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I have devoted much of my working life to arguing that we need to bring about a revolution in academia so that it promotes wisdom and does not just acquire knowledge. I have published six books on this theme: What’s Wrong With Science? (Bran's Head Books, 1976; 2nd edition, Pentire Press, 2009), From Knowledge to Wisdom (Blackwell, 1984; 2nd edition, Pentire Press, 2007), The Comprehensibility of the Universe (Oxford University Press, 1998; pbk 2003), The Human World in the Physical Universe (Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), Is Science Neurotic? (Imperial College Press, December 2004) and Cutting God in Half - And Putting the Pieces Together Again: A New Approach to Philosophy (Pentire Press, 2010). I have also contributed to a number of other books, and have published numerous papers in science and philosophy journals on problems that range from consciousness to quantum theory. For nearly thirty years I taught philosophy of science at University College London, where I am now Emeritus Reader in Philosophy of Science. In 2009 a book was published devoted to my work, edited by Leemon McHenry, called Science and the Pursuit of Wisdom: Studies in the Philosophy of Nicholas Maxwell (Ontos Verlag). My website URL, where more information about my life and work may be found, is: www.nick-maxwell.demon.co.uk

138 items found. Sort by: publication yearfirst authorviewingsaddition date Nicholas Maxwell, From Knowledge to Wisdom: Assessment and Prospects After Three Decades. Research Across Boundaries – Advances in Integrative Meta-Studies and Research Practice. We are in a state of impending crisis. And the fault lies in part with academia. For two centuries or so, academia has been devoted to the pursuit of knowledge and technological know-how. This has enormously increased our power to act which has, in turn, brought us both all the great benefits of the modern world and the crises we now face. Modern science and technology have made possible modern industry and agriculture, the explosive growth of the world’s population, global (...) warming, modern armaments and the lethal character of modern warfare, destruction of natural habitats and rapid extinction of species, immense inequalities of wealth and power across the globe, pollution of earth, sea and air, even the aids epidemic (aids being spread by modern travel). All these global problems have arisen because some of us have acquired unprecedented powers to act without acquiring the capacity to act wisely. We urgently need to bring about a revolution in universities so that the basic intellectual aim becomes, not knowledge merely, but rather wisdom – wisdom being the capacity to realize what is of value in life, for oneself and others, thus including knowledge and technological know-how, but much else besides. This is an argument I have propounded during the last three decades in six books, over thirty papers, and countless lectures delivered in universities and conferences all over the UK, Europe and north America. Despite all this effort, the argument has, by and large, been ignored. What is really surprising is that philosophers have paid no attention, despite the fact that that this body of work claims to solve the profoundly important philosophical problem: What kind of inquiry best helps us make progress towards as good a world as possible? There are, nevertheless, indications that some scientists and university administrators are beginning to become aware of the urgent need for science, and universities, to change. This is prompted, partly by growing awareness of the seriousness of environmental problems, especially global warming, and partly by a concern to improve the relationship between science and the public. So far, however, these changes have been small-scale, scattered and piecemeal. What we require is for academics and non-academics alike to wake up to the urgent need for change so that we may come to possess what we so strikingly and disastrously lack at present: a kind of inquiry rationally devoted to helping humanity make progress towards as good a world as possible. (shrink) Global Justice in Applied Ethics Philosophy of Physical Science, Miscellaneous in Philosophy of Physical Science Philosophy of Science, Misc Science and Values in General Philosophy of Science Social and Political Philosophy, Misc in Social and Political Philosophy Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (forthcoming). Has Science Established That the Cosmos is Physically Comprehensible? In Recent Advances in Cosmology. Nova Science Publishers. Most scientists would hold that science has not established that the cosmos is physically comprehensible – i.e. such that there is some as-yet undiscovered true physical theory of everything that is unified. This is an empirically untestable, or metaphysical thesis. It thus lies beyond the scope of science. Only when physics has formulated a testable unified theory of everything which has been amply corroborated empirically will science be in a position to declare that it has established that the cosmos is (...) physically comprehensible. But this argument presupposes a widely accepted but untenable conception of science which I shall call standard empiricism. According to standard empiricism, in science theories are accepted solely on the basis of evidence. Choice of theory may be influenced for a time by considerations of simplicity, unity, or explanatory capacity, but not in such a way that the universe itself is permanently assumed to be simple, unified or physically comprehensible. In science, no thesis about the universe can be accepted permanently as a part of scientific knowledge independently of evidence. Granted this view, it is clear that science cannot have established that the universe is physically comprehensible. Standard empiricism is, however, as I have indicated, untenable. Any fundamental physical theory, in order to be accepted as a part of theoretical scientific knowledge, must satisfy two criteria. It must be (1) sufficiently empirically successful, and (2) sufficiently unified. Given any accepted theory of physics, endlessly many empirically more successful disunified rivals can always be concocted – disunified because they assert that different dynamical laws govern the diverse phenomena to which the theory applies. These disunified rivals are not considered for a moment in physics, despite their greater empirical success. This persistent rejection of empirically more successful but disunified rival theories means, I argue, that a big, highly problematic, implicit assumption is made by science about the cosmos, to the effect, at least, that the cosmos is such that all seriously disunified theories are false. Once this point is recognized, it becomes clear, I argue, that we need a new conception of science which makes explicit, and so criticizable and improvable the big, influential, and problematic assumption that is at present implicit in physics in the persistent preference for unified theories. This conception of science, which I call aim-oriented empiricism, represents the assumption of physics in the form of a hierarchy of assumptions. As one goes up the hierarchy, the assumptions become less and less substantial, and more and more nearly such that their truth is required for science, or the pursuit of knowledge, to be possible at all. At each level, that assumption is accepted which (a) best accords with the next one up, and (b) has, associated with it the most empirically progressive research programme in physics, or holds out the greatest hope of leading to such an empirically progressive research programme. In this way a framework of relatively insubstantial, unproblematic, fixed assumptions and associated methods is created, high up in the hierarchy, within which much more substantial and problematic assumptions and associated methods, low down in the hierarchy, can be changed, and indeed improved, as scientific knowledge improves. One assumption in this hierarchy of assumptions, I argue, is that the cosmos is physically comprehensible – that is, such that some yet-to-be-discovered unified theory of everything is true. Hence the conclusion: improve our ideas about the nature of science and it becomes apparent that science has already established that the cosmos is physically comprehensible – in so far as science can ever establish anything theoretical. (shrink) General Philosophy of Science Philosophy of Physics, Misc in Philosophy of Physical Science Simplicity and Parsimony in General Philosophy of Science Direct download (3 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (forthcoming). How Universities Can Help Create a Wiser World: The Urgent Need for an Academic Revolution. Imprint Academic. In order to make progress towards a better world we need to learn how to do it. And for that we need institutions of learning rationally designed and devoted to helping us solve our global problems, make progress towards a better world. It is just this that we lack at present. Our universities pursue knowledge. They are neither designed nor devoted to helping humanity learn how to tackle global problems — problems of living — in more intelligent, humane and effective (...) ways. That, this book argues, is the key disaster of our times, the crisis behind all the others: our failure to have developed our institutions of learning so that they are rationally organized to help us solve our problems of living — above all, our global problems. Having universities devoted almost exclusively to the pursuit of knowledge is a recipe for disaster. Scientific knowledge and technological know-how have unquestionably brought great benefits to humanity. But they have also made possible — even caused — our current global crises, above all the impending crisis of global warming. In this lucid and provocative book, Nicholas Maxwell argues convincingly that we need urgently to bring about a revolution in universities round the world so that their basic aim becomes wisdom, and not just knowledge. (shrink) Philosophy of Higher Education in Philosophy of Social Science Philosophy of Physics, Misc in Philosophy of Physical Science Social Sciences, Misc in Social Sciences Virtue Ethics and Practical Wisdom in Normative Ethics Wisdom in Epistemology   My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (ed.) (forthcoming). Karl Popper, Science and Enlightenment. Pentire Press. Karl Popper in 20th Century Philosophy   My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (forthcoming). Misconceptions Concerning Wisdom. Journal of Modern Wisdom. If our concern is to help wisdom to flourish in the world, then the central task before us is to transform academia so that it takes up its proper task of seeking and promoting wisdom instead of just acquiring knowledge. Improving knowledge about wisdom is no substitute; nor is the endeavour of searching for the correct definition of wisdom. Philosophy of Social Science, Misc in Philosophy of Social Science Social and Political Philosophy, Misc in Social and Political Philosophy The Political Role of Philosophy in Social and Political Philosophy Value, Misc in Value Theory, Miscellaneous Wisdom in Epistemology Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (ed.) (forthcoming). Popper's Paradoxical Pursuit of Natural Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. Philosophy of science is seen by most as a meta-discipline – one that takes science as its subject matter, and seeks to acquire knowledge and understanding about science without in any way affecting, or contributing to, science itself. Karl Popper’s approach is very different. His first love is natural philosophy or, as he would put it, cosmology. This intermingles cosmology and the rest of natural science with epistemology, methodology and metaphysics. Paradoxically, however, one of his best known contributions, his proposed (...) solution to the problem of demarcation, helps to maintain the gulf that separates science from metaphysics, thus fragmenting cosmology into falsifiable science on the one hand, untestable philosophy on the other. This has damaging repercussions for a number of issues Popper tackles, from the problem of induction to simplicity of theory and quantum theory. But his proposed solution to the demarcation problem is untenable. Metaphysical assumptions are an integral part of scientific knowledge, inherent in the persistent acceptance of unified theories against the evidence. Once this is appreciated, it becomes obvious that natural philosophy, a synthesis of science and philosophy, is both more rigorous and of greater intellectual value than the two dissociated components we have today. What Popper sought for could come to full fruition. Problems that Popper tackled, from the problem of induction, to the problem of unity of theory, problems of quantum theory, and problems concerning the scope and limits of physics, all receive more adequate resolution within the new, fully-fledged natural philosophy. (shrink) General Philosophy of Science, Misc in General Philosophy of Science Karl Popper in 20th Century Philosophy Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (forthcoming). Recent Advances in Cosmology. Nova Science Publishers. No categories   My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (forthcoming). Taking the Nature of God Seriously. In Jeanine Diller Diller & Asa Kasher (eds.), Models of God and Other Ultimate Realities. Once it is appreciated that it is not possible for an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-loving God to exist, the important question arises: What does exist that is closest to, and captures the best of what is in, the traditional conception of God? In this paper I set out to answer that question. The first step that needs to be taken is to sever the God-of-cosmic-power from the God-of-cosmic-value. The first is Einstein’s God, the underlying dynamic unity in the physical universe which (...) physics seeks to depict by means of a true, unified, physical “theory of everything”. Science has already achieved some theoretical knowledge of this God-of-cosmic-power. The second is what is of most value in our human world, and in the world of sentient life more generally. Having cut God in half in this way, our fundamental problem, intellectual and practical, becomes: How can the God-of-cosmic-value (as it is represented on earth at least) exist and best flourish within the God-of-cosmic-power? Or, in other words: How can what is of value associated with human life – and sentient life more generally – exist and best flourish within the physical universe? Clearly acknowledging that this is our fundamental problem, in academic inquiry, and in all that we do, might help what is of value in life to flourish rather better than it does at present. (shrink) Dualism, Misc in Philosophy of Mind Metaphysical Realism in Metaphysics Physicalism, Misc in Metaphysics The Argument from Evil in Philosophy of Religion Value Realism in Value Theory, Miscellaneous Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (August 2011). Three Philosophical Problems About Consciousness and Their Possible Resolution. Open Journal of Philosophy 1 (1). Three big philosophical problems about consciousness are: Why does it exist? How do we explain and understand it? How can we explain brain-consciousness correlations? If functionalism were true, all three problems would be solved. But it is false, and that means all three problems remain unsolved (in that there is no other obvious candidate for a solution). Here, it is argued that the first problem cannot have a solution; this is inherent in the nature of explanation. The second problem is (...) solved by recognizing that (a) there is an explanation as to why science cannot explain consciousness, and (b) consciousness can be explained by a different kind of explanation, empathic or “personalistic” explanation, compatible with, but not reducible to, scientific explanation. The third problem is solved by exploiting David Chalmers“principle of structural coherence”, and involves postulating that sensations experienced by us–visual, auditory, tactile, and so on–amount to minute scattered regions in a vast, multi dimensional “space” of all possible sensations, which vary smoothly, and in a linear way, throughout the space. There is also the space of all possible sentient brain processes. There is just one, unique one-one mapping between these two spaces that preserves continuity and linearity. It is this which provides the explanation as to why brain processes and sensations are correlated as they are. I consider objections to this unique-matching theory, and consider how the theory might be empirically confirmed. (shrink) Philosophical Traditions Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   N. Maxwell (2012). Arguing for Wisdom in the University: An Intellectual Autobiography. Philosophia 40 (4):663-704. For forty years I have argued that we urgently need to bring about a revolution in academia so that the basic task becomes to seek and promote wisdom. How did I come to argue for such a preposterously gigantic intellectual revolution? It goes back to my childhood. From an early age, I desired passionately to understand the physical universe. Then, around adolescence, my passion became to understand the heart and soul of people via the novel. But I never discovered how (...) to tell stories in order to tell the truth. So, having failed to become a physicist, and failed to become a novelist, I studied philosophy at Manchester University and then, in six weeks of inspiration, discovered that the riddle of the universe is the riddle of our desires. Philosophy should be about how to live, and should not just do conceptual analysis. I struggled to reconcile the two worlds of my childhood ambitions, the physical universe and the human world. I decided they could be reconciled with one another if one regarded the two accounts of them, physics and common sense, as myths, and not as literal truths. But then I discovered Karl Popper: truth is too important to be discarded. I revised my ideas: physics seeks to depict truly only an aspect of all that there is; in addition, there is the aspect of the experiential features of the world as we experience it. I was immensely impressed with Popper’s view that science makes progress, not by verification, but by ferocious attempted falsification of theories. I was impressed, too, with his generalization of this view to form critical rationalism. Then it dawned on me: Popper’s view of science is untenable because it misrepresents the basic aim of science. This is not truth as such; rather it is explanatory truth – truth presupposed to be unified or physically comprehensible. We need, I realized, a new conception of science, called by me aim-oriented empiricism, which acknowledges the real, problematic aims of science, and seeks to improve them. Then, treading along a path parallel to Popper’s, I realized that aim-oriented empiricism can be generalized to form a new conception of rationality, aim-oriented rationality, with implications for all that we do. This led on to a new conception of academic inquiry. From the Enlightenment we have inherited the view that academia, in order to help promote human welfare, must first acquire knowledge. But this is profoundly and damagingly irrational. If academia really does seek to help promote human welfare, then its primary tasks must be to articulate problems of living, and propose and critically assess possible solutions – possible actions, policies, political programmes, philosophies of life. The pursuit of knowledge is secondary. Academia needs to promote cooperatively rational problem solving in the social world, and needs to help humanity improve individual and institutional aims by exploiting aim-oriented rationality, arrived at by generalizing the real progress-achieving methods of science. We might, as a result, get into life some of the progressive success that is such a marked feature of science. Thus began my campaign to promote awareness of the urgent need for a new kind of academic inquiry rationally devoted to helping humanity create a wiser world. (shrink) Metaphilosophy, Misc in Metaphilosophy Philosophy of Physical Science, Miscellaneous in Philosophy of Physical Science Philosophy of Social Science, Misc in Philosophy of Social Science The Role of Philosophy in Metaphilosophy Wisdom in Epistemology Direct download (3 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   N. Maxwell (2012). In Praise of Natural Philosophy: A Revolution for Thought and Life. Philosophia 40 (4):705-715. Modern science began as natural philosophy. In the time of Newton, what we call science and philosophy today – the disparate endeavours – formed one mutually interacting, integrated endeavour of natural philosophy: to improve our knowledge and understanding of the universe, and to improve our understanding of ourselves as a part of it. Profound, indeed unprecedented discoveries were made. But then natural philosophy died. It split into science on the one hand, and philosophy on the other. This happened during the (...) 