agency towards it. In this paper we want to provide an alternative analysis of the condition, according to which subjects typically lack both ownership and authorship of the ‘inserted’ thoughts. We argue that by (...) appealing to a failure of ownership and authorship we can describe more accurately the phenomenology of thought insertion, and distinguish it from that of non-delusional beliefs that have not been deliberated about, and of other delusions of passivity. We can also start developing a more psychologically realistic account of the relation between intentionality, rationality and self knowledge in normal and abnormal cognition. (shrink) Delusions in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Psychopathology in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Schizophrenia in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Self-Consciousness in Psychology in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: philosophy.bham.ac.uk springerlink.com   | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Lisa Bortolotti & Rochelle Cox (2009). Faultless Ignorance: Strengths and Limitations of Epistemic Definitions of Confabulation. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (4):952-965. There is no satisfactory account for the general phenomenon of confabulation, for the following reasons: (1) confabulation occurs in a number of pathological and non-pathological conditions; (2) impairments giving rise to confabulation are likely to have different neural bases; and (3) there is no unique theory explaining the aetiology of confabulations. An epistemic approach to defining confabulation could solve all of these issues, by focusing on the surface features of the phenomenon. However, existing epistemic accounts are unable to offer sufficient (...) conditions for confabulation and tend to emphasise only its epistemic disadvantages. In this paper, we argue that a satisfactory epistemic account of confabulation should also acknowledge those features which are (potentially) epistemically advantageous. For example, confabulation may allow subjects to exercise some control over their own cognitive life which is instrumental to the construction or preservation of their sense of self. (shrink) Belief, Misc in Philosophy of Mind Other Mental Disorders in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Philosophy of Psychiatry and Psychopathology, Misc in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Lisa Bortolotti & Daniela Cutas (2009). Reproductive and Parental Autonomy: An Argument for Compulsory Parental Education. Reproductive Biomedicine Online 19 (ethics suppl.):5-14. In this paper we argue that society should make available reliable information about parenting to everybody from an early age. The reason why parental education is important (when offered in a comprehensive and systematic way) is that it can help young people understand better the responsibilities associated with reproduction, and the skills required for parenting. This would allow them to make more informed life-choices about reproduction and parenting, and exercise their autonomy with respect to these choices. We do not believe (...) that parental education would constitute a limitation of individual freedom. Rather, the acquisition of relevant information about reproduction and parenting and the acquisition of self-knowledge with respect to reproductive and parenting choices can help give shape to individual life plans. We make a case for compulsory parental education on the basis of the need to respect and enhance individual reproductive and parental autonomy within a culture that presents contradictory attitudes towards reproduction and where decisions about whether to become a parent are subject to significant pressure and scrutiny. (shrink) Autonomy in Applied Ethics in Applied Ethics Contraception in Applied Ethics Parenthood in Applied Ethics Reproductive Ethics, Misc in Applied Ethics Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Lisa Bortolotti & Yujin Nagasawa (2009). Immortality Without Boredom. Ratio 22 (3):261-277. In this paper we address Bernard Williams' argument for the undesirability of immortality. Williams argues that unavoidable and pervasive boredom would characterise the immortal life of an individual with unchanging categorical desires. We resist this conclusion on the basis of the distinction between habitual and situational boredom and a psychologically realistic account of significant factors in the formation of boredom. We conclude that Williams has offered no persuasive argument for the necessity of boredom in the immortal life. 1. The Badness of Death in Applied Ethics Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: blackwell-synergy.com dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Matthew Broome & Lisa Bortolotti (2009). Mental Illness as Mental: A Defence of Psychological Realism. Humana.Mente 11:25-44. This paper argues for psychological realism in the conception of psychiatric disorders. We review the following contemporary ways of understanding the future of psychiatry: (1) psychiatric classification cannot be successfully reduced to neurobiology, and thus psychiatric disorders should not be conceived of as biological kinds; (2) psychiatric classification can be successfully reduced to neurobiology, and thus psychiatric disorders should be conceived of as biological kinds. Position (1) can lead either to instrumentalism or to eliminativism about psychiatry, depending on whether psychiatric (...) classification is regarded as useful. Position (2), which is inspired by the growing interest in neuroscience within scientific psychiatry, leads to biological realism or essentialism. In this paper we endorse a different realist position, which we label psychological realism. Psychiatric disorders are identified and addressed on the basis of their psychological manifestations which are often described as violations of epistemic, moral or social norms. A couple of examples are proposed by reference to the pathological aspects of delusions, and the factors contributing to their formation. (shrink) Mental Illness in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Matthew Broome & Lisa Bortolotti (2009). Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. Neuroscience has long had an impact on the field of psychiatry, and over the last two decades, with the advent of cognitive neuroscience and functional neuroimaging, that influence has been most pronounced. However, many question whether psychopathology can be understood by relying on neuroscience alone, and highlight some of the perceived limits to the way in which neuroscience informs psychiatry. Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience is a philosophical analysis of the role of neuroscience in the study of psychopathology. The book examines (...) numerous cognitive neuroscientific methods, such as neuroimaging and the use of neuropsychological models, in the context of a variety of psychiatric disorders, including depression, schizophrenia, dependence syndrome, and personality disorders. Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience includes chapters on the nature of psychiatry as a science; the compatibility of the accounts of mental illness derived from neuroscience, information-processing, and folk psychology; the nature of mental illness; the impact of methods such as fMRI, neuropsychology, and neurochemistry, on psychiatry; the relationship between phenomenological accounts of mental illness and those provided by naturalistic explanations; the status of delusions and the continuity between delusions and ordinary beliefs; the interplay between clinical and empirical findings in psychopathology and issues in moral psychology and ethics. With contributions from world class experts in philosophy and cognitive science, this book will be essential reading for those who have an interest in the importance and the limitations of cognitive neuroscience as an aid to understanding mental illness. (shrink) Neuroethics, Misc in Applied Ethics Philosophy of Psychiatry and Psychopathology, Misc in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Psychopathology in Philosophy of Cognitive Science $40.16 used   $53.41 new   $75.00 direct from Amazon   Amazon page Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Lisa Bortolotti (2008). An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Polity. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science provides a lively and accessible introduction to current key issues and debates in this area. The classic philosophical questions about methodology, progress, rationality and reality are addressed by reference to examples from the full range of natural and social sciences. Lisa Bortolotti uses a historically-informed perspective on the evolution of science and includes a thorough discussion of the ethical implications of scientific research. Special attention is paid to the complex relationship between the advancement (...) of science, policy making and public interest and to the continuity between scientific research and other human activities. The book is designed to help students think for themselves about the issues identified above, and includes information tables and questions for further reflection to support all stages of the teaching and learning experience, from the comprehension of primary and other secondary texts to debate and essay writing. It also includes a thematic bibliography and a glossary of technical terms. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science is an excellent introduction to philosophy for students and provides researchers of scientific disciplines with an opportunity to reflect upon the value and impact of their work. It is also a stimulating read for anybody who is interested in the philosophical issues raised by the status of scientific knowledge, the practice of science and the role of experts in contemporary society. (shrink) Philosophy of Science, General Works in Philosophy of Science, Misc $13.22 used   $18.00 new   $24.95 direct from Amazon   Amazon page Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Lisa Bortolotti (2008). The Philosophy of Happiness. Palgrave. Philosophy and Happiness addresses the need to situate any meaningful discourse about happiness in a wider context of human interests, capacities and circumstances. How is happiness manifested and expressed? Can there be any happiness if no worthy life projects are pursued? How is happiness affected by relationships, illness, or cultural variants? Can it be reduced to preference satisfaction? Is it a temporary feeling or a persistent way of being? Is reflection conducive to happiness? Is mortality necessary for it? These are (...) the questions people ask themselves when they stop and think about how they feel, how their lives are