We often speak of 'Eastern' and 'Western' philosophy, yet it is not always easy to distinguish the key factors that justify this distinction. This essay explores the very different conceptions of the continuum that underlie these two traditions of thought and knowledge. The views of Hermann Weyl are given and it is proposed that they are correct. Attention is drawn to the mutually-exclusive visions of the continuum that separate the philosophies of East and West, and that give us a way (...) of pinning down a definition of these vague geographical terms so as to give them, in at least one respect, a clear philosophical and scientific meaning. (shrink)
The view that metaphysics is a waste of time appears to be gaining in popularity with every passing day. It is held openly by many scientists and even by many philosophers. I argue here that this is a consequence of the way metaphysics is often done, the futility of a certain approach to it, and not a reason to suppose that there is no useful knowledge to be acquired in metaphysics.
Mysticism claims of its logical scheme that it is Euclidean, that from its first axiom or principle the remainder of its doctrine follows, but it makes this claim in so many languages and in such a variety of obscure and self-contradictory ways that it is difficult to discern how this could be possible, and it is rarely considered a plausible claim in metaphysics. I believe it is plausible, and in this essay I try to explain why. -/- .
Some time ago, in an article for the Journal of Consciousness Studies, David Chalmers challenged his peers to identify the ingredient missing from our current theories of consciousness, the absence of which prevents us from solving the 'hard' problem and forces us to make do with nonreductive theories. Here I respond to this challenge. I suggest that consciousness is a metaphysical problem and as such can be solved only within a global metaphysical theory. Such a theory would look very like (...) the information theory proposed by Chalmers, but with the addition of an extra phenomenon that would allow it to become fundamental. (shrink)