18th and 19th centuries, and the split is now built into our intellectual landscape. But the two fragments, science and philosophy, are defective shadows of the glorious unified endeavour of natural philosophy. Rigour, sheer intellectual good sense and decisive argument demand that we put the two together again, and rediscover the immense merits of the integrated enterprise of natural philosophy. This requires an intellectual revolution, with dramatic implications for how we understand our world, how we understand and do science, and how we understand and do philosophy. There are dramatic implications, too, for education, and for the entire academic endeavour, and its capacity to help us discover how to tackle more successfully our immense global problems. (shrink) Philosophy of Physics, Misc in Philosophy of Physical Science Direct download (5 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2012). A Revolution in Universities. Bedales Association and Old Bedalian Newsletter:19. For much of my working life I have argued, in and out of print, that we need to bring about a revolution in the aims and methods of science – and of academic inquiry more generally. Instead of giving priority to the search for knowledge, universities need to devote themselves to seeking and promoting wisdom by rational means, wisdom being the capacity to realize what is of value in life, for oneself and others, wisdom thus including knowledge, understanding and technological (...) know-how, but much else besides. A basic task ought to be to help humanity learn how to create a better world. (shrink) Philosophy of Higher Education in Philosophy of Social Science Philosophy of Social Science, Misc in Philosophy of Social Science Rational Requirements in Epistemology Social Epistemology, Misc in Epistemology Virtue Ethics and Practical Wisdom in Normative Ethics Wisdom in Epistemology Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2012). Does Science Provide Us with the Methodological Key to Wisdom? Philosophia, First Part of 'Arguing for Wisdom in the University' 40 (4):664-673. Science provides us with the methodological key to wisdom. This idea goes back to the 18th century French Enlightenment. Unfortunately, in developing the idea, the philosophes of the Enlightenment made three fundamental blunders: they failed to characterize the progress-achieving methods of science properly, they failed to generalize these methods properly, and they failed to develop social inquiry as social methodology having, as its basic task, to get progress-achieving methods, generalized from science, into social life so that humanity might make progress (...) towards an enlightened world. Instead, the philosophes developed social inquiry as social science. This botched version of the Enlightenment idea was further developed throughout the 19th century, and built into academia in the early 20th century with the creation of university departments of social science. As a result, academia today seeks knowledge but does not devote reason to the task of helping humanity make progress towards a better, wiser world. Our current and impending global crises are the outcome. We urgently need to bring about a revolution in universities throughout the world so that the blunders of the Enlightenment are corrected, and universities take up their proper task of helping humanity make progress towards a wiser world. (shrink) General Philosophy of Science, Misc in General Philosophy of Science Philosophy of Physical Science, Miscellaneous in Philosophy of Physical Science Social Epistemology, Misc in Epistemology Social and Political Philosophy, Misc in Social and Political Philosophy Value, Misc in Value Theory, Miscellaneous Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2012). How Universities Can Help Humanity Learn How to Resolve the Crises of Our Times - From Knowledge to Wisdom: The University College London Experience. In G. Heam, T. Katlelle & D. Rooney (eds.), Handbook on the Knowledge Economy, vol. 2. Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. We are in a state of impending crisis. And the fault lies in part with academia. For two centuries or so, academia has been devoted to the pursuit of knowledge and technological know-how. This has enormously increased our power to act which has, in turn, brought us both all the great benefits of the modern world and the crises we now face. Modern science and technology have made possible modern industry and agriculture, the explosive growth of the world’s population, global (...) warming, modern armaments and the lethal character of modern warfare, destruction of natural habitats and rapid extinction of species, immense inequalities of wealth and power across the globe, pollution of earth, sea and air, even the aids epidemic (aids being spread by modern travel). All these global problems have arisen because some of us have acquired unprecedented powers to act, via science and technology, without also acquiring the capacity to act wisely. We urgently need to bring about a revolution in universities so that the basic intellectual aim becomes, not knowledge merely, but rather wisdom – wisdom being the capacity to realize what is of value in life, for oneself and others, thus including knowledge and technological know-how, but much else besides. (shrink) General Philosophy of Science, Misc in General Philosophy of Science Global Justice in Applied Ethics Science and Values in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Method, Miscellaneous in General Philosophy of Science Wisdom in Epistemology Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2012). Our Global Problems And What We Need To Do About Them. In Charles Tandy & Jack Lee (eds.), Death and Anti-Death Anthology, vol. 10: Ten Years After John Rawls (1921-2002). Ria University Press. How can what is of value associated with our human world exist and best flourish embedded as it is in the physical universe? Or, as we may put it, how can the God-of-Cosmic-Value exist and best flourish embedded as it is in the God-of-Cosmic-Power? This, I argue, is our fundamental problem – fundamental in both intellectual and practical terms. Here, I tackle the practical aspect of the problem. I consider briefly five global problems – climate change, war, population growth, world (...) poverty, habitat destruction and extinction of species – and argue that, in order to solve them it is essential to bring about a revolution in universities round the world so that the basic aim becomes wisdom and not just knowledge. I conclude by indicating recent developments which suggest the revolution may already be underway. (shrink) General Philosophy of Science, Misc in General Philosophy of Science Global Justice in Applied Ethics Scientific Metamethodology in General Philosophy of Science Social and Political Philosophy, Misc in Social and Political Philosophy Wisdom in Epistemology Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2012). The Menace of Science Without Wisdom. Ethical Record 117 (9):10-15. We urgently need to bring about a revolution in the aims and methods of science – and of academic inquiry more generally. Instead of giving priority to the search for knowledge, universities need to devote themselves to seeking and promoting wisdom by rational means, wisdom being the capacity to realize what is of value in life, for oneself and others, wisdom thus including knowledge, understanding and technological know-how, but much else besides. A basic task ought to be to help humanity (...) learn how to create a better world. Acquiring scientific knowledge dissociated from a more basic concern for wisdom, as we do at present, is dangerously and damagingly irrational. (shrink) No categories Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2012). The Menace of Science Without Civilization: From Knowledge to Wisdom. Dialogue and Universalism (3):39-63. We are in a state of impending crisis. And the fault lies in part with academia. For two centuries or so, academia has been devoted to the pursuit of knowledge and technological know-how. This has enormously increased our power to act which has, in turn, brought us both all the great benefits of the modern world and the crises we now face. Modern science and technology have made possible modern industry and agriculture, the explosive growth of the world’s population, global (...) warming, modern armaments and the lethal character of modern warfare, destruction of natural habitats and rapid extinction of species, immense inequalities of wealth and power across the globe, pollution of earth, sea and air, even the aids epidemic (aids being spread by modern travel). All these global problems have arisen because some of us have acquired unprecedented powers to act, via science and technology, without also acquiring the capacity to act wisely. We urgently need to bring about a revolution in universities so that the basic intellectual aim becomes, not knowledge merely, but rather wisdom – wisdom being the capacity to realize what is of value in life, for oneself and others, thus including knowledge and technological know-how, but much else besides. The revolution we require would put problems of living at the heart of the academic enterprise, the pursuit of knowledge emerging out of, and feeding back into, the fundamental intellectual activity of proposing and critically assessing possible actions, policies, political programmes, from the standpoint of their capacity to help solve problems of living. This revolution would affect almost every branch and aspect of academic inquiry. (shrink) General Philosophy of Science, Misc in General Philosophy of Science Philosophy of Social Science, Misc in Philosophy of Social Science Social Epistemology, Misc in Epistemology Wisdom in Epistemology Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2012). Wisdom: Object of Study or Basic Aim of Inquiry?,. In Michel Ferrari & N. Weststrate (eds.), The Scientific Study of Personal Wisdom. Springer. We face severe global problems, many that we have inadvertently created ourselves. It is clear that there is an urgent need for more wisdom. One response is to improve knowledge about wisdom. This, I argue, is an inadequate response to the problems we face. Our global problems arise, in part, from a damagingly irrational kind of academic enterprise, devoted as it is to the pursuit of knowledge. We need to bring about a revolution in academic inquiry so that its basic (...) aim becomes to seek and promote wisdom. (shrink) General Philosophy of Science, Misc in General Philosophy of Science Global Justice in Applied Ethics International Ethics, Misc in Applied Ethics Social and Political Philosophy, Misc in Social and Political Philosophy Wisdom in Epistemology Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2011). A Priori Conjectural Knowledge in Physics: The Comprehensibility of the Universe. In Mkichael Shaffer & Michael Veber (eds.), What Place for the A Priori? Open Court. In this paper I argue for a priori conjectural scientific knowledge about the world. Physics persistently only accepts unified theories, even though endlessly many empirically more successful disunified rivals are always available. This persistent preference for unified theories, against empirical considerations, means that physics makes a substantial, persistent metaphysical assumption, to the effect that the universe has a (more or less) unified dynamic structure. In order to clarify what this assumption amounts to, I solve the problem of what it means (...) to say of a theory that it is unified. There are, I argue, eight different kinds of unity important in theoretical physics, all varieties of one basic idea. This provides us with a precise way of partially ordering physical theories with respect to their degree of unity. It also leads to a hierarchical view of physics, according to which physics makes a number of increasingly insubstantial metaphysical assumptions concerning the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe. Two of these are identified as constituting a priori conjectures. I conclude by arguing that the view developed in the paper resolves the traditional clash between empiricism and rationalism in the philosophy of science, and has important implications for science, and for academic inquiry more generally. (shrink) General Philosophy of Science, Misc in General Philosophy of Science The A Priori, Misc in Epistemology $30.12 new   $32.31 used   $32.58 direct from Amazon   (collection)   Amazon page Direct download (4 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2011). Creating a Better World: Towards the University of Wisdom. In Ronald Barnett (ed.), The Future University: Ideas and Possibilities. Routledge. Universities need to change dramatically in order to help humanity make progress towards as good a world as possible. Global Justice in Applied Ethics Science and Values in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Method, Miscellaneous in General Philosophy of Science Social and Political Philosophy, Misc in Social and Political Philosophy Wisdom in Epistemology $130.96 new   $170.00 direct from Amazon   $195.49 used   (collection)   Amazon page Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2011). Is the Quantum World Composed of Propensitons? In Mauricio Suarez (ed.), Probabilities, Causes and Propensities in Physics. Springer. In this paper I outline my propensiton version of quantum theory (PQT). PQT is a fully micro-realistic version of quantum theory that provides us with a very natural possible solution to the fundamental wave/particle problem, and is free of the severe defects of orthodox quantum theory (OQT) as a result. PQT makes sense of the quantum world. PQT recovers all the empirical success of OQT and is, furthermore, empirically testable (although not as yet tested). I argue that Einstein almost put (...) forward this version of quantum theory in 1916/17 in his papers on spontaneous and induced radiative transitions, but retreated from doing so because he disliked the probabilistic character of the idea. Subsequently, the idea was overlooked because debates about quantum theory polarised into the Bohr/Heisenberg camp, which argued for the abandonment of realism and determinism, and the Einstein/Schrödinger camp, which argued for the retention of realism and determinism, no one, as a result, pursuing the most obvious option of retaining realism but abandoning determinism. It is this third, overlooked option that leads to PQT. PQT has implications for quantum field theory, the standard model, string theory, and cosmology. The really important point, however, is that it is experimentally testable. I indicate two experiments in principle capable of deciding between PQT and OQT. (shrink) Quantum Mechanics in Philosophy of Physical Science Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell, Looking for Ultimate Explanations in the Wrong Place. Metascience. Review of Michael Heller, Ultimate Explanations of the Cosmos, Springer, 2009. Cosmological Arguments for Theism, Misc in Philosophy of Religion Philosophy of Cosmology, Misc in Philosophy of Physical Science Direct download (5 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2011). Three Philosophical Problems About Consciousness and Their Possible Resolution. Open Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):1-10. Three big philosophical problems about consciousness are: Why does it exist? How do we explain and understand it? How can we explain brain-consciousness correlations? If functionalism were true, all three problems would be solved. But it is false, which means all three problems remain unsolved. Here, it is argued that the first problem cannot have a solution; this is inherent in the nature of explanation. The second problem is solved by recognizing that (a) there is an explanation as to why (...) science cannot explain consciousness, and (b) consciousness can be explained by a different kind of explanation, empathic or "personalistic" explanation, compatible with, but not reducible to, scientific explanation. The third problem is solved by exploiting David Chalmers' "principle of structural coherence", and involves postulating that sensations experienced by us visual, auditory, tactile, and so on amount to minute scattered regions in a vast, multi dimensional "space" of all possible sensations, which vary smoothly, and in a linear way, throughout the space. There is also the space of all possible sentient brain processes. There is just one, unique one-one mapping between these two spaces that preserves continuity and linearity. It is this which provides the explanation as to why brain processes and sensations are correlated as they are. I consider objections to this unique-matching theory, and consider how the theory might be empirically confirmed. (shrink) Dualism about Consciousness in Philosophy of Mind Explaining Consciousness, Misc in Philosophy of Mind Qualia, Misc in Philosophy of Mind Subjectivity and Objectivity in Philosophy of Mind The Explanatory Gap in Philosophy of Mind Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2011). We Need an Academic Revolution. Oxford Magazine (309):15-18. Universities today betray both reason and humanity. They are still dominated by the idea, inherited from the past, that the best way the academic enterprise can help promote human welfare is, in the first instance, to pursue the intellectual aim of acquiring knowledge. First, knowledge and technological know-how are to be acquired; then, secondarily, they can be applied to help solve social problems. But academic inquiry conducted in this way – knowledge-inquiry as it may be called – violates the most (...) elementary rules of reason that one can think of and, as a result, betrays the interests of humanity. We need a revolution in academia, one which puts problems of living at the heart of academic inquiry, and takes the basic aim to be to seek and promote wisdom, construed to be the capacity to realize what is of value in life, for oneself and others, thus including knowledge, but much else besides. (shrink) Metaepistemology in Epistemology Philosophy, Miscellaneous Value Theory, Misc in Value Theory, Miscellaneous Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2010). Cutting God in Half - And Putting the Pieces Together Again: A New Approach to Philosophy. Pentire Press. Cutting God in Half argues that, in order to tackle climate change, world poverty, extinction of species and our other global problems rather better than we are doing at present we need to bring about a revolution in science, and in academia more generally. We need to put our problems of living – personal, social, global – at the heart of the academic enterprise. How our human world, imbued with meaning and value, can exist and best flourish embedded in the (...) physical universe is, the book argues, our basic problem. It is our fundamental philosophical problem, our fundamental problem of knowledge and understanding, and our fundamental practical problem of living. It is this problem that we fail, at present, to recognize as fundamental – to our cost. It can be understood to arise as a result of cutting God in half – severing the God of Cosmic Power from the God of Value. The first is Einstein’s God, the underlying unity in the physical universe that determines how events occur. The second is what is of most value associated with human life – and sentient life more generally. Having cut God in half in this way, the problem then becomes to see how the two halves can be put together again. This book tackles outstanding aspects of this problem, and in doing so throws out original ideas about science, education, religion, evolutionary theory, free will, quantum theory, and how we should go about tackling our impending global crises. It transpires that bringing our basic problem into sharp focus has revolutionary implications. It becomes clear how and why many aspects of our social and cultural world urgently need to be transformed. Cutting God in Half is written in a lively, accessible style, and ought to be essential reading for anyone concerned about ultimate questions – the nature of the universe, the meaning of life, the future of humanity. (shrink) No categories $9.31 used   $10.99 new   $14.00 direct from Amazon   Amazon page Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2010). Wisdom-Inquiry. The Philosophers' Magazine 22 (50):84-85. The most exciting and important new philosophical idea of the past decade, in my view, is the discovery that we urgently need to bring about a revolution in science, and in academic inquiry more generally, so that the basic intellectual aim becomes to seek and promote wisdom. We urgently need to transform our schools and universities so that they become rationally devoted to helping humanity learn how to tackle our grave global problems, and thus make progress towards as good a (...) world as possible. (shrink) Epistemology, Misc in Epistemology Metaphilosophical Views, Misc in Metaphilosophy Philosophy of Social Science, General Works in Philosophy of Social Science Philosophy, Miscellaneous Wisdom in Epistemology Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2010). Review of Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal. [REVIEW] Metapsychology 14 (10). In this book Heather Douglas argues that widespread acceptance of the value-free ideal for science adversely affects the way science is used in policy making. The book is about an important issue. It is clearly written, and is a pleasure to read. I must confess, however that, as the author of at least four books that cover some of the same ground, and in many ways develop the argument much further than the author does here, I was disappointed to find (...) my work entirely ignored -- as other authors may be too, whose work is also ignored. (shrink) General Philosophy of Science, Misc in General Philosophy of Science Science and Values in General Philosophy of Science Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2010). Reply to Comments on Science and the Pursuit of Wisdom. Philosophia 38 (4):667-690. In this article I reply to comments made by Agustin Vicente and Giridhari Lal Pandit on Science and the Pursuit of Wisdom (McHenry 2009 ). I criticize analytic philosophy, go on to expound the argument for the need for a revolution in academic inquiry so that the basic aim becomes wisdom and not just knowledge, defend aim-oriented empiricism, outline my solution to the human world/physical universe problem, and defend the thesis that free will is compatible with physicalism. Free