going, and how they would be going if different choices had been made or different values had been prioritized. These are the questions that contributors to this volume begin to answer, adopting different methodologies, among which the analysis of widespread intuitions about imaginary and real-life scenarios, and reflection on the interpretation of the relevant empirical evidence emerging from psychology and economics. (shrink) Aspects of Emotion, Misc in Philosophy of Mind Disease in Applied Ethics Emotional Expression in Philosophy of Mind Happiness in Normative Ethics Illness in Applied Ethics Knowledge of Emotion in Philosophy of Mind The Meaning of Life in Value Theory, Miscellaneous The Value of Lives in Value Theory, Miscellaneous Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Lisa Bortolotti (2008). What Does Fido Believe? Think 7 (19):7-15. Animal Cognition, Misc in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Belief, Misc in Philosophy of Mind Donald Davidson in 20th Century Philosophy Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome (2008). Delusional Beliefs and Reason Giving. Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):801-21. Philosophers have been long interested in delusional beliefs and in whether, by reporting and endorsing such beliefs, deluded subjects violate norms of rationality (Campbell 1999; Davies & Coltheart 2002; Gerrans 2001; Stone & Young 1997; Broome 2004; Bortolotti 2005). So far they have focused on identifying the relation between intentionality and rationality in order to gain a better understanding of both ordinary and delusional beliefs. In this paper Matthew Broome and I aim at drawing attention to the extent to which (...) deluded subjects are committed to the content of their delusional beliefs, that is, to whether they can be regarded as authors of their beliefs (Moran 2001). We consider several levels of commitment one can have to a reported belief, delusional or otherwise, and we distinguish between _ownership_ and _authorship_ of beliefs (Gallagher 2000). After examining some examples of belief authoring (or lack thereof) in psychopathology, we argue that there is no straight-forward and unitary answer to the question whether deluded subjects author their beliefs. Nevertheless, introducing the notion of authorship in the debate can significantly contribute to the philosophical literature on the rationality of delusions and can also have important implications for diagnosis and therapy in psychiatry. (shrink) Delusions in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: informaworld.com dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ... S. Camporesi & L. Bortolotti (2008). Reproductive Cloning in Humans and Therapeutic Cloning in Primates: Is the Ethical Debate Catching Up with the Recent Scientific Advances? Journal of Medical Ethics 34 (9):e15-e15. After years of failure, in November 2007 primate embryonic stem cells were derived by somatic cellular nuclear transfer, also known as therapeutic cloning. The first embryo transfer for human reproductive cloning purposes was also attempted in 2006, albeit with negative results. These two events force us to think carefully about the possibility of human cloning which is now much closer to becoming a reality. In this paper we tackle this issue from two sides, first summarising what scientists have achieved so (...) far, then discussing some of the ethical arguments in favour and against human cloning which are debated in the context of policy making and public consultation. Therapeutic cloning as a means to improve and save lives has uncontroversial moral value. As to human reproductive cloning, we consider and assess some common objections and failing to see them as conclusive. We do recognise, though, that there will be problems at the level of policy and regulation that might either impair the implementation of human reproductive cloning or make its accessibility restricted in a way that could become difficult to justify on moral grounds. We suggest using the time still available before human reproductive cloning is attempted successfully to create policies and institutions that can offer clear directives on its legitimate applications on the basis of solid arguments, coherent moral principles, and extensive public consultation. (shrink) Cloning in Applied Ethics Reproductive Ethics, Misc in Applied Ethics Therapeutic Cloning in Applied Ethics Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Lisa Bortolotti (2007). Disputes Over Moral Status: Philosophy and Science in the Future of Bioethics. Health Care Analysis 15 (2):153-8. Various debates in bioethics have been focused on whether non-persons, such as marginal humans or non-human animals, deserve respectful treatment. It has been argued that, where we cannot agree on whether these individuals have moral status, we might agree that they have symbolic value and ascribe to them moral value in virtue of their symbolic significance. In the paper I resist the suggestion that symbolic value is relevant to ethical disputes in which the respect for individuals with no intrinsic moral (...) value is in conflict with the interests of individuals with intrinsic moral value. I then turn to moral status and discuss the suitability of personhood as a criterion. There some desiderata for a criterion for moral status: it should be applicable on the basis of our current scientific knowledge; it should have a solid ethical justification; and it should be in line with some of our moral intuitions and social practices. Although it highlights an important connection between the possession of some psychological properties and eligibility for moral status, the criterion of personhood does not meet the desiderata above. I suggest that all intentional systems should be credited with moral status in virtue of having preferences and interests that are relevant to their well-being. (shrink) Animal Rights in Applied Ethics Biomedical Ethics in Applied Ethics Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: ptr.bham.ac.uk   | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Lisa Bortolotti & Bert Heinrichs (2007). Delimiting the Concept of Research: An Ethical Perspective. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 28 (3). It is important to be able to offer an account of which activities count as scientific research, given our current interest in promoting research as a means to benefit humankind and in ethically regulating it. We attempt to offer such an account, arguing that we need to consider both the procedural and functional dimensions of an activity before we can establish whether it is a genuine instance of scientific research. By placing research in a broader schema of activities, the similarities (...) and differences between research activities and other activities become visible. It is also easier to show why some activities that do not count as research can sometimes be confused with research and why some other activities can be regarded only partially as research. Although the concept of research is important to delimit a class of activities which we might be morally obliged to promote, we observe that the class of activities which are regarded as subject to ethical regulation is not exhausted by research activities. We argue that, whether they be research or not, all the activities that are likely to affect the rights and interests of the individuals involved and impact on the rights and interests of other individuals raise ethical issues and might be in need of ethical regulation. (shrink) Biomedical Ethics in Applied Ethics General Philosophy of Science, Misc in General Philosophy of Science Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Søren Holm & Lisa Bortolotti (2007). Large Scale Surveys for Policy Formation and Research–a Study in Inconsistency. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 28 (3). In this paper we analyse the degree to which a distinction between social science and public health research and other non-research activities can account for differences between a number of large scale social surveys performed at the national and European level. The differences we will focus on are differences in how participation is elicited and how data are used for government, research and other purposes. We will argue that the research / non-research distinction does not account for the identified differences (...) in recruitment or use and that there are no other convincing justifications. We argue that this entails that eliciting participation by coercion or manipulation becomes very difficult to justify. (shrink) Biomedical Ethics in Applied Ethics Scientific Research Ethics in Applied Ethics Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Lisa Bortolotti (2006). Moral Rights and Human Culture. Ethical Perspectives 13 (4):603-620. In this paper I argue that there is no moral justification for the conviction that rights should be reserved to humans. In particular, I reject James Griffin’s view on the moral relevance of the cultural dimension of humanity. Drawing from the original notion of individual right introduced in the Middle Ages and the development of this notion in the eighteenth century, I emphasise that the practice of according rights is justified by the interest in safeguarding the powers of reason and (...) autonomy that some individuals can exercise. Since we are in no position to rule out that non-humans can exercise these capacities, I conclude that rights should not be reserved to humans. This will lead to a reformulation of the reasons why so-called ‘marginal’ humans and non-human animals can be granted some basic rights. Being human is neither necessary nor sufficient for holding rights. All individuals, human or non-human, who can exercise reason and autonomy to some extent can be accorded basic rights in virtue of their having morally relevant preferences. (shrink) Animal Rights in Applied Ethics Applied Ethics, Misc in Applied Ethics Autonomy in Applied Ethics in Applied Ethics Autonomy, Misc in Social and Political Philosophy Intentionality, Misc in Philosophy of Mind Rights in Social and Political Philosophy Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: poj.peeters-leuven.be dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Lisa Bortolotti & John Harris (2006). Disability, Enhancement and the Harm -Benefit Continuum. In John R. Spencer & Antje du Bois-Pedain (eds.), Freedom and Responsibility in Reproductive Choice. Hart Publishers. Suppose that you are soon to be a parent and you learn that there are some simple measures that you can take to make sure that your child will be healthy. In particular, suppose that by following the doctor’s advice, you can prevent your child from having a disability, you can make your child immune from a number of dangerous diseases and you can even