Will and Physics in Philosophy of Action Philosophy of Physical Science, Miscellaneous in Philosophy of Physical Science Philosophy, Miscellaneous Scientific Method, Miscellaneous in General Philosophy of Science Wisdom in Epistemology Direct download (3 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2010). The Urgent Need for an Academic Revolution: From Knowledge to Wisdom. In W. Karpiuk & K. Wisniewski (eds.), III International Interdisciplinary Technical Conference of Young Scientists: Proceedings. At present the basic intellectual aim of academic inquiry is to improve knowledge. Much of the structure, the whole character, of academic inquiry, in universities all over the world, is shaped by the adoption of this as the basic intellectual aim. But, judged from the standpoint of making a contribution to human welfare, academic inquiry of this type is damagingly irrational. Three of four of the most elementary rules of rational problem-solving are violated. A revolution in the aims and methods (...) of academic inquiry is needed so that the basic aim becomes to promote wisdom, conceived of as the capacity to realize what is of value, for oneself and others, thus including knowledge and technological know-how, but much else besides. This urgently needed revolution would affect every branch and aspect of the academic enterprise. (shrink) Philosophy of Physics, Misc in Philosophy of Physical Science Science and Values in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Metamethodology in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Method, Miscellaneous in General Philosophy of Science Wisdom in Epistemology Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2010). The Urgent Need for an Academic Revolution. In Mark Levene, Rob Johnson & Richard Maguire (eds.), History at the End of the World? History, Climate Change and the Possibility of Closure. Humanities-EBooks. Two great problems of learning confront humanity: first, learning about the nature of the universe and about ourselves as a part of the universe, and second, learning how to live wisely – learning how to make progress towards as good a world as possible. The first problem was solved, in essence, in the 17th century, with the creation of modern science. A method was discovered for progressively improving knowledge and understanding of the natural world, the famous empirical method of science. (...) But the second great problem of learning has not yet been solved. And this puts us in a situation of unprecedented danger. Indeed, all our current global problems can be traced back, in one way or another, to this source. Solving the first great problem of learning enormously increases our power to act, via the increase of scientific knowledge and technological know-how. But without wisdom – without a solution to the second problem of learning – our immensely increased power to act may have good consequences, but will as often as not have all sorts of harmful consequences as well, whether intended or not. In order to cope with the situation of unprecedented danger we find ourselves in, we need to learn from our solution to the first problem how to solve the second. That is, we need to learn from scientific progress how to make better social progress towards a wiser world. (shrink) Global Justice in Applied Ethics Scientific Metamethodology in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Method, Miscellaneous in General Philosophy of Science Social and Political Philosophy, Misc in Social and Political Philosophy Wisdom in Epistemology $26.29 new   $32.95 direct from Amazon   $46.29 used   (collection)   Amazon page Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2010). The Urgent Need for an Academic Revolution: The Rational Pursuit of Wisdom. In Charles Tandy (ed.), Death And Anti-Death, Volume 7: Nine Hundred Years After St. Anselm (1033-1109. Ria University Press. We are in a state of impending crisis. And the fault lies in part with academia. For two centuries or so, academia has been devoted to the pursuit of knowledge and technological know-how. This has enormously increased our power to act which has, in turn, brought us both all the great benefits of the modern world and the crises we now face. Modern science and technology have made possible modern industry and agriculture, the explosive growth of the world’s population, global (...) warming, modern armaments and the lethal character of modern warfare, destruction of natural habitats and rapid extinction of species, immense inequalities of wealth and power across the globe, pollution of earth, sea and air, even the AIDS epidemic (AIDS being spread by modern travel). All these global problems, involving preventable deaths of millions, have arisen because some of us have acquired unprecedented powers to act without acquiring the capacity to act wisely. We urgently need to bring about a revolution in universities so that the basic intellectual aim becomes, not knowledge merely, but rather to help humanity acquire the capacity to resolve conflicts and problems of living in more cooperatively rational ways. The revolution we need would affect every branch and aspect of academic inquiry. The basic intellectual task of academia would be to articulate our problems of living (personal, social and global) and propose and critically assess possible solutions, possible actions. This would be the task of social inquiry and the humanities. Tackling problems of knowledge would be secondary. Social inquiry would be at the heart of the academic enterprise, intellectually more fundamental than natural science. On a rather more long-term basis, social inquiry would be concerned to help humanity build cooperatively rational methods of problem-solving into the fabric of social and political life, so that we may gradually acquire the capacity to resolve our conflicts and problems of living in more cooperatively rational ways. Natural science would change to include three domains of discussion: evidence, theory, and aims – the latter including discussion of metaphysics, values and politics. Academia would actively seek to educate the public by means of discussion and debate. These changes all come from demanding that academia cure its current damaging structural irrationality, so that reason – the authentic article – may be devoted to promoting human welfare. (shrink) Global Justice in Applied Ethics International Ethics, Misc in Applied Ethics Science and Values in General Philosophy of Science Social and Political Philosophy, Misc in Social and Political Philosophy Wisdom in Epistemology Direct download (3 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2010). Universities: From Knowledge to Wisdom. Scientists for Global Responsibility Newsletter (38):18-20. Nicholas Maxwell argues that the growth in academic work devoted to policy issues could mark the beginning of a shift from ‘knowledge-inquiry’ to ‘wisdom-inquiry’, leading to importance benefits for society. Philosophy, Miscellaneous Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2010). Wisdom Mathematics. Friends of Wisdom Newsletter (6):1-6. For over thirty years I have argued that all branches of science and scholarship would have both their intellectual and humanitarian value enhanced if pursued in accordance with the edicts of wisdom-inquiry rather than knowledge-inquiry. I argue that this is true of mathematics. Viewed from the perspective of knowledge-inquiry, mathematics confronts us with two fundamental problems. (1) How can mathematics be held to be a branch of knowledge, in view of the difficulties that view engenders? What could mathematics be knowledge (...) about? (2) How do we distinguish significant from insignificant mathematics? This is a fundamental philosophical problem concerning the nature of mathematics. But it is also a practical problem concerning mathematics itself. In the absence of the solution to the problem, there is the danger that genuinely significant mathematics will be lost among the unchecked growth of a mass of insignificant mathematics. This second problem cannot, it would seem, be solved granted knowledge-inquiry. For, in order to solve the problem, mathematics needs to be related to values, but this is, it seems, prohibited by knowledge-inquiry because it could only lead to the subversion of mathematical rigour. Both problems are solved, however, when mathematics is viewed from the perspective of wisdom-inquiry. (1) Mathematics is not a branch of knowledge. It is a body of systematized, unified and inter-connected problem-solving methods, a body of problematic possibilities. (2) A piece of mathematics is significant if (a) it links up to the interconnected body of existing mathematics, ideally in such a way that some problems difficult to solve in other branches become much easier to solve when translated into the piece of mathematics in question; (b) it has fruitful applications for (other) worthwhile human endeavours. If ever the revolution from knowledge to wisdom occurs, I would hope wisdom mathematics would flourish, the nature of mathematics would become much more transparent, more pupils and students would come to appreciate the fascination of mathematics, and it would be easier to discern what is genuinely significant in mathematics (something that baffled even Einstein). As a result of clarifying what should count as significant, the pursuit of wisdom mathematics might even lead to the development of significant new mathematics. (shrink) Logicism in Mathematics in Philosophy of Mathematics Philosophy of Mathematics, Misc in Philosophy of Mathematics The Application of Mathematics in Philosophy of Mathematics Theories of Mathematics, Misc in Philosophy of Mathematics Value, Misc in Value Theory, Miscellaneous Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   N. Maxwell (2009). Replies and Reflections. In Leemon McHenry (ed.), Science and the Pursuit of Wisdom: Studies in the Philosophy of Nicholas Maxwell. Ontos Verlag. I reply to critical discussion of my work by Copthorne Macdonald, Steve Fuller, John Stewart, Joseph Agassi, Margaret Boden, Donald Gillies, Mathew Iredale, David Hodgson, Karl Rogers, and Leemon McHenry. No categories $96.50 used   $96.51 new   $135.00 direct from Amazon   (collection)   Amazon page Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   N. Maxwell (2009). The Metaphysics of Science: An Account of Modern Science in Terms of Principles, Laws and Theories, Craig Dilworth, Dordrecht, Springer, 2007, 2nd Ed. [REVIEW] International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):13-16.. This book propounds an immensely important idea. Science makes metaphysical presuppositions. I must, however, at once declare an interest. For well over thirty years I have myself been expounding and arguing for just this idea. No categories Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2009). An Idea to Save the World. Sublime (17):90-93. Here is an idea that just might save the world. It is that science, properly understood, provides us with the methodological key to the salvation of humanity. General Philosophy of Science, Misc in General Philosophy of Science Science and Values in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Method, Miscellaneous in General Philosophy of Science Social and Political Philosophy, Misc in Social and Political Philosophy Wisdom in Epistemology Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2009). Are Universities Undergoing an Intellectual Revolution?,. Oxford Magazine (290):13-16. For over 30 years I have argued, in and out of print that, for both intellectual and humanitarian reasons, we urgently need a revolution in the aims and methods of academic inquiry. Instead of giving priority to the search for knowledge, academia needs to devote itself to seeking and promoting wisdom by rational means, wisdom being the capacity to realize what is of value in life, for oneself and others. Wisdom thus includes knowledge but much else besides. A basic task (...) of academia would be to help humanity learn how to create a better world. Now I find the revolution is underway – entirely independent of my own efforts to promote it. During the last ten to twenty years, all sorts of changes have taken place in academia that amount to putting aspects of wisdom-inquiry into practice – even if in complete ignorance of my work. Perhaps the most significant steps are the creation of departments, institutions and research centres concerned with social policy, with problems of environmental degradation, climate change, poverty, injustice and war, and with such matters as medical ethics and community health. Nevertheless, the revolution is happening with agonizing slowness, in a dreadfully muddled and piecemeal way. It needs academics and non-academics to wake up to what is going on – or what needs to go on – to help give direction, coherence and a rationale to this nascent revolution from knowledge to wisdom. (shrink) No categories Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2009). From Knowledge to Wisdom. In David Cayley (ed.), Ideas on the Nature of Science. Goose Lane Editions. There are these two absolutely basic problems: to learn about the universe and ourselves as a part of the universe, and to learn how to create a civilized world. Essentially, we have solved the first problem. We solved it when we created modern science. That is not to say that we know everything that is to be known, but we created a method for improving our knowledge about the world. But we haven't solved the second problem. And to solve the (...) first problem without solving the second problem is very, very dangerous. The crisis is this: the crisis of having science without civlization. (shrink) General Philosophy of Science, Misc in General Philosophy of Science Science and Values in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Method, Miscellaneous in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Progress in General Philosophy of Science Wisdom in Epistemology $14.96 direct from Amazon   $15.76 new   $24.58 used   (collection)   Amazon page Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2009). How Can Life of Value Best Flourish in the Real World? In Leemon McHenry (ed.), Science and the Pursuit of Wisdom. Ontos Verlag. The Urgent Need for an Intellectual Revolution For much of my working life (from 1972 onwards) I have argued, in and out of print, that we need to bring about a revolution in the aims and methods of science – and of academic inquiry more generally. Instead of giving priority to the search for knowledge, academia needs to devote itself to seeking and promoting wisdom by rational means, wisdom being the capacity to realize what is of value in life, for (...) oneself and others, wisdom thus including knowledge, understanding and technological know-how, but much else besides. A basic task ought to be to help humanity learn how to create a better world. (shrink) No categories $96.50 used   $96.51 new   $135.00 direct from Amazon   (collection)   Amazon page Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2009). Muller's Critique of the Argument for Aim-Oriented Empiricism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 40 (1):103-114. For over 30 years I have argued that we need to construe science as accepting a metaphysical proposition concerning the comprehensibility of the universe. In a recent paper, Fred Muller criticizes this argument, and its implication that Bas van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism is untenable. In the present paper I argue that Muller’s criticisms are not valid. The issue is of some importance, for my argument that science accepts a metaphysical proposition is the first step in a broader argument intended to (...) demonstrate that we need to bring about a revolution in science, and ultimately in academic inquiry as a whole so that the basic aim becomes wisdom and not just knowledge. (shrink) Science, Logic, and Mathematics Direct download (4 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2009). The Metaphysics of Science: An Account of Modern Science in Terms of Principles, Laws and Theories. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):228 – 232. Science, Logic, and Mathematics Direct download (4 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2009). What’s Wrong With Science? Towards a People’s Rational Science of Delight and Compassion, Second Edition. Pentire Press. What ought to be the aims of science? How can science best serve humanity? What would an ideal science be like, a science that is sensitively and humanely responsive to the needs, problems and aspirations of people? How ought the institutional enterprise of science to be related to the rest of society? What ought to be the relationship between science and art, thought and feeling, reason and desire, mind and heart? Should the social sciences model themselves on the natural sciences: (...) or ought they to take a different form if they are to serve the interests of humanity objectively, sensitively and rigorously? Might it be possible to get into human life, into art, education, politics, industry, international affairs, and other domains of human activity, the same kind of progressive success that is found so strikingly, on the intellectual level, within science? These are some of the questions tackled by What’s Wrong With Science? But the book is no abstruse treatise on the philosophy of science. Most of it takes the form of a passionate debate between a Scientist and a Philosopher, a debate that is by turns humorous, ironical, bitter, dramatically explosive. Even as the argument explores the relationship between thought and feeling, reason and desire, the two main protagonists find it necessary to examine their own feelings and motivations. The book is a delight to read and can be understood by anyone. The book should have a wide appeal. It will be of interest to any scientist concerned about the intellectual and moral integrity of modern science – whether working in a physical, biological or social science. It will be of interest to educationalists, science teachers, students, 6th form pupils, historians, sociologists and philosophers of science, and indeed to anyone concerned about the place and role of science and technology in the modern world. First published in 1976, the book is even more relevant today than it was 33 years ago. This second edition has a new introduction in which the author explains how the book both exploits and develops Karl Popper’s philosophy. (shrink) General Philosophy of Science, Misc in General Philosophy of Science Philosophy of Social Science, Misc in Philosophy of Social Science Science and Values in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Metamethodology in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Method, Miscellaneous in General Philosophy of Science Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2008). Are Philosophers Responsible for Global Warming? Philosophy Now 65 (65):12-13. The suggestion that philosophers are responsible for global warming seems, on the face of it, absurd. However, that we might cause global warming has been known for over a century. If we had had in existence a more rigorous kind of academic inquiry devoted to promoting human welfare, giving priority to problems of living, humanity might have become aware of the dangers of global warming long ago, and might have taken steps to meet these dangers decades ago. That we do (...) not have academic inquiry of this type, giving priority to problems of living and able to warn humanity of the impending disaster of global warming, is the result of a philosophical mistake – a mistake about what constitutes rigorous intellectual inquiry. This is a mistake of philosophers. Thus philosophers, in failing to grasp the profound intellectual and humanitarian failings of academia as it is at present organized (the outcome of implementing a seriously defective philosophy of inquiry) can perhaps be said to be responsible for global warming. (shrink) Justice, Misc in Social and Political Philosophy Philosophy of Physical Science, Miscellaneous in Philosophy of Physical Science Scientific Method, Miscellaneous in General Philosophy of Science Social and Political Philosophy, Misc in Social and Political Philosophy The Political Role of Philosophy in Social and Political Philosophy Direct download (3 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2008). Do We Need a Scientific Revolution? Journal for Biological Physics and Chemistry 8 (3):95-105. Do We Need a Scientific Revolution? (Published in the Journal of Biological Physics and Chemistry, vol. 8, no. 3, September 2008) Nicholas Maxwell (Emeritus Reader in Philosophy of Science at University College London) www.nick-maxwell.demon.co.uk Abstract Many see modern science as having serious defects, intellectual, social, moral. Few see this as having anything to do with the philosophy of science. I argue that many diverse ills of modern science are a consequence of the fact that the scientific community has long accepted, (...) and sought to implement, a bad philosophy of science, which I call standard empiricism. This holds that the basic intellectual aim is truth, the basic method being impartial assessment of claims to knowledge with respect to evidence. Standard empiricism is, however, untenable. Furthermore, the attempt to put it into scientific practice has many damaging consequences for science. The scientific community urgently needs to bring about a revolution in both the conception of science, and science itself. It needs to be acknowledged that the actual aims of science make metaphysical, value and political assumptions and are, as a result, deeply problematic. Science needs to try to improve its aims and methods as it proceeds. Standard empiricism needs to be rejected, and the more rigorous philosophy of science of aim-oriented empiricism needs to be adopted and explicitly implemented in scientific practice instead. The outcome would be the emergence of a new kind of science, of greater value in both intellectual and humanitarian terms. (shrink) No categories Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell & Ronald Barnett (2008). Wisdom in the University. Routledge. We face grave global problems. We urgently need to learn how to tackle them in wiser, more effective, intelligent and humane ways than we have done so far. This requires that universities become devoted to helping humanity acquire the necessary wisdom to perform the task. But at present universities do not even conceive of their role in these terms. The essays of this book consider what needs to change in the university if it is to help humanity acquire the wisdom (...) it so urgently needs. (shrink) Applications of Science in General Philosophy of Science Moral Education in Normative Ethics Science and Values in General Philosophy of Science The Value of Lives in Value Theory, Miscellaneous Wisdom in Epistemology Direct download (4 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2007). Can the World Learn Wisdom? Solidarity, Sustainability, and Non-Violence 3 (4). The crisis of our times is that we have science without wisdom. This is the crisis behind all the others. Population growth, the terrifyingly lethal character of modern war and terrorism, immense differences of wealth across the globe, annihilation of indigenous people, cultures and languages, impending depletion of natural resources, destruction of tropical rain forests and other natural habitats, rapid mass extinction of species, pollution of sea, earth and air, thinning of the ozone layer, above all global warming - even (...) the aids epidemic: all these relatively recent crises have been made possible by modern science and technology. Indeed, in a perfectly reasonable sense of "cause", they have been caused by modern science and technology. An essential step we need to take, in order to tackle these global problems more effectively, intelligently and humanely than we have done so far, is to create a new kind of academic inquiry which puts problems of living, and the pursuit of wisdom, at the heart of the enterprise. (shrink) Global Justice in Applied Ethics Philosophy of Science, Miscellaneous in Philosophy of Science, Misc Science and Values in General Philosophy of Science Social and Political Philosophy, Misc in Social and Political Philosophy Wisdom in Epistemology Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2007). From Knowledge to Wisdom: A Revolution for Science and the Humanities (Second Edition). Pentire Press. From Knowledge to Wisdom argues that there is an urgent need, for both intellectual and humanitarian reasons, to bring about a revolution in science and the humanities. The outcome would be a kind of academic inquiry rationally devoted to helping humanity learn how to create a better world. Instead of giving priority to solving problems of knowledge, as at present, academia would devote itself to helping us solve our immense, current global problems – climate change, war, poverty, population growth, pollution... (...) of sea, earth and air, destruction of natural habitats and rapid extinction of species, injustice, tyranny, proliferation of armaments, conventional, chemical, biological and nuclear, depletion of natural resources. The basic intellectual aim of inquiry would be to seek and promote wisdom – wisdom being the capacity to realize what is of value in life for oneself and others, thus including knowledge and technological know-how, but much else besides. This second edition has been revised throughout, has additional material, a new introduction and three new chapters. (shrink) Epistemology, Misc in Epistemology Science and Values in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Method, Miscellaneous in General Philosophy of Science Wisdom in Epistemology $14.67 new   $18.00 direct from Amazon   $24.42 used   Amazon page Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2007). From Knowledge to Wisdom: The Need for an Academic Revolution. London Review of Education 5:97-115. At present the basic intellectual aim of academic inquiry is to improve knowledge. Much of the structure, the whole character, of academic inquiry, in universities all over the world, is shaped by the adoption of this as the basic intellectual aim. But, judged from the standpoint of making a contribution to human welfare, academic inquiry of this type is damagingly irrational. Three of four of the most elementary rules of rational problem-solving are violated. A revolution in the aims and methods (...) of academic inquiry is needed so that the basic aim becomes to promote wisdom, conceived of as the capacity to realize what is of value, for oneself and others, thus including knowledge and technological know-how, but much else besides. This urgently needed revolution would affect every branch and aspect of the academic enterprise. (shrink) Education in Professional Areas Philosophy of Sociology in Philosophy of Social Science Philosophy, Miscellaneous Physics in Natural Sciences The Aims of Education in Philosophy of Social Science Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2007). The Disastrous War Against Terrorism: Violence Versus Enlightenment. In Albert W. Merkidze (ed.), Terrorism Issues: Threat Assessment , Consequences and Prevention. In combating international terrorism, it is important to observe some basic principles, such as that international law must be complied with, care should be taken that one does not proceed in such a way that future terrorists are recruited, and one does not oneself become a terrorist. Unfortunately, the war on terrorism. Conduct of War in Social and Political Philosophy Ethics and Justification of War in Social and Political Philosophy Purpose of War in Social and Political Philosophy Terrorism in Social and Political Philosophy Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2007). The Enlightenment, Popper and Einstein. In ShiY (ed.), Knowledge and Wisdom. IOS Press. The Enlightenment, Popper and Einstein Abstract Nicholas Maxwell Email: nicholas.maxwell@ucl.ac.uk In this paper I discuss four versions of the basic idea of the French Enlightenment of the 18th century, namely: To learn from scientific progress how to achieve social progress towards an enlightened world. These four versions are: 1. The Traditional Enlightenment Programme. 2. The Popperian Version of the Enlightenment Programme. 3. The Improved Popperian Enlightenment Programme. 4. The New Enlightenment Programme. The Traditional Enlightenment Programme is the version of the (...) idea upheld by the philosophes of the French Enlightenment. It was developed throughout the 19th century and put into practice in the early 20th century with the creation of departments of social science in universities all over the world. It is however damagingly defective. The Popperian Version of the Enlightenment Programme is an improvement, but still defective. As we go down the list, from 1 and 2 to 3 and 4, each Programme improves on its predecessor, until with The New Enlightenment, which can in some respects be associated with Einstein, we arrive at a version of the idea which can genuinely help humanity make social progress towards an enlightened world. (shrink) Karl Popper in 20th Century Philosophy Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell, The Problem of Induction and Metaphysical Assumptions Concerning the Comprehensibility and Knowability of the Universe. PhilSci Archive. Even though evidence underdetermines theory, often in science one theory only is regarded as acceptable in the light of the evidence. This suggests there are additional unacknowledged assumptions which constrain what theories are to be accepted. In the case of physics, these additional assumptions are metaphysical theses concerning the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe. Rigour demands that these implicit assumptions be made explicit within science, so that they can be critically assessed and, we may hope improved. This leads to (...) a new conception of science, one which we need to adopt in order to solve the problem of induction. (shrink) Induction, Misc in General Philosophy of Science Justification of Induction in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Metamethodology in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Method, Miscellaneous in General Philosophy of Science Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell, Aim-Oriented Empiricism: David Miller's Critique. PhilSci Archive. For three decades I have expounded and defended aim-oriented empiricism, a view of science which, l claim, solves a number of problems in the philosophy of science and has important implications for science itself and, when generalized, for the whole of academic inquiry, and for our capacity to solve our current global problems. Despite these claims, the view has received scant attention from philosophers of science. Recently, however, David Miller has criticized the view. Miller’s criticisms are, however, not valid. Justification of Induction in General Philosophy of Science Metaphysics, Misc in Metaphysics Scientific Metamethodology in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Method, Miscellaneous in General Philosophy of Science Simplicity and Parsimony in General Philosophy of Science Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2006). Knowledge to Wisdom: We Need a Revolution. Philosophia 34 (3):377-378. The following document is a very brief summary of a thesis and argument that I have devoted the last 30 years of my life to trying to get across to my fellow human beings. It was first spelled out in What’s Wrong With Science? (Bran’s Head Books, 1976) and subsequently in From Knowledge to Wisdom (Blackwell, 1984), Is Science Neurotic? (Imperial College Press, 2004) and numerous articles, references to which can be found on http://www.nick-maxwell.demon.co.uk. Three years ago an international group (...) was formed, called Friends of Wisdom, which seeks to get across to academics and the public the compelling arguments and urgent need to transform academic inquiry so that its basic aim becomes to seek and promote wisdom. The document below is taken from the website of Friends of Wisdom, the URL of which is http://www.knowledgetowisdom.org. It is the mission statement of Friends of Wisdom. You are invited to join. (shrink) No categories Direct download (5 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2006). Learning to Live a Life of Value. In Jason A. Merchey (ed.), Living a Life of Value. Values of the Wise Press. Much of my working life has been devoted to trying to get across the point that we urgently need to bring about a revolution in the aims and methods of academic inquiry, so that the basic aim becomes to seek and promote wisdom rather than just acquire knowledge. Explaining Consciousness, Misc in Philosophy of Mind Metaphysics, Misc in Metaphysics Philosophy of Social Science, Misc in Philosophy of Social Science Physics in Natural Sciences Value Theory, Misc in Value Theory, Miscellaneous $0.64 used   $18.95 direct from Amazon   (collection)   Amazon page Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2006). Practical Certainty and Cosmological Conjectures. In Michael Rahnfeld (ed.), Is there Certain Knowledge? Leipziger Universitätsverlag. We ordinarily assume that we have reliable knowledge of our immediate surroundings, so much so that almost all the time we entrust our lives to the truth of what we take ourselves to know, without a moment’s thought. But if, as Karl Popper and others have maintained, all our knowledge is conjectural, then this habitual assumption that our common sense knowledge of our environment is secure and trustworthy would seem to be an illusion. Popper’s philosophy of science, in particular, fails (...) to do justice to the distinction we ordinarily draw between secure knowledge and mere conjecture. But Popper’s philosophy of science, in particular his attempted solution to the problem of induction, is defective. It fails to take into account that physics, in only accepting unified theories, even though endlessly empirically more successful disunified rivals are always available, makes the persistent metaphysical assumption that all disunified theories are false. Once this point is acknowledged, it becomes clear that a new conception of scientific method is required which sees science as making a hierarchy of metaphysical assumptions concerning the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe. This provides a framework of relatively unproblematic assumptions and associated methods of science within which much more problematic assumptions and associated methods can be critically assessed and improved. This hierarchical view seems at first to intensify the problem of distinguishing certainty from conjecture, in that it emphasizes that scientific knowledge, and even humble common sense knowledge, contain usually unacknowledged cosmological conjectures. But actually it explicates the basis we have for drawing the distinction between trustworthy knowledge and mere conjecture, and even goes some way towards providing a rationale for this distinction, in so far as one exists. (shrink) No categories Direct download (3 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2006). Special Relativity, Time, Probabilism, and Ultimate Reality. In D. Dieks (ed.), The Ontology of Spacetime. Elsevier, B. V. McTaggart distinguished two conceptions of time: the A-series, according to which events are either past, present or future; and the B-series, according to which events are merely earlier or later than other events. Elsewhere, I have argued that these two views, ostensibly about the nature of time, need to be reinterpreted as two views about the nature of the universe. According to the so-called A-theory, the universe is three dimensional, with a past and future; according to the B-theory, the universe (...) is four dimensional. Given special relativity (SR), we are obliged, it seems, to accept (a modified version of) the B-series, four dimensional view, and reject the A-series, three dimensional view, because SR denies that there is a privileged, instantaneous cosmic "now" which seems to be required by the A-theory. Whether this is correct or not, it is important to remember that the fundamental problem, here, is not "What does SR imply?", but rather "What is the best guess about the ultimate nature of the universe in the light of current theoretical knowledge in physics?". In order to know how to answer this question, we need to have some inkling as to how the correct theory of quantum gravity incorporates quantum theory, probability and time. This is, at present, an entirely open question. String theory, or M-theory, seems to evade the issue, and other approaches to quantum gravity seem equally evasive. However, if probabilism is a fundamental feature of ultimate physical reality, then it may well be that the A-theory, or rather a closely related doctrine I call “objectism”, is built into the ultimate constitution of things. (shrink) A-Theories of Time in Metaphysics B-Theories of Time in Metaphysics Special Relativity in Philosophy of Physical Science $129.60 used   $130.08 new   $145.67 direct from Amazon   (collection)   Amazon page Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2006). The Enlightenment Programme and Karl Popper. In I. I. Jarvie, K. Milford & D. Miller (eds.), Karl Popper: A Centenary Assessment. Volume 1: Life and Times, Values in a World of Facts. Ashgate. Popper first developed his theory of scientific method – falsificationism – in his The Logic of Scientific Discovery, then generalized it to form critical rationalism, which he subsequently applied to social and political problems in The Open Society and Its Enemies. All this can be regarded as constituting a major development of the 18th century Enlightenment programme of learning from scientific progress how to achieve social progress towards a better world. Falsificationism is, however, defective. It misrepresents the real, problematic aims (...) of science. We need a new conception of scientific method, a meta-methodology which provides a framework for the improvement of the aims and methods of science as scientific knowledge improves. This aim-oriented empiricist idea can be generalized to form a conception of rationality – aim-oriented rationality – which helps us improve problematic aims and methods whatever we may be doing. In this way, Popper’s version of the Enlightenment programme can be much improved, indeed transformed. (shrink) Karl Popper in 20th Century Philosophy Philosophy of Science, Miscellaneous in Philosophy of Science, Misc Scientific Method, Miscellaneous in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Progress in General Philosophy of Science Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Graham Cairns-Smith, Thomas W. Clark, Ravi Gomatam, Robert H. Kane, Nicholas Maxwell, J. J. C. Smart, Sean A. Spence & Henry P. Stapp (2005). Commentaries on David Hodgson's "a Plain Person's Free Will". Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (1):20-75. REMARKS ON EVOLUTION AND TIME-SCALES, Graham Cairns-Smith; HODGSON'S BLACK BOX, Thomas Clark; DO HODGSON'S PROPOSITIONS UNIQUELY CHARACTERIZE FREE WILL?, Ravi Gomatam; WHAT SHOULD WE RETAIN FROM A PLAIN PERSON'S CONCEPT OF FREE WILL?, Gilberto Gomes; ISOLATING DISPARATE CHALLENGES TO HODGSON'S ACCOUNT OF FREE WILL, Liberty Jaswal; FREE AGENCY AND LAWS OF NATURE, Robert Kane; SCIENCE VERSUS REALIZATION OF VALUE, NOT DETERMINISM VERSUS CHOICE, Nicholas Maxwell; COMMENTS ON HODGSON, J.J.C. Smart; THE VIEW FROM WITHIN, Sean Spence; COMMENTARY ON HODGSON, Henry Stapp. Free Will and Neuroscience in Philosophy of Action Libertarianism about Free Will in Philosophy of Action Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2005). A Mug's Game? Solving the Problem of Induction with Metaphysical Presuppositions. In John Earman & John Norton (eds.), PhilSci Archive. A Mug's Game? Solving the Problem of Induction with Metaphysical Presuppositions Nicholas Maxwell Emeritus Reader in Philosophy of Science at University College London Email: nicholas.maxwell@ucl.ac.uk Website: www.nick-maxwell.demon.co.uk Abstract This paper argues that a view of science, expounded and defended elsewhere, solves the problem of induction. The view holds that we need to see science as accepting a hierarchy of metaphysical theses concerning the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe, these theses asserting less and less as we go up the hierarchy. (...) It may seem that this view must suffer from vicious circularity, in so far as accepting physical theories is justified by an appeal to metaphysical theses in turn justified by the success of science. But this is rebutted. A thesis high up in the hierarchy asserts that the universe is such that the element of circularity, just indicated, is legitimate and justified, and not vicious. Acceptance of the thesis is in turn justified without appeal to the success of science. It may seem that the practical problem of induction can only be solved along these lines if there is a justification of the truth of the metaphysical theses in question. It is argued that this demand must be rejected as it stems from an irrational conception of science. (shrink) Justification of Induction in General Philosophy of Science Karl Popper in 20th Century Philosophy Metaphysics, Misc in Metaphysics Philosophy of Physical Science, Miscellaneous in Philosophy of Physical Science Scientific Metamethodology in General Philosophy of Science Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2005). A Revolution for Science and the Humanities: From Knowledge to Wisdom. Dialogue and Universalism 15 (1-2):29-57. At present the basic intellectual aim of academic inquiry is to improve knowledge. Much of the structure, the whole character, of academic inquiry, in universities all over the world, is shaped by the adoption of this as the basic intellectual aim. But, judged from the standpoint of making a contribution to human welfare, to the quality of human life, academic inquiry of this type, devoted, in the first instance, to the pursuit of knowledge, is grossly and damagingly irrational. Three of (...) four of the most elementary and uncontroversial rules of rational problem solving conceivable are violated. This rarely noticed, damaging, structural irrationality in current academic inquiry stems from the 18th century Enlightenment. In seeking to learn from scientific progress how humanity might make social progress towards a wiser, more enlightened world, Voltaire, Diderot, Condorcet et al. blundered; these blunders were developed throughout the 19th century, and built into the institutional structure of academic inquiry in the 20th century with the creation of diverse branches of social science. In order to create a kind of academic inquiry free of these blunders, devoted in a genuinely rational way to helping promote human welfare by intellectual and educational means, we need to bring about a major revolution in the overall aims and methods of inquiry, in its whole institutional and intellectual structure and character. The basic intellectual aim needs to become to promote wisdom - wisdom being understood to be the capacity to realize what is of value in life for oneself and others (and thus including knowledge, know-how and understanding). The social sciences need to become social philosophy, or social methodology, devoted to promoting more cooperatively rational solving of conflicts and problems of living in the world. Social inquiry, so pursued, would be intellectually more fundamental than natural science. The natural sciences need to recognize three domains of discussion: evidence, theories, and aims. Problems concerning research aims need to be discussed by both scientists and non-scientists alike, involving as they do questions concerning social priorities and values. Philosophy needs to become the sustained rational exploration of our most fundamental problems of understanding; it also needs to take up the task of discovering how we may improve our personal, institutional and global aims and methods in life, so that what is of value in life may be realized more successfully. Education needs to change so that problems of living become more fundamental than problems of knowledge, the basic aim of education being to learn how to acquire wisdom in life. Academic inquiry as a whole needs to become somewhat like a people's civil service, having just sufficient power to retain its independence and integrity, doing for people, openly, what civil services are supposed to do, in secret, for governments. These and many other changes, affecting every branch and aspect of academic inquiry, all result from replacing the aim to acquire knowledge by the aim to promote wisdom by cooperatively rational means. (shrink) Philosophy of Social Science Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2005). Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos and Aim-Oriented Empiricism. Philosophia 32 (1-4):181-239. In this paper I argue that aim-oriented empiricism (AOE), a conception of natural science that I have defended at some length elsewhere, is a kind of synthesis of the views of Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, but is also an improvement over the views of all three. Whereas Popper's falsificationism protects metaphysical assumptions implicitly made by science from criticism, AOE exposes all such assumptions to sustained criticism, and furthermore focuses criticism on those assumptions most likely to need revision if science is (...) to make progress. Even though AOE is, in this way, more Popperian than Popper, it is also, in some respects, more like the views of Kuhn and Lakatos than falsificationism is. AOE is able, however, to solve problems which Kuhn's and Lakatos's views cannot solve. (shrink) Imre Lakatos in 20th Century Philosophy Karl Popper in 20th Century Philosophy Philosophy of Physical Science, Miscellaneous in Philosophy of Physical Science Scientific Method, Miscellaneous in General Philosophy of Science Thomas Kuhn in 20th Century Philosophy Direct download (6 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2005). Philosophy Seminars for Five-Year-Olds,. Learning for Democracy 1 (2):71-77. We need a revolution in education, from five year olds onwards, so that exploration of problems is at the heart of the enterprise. Philosophy, Miscellaneous Rationality, Misc in Epistemology The Aims of Education in Philosophy of Social Science The Nature of Education in Philosophy of Social Science Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2005). Science Under Attack. The Philosopher’s Magazine (31, 3rd Quarter 2005):37-41. Science has been under attack ever since William Blake and Romantic movement. In our time, criticisms of modern science have led to Alan Sokal's spoof, and the so-called science wars. Both sides missed the point. Science deserves to be criticized for seriously misrepresenting its highly problematic aims, which have metaphysical, value and political assumptions associated with them. Instead of repressing these problematic aims, science ought rather to make them explicit, so that they can be critically assessed and, we may hope, (...) improved. (shrink) General Philosophy of Science, Misc in General Philosophy of Science Philosophy of Social Science, Misc in Philosophy of Social Science Science and Values in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Method, Miscellaneous in General Philosophy of Science Direct download (4 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2005). Science Versus Realization of Value, Not Determinism Versus Choice. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (1):53-58. Free Will and Science, Misc in Philosophy of Action   My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell, Comprehensibility Rather Than Beauty. PhilSci Archive. Most scientists and philosophers of science recognize that, when it comes to accepting and rejecting theories in science, considerations that have to do with simplicity, unity, symmetry, elegance, beauty or explanatory power have an important role to play, in addition to empirical considerations. Until recently, however, no one has been able to give a satisfactory account of what simplicity (etc.) is, or how giving preference to simple theories is to be justified. But in the last few years, two different but (...) related accounts have appeared, both of which address the above issues. On the one hand, James McAllister has argued that aesthetic criteria in science reflect scientists' judgements about what kind of theory is most likely to be empirically successful, based on the relative empirical success and failure of different kinds of theories in the past. Scientists employ what McAllister dubs "the aesthetic induction". On the other hand, I have argued that we need to see science as making a hierarchy of metaphysical assumptions about the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe, these assumptions asserting less and less as one ascends the hierarchy. One of the more substantial of these assumptions is that the universe is physically comprehensible. The key non-empirical feature a body of fundamental theories in physics must possess to be acceptable is unity. The better such a body of theory exemplifies the metaphysical thesis that the universe is physically comprehensible, in the sense that it has a unified dynamic structure, so the more acceptable such a body of theory is, from this standpoint. This affects not just theoretical physics, but the whole of natural science. In this paper I compare and contrast, and try to assess impartially the relative merits of, these two views. (shrink) Aesthetic Understanding in Aesthetics Explanation, Misc in General Philosophy of Science Philosophy of Physics, Misc in Philosophy of Physical Science Symmetry in Physics in Philosophy of Physical Science Unification Accounts of Explanation in General Philosophy of Science Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2004). Does Probabilism Solve the Great Quantum Mystery? Theoria 19 (3):321-336. What sort of entities are electrons, photons and atoms given their wave-like and particle-like properties? Is nature fundamentally deterministic or probabilistic? Orthodox quantum theory (OQT) evades answering these two basic questions by being a theory about the results of performing measurements on quantum systems. But this evasion results in OQT being a seriously defective theory. A rival, somewhat ignored strategy is to conjecture that the quantum domain is fundamentally probabilistic. This means quantum entities, interacting with one another probabilistically, must differ (...) radically from the entities of deterministic classical physics, the classical wave or particle. It becomes possible to conceive of quantum entities as a new kind of fundamentally probabilistic entity, the “propensiton”, neither wave nor particle. A fully micro realistic, testable rival to OQT results. (shrink) Quantum Mechanics in Philosophy of Physical Science Direct download (3 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2004). In Defense of Seeking Wisdom. Metaphilosophy 35 (5):733-743. Steven Yates has criticized my claim that we need to bring about a revolution in the aims and methods of academic inquiry, so that the aim becomes to promote wisdom rather than just acquire knowledge. Yates's main criticism is that the proposed revolution does not have a clear strategy for its implementation, and is, in any case, Utopian, unrealizable and undesirable. It is argued, here, that Yates has misconstrued what the proposed revolution amounts to; in fact it is realizable, urgently (...) needed, and involves exploiting the kind of strategies utilized so effectively by the philosophes of the 18th century French Enlightenment. (shrink) Objectivity and Value in Social Science in Philosophy of Social Science Philosophy of Social Science, Misc in Philosophy of Social Science Scientific Metamethodology in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Method, Miscellaneous in General Philosophy of Science Wisdom in Epistemology Direct download (4 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2004). Is Science Neurotic? Imperial College Press. Is Science Neurotic? sets out to show that science suffers from a damaging but rarely noticed methodological disease — “rationalistic neurosis.” Assumptions concerning metaphysics, human value and politics, implicit in the aims of science, are repressed, and the malaise has spread to affect the whole academic enterprise, with the potential for extraordinarily damaging long-term consequences. The book begins with a discussion of the aims and methods of natural science, and moves on to discuss social science, philosophy, education, psychoanalytic theory and (...) academic inquiry as a whole. It makes an original and compelling contribution to the current debate between those for and those against science, arguing that science would be of greater human value if it were more rigorous — we suffer not from too much scientific rationality, but too little. The author discusses the need for a revolution in the aims of science and academic inquiry in general and, in a lively and accessible style, spells out a thesis with profound importance for the long-term future of humanity. (shrink) General Philosophy of Science, Misc in General Philosophy of Science Philosophy of Physical Science, Misc in Philosophy of Physical Science Philosophy of Social Science, Misc in Philosophy of Social Science Scientific Method, Miscellaneous in General Philosophy of Science The Aims of Education in Philosophy of Social Science $49.99 used   $77.42 new   $79.00 direct from Amazon   Amazon page Direct download (5 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell, Non-Empirical Requirements Scientific Theories Must Satisfy: Simplicity, Unification, Explanation, Beauty. PhilSci Archive. A scientific theory, in order to be accepted as a part of theoretical scientific knowledge, must satisfy both empirical and non-empirical requirements, the latter having to do with simplicity, unity, explanatory character, symmetry, beauty. No satisfactory, generally accepted account of such non-empirical requirements has so far been given. Here, a proposal is put forward which, it is claimed, makes a contribution towards solving the problem. This proposal concerns unity of physical theory. In order to satisfy the non-empirical requirement of unity, (...) a physical theory must be such that the same laws govern all possible phenomena to which the theory applies. Eight increasingly demanding versions of this requirement are distinguished. Some implications for other non-empirical requirements, and for our understanding of science are indicated. (shrink) General Philosophy of Science, Misc in General Philosophy of Science Nonempirical Virtues in General Philosophy of Science Philosophy of Physical Science, Miscellaneous in Philosophy of Physical Science Theoretical Virtues, Misc in General Philosophy of Science Unification Accounts of Explanation in General Philosophy of Science Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell, Scientific Metaphysics. PhilSci Archive. In this paper I argue that physics makes metaphysical presuppositions concerning the physical comprehensibility, the dynamic unity, of the universe. I argue that rigour requires that these metaphysical presuppositions be made explicit as an integral part of theoretical knowledge in physics. An account of what it means to assert of a theory that it is unified is developed, which provides the means for partially ordering dynamical physical theories with respect to their degrees of unity. This in turn makes it possible (...) to assess the empirical fruitfulness of (some) metaphysical theses, in terms of the extent to which they play a role in empirically progressive scientific research programmes. A new conception of physics is developed which makes metaphysical theses an integral part of physics and which, at the same time, makes it possible to assess such theses in terms of their empirical fruitfulness. Circularity objections are rebutted. (shrink) Metaphysics, Misc in Metaphysics Philosophy of Physical Science, Misc in Philosophy of Physical Science Philosophy of Science, Miscellaneous in Philosophy of Science, Misc Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2003). Art as Its Own Interpretation. In Andreea Ruvoi (ed.), Interpretation and Its Objects: Studies in the Philosophy of Michael Krausz. Rodopi. In this article I argue that a work of art provides the best interpretation of itself - more faithful than any other scholarly interpretative work. Fiction, Misc in Aesthetics Literary Interpretation in Aesthetics Literary Values in Aesthetics Philosophy of Literature, Misc in Aesthetics Philosophy of Music, Misc in Aesthetics Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2003). Do Philosophers Love Wisdom? The Philosophers' Magazine 22 (2):22-24. There is an urgent need to bring about a revolution in the overall aims and methods of academic inquiry, its whole character and structure, so that it takes up its proper task of promoting wisdom rather than just acquiring knowledge. Academia as at present constituted has built into its institutions a momumental and very damaging philosophical blunder - one that most professional philosophers are blind to. This is little short of an intellectual scandal. It is time philosophers woke up to (...) their intellectual and humanitarian responsibilities. (shrink) M&E, Misc Objectivity and Value in Social Science in Philosophy of Social Science Philosophy of Physical Science, Miscellaneous in Philosophy of Physical Science Philosophy of Social Science, Misc in Philosophy of Social Science The Role of Philosophy in Metaphilosophy Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2003). Science, Knowledge, Wisdom and the Public Good. Scientists for Global Responsibility Newsletter (26 February 2003):7-9. What kind of science – or, more generally, what kind of academic inquiry – can best contribute to the public good? Two answers are considered: knowledge-inquiry and wisdom-inquiry. The former is what we have at present. It is, however, damagingly irrational. The latter is more rigorous and, potentially, of greater value in human and intellectual terms. It arises as a result of putting the Enlightenment Programme properly into practice. We urgently need to bring about a revolution in academia, so that (...) wisdom-inquiry is put into practice. (shrink) Global Justice in Applied Ethics Philosophy of Social Science, Misc in Philosophy of Social Science Science and Values in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Metamethodology in General Philosophy of Science Wisdom in Epistemology Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2003). Two Great Problems of Learning. Teaching in Higher Education, 8 (January):129-134. Two great problems of learning confront humanity: learning about the universe, and learning how to live wisely. The first problem was solved with the creation of modern science, but the second problem has not been solved. This combination puts humanity into a situation of unprecedented danger. In order to solve the second problem we need to learn from our solution to the first problem. This requires that we bring about a revolution in the overall aims and methods of academic inquiry, (...) so that it takes up its proper task of promoting wisdom. (shrink) Philosophy of Social Science, Misc in Philosophy of Social Science Science and Values in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Metamethodology in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Method, Miscellaneous in General Philosophy of Science The Aims of Education in Philosophy of Social Science Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2002). Cutting God in Half. Philosophy Now 35 (35):22-25. In order to solve the problem of the monstrous acts that an all-powerful, all-knowing God would daily be performing, we need to sever the God of Power from the God of Value. The former is the underlying dynamic unity in the physical universe, eternal, omnipresent, all-powerful, but an It, and thus not capable of knowing what It does. It can be forgiven the terrible things It does. The latter is what is of most value associated with our human world - (...) or the world of sentient life more generally. Having performed this surgical operation on God, the problem then becomes: How can we put the two halves of God together again? How can our human world, imbued with experiential qualities, consciousness, free will meaning and value, exist and best flourish, embedded as it is in the physical universe? This is our fundamental problem - philosophical, intellectual and practical. It is our fundamental religious problem. (shrink) Consciousness and Materialism, Misc in Philosophy of Mind Divine Goodness in Philosophy of Religion Divine Omnipotence in Philosophy of Religion Mind-Body Problem, General in Philosophy of Mind Nonreductive Materialism in Philosophy of Mind Science and Values in General Philosophy of Science The Argument from Evil in Philosophy of Religion Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2002). Is Science Neurotic? Metaphilosophy 33 (3):259-299. Neurosis can be interpreted as a methodological condition which any aim-pursuing entity can suffer from. If such an entity pursues a problematic aim B, represents to itself that it is pursuing a different aim C, and as a result fails to solve the problems associated with B which, if solved, would lead to the pursuit of aim A, then the entity may be said to be "rationalistically neurotic". Natural science is neurotic in this sense in so far as a basic (...) aim of science is represented to be to improve knowledge of factual truth as such (aim C), when actually the aim of science is to improve knowledge of explanatory truth (aim B). Science does not suffer too much from this neurosis, but philosophy of science does. Much more serious is the rationalistic neurosis of the social sciences, and of academic inquiry more generally. Freeing social science and academic inquiry from neurosis would have far reaching, beneficial, intellectual, institutional and cultural consequences. (shrink) Philosophy of Physical Science, Miscellaneous in Philosophy of Physical Science Philosophy of Social Science, Misc in Philosophy of Social Science Science and Values in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Metamethodology in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Method, Miscellaneous in General Philosophy of Science Direct download (6 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2002). Karl Raimund Popper. In Leemon McHenry, P. Dematteis & P. Fosl (eds.), British Philosophers, 1800-2000. Bruccoli Clark Layman. Karl Popper is the greatest philosopher of the 20th century. No other philosopher of the period has produced a body of work that is as significant. What is best in Popper's output is contained in his first four published books. These tackle fundamental problems with ferocious, exemplary integrity, clarity, simplicity and originality. They have widespread, fruitful implications, for science, for philosophy, for the social sciences, for education, for art, for politics and political philosophy. This article provides a critical survey of (...) Popper’s work. (shrink) Karl Popper in 20th Century Philosophy Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2002). Science and Meaning. The Philosophers' Magazine (18):15-16. How can we understand our human world, embedded as it is within the physical universe, in such a way that justice is done to both the richness, meaning and value of human life on the one hand, and what modern science tells us about the physical universe on the other hand? I argue that, in order to solve this problem, we need to see physics as being concerned only with a highly selected aspect of reality – that aspect which determines (...) how events unfold – the causally efficacious aspect. Physics cannot describe the experiential, and if it is extended so that it does so, physical theory would cease to be explanatory. The human world can, however, be understood in terms of a different kind of explanation, which I call “personalistic”. This is not reducible to physical explanation. The world is, in short, riddled with what may be called “double comprehensibility”. (shrink) Consciousness and Materialism, Misc in Philosophy of Mind Mind-Body Problem, General in Philosophy of Mind Mind-Brain Identity Theory in Philosophy of Mind Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2002). The Need for a Revolution in the Philosophy of Science. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 33 (2):381-408. There is a need to bring about a revolution in the philosophy of science, interpreted to be both the academic discipline, and the official view of the aims and methods of science upheld by the scientific community. At present both are dominated by the view that in science theories are chosen on the basis of empirical considerations alone, nothing being permanently accepted as a part of scientific knowledge independently of evidence. Biasing choice of theory in the direction of simplicity, unity (...) or explanatory power does not permanently commit science to the thesis that nature is simple or unified. This current ‘paradigm’ is, I argue, untenable. We need a new paradigm, which acknowledges that science makes a hierarchy of metaphysical assumptions concerning the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe, theories being chosen partly on the basis of compatibility with these assumptions. Eleven arguments are given for favouring this new ‘paradigm’ over the current one. (shrink) Science, Logic, and Mathematics Direct download (7 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2002). Three Philosophical Problems About Consciousness. Ethical Record 107 (4):3-11. Explaining Consciousness, Misc in Philosophy of Mind   My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2001). Can Humanity Learn to Create a Better World? The Crisis of Science Without Wisdom. In Tom Bentley & Daniel Stedman Jones (eds.), The Moral Universe. Can we learn to create a better world? Yes, if we first create traditions and institutions of learning rationally devoted to that end. At present universities all over the world are dominated by the idea that the basic aim of academic inquiry is to acquire knowledge. Such a conception of inquiry, judged from the standpoint of helping us learn wisdom and civilization, is grotesquely and damagingly irrational. We need to change our approach to academic enterprise if we are to create (...) a kind of inquiry rationally devoted to helping us become more civilized. (shrink) Irrationality in Epistemology Moral Rationalism in Meta-Ethics Science and Values in General Philosophy of Science Social Epistemology, Misc in Epistemology Wisdom in Epistemology $3.18 used   $19.34 new   (collection)   Amazon page Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell, Simplicity. PhilSci Archive. There are two problems of simplicity. What does it mean to characterize a scientific theory as simple, unified or explanatory in view of the fact that a simple theory can always be made complex (and vice versa) by a change of terminology? How is preference in science for simple theories to be justified? In this paper I put forward a proposal as to how the first problem is to be solved. The more nearly the totality of fundamental physical theory exemplifies (...) the metaphysical thesis that the universe has a unified dynamic structure, so the simpler that totality of theory is. What matters is content, not form. This proposed solution may appear to be circular, but I argue that it is not. Towards the end of the paper I make a few remarks about the second, justificational problem of simplicity. (shrink) Philosophy of Physical Science Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2001). The Human World in the Physical Universe: Consciousness, Free Will and Evolution. Lanham: Rowman &Amp; Littlefield. This book tackles the problem of how we can understand our human world embedded in the physical universe in such a way that justice is done both to the richness... Compatibilism in Philosophy of Action Evolutionary Biology in Philosophy of Biology Free Will and Neuroscience in Philosophy of Action Free Will and Science, Misc in Philosophy of Action Mind-Body Problem, General in Philosophy of Mind $2.49 used   $37.87 new   $85.00 direct from Amazon   Amazon page Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2001). Wisdom and Curiosity? I Remember Them Well. The Times Higher Education Supplement (1,488):14. Academic inquiry has two basic inter-related aims. One is to explore intellectually aspects of our world of intrinsic interest and value, for its own sake, and to encourage non-academics to participate in such exploration, thus improving our knowledge and understanding. The other is, by intellectual means, to help humanity solve its problems of living, so that a more peaceful, just, democratic and environmentally enlightened world may be attained. Both are at present betrayed. Global Justice in Applied Ethics Science and Values in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Discovery in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Practice, Misc in General Philosophy of Science Wisdom in Epistemology Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2001). Weinert's Review of ‘the Comprehensibility of the Universe’. Philosophy 76 (2):297-303. In my book The Comprehensibility of the Universe (OUP, 1998), I argue for a new conception of science that construes science as adopting a hierarchy of increasingly contentless cosmological assumptions about the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe. This view, I argue, solves outstanding problems about science, such as problems of induction, simplicity and verisimilitude. In his essay review of my book (Philosophy 75, 2000, 296–309) Friedel Weinert criticizes me for defending a number of views about science. But, as I (...) make clear from quotations from the book, I do not defend the views that Weinert attributes to me. (shrink) Nature of Science in General Philosophy of Science Direct download (6 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2000). A New Conception of Science. Physics World 13 (8):17-18. When scientists choose one theory over another, they reject out of hand all those that are not simple, unified or explanatory. Yet the orthodox view of science is that evidence alone should determine what can be accepted. Nicholas Maxwell thinks he has a way out of the dilemma. General Philosophy of Science, Misc in General Philosophy of Science Nonempirical Virtues in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Metamethodology in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Method, Miscellaneous in General Philosophy of Science Simplicity and Parsimony in General Philosophy of Science Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2000). Can Humanity Learn to Become Civilized? The Crisis of Science Without Civilization. Journal of Applied Philosophy 17 (1):29–44. Two great problems of learning confront humanity: learning about the nature of the universe and our place in it, and learning how to become civilized. The first problem was solved, in essence, in the 17th century, with the creation of modern science. But the second problem has not yet been solved. Solving the first problem without also solving the second puts us in a situation of great danger. All our current global problems have arisen as a result. What we need (...) to do, in response to this unprecedented crisis, is learn from our solution to the first problem how to solve the second. This was the basic idea of the 18th century Enlightenment. Unfortunately, in carrying out this programme, the Enlightenment made three blunders, and it is this defective version of the Enlightenment programme that we have institutionalized in 20th century academic inquiry. In order to solve the second great problem of learning we need to correct the three blunders of the traditional Enlightenment. This involves changing the nature of social inquiry, so that social science becomes social methodology or social philosophy, concerned to help us build into social life the progress-achieving methods of aim-oriented rationality, arrived at by generalizing the progress-achieving methods of science. It also involves, more generally, bringing about a revolution in the nature of academic inquiry as a whole, so that it takes up its proper task of helping humanity learn how to become wiser by increasingly cooperatively rational means. The scientific task of improving knowledge and understanding of nature becomes a part of the broader task of improving global wisdom. (shrink) Applied Ethics Direct download (7 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (2000). The Mind-Body Problem and Explanatory Dualism. Philosophy 75 (291):49-71. An important part of the mind-brain problem arises because sentience and consciousness seem inherently resistant to scientific explanation and understanding. The solution to this dilemma is to recognize, first, that scientific explanation can only render comprehensible a selected aspect of what there is, and second, that there is a mode of explanation and understanding, the personalistic, quite different from, but just as viable as, scientific explanation. In order to understand the mental aspect of brain processes - that aspect we know (...) about as a result of having relevant neurological processes occur in our own brain - we need to avail ourselves of personalistic explanation, irreducible to scientific explanation. The problem of explaining and understanding why experiential or mental aspects of brain processes or things should be correlated with certain physical processes, things or states of affairs is a non-problem because there is no kind of explanation possible in terms of which an explanation could be couched. A physical theory, amplified to include the experiential, might be predictive but would, necessarily, cease to be explanatory; and an amplified personalistic explanation could not succeed either. There is, in short, an explanation as to why there cannot be an explanation of correlations between physical and mental aspects of processes going on inside our heads. (shrink) Explaining Consciousness, Misc in Philosophy of Mind Functionalism and Qualia in Philosophy of Mind Primary and Secondary Qualities in Philosophy of Mind Psychophysical Supervenience in Philosophy of Mind Unification Accounts of Explanation in General Philosophy of Science Direct download (7 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1999). Are There Objective Values? The Dalhousie Review 79 (3):301-317. In this paper I demolish three influential arguments - moral, metaphysical and epistemological - against value realism. We have good reasons to believe, and no good reasons not to believe, that value-features, value-facts, really do exist in the world. Intrinsic Value in Value Theory, Miscellaneous The Value of Lives, Misc in Value Theory, Miscellaneous Value Realism in Value Theory, Miscellaneous Value, Misc in Value Theory, Miscellaneous Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1999). Has Science Established That the Universe is Comprehensible? Cogito 13 (2):139-145. Many scientists, if pushed, may be inclined to hazard the guess that the universe is comprehensible, even physically comprehensible. Almost all, however, would vehemently deny that science has already established that the universe is comprehensible. It is, nevertheless, just this that I claim to be the case. Once one gets the nature of science properly into perspective, it becomes clear that the comprehensibility of the universe is as secure an item of current scientific knowledge as anything theoretical in science can (...) be, more secure, indeed, than the most firmly established fundamental theories of physics, such as quantum theory or Einstein's general theory of relativity. (shrink) General Philosophy of Science, Misc in General Philosophy of Science Philosophy of Physical Science, Miscellaneous in Philosophy of Physical Science Scientific Metamethodology in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Method, Miscellaneous in General Philosophy of Science Direct download (3 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1998). The Comprehensibility of the Universe: A New Conception of Science. Oxford University Press. This book puts forth a radically new conception of science. Maxwell argues that the prevailing view of the relation between scientific theory and evidence is untenable; he calls for a new orthodoxy that sees science as making a hierarchy of assumptions about the comprehensibility of the universe. This new conception has significant implications for both philosophy and science, promises to heal the rift between the two, and will be essential reading for people working in both fields. Nature of Science in General Philosophy of Science $17.89 used   $100.49 new   $112.86 direct from Amazon   Amazon page Direct download (3 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1997). Must Science Make Cosmological Assumptions If It is to Be Rational?,. In T. Kelly (ed.), The Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of the Irish Philosophical Society Spring Conference. Irish Philosophical Society. Cosmological speculation about the ultimate nature of the universe, being necessary for science to be possible at all, must be regarded as a part of scientific knowledge itself, however epistemologically unsound it may be in other respects. The best such speculation available is that the universe is comprehensible in some way or other and, more specifically, in the light of the immense apparent success of modern natural science, that it is physically comprehensible. But both these speculations may be false; in (...) order to take this possibility into account, we need to adopt an hierarchy of increasingly contentless cosmological conjectures until we arrive at the conjecture that the universe is such that it is possible for us to acquire some knowledge of something, a conjecture which we are justified in accepting as knowledge since doing so cannot harm the pursuit of knowledge in any circumstances whatsoever. As a result of adopting such an hierarchy of increasingly contentless cosmological conjectures in this way, we maximize our chances of adopting conjectures that promote the growth of knowledge, and minimize our chances of taking some cosmological assumption for granted that is false and impedes the growth of knowledge. The hope is that as we increase our knowledge about the world we improve (lower level) cosmological assumptions implicit in our methods, and thus in turn improve our methods. As a result of improving our knowledge we improve our knowledge about how to improve knowledge. Science adapts its own nature to what it learns about the nature of the universe, thus increasing its capacity to make progress in knowledge about the world. This aim-oriented empiricist conception of science solves outstanding problems in the philosophy of science such as the problems of induction, simplicity and verisimilitude. (shrink) General Philosophy of Science, Misc in General Philosophy of Science Nature of Science, Misc in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Discovery in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Practice, Misc in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Realism, Misc in General Philosophy of Science Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1997). Science and the Environment: A New Enlightenment. Science and Public Affairs (Spring 1997):50-56. Nicholas Maxwell believes that while we have developed an excellent way of learning about the nature of the universe, we have so far failed in our attempts to apply this method to create a civilized world. Science and Values in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Method, Miscellaneous in General Philosophy of Science   My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1995). A Philosopher Struggles to Understand Quantum Theory: Particle Creation and Wavepacket Reduction. In M. Ferrero & A. van der Merwe (eds.), Fundamental Problems in Quantum Physics. Work on the central problems of the philosophy of science has led the author to attempt to create an intelligible version of quantum theory. The basic idea is that probabilistic transitions occur when new stationary or particle states arise as a result of inelastic collisions. Collapse Interpretations in Philosophy of Physical Science Measurement Problem in Philosophy of Physical Science Probabilities in Quantum Mechanics in Philosophy of Physical Science Scientific Realism, Misc in General Philosophy of Science $245.56 new   $274.55 direct from Amazon   $289.23 used   (collection)   Amazon page Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1994). Particle Creation as the Quantum Condition for Probabilistic Events to Occur. Physics Letters A 187 (2 May 1994):351-355. A new version of quantum theory is proposed, according to which probabilistic events occur whenever new statioinary or bound states are created as a result of inelastic collisions. The new theory recovers the experimental success of orthodox quantum theory, but differs form the orthodox theory for as yet unperformed experiments. Collapse Interpretations in Philosophy of Physical Science Measurement Problem in Philosophy of Physical Science Probabilities in Quantum Mechanics in Philosophy of Physical Science Scientific Realism, Misc in General Philosophy of Science Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1994). Towards a New Enlightenment: What the Task of Creating Civilization has to Learn From the Success of Modern Science. In Ronald Barnett (ed.), Academic Community: Discourse or Discord? Jessica Kingsley. We face two great probems of learning: learning about the universe and about ourselves as a part of the universe, and learning how to create world civilization. We have solved the first problem, but not the second. We need to learn from our solution to the first problem how to solve the second. That involves getting clear about the nature of the progress-achieving methods of science, generalizing these methods so that they become fruitfully applicable to any problematic endeavour, and then (...) getting these generalized progress-acheving methods into all our other institutions besides science, and above all into the endeavour to make progress towards a good, civilized world. This article spells out what this programme involves. (shrink) General Philosophy of Science, Misc in General Philosophy of Science Philosophy of Physical Science, Miscellaneous in Philosophy of Physical Science Philosophy of Social Science, Misc in Philosophy of Social Science Wisdom in Epistemology $4.14 used   $16.32 new   (collection)   Amazon page Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1993). Beyond Fapp: Three Approaches to Improving Orthodox Quantum Theory and An Experimental Test. In F. Selleri and G. Tarozzi van der Merwe, F. Selleri & G. Tarozzi (eds.), Bell's Theorem and the Foundations of Modern Physics. World Scientific. Because it fails to solve the wave-particle problem, orthodox quantum theory is obliged to be about observables and not quantum beables. As a result the theory is imprecise, ambiguous, ad hoc, lacking in explanatory power, restricted in scope and resistant to unification. A new version of quantum theory is needed that is about quantum beables. Bell's Theorem in Philosophy of Physical Science Collapse Interpretations in Philosophy of Physical Science Measurement Problem in Philosophy of Physical Science Probabilities in Quantum Mechanics in Philosophy of Physical Science Scientific Realism, Misc in General Philosophy of Science   My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1993). Can Academic Inquiry Help Humanity Become Civilized?,. Philosophy Today (13 May 1993):1-3. Humanity is confronted by immense global problems. In order to learn how to tackle them we need a new kind of academic inquiry, rationally organized and devoted to helping us resolve our problems of living in increasingly cooperatively rational ways. General Philosophy of Science, Misc in General Philosophy of Science Science and Values in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Metamethodology in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Method, Miscellaneous in General Philosophy of Science   My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1993). Does Orthodox Quantum Theory Undermine, or Support, Scientific Realism? Philosophical Quarterly 44 (171):139-157. It is usually taken for granted that orthodox quantum theory poses a serious problem for scientific realism, in that the theory is empirically extraordinarily successful, and yet has instrumentalism built into it. This paper stand this view on its head. I argue that orthodox quantum theory suffers from a number of serious (if not always noticed) defects precisely because of its inbuilt instrumentalism. This defective character of orthdoox quantum theory thus undermines instrumentalism, and supports scientific realism. I go on to (...) consider whether there is here the basis of a general argument against instrumentalism. (shrink) Arguments For and Against Scientific Realism, Misc in General Philosophy of Science Collapse Interpretations in Philosophy of Physical Science Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics, Misc in Philosophy of Physical Science Measurement Problem in Philosophy of Physical Science Direct download (4 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1993). Induction and Scientific Realism: Einstein Versus Van Fraassen Part One: How to Solve the Problem of Induction. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (1):61-79. In this three-part paper, my concern is to expound and defend a conception of science, close to Einstein's, which I call aim-oriented empiricism. I argue that aim-oriented empiricsim has the following virtues. (i) It solve the problem of induction; (ii) it provides decisive reasons for rejecting van Fraassen's brilliantly defended but intuitively implausible constructive empiricism; (iii) it solves the problem of verisimilitude, the problem of explicating what it can mean to speak of scientific progress given that science advances from one (...) false theory to another; (iv) it enables us to hold that appropriate scientific theories, even though false, can nevertheless legitimately be interpreted realistically, as providing us with genuine , even if only approximate, knowledge of unobservable physical entities; (v) it provies science with a rational, even though fallible and non-mechanical, method for the discovery of fundamental new theories in physics. In the third part of the paper I show that Einstein made essential use of aim-oriented empiricism in scientific practice in developing special and general relativity. I conclude by considering to what extent Einstein came explicitly to advocate aim-oriented empiricism in his later years. (shrink) General Relativity in Philosophy of Physical Science Justification of Induction in General Philosophy of Science Philosophy of Physics, Misc in Philosophy of Physical Science Scientific Realism, Misc in General Philosophy of Science Special Relativity, Misc in Philosophy of Physical Science Verisimilitude in General Philosophy of Science Direct download (8 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1993). Induction and Scientific Realism: Einstein Versus Van Fraassen: Part Two: Aim-Oriented Empiricism and Scientific Essentialism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (1):81-101. In this paper I argue that aim-oriented empiricism provides decisive grounds for accepting scientific realism and rejecting instrumentalism. But it goes further than this. Aim-oriented empiricism implies that physicalism is a central part of current (conjectural) scientific knowledge. Furthermore, we can and need, I argue, to interpret fundamental physical theories as attributing necessitating physical properties to fundamental physical entities. Scientific Essentialism in Metaphysics Scientific Realism, Misc in General Philosophy of Science Direct download (4 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1993). Induction and Scientific Realism: Einstein Versus Van Fraassen Part Three: Einstein, Aim-Oriented Empiricism and the Discovery of Special and General Relativity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (2):275-305. In this paper I show that Einstein made essential use of aim-oriented empiricism in scientific practice in developing special and general relativity. I conclude by considering to what extent Einstein came explicitly to advocate aim-oriented empiricism in his later years. Alternatives to Scientific Realism, Misc in General Philosophy of Science General Relativity in Philosophy of Physical Science Scientific Progress in General Philosophy of Science Special Relativity, Misc in Philosophy of Physical Science Direct download (7 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1993). On Relativity Theory and Openness of the Future. Philosophy of Science 60 (2):341-348. In a recent paper, Howard Stein makes a number of criticisms of an earlier paper of mine ('Are Probabilism and Special Relativity Incompatible?', Phil. Sci., 1985), which explored the question of whether the idea that the future is genuinely 'open' in a probabilistic universe is compatible with special relativity. I disagree with almost all of Stein's criticisms. Collapse Interpretations in Philosophy of Physical Science Probabilities in Quantum Mechanics in Philosophy of Physical Science Special Relativity, Misc in Philosophy of Physical Science The Open Future in Metaphysics Direct download (5 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1992). What Kind of Inquiry Can Best Help Us Create a Good World?,. Science, Technology and Human Values 17:205-227. In order to create a good world, we need to learn how to do it - how to resolve our appalling problems and conflicts in more cooperative ways than at present. And in order to do this, we need traditions and institutions of learning rationally devoted to this end. When viewed from this standpoint, what we have at present - academic inquiry devoted to the pursuit of knowledge and technological know-how - is an intellectual and human disaster. We urgently need (...) a new, more rigorous kind of inquiry that gives intellectual priority to the tasks of articulating our problems of living and proposing and critically assessing possible cooperative solutions. This new kind of inquiry would have as its basic aim to improve, not just knowledge, but also personal and global wisdom - wisdom being understood to be the capacity to realize what is of value in life. To develop this new kind of inquiry we will need to change almost every branch and aspect of the academic enterprise. (shrink) Global Justice in Applied Ethics Scientific Method, Miscellaneous in General Philosophy of Science Theories of Knowledge, Misc in Epistemology Wisdom in Epistemology Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1992). What the Task of Creating Civilization has to Learn From the Success of Modern Science: Towards a New Enlightenment. Reflections on Higher Education 4:47-69. Modern scientific, academic inquiry suffers from a serious, wholesale fundamental defect. Though very successful at improving specialized scientific knowledge and technological know-how, it is an intellectual and human disaster when it comes to helping us realize what is of value in life - in particlar, when it comes to helping us create a more enlightened, civilized world. Global Justice in Applied Ethics Philosophy of Social Science, Misc in Philosophy of Social Science Science and Values in General Philosophy of Science Wisdom in Epistemology Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1991). How Can We Build a Better World? In J. Mittelstrass (ed.), Einheit der Wissenschaften: Internationales Kolloquium der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, 25-27 June 1990. Walter de Gruyter. In order to make progress with solving our grave global problems we need to bring about a revolution in academia so that problems of living are given intellectual priority, and the basic intellectual aim becomes to seek and promote wisdom, and not just acquire knowledge. Philosophy of Science, Miscellaneous in Philosophy of Science, Misc Science and Values in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Method, Miscellaneous in General Philosophy of Science The Aims of Education in Philosophy of Social Science Wisdom in Epistemology $86.40 used   $155.00 new   (collection)   Amazon page Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1988). Are Probabilism and Special Relativity Compatible? Philosophy of Science 55 (4):640-645. Are speical relativity and probabilism compatible? Dieks argues that they are. But the possible universe he specifies, designed to exemplify both probabilism and special relativity, either incorporates a universal "now" (and is thus incompatible with special relativity), or amounts to a many world universe (which I have discussed, and rejected as too ad hoc to be taken seriously), or fails to have any one definite overall Minkowskian-type space-time structure (and thus differs drastically from special relativity as ordinarily understood). Probabilism and (...) special relativity appear to be incompatible after all. What is at issue is not whether "the flow of time" can be reconciled with special relativity, but rather whether explicitly probabilistic versions of quantum theory should be rejected because of incompatibility with special relativity. (shrink) Collapse Interpretations in Philosophy of Physical Science Measurement Problem in Philosophy of Physical Science Probabilities in Quantum Mechanics in Philosophy of Physical Science Special Relativity in Philosophy of Physical Science Direct download (10 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1988). Quantum Propensiton Theory: A Testable Resolution of the Wave/Particle Dilemma. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (1):1-50. In this paper I put forward a new micro realistic, fundamentally probabilistic, propensiton version of quantum theory. According to this theory, the entities of the quantum domain - electrons, photons, atoms - are neither particles nor fields, but a new kind of fundamentally probabilistic entity, the propensiton - entities which interact with one another probabilistically. This version of quantum theory leaves the Schroedinger equation unchanged, but reinterprets it to specify how propensitons evolve when no probabilistic transitions occur. Probabilisitic transitions occur (...) when new "particles" are created as a result of inelastic interactions. All measurements are just special cases of this. This propensiton version of quantum theory, I argue, solves the wave/particle dilemma, is free of conceptual problems that plague orthodox quantum theory, recovers all the empirical success of orthodox quantum theory, and at the same time yields as yet untested predictions that differ from those of orthodox quantum theory. (shrink) Collapse Interpretations in Philosophy of Physical Science Measurement Problem in Philosophy of Physical Science Probabilities in Quantum Mechanics in Philosophy of Physical Science Direct download (7 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1987). Wanted: A New Way of Thinking. New Scientist (14 May 1987):63. Our world is beset with appalling problems. To solve these urgent, intractable global problems it is not new scientific knowledge and technology that we need so much as new actions: new policies, new international relations, new institutions and social arrangements, new ways of living. The mere provision of scientific know-ledge and technological know-how cannot help much: indeed, all too often it actually makes matters worse. The dreadful truth is that science has played a crucial role, often unwittingly, in the creation (...) of our problems. To solve our problems we certainly need to learn, but what we need to learn is not so much new knowledge as new actions—new, more cooperative, wiser ways of living. Above all, we need to learn how to resolve our conflicts in more just, humane and rationally cooperative ways. This in turn requires that we create new institutions and traditions of learning, rationally devoted to helping us to learn how to become more cooperative and wise. We need a new kind of academic enterprise, all over the world, which takes as its basic task to promote not just knowledge, but rather wisdom—wisdom being defined as the capacity to solve problems of living so as to achieve what is of value, for oneself and others (wisdom thus including but going beyond knowledge). (shrink) Global Justice in Applied Ethics Philosophy of Science, Miscellaneous in Philosophy of Science, Misc Science and Values in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Metamethodology in General Philosophy of Science Wisdom in Epistemology Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1986). The Fate of the Enlightenment: Reply to Kekes. Inquiry 29 (1-4):79-92. If humanity is to learn how to live together more cooperatively and wisely than at present, it is essential that we create a new kind of academic inquiry and education that is rationally devoted to helping us learn how to be cooperative and wise. This new kind of inquiry would give intellectual priority to articulating our problems of living, proposing and criticizing possible solutions, possible cooperative actions. The pursuit of knowledge would play a subordinate role. This in essence is the (...) argument of my book From Knowledge to Wisdom. Professor Kekes interprets my book as advocating merely a change in the aims and methods of science, and on this basis criticizes it for advocating a kind of scientific and Enlightenment imperialism. But these criticisms are entirely without foundation, based as they are on a gross misinterpretation of the central thesis of the book. In order to implement what the book advocates, far more is needed than a mere change in the aims and methods of science. (shrink) No categories Direct download (3 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1985). Are Probabilism and Special Relativity Incompatible? Philosophy of Science 52 (1):23-43. In this paper I expound an argument which seems to establish that probabilism and special relativity are incompatible. I examine the argument critically, and consider its implications for interpretative problems of quantum theory, and for theoretical physics as a whole. Collapse Interpretations in Philosophy of Physical Science Measurement Problem in Philosophy of Physical Science Physics of Time in Philosophy of Physical Science Probabilities in Quantum Mechanics in Philosophy of Physical Science Special Relativity in Philosophy of Physical Science Direct download (10 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1985). Methodological Problems of Neuroscience. In David Rose & Vernon Dobson (eds.), Models of the Visual Cortex. New York: John Wiley & Sons. In this paper I argue that neuroscience has been harmed by the widespread adoption of seriously inadequate methodologies or philosophies of science - most notably inductivism and falsificationism. I argue that neuroscience, in seeking to understand the human brain and mind, needs to follow in the footsteps of evolution. Evolutionary Biology, Misc in Philosophy of Biology Philosophy of Neuroscience, Misc in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Philosophy of Science, Miscellaneous in Philosophy of Science, Misc $8.24 used   $282.84 new   (collection)   Amazon page Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1984). From Knowledge to Wisdom: A Revolution in the Aims and Methods of Science. Basil Blackwell. This book argues for the need to put into practice a profound and comprehensive intellectual revolution, affecting to a greater or lesser extent all branches of scientific and technological research, scholarship and education. This intellectual revolution differs, however, from the now familiar kind of scientific revolution described by Kuhn. It does not primarily involve a radical change in what we take to be knowledge about some aspect of the world, a change of paradigm. Rather it involves a radical change in (...) the fundamental, overall intellectual aims and methods of inquiry. At present inquiry is devoted to the enhancement of knowledge. This needs to be transformed into a kind of rational inquiry having as its basic aim to enhance personal and social wisdom. This new kind of inquiry gives intellectual priority to the personal and social problems we encounter in our lives as we strive to realize what is desirable and of value – problems of knowledge and technology being intellectually subordinate and secondary. For this new kind of inquiry, it is what we do and what we are that ultimately matters: our knowledge is but an aspect of our life and being. (shrink) Science and Values in General Philosophy of Science Wisdom in Epistemology $6.24 used   $74.98 new   Amazon page Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1984). From Knowledge to Wisdom: Guiding Choices in Scientific Research. Bulletin of Science, Technology and Society 4:316-334.. This article argues for the need to put into practice a profound and comprehensive intellectual revolution, affecting to a greater or lesser extent all branches of scientific and technological research, scholarship and education. This intellectual revolution differs, however, from the now familiar kind of scientific revolution described by Kuhn. It does not primarily involve a radical change in what we take to be knowledge about some aspect of the world, a change of paradigm. Rather it involves a radical change in (...) the fundamental, overall intellectual aims and methods of inquiry. At present inquiry is devoted to the enhancement of knowledge. This needs to be transformed into a kind of rational inquiry having as its basic aim to enhance personal and social wisdom. This new kind of inquiry gives intellectual priority to the personal and social problems we encounter in our lives as we strive to realize what is desirable and of value – problems of knowledge and technology being intellectually subordinate and secondary. For this new kind of inquiry, it is what we do and what we are that ultimately matters: our knowledge is but an aspect of our life and being. (shrink) Philosophy of Science, Miscellaneous in Philosophy of Science, Misc   My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1982). Instead of Particles and Fields: A Micro Realistic Quantum "Smearon" Theory. Foundatioins of Physics 12 (6):607-631. A fully micro realistic, propensity version of quantum theory is proposed, according to which fundamental physical entities - neither particles nor fields - have physical characteristics which determine probabilistically how they interact with one another (rather than with measuring instruments). The version of quantum "smearon" theory proposed here does not modify the equations of orthodox quantum theory: rather, it gives a radically new interpretation to these equations. It is argued that (i) there are strong general reasons for preferring quantum "smearon" (...) theory to orthodox quantum theory; (ii) the proposed change in physical interpretation leads quantum "smearon" theory to make experimental predictions subtly different from those of orthodox quantum theory. Some possible crucial experiments are considered. (shrink) Collapse Interpretations in Philosophy of Physical Science Measurement Problem in Philosophy of Physical Science Probabilities in Quantum Mechanics in Philosophy of Physical Science Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1980). Science, Reason, Knowledge, and Wisdom: A Critique of Specialism. Inquiry 23 (1):19 – 81. In this paper I argue for a kind of intellectual inquiry which has, as its basic aim, to help all of us to resolve rationally the most important problems that we encounter in our lives, problems that arise as we seek to discover and achieve that which is of value in life. Rational problem-solving involves articulating our problems, proposing and criticizing possible solutions. It also involves breaking problems up into subordinate problems, creating a tradition of specialized problem-solving - specialized scientific, (...) academic inquiry, in other words. It is vital, however, that specialized academic problem-solving be subordinated to discussion of our more fundamental problems of living. At present specialized academic inquiry is dissociated from problems of living - the sin of specialism, which I criticize. (shrink) No categories Direct download (4 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1979). Induction, Simplicity and Scientific Progress. Scientia 114:629-653. In a recent work, Popper claims to have solved the problem of induction. In this paper I argue that Popper fails both to solve the problem, and to formulate the problem properly. I argue, however, that there are aspects of Popper's approach which, when strengthened and developed, do provide a solution to at least an important part of the problem of induction, along somewhat Popperian lines. This proposed solution requires, and leads to, a new theory of the role of simplicity (...) in science, which may have helpful implications for science itself, thus actually stimulating scientific progress. (shrink) General Philosophy of Science, Misc in General Philosophy of Science Justification of Induction in General Philosophy of Science Karl Popper in 20th Century Philosophy Scientific Progress in General Philosophy of Science Theory Change in General Philosophy of Science   My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1977). Articulating the Aims of Science. Nature 265 (January 6):2. Most scientists and philosophers of science take for granted the standard empiricist view that the basic intellectual aim of science is truth per se. But this seriously misrepresents the aims of scieince. Actually, science seeks explanatory truth and, more generally, important truth. Problematic metaphysical and value assumptions are inherent in the real aims of science. Precisely because these aims are profoundly problematic, they need to be articulated, imaginatively explored and critically assesseed, in order to improve them, as an integral part (...) of science itself. This was how Einstein did science in developing the special and general theories of relativity. Science needs to put a new aim-oriented empiricist methodology into practice. (shrink) General Philosophy of Science, Misc in General Philosophy of Science Nature of Science, Misc in General Philosophy of Science Science and Values in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Practice, Misc in General Philosophy of Science Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1976). Towards a Micro Realistic Version of Quantum Mechanics, Part I. Foundations of Physics 6 (3):275-292. This paper investigates the possibiity of developing a fully micro realistic version of elementary quantum mechanics. I argue that it is highly desirable to develop such a version of quantum mechanics, and that the failure of all current versions and interpretations of quantum mechanics to constitute micro realistic theories is at the root of many of the interpretative problems associated with quantum mechanics, in particular the problem of measurement. I put forward a propensity micro realistic version of quantum mechanics, and (...) suggest how it might be possible to discriminate, on expermental grounds, between this theory and other versions of quantum mechanics. (shrink) Collapse Interpretations in Philosophy of Physical Science Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics, Misc in Philosophy of Physical Science Measurement Problem in Philosophy of Physical Science Probabilities in Quantum Mechanics in Philosophy of Physical Science Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1976). Towards a Micro Realistic Version of Quantum Mechanics, Part II. Foundations of Physics 6 (6):661-676. In this paper, possible objections to the propensity microrealistic version of quantum mechanics proposed in Part I are answered. This version of quantum mechanics is compared with the statistical, particle microrealistic viewpoint, and a crucial experiment is proposed designed to distinguish between these to microrealistic versions of quantum mechanics. Collapse Interpretations in Philosophy of Physical Science Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics, Misc in Philosophy of Physical Science Measurement Problem in Philosophy of Physical Science Probabilities in Quantum Mechanics in Philosophy of Physical Science Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1976). What's Wrong with Science?: Towards a People's Rational Science of Delight and Compassion. Bran's Head Books Ltd. What ought to be the aims of science? How can science best serve humanity? What would an ideal science be like, a science that is sensitively and humanely responsive to the needs, problems and aspirations of people? How