enhance its future intelligence. All that is required for this to happen is that you (or (...) your partner) comply with lifestyle and dietary requirements. Do you and your partner have any moral reasons (or moral obligations) to follow the doctor’s advice? Would it make a difference if, instead of following some simple dietary requirements, you consented to genetic engineering to make sure that your child was free from disabilities, healthy and with above average intelligence? In this paper we develop a framework for dealing with these questions and we suggest some directions the answers might take. (shrink) Cognitive Enhancement in Applied Ethics Disability in Applied Ethics Reproductive Ethics, Misc in Applied Ethics Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Lisa Bortolotti & Matteo Mameli (2006). Deception in Psychology : Moral Costs and Benefits of Unsought Self-Knowledge. Accountability in Research 13:259-275. Is it ethical to deceive the individuals who participate in psychological experiments for methodological reasons? We argue against an absolute ban on the use of deception in psychological research. The potential benefits of many psychological experiments involving deception consist in allowing individuals and society to gain morally significant self-knowledge that they could not otherwise gain. Research participants gain individual self-knowledge which can help them improve their autonomous decision-making. The community gains collective self-knowledge that, once shared, can play a role in (...) shaping education, informing policies and in general creating a more efficient and just society. (shrink) Autonomy and Moral Psychology in Social and Political Philosophy Deception in Applied Ethics Psychology in Cognitive Sciences Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: informaworld.com ingentaconnect.com ptr.bham.ac.uk   | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Matteo Mameli & Lisa Bortolotti (2006). Animal Rights, Animal Minds, and Human Mindreading. Journal of Medical Ethics 32 (2):84-89. Do non-human animals have rights? The answer to this question depends on whether animals have morally relevant mental properties. Mindreading is the human activity of ascribing mental states to other organisms. Current knowledge about the evolution and cognitive structure of mindreading indicates that human ascriptions of mental states to non-human animals are very inaccurate. The accuracy of human mindreading can be improved with the help of scientific studies of animal minds. But the scientific studies by themselves do not by themselves (...) solve the problem of how to map psychological similarities (and differences) between humans and animals onto a distinction between morally relevant and morally irrelevant mental properties. The current limitations of human mindreading – whether scientifically aided or not – have practical consequences for the rational justification of claims about which rights (if any) non-human animals should be accorded. (shrink) Animal Cognition in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Animal Rights in Applied Ethics Rights in Social and Political Philosophy Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: jme.bmj.com jme.bmjjournals.com people.pwf.cam.ac.uk ncbi.nlm.nih.gov dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Lisa Bortolotti (2005). Delusions and the Background of Rationality. Mind and Language 20 (2):189-208. I argue that some cases of delusions show the inadequacy of those theories of interpretation that rely on a necessary rationality constraint on belief ascription. In particular I challenge the view that irrational beliefs can be ascribed only against a general background of rationality. Subjects affected by delusions seem to be genuine believers and their behaviour can be successfully explained in intentional terms, but they do not meet those criteria that according to Davidson (1985a) need to be met for the (...) background of rationality to be in place. (shrink) Attitude Ascriptions, Misc in Philosophy of Language Delusions in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Rationality, Misc in Epistemology Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: philosophy.bham.ac.uk law.manchester.ac.uk blackwell-synergy.com ingentaconnect.com dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Lisa Bortolotti (2005). Intentionality Without Rationality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):385-392. It is often taken for granted in standard theories of interpretation that there cannot be intentionality without rationality. According to the background argument, a system can be interpreted as having irrational beliefs only against a general background of rationality. Starting from the widespread assumption that delusions can be reasonably described as irrational beliefs, I argue here that the background argument fails to account for their intentional description. Belief, Misc in Philosophy of Mind Donald Davidson in 20th Century Philosophy Rationality and Cognitive Science in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: philosophy.bham.ac.uk blackwell-synergy.com ingentaconnect.com blackwell-synergy.com jstor.org dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Lisa Bortolotti & John Harris (2005). Stem Cell Research, Personhood and Sentience. Reproductive Biomedicine Online 10:68-75. In this paper the permissibility of stem cell research on early human embryos is defended. It is argued that, in order to have moral status, an individual must have an interest in its own wellbeing. Sentience is a prerequisite for having an interest in avoiding pain, and personhood is a prerequisite for having an interest in the continuation of one's own existence. Early human embryos are not sentient and therefore they are not recipients of direct moral consideration. Early human embryos (...) do not satisfy the requirements for personhood, but there are arguments to the effect that they should be treated as persons nonetheless. These are the arguments from potentiality, symbolic value and the principle of human dignity. These arguments are challenged in this paper and it is claimed that they offer us no good reason to believe that early human embryos should be treated as persons. (shrink) Medical Research Ethics in Applied Ethics Personal Identity and Applied Ethics in Metaphysics Persons, Misc in Metaphysics Stem Cell Research in Applied Ethics Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: philosophy.bham.ac.uk ncbi.nlm.nih.gov   | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Lisa Bortolotti & John Harris (2005). Embryos and Eagles: Symbolic Value in Research and Reproduction. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 15 (01):-. On both sides of the debate on the use of embryos in stem cell research, and in reproductive technologies more generally, rhetoric and symbolic images have been evoked to influence public opinion. Human embryos themselves are described as either “very small human beings” or “small clusters of cells.” The intentions behind the use of these phrases are clear. One description suggests that embryos are already members of our community and share with us a right to life or at least respectful (...) treatment, whereas the other focuses on the differences between embryos and adult human beings with normal capacities, that is, their lack of sentience and of personal identity. The research on stem cells has been nicknamed “Frankenstein science” or presented as “research that could stop Parkinson disease.” Again, one description reminds us of scary science-fiction scenarios where the scientist is guilty of “playing God,” whereas the other description highlights the worth and potential benefits of the research outcomes. (shrink) Abortion in Applied Ethics Stem Cell Research in Applied Ethics Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Lisa Bortolotti (2004). Can We Interpret Irrational Behavior? Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):359 - 375. According to some theories of interpretation, it is difficult to explain and predict irrational behavior in intentional terms because irrational behavior does not support the ascription of intentional states with determinate content. In this paper I challenge this claim by offering a general diagnosis of those cases in which behavior, rational or not, resists interpretation. I argue that indeterminacy of ascription and paralysis of interpretation ensue when the interpreter lacks relevant information about the system to be interpreted and about the (...) environment in which the system is embedded. Moreover, the heuristics of interpretation that guide the ascription of beliefs can be limited in scope. In the end I suggest that by giving up the idea of a necessary rationality constraint on the ascription of intentional states we can develop a new framework for a more psychologically realistic account of interpretation. (shrink) No categories Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Lisa Bortolotti (2003). Inconsistency and Interpretation. Philosophical Explorations 6 (2):109-123. In this paper my purpose is to examine whether the case of inconsistent believers can offer a reason to object to theories of belief ascription that rely on a rationality constraint. I shall first illustrate how the possibility of inconsistent believers might be a challenge for the rationality constraint and then assess Davidson's influential reply to that challenge. Attitude Ascriptions, Misc in Philosophy of Language Irrationality in Epistemology The Intentional Stance in Philosophy of Mind Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: informaworld.com tandfonline.com dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ... L. Bortolotti (2002). Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):247 – 248. Book Information Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution. Edited by Fisette Denis. Kluwer Academic Publishers. Dordrecht. 1999. Pp. viii + 361. Hardback, US$140, £88. Consciousness and Intentionality in Philosophy of Mind Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: informaworld.com dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Lisa Bortolotti (2002). Review of Carolyn Price, Functions in Mind: A Theory of Intentional Content. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (3):380 – 381. Book Information Functions in Mind: A Theory of Intentional Content. Functions in Mind: A Theory of Intentional Content Carolyn Price Oxford Clarendon Press 2001 vi + 263 Hardback £35 By Carolyn Price. Clarendon Press. Oxford. Pp. vi + 263. Hardback:£35. Teleological Accounts of Mental Content in Philosophy of Mind Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: informaworld.com   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...

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