ought the institutional enterprise of science to be related to the rest of society? What ought to be the relationship between science and art, thought and feeling, reason and desire, mind and heart? Should the social sciences model themselves on the natural sciences: (...) or ought they to take a different form if they are to serve the interests of humanity objectively, sensitively and rigorously? Might it be possible to get into human life, into art, education, politics, industry, international affairs, and other domains of human activity, the same kind of progressive success that is found so strikingly, on the intellectual level, within science? These are some of the questions tackled by What’s Wrong With Science? But the book is no abstruse treatise on the philosophy of science. Most of it takes the form of a passionate debate between a Scientist and a Philosopher, a debate that is by turns humorous, ironical, bitter, dramatically explosive. Even as the argument explores the relationship between thought and feeling, reason and desire, the two main protagonists find it necessary to examine their own feelings and motivations. (shrink) General Philosophy of Science, Misc in General Philosophy of Science $6.85 new   $10.60 direct from Amazon   $21.93 used   Amazon page Direct download (3 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1975). Does the Minimal Statistical Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics Resolve the Measurement Problem? Methodology and Science 8:84-101. It is argued that the so-called minimal statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics does not completely resolve the measurement problem in that this view is unable to show that quantjum mechanics can dispense with classical physics when it comes to a treatment of the measuring interaction. It is suggested that the view that quantum mechanics applies to individual systems should not be too hastily abandoned, in that this view gives perhaps the best hope of leading to a version of quantum mechanics (...) which does provide a complete solution to the measurement problem. (shrink) Collapse Interpretations in Philosophy of Physical Science Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics, Misc in Philosophy of Physical Science Measurement Problem in Philosophy of Physical Science   My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1974). The Rationality of Scientific Discovery Part II: An Aim Oriented Theory of Scientific Discovery. Philosophy of Science 41 (3):247-295. In Part I (Philosophy of Science, Vol. 41 No.2, June, 1974) it was argued that in order to rebut Humean sceptical arguments, and thus show that it is possible for pure science to be rational, we need to reject standard empiricism and adopt in its stead aim oriented empiricism. Part II seeks to articulate in more detail a theory of rational scientific discovery within the general framework of aim oriented empiricism. It is argued that this theory (a) exhibits pure science (...) as a rational enterprise (b) enables us to resolve problems associated with the key notions of simplicity and intelligibility (c) has important implications both for philosophy of science and for scientific practice itself. (shrink) Inductive Skepticism in General Philosophy of Science Rationality in Epistemology Direct download (6 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1974). The Rationality of Scientific Discovery Part 1: The Traditional Rationality Problem. Philosophy of Science 41 (2):123--53. The basic task of the essay is to exhibit science as a rational enterprise. I argue that in order to do this we need to change quite fundamentally our whole conception of science. Today it is rather generally taken for granted that a precondition for science to be rational is that in science we do not make substantial assumptions about the world, or about the phenomena we are investigating, which are held permanently immune from empirical appraisal. According to this standard (...) view, science is rational precisely because science does not make a priori metaphysical presuppositions about the world forever preserved from possible empirical refutation. It is of course accepted that an individual scientist, developing a new theory, may well be influenced by his own metaphysical presuppositions. In addition, it is acknowledged that a successful scientific theory, within the context of a particular research program, may be protected for a while from refutation, thus acquiring a kind of temporary metaphysical status, as long as the program continues to be empirically progressive. All such views unite, however, in maintaining that science cannot make permanent metaphysical presuppositions, held permanently immune from objective empirical evaluation. According to this standard view, the rationality of science arises, not from the way in which new theories are discovered, but rather from the way in which already formulated theories are appraised in the light of empirical considerations. And the fundamental problem of the rationality of science—the Humean problem of induction— concerns precisely the crucial issue of the rationality of accepting theories in the light of evidence. In this essay I argue that this widely accepted standard conception of science must be completely rejected if we are to see science as a rational enterprise. In order to assess the rationality of accepting a theory in the light of evidence it is essential to consider the ultimate aims of science. This is because adopting different aims for science will lead us, quite rationally, to accept different theories in the light of evidence. I argue that a basic aim of science is to explain. At the outset science simply presupposes, in a completely a priori fashion, that explanations can be found, that the world is ultimately intelligible or simple. In other words, science simply presupposes in an a priori way the metaphysical thesis that the world is intelligible, and then seeks to convert this presupposed metaphysical theory into a testable scientific theory. Scientific theories are only accepted insofar as they promise to help us realize this fundamental aim. At once a crucial problem arises. If scientific theories are only accepted insofar as they promise to lead us towards articulating a presupposed metaphysical theory, it is clearly essential that we can choose rationally, in an a priori way, between all the very different possible metaphysical theories that can be thought up, all the very different ways in which the universe might ultimately be intelligible. For holding different aims, accepting different metaphysical theories conceived of as blueprints for future scientific theories will, quite rationally, lead us to accept different scientific theories. Thus it is only if we can choose rationally between conflicting metaphysical blueprints for future scientific theories that we will be in a position to appraise rationally the acceptability of our present day scientific theories. We thus face the crucial problem: How can we choose rationally between conflicting possible aims for science, conflicting metaphysical blueprints for future scientific theories ? It is only if we can solve this fundamental problem concerning the aims of science that we can be in a position to appraise rationally the acceptability of existing scientific theories. There is a further point here. If we could choose rationally between rival aims, rival metaphysical blueprints for future scientific theories, then we would in effect have a rational method for the discovery of new scientific theories! Thus we reach the result: there is only a rational method for the appraisal of existing scientific theories if there is a rational method of discovery. I shall argue that the aim-oriented theory of scientific inquiry to be advocated here succeeds in exhibiting science as a rational enterprise in that it succeeds in providing a rational procedure for choosing between rival metaphysical blueprints: it thus provides a rational, if fallible, method of discovery, and a rational method for the appraisal of existing scientific theories—thus resolving the Humean problem. In Part I of the essay I argue that the orthodox conception of science fails to exhibit science as a rational enterprise because it fails to solve the Humean problem of induction. The presuppositional view advocated here does however succeed in resolving the Humean problem. In Part II of the essay I spell out the new aim-oriented theory of scientific method that becomes inevitable once we accept the basic presuppositional viewpoint. I argue that this new aim oriented conception of scientific method is essentially a rational method of scientific discovery, and that the theory has important implications for scientific practice. (shrink) Rationality in Epistemology Science, Logic, and Mathematics Direct download (4 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1973). Alpha Partricle Emission and the Orthodox Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. Physics Letters 43 (1):29-30. It is argued that Robinson's attempt to show that alpha particle emission contradicts orthodox quantum mechanics does not succeed. However, the possibility remains that alpha particle emission does contradict quantum mechanics. Collapse Interpretations in Philosophy of Physical Science Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics, Misc in Philosophy of Physical Science Measurement Problem in Philosophy of Physical Science   My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1973). The Problem of Measurement - Real or Imaginary? American Journal of Physics 41:1022-5. It is argued that criticisms of Willian Band and James Park concerning the quantum mechanics measurement problem do not succeed. Collapse Interpretations in Philosophy of Physical Science Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics, Misc in Philosophy of Physical Science Measurement Problem in Philosophy of Physical Science Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1972). A Critique of Popper's Views on Scientific Method. Philosophy of Science 39 (2):131-152. This paper considers objections to Popper's views on scientific method. It is argued that criticism of Popper's views, developed by Kuhn, Feyerabend, and Lakatos, are not too damaging, although they do require that Popper's views be modified somewhat. It is argued that a much more serious criticism is that Popper has failed to provide us with any reason for holding that the methodological rules he advocates give us a better hope of realizing the aims of science than any other set (...) of rules. Consequently, Popper cannot adequately explain why we should value scientific theories more than other sorts of theories ; which in turn means that Popper fails to solve adequately his fundamental problem, namely the problem of demarcation. It is suggested that in order to get around this difficulty we need to take the search for explanations as a fundamental aim of science. (shrink) Imre Lakatos in 20th Century Philosophy Karl Popper in 20th Century Philosophy Paul Feyerabend in 20th Century Philosophy Science, Logic, and Mathematics Direct download (6 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1972). A New Look at the Quantum Mechanical Problem of Measurement. American Journal of Physics 40:1431-5.. According to orthodox quantum mechanics, state vectors change in two incompatible ways: "deterministically" in accordance with Schroedinger's time-dependent equation, and probabilistically if and only if a measurement is made. It is argued here that the problem of measurement arises because the precise mutually exclusive conditions for these two types of transitions to occur are not specified within orthodox quantum mechanics. Fundamentally, this is due to an inevitable ambiguity in the notion of "meawurement" itself. Hence, if the problem of measurement is (...) to be resolved, a new, fully objective version of quantjm mechanics needs to be developed which does not incorporate the notion of measurement in its basic postuolates at all. (shrink) Collapse Interpretations in Philosophy of Physical Science Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics, Misc in Philosophy of Physical Science Measurement Problem in Philosophy of Physical Science Probabilities in Quantum Mechanics in Philosophy of Physical Science Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1971). Reviews. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 22 (4). Science, Logic, and Mathematics Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1969). Reviews. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 20 (1). Science, Logic, and Mathematics Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1968). Can There Be Necessary Connections Between Successive Events? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (1):1-25. THE aim of this paper is to refute Hume's contention that there cannot be logically necessary connections between successive events. I intend to establish, in other words, not 'Logically necessary connections do exist between successive events', but instead the rather more modest proposition: 'It may be, it is possible, as far as we can ever know for certain, that logically necessary connections do exist between successive events.' Towards the end of the paper I shall say something about the implications of (...) rejecting Hume's contention. (shrink) Science, Logic, and Mathematics Direct download (8 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1968). Understanding Sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 46 (August):127-146. My aim in this paper is to defend a version of the brain process theory, or identity thesis, which differs in one important respect from the theory put forward by J.J.C. Smart. I shall argue that although the sensations which a person experiences are, as a matter of contingent fact, brain processes, nonetheless there are facts about sensations which cannot be described or understood in terms of any physical theory. These 'mental' facts cannot be described by physics for the simple (...) reason that physical descriptions are designed specifically to avoid mentioning such facts. Thus in giving a physical explanation of a sensation we necessarily describe and render intelligible that sensation only as a physical process, and not also as a sensation. If we are to describe and render intelligible a person's sensations, or inner experiences, as sensations, and not as physical processes occurring in that person's brain, then we must employ a kind of description that connot be derived from any set of physical statements. (shrink) Causal Closure of the Physical in Metaphysics Dualism about Consciousness in Philosophy of Mind Functionalism and Qualia in Philosophy of Mind Nonreductive Materialism in Philosophy of Mind Other Anti-Materialist Arguments in Philosophy of Mind Direct download (9 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell (1966). Physics and Common Sense. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 16 (February):295-311. In this paper I set out to solve the problem of how the world as we experience it, full of colours and other sensory qualities, and our inner experiences, can be reconciled with physics. I discuss and reject the views of J. J. C. Smart and Rom Harré. I argue that physics is concerned only to describe a selected aspect of all that there is – the causal aspect which determines how events evolve. Colours and other sensory qualities, lacking causal (...) efficacy, are ignored by physics and cannot be predicted by physical theory. Even though physics is silent about sensory qualities, they nevertheless exist objectively in the world – in one sense of “objective” at least. (shrink) Philosophy of Mind, Misc in Philosophy of Mind Philosophy, Miscellaneous Scientific Realism, Misc in General Philosophy of Science Theories of Color, Misc in Philosophy of Mind Direct download (8 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell, The Basic Argument ..... My Work ..... Recent Publications ..... Publications ..... Reviews .....About Me. This is an association of people sympathetic to the idea that academic inquiry should help humanity acquire more wisdom by rational means. Wisdom is taken to be the capacity to realize what is of value in life, for oneself and others. It includes knowledge, understanding and technological know-how, and much else besides. Friends of Wisdom try to encourage universities and schools actively to seek and promote wisdom by educational and intellectual means. At present, Friends of Wisdom communicate with one another (...) in the main by email (JISCMAIL). If you wish to join, click HERE, and then click on "join or leave the list", or email: nick@knowledgetowisdom.org See Friends of Wisdom Website: www.knowledgetowisdom.org.. (shrink) No categories Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell, Does Philosophy Betray Both Reason and Humanity? A bad philosophy of inquiry, built into the intellectual/institutional structure of universities round the world, betrays both reason and humanity. Philosophy, Miscellaneous The Political Role of Philosophy in Social and Political Philosophy Virtue Ethics and Practical Wisdom in Normative Ethics Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell, Is the Wisdom Revolution Underway? The world faces grave global problems. These have been made possible by modern science and technology. We have put knowledge-inquiry into academic practice – a seriously irrational kind of inquiry that seeks knowledge and technological know-how dissociated from a more fundamental concern to seek and promote wisdom. We urgently need to bring about a revolution in academic inquiry, so that knowledge-inquiry becomes wisdom-inquiry – a kind of inquiry rationally designed and devoted to helping humanity make progress towards a wiser world. (...) In this paper I indicate what needs to change if knowledge-inquiry is to become wisdom-inquiry, and I indicate a number of recent developments, mainly in universities in the UK, that can be regarded as first steps towards wisdom-inquiry. (shrink) Academic and Teaching Ethics in Philosophy of Social Science Virtue Ethics and Practical Wisdom in Normative Ethics Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell, Unification and Revolution: A Paradigm for Paradigms. On the first of the two occasions I met Thomas Kuhn, we immediately plunged into a ferocious but very friendly argument about incommensurability. He was for it, I was against. Believing in incommensurability was Kuhn’s worst mistake. If it is to be found anywhere in science, it would be in theoretical physics. But revolutions in theoretical physics have one striking feature in common: they all embody theoretical unification. Revolutions associated with Galileo, Newton, Faraday and Maxwell, Einstein, Bohr, Schrödinger, Dirac, Tomonaga, (...) Schwinger and Feynman, Weinberg and Salam, have all been unifying revolutions. Far from obliterating the idea that there is a persisting theoretical idea in physics, revolutions do just the opposite: they all actually exemplify the persisting idea of underlying unity. Furthermore, persistent acceptance of unifying theories in physics when empirically more successful disunified rivals can always be concocted means that physics makes a persistent implicit assumption concerning unity. To put it in Kuhnian terms, underlying unity is a paradigm for paradigms. Once this is recognized, it becomes clear that we need a new conception of science which represents problematic assumptions concerning the physical comprehensibility and knowability of the universe in the form of a hierarchy, these assumptions becoming less and less substantial and more and more such that their truth is required for science, or the pursuit of knowledge, to be possible at all, as one goes up the hierarchy. This view makes explicit that we can improve assumptions and associated methods – aims and methods – as we proceed with physics, and knowledge improves. There is something like positive feedback between improving knowledge, and improving aims and methods – the nub of scientific rationality, and the methodological key to the great success of science. This hierarchical conception of science has important Kuhnian features, but also differs dramatically from the view Kuhn expounds in his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. I describe basic features of this hierarchical view, and give reasons why it should be accepted. (shrink) Karl Popper in 20th Century Philosophy Nature of Science, Misc in General Philosophy of Science Philosophy of Physical Science, Miscellaneous in Philosophy of Physical Science Simplicity and Parsimony in General Philosophy of Science Thomas Kuhn in 20th Century Philosophy Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Nicholas Maxwell, What’s Wrong With Aim-Oriented Empiricism? For four decades it has been argued that we need to adopt a new conception of science called aim-oriented empiricism. This has far-reaching implications and repercussions for science, the philosophy of science, academic inquiry in general, conception of rationality, and how we go about attempting to make progress towards as good a world as possible. Despite these far-reaching repercussions, aim-oriented empiricism has so far received scant attention from philosophers of science. Here, sixteen objections to the validity of the argument for (...) aim-oriented empiricism are subjected to critical scrutiny. (shrink) Nature of Science, Misc in General Philosophy of Science Philosophy of Physical Science, Misc in Philosophy of Physical Science Scientific Progress in General Philosophy of Science Theory Change in General Philosophy of Science Unification Accounts of Explanation in General Philosophy of Science Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation

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