Ian B. Phillips Oxford University
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About me
I am a CUF Lecturer and Gabriele Taylor Fellow at St. Anne's College, Oxford University. I work mainly in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, but have broad interests especially in theoretical philosophy. I am currently working on a book, Our Experience of Time.
My works
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  1. I. Phillips (forthcoming). Review of Nudds and O'Callaghan (Eds.) Sounds & Perception. [REVIEW] Journal of Consciousness Studies.
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  2. I. B. Phillips (forthcoming). Perception and Iconic Memory. Mind & Language.
    Philosophers have lately seized upon Sperling’s partial report technique and subsequent work on iconic memory in support of controversial claims about perceptual experience, in particular that phenomenology overflows cognitive access. Drawing on mounting evidence concerning postdictive perception, I offer an interpretation of Sperling’s data in terms of cue-sensitive experience which fails to support any such claims. Arguments for overflow based on change-detection paradigms (e.g., Landman et al., 2003; Sligte et al., 2008) cannot be blocked in this way. However, such paradigms (...)
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  3. Ian Phillips (forthcoming). Cetacean Semantics: A Reply to Sainsbury. Analysis:anu052.
    Sainsbury argues that the nineteenth century case of Maurice v. Judd, in which the jury apparently ruled that whales are fish, presents a paradox whose ‘resolution will require carefully formulated metasemantic principles’ (2014: 5). I argue that Sainsbury misconstrues what is fundamentally at issue in the court room. The substantive disagreement (and so verdict) does not concern whether whales are fish but rather the intended meaning of the phrase ‘fish oil’ as employed in a statute authorizing the appointment of ‘fish (...)
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  4. Ian Phillips (forthcoming). Hallucinating Silence. In Dimitri Platchias & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Hallucination. MIT Press.
    Tradition has it that, although we experience darkness, we can neither hear nor hallucinate silence. At most, we hear that it is silent, in virtue of lacking auditory experience. This cognitive view is at odds with our ordinary thought and talk. Yet it is not easy to vouchsafe the perception of silence: Sorensen‘s recent account entails the implausible claim that the permanently and profoundly deaf are perpetually hallucinating silence. To better defend the view that we can genuinely hear and hallucinate (...)
     
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  5. Ian Phillips (2014). Breaking the Silence: Motion Silencing and Experience of Change. Philosophical Studies 168 (3):693-707.
    The naïve view of temporal experience (Phillips, in: Lloyd D, Arstila V (eds) Subjective time: the philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of temporality, forthcoming-a) comprises two claims. First, that we are perceptually aware of temporal properties, such as succession and change. Second, that for any temporal property apparently presented in experience, our experience itself possesses that temporal property. In his paper ‘Silencing the experience of change’ (forthcoming), Watzl argues that this second naïve inheritance thesis faces a novel counter-example in the form (...)
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  6. Ian Phillips (2014). Experience of and in Time. Philosophy Compass 9 (2):131-144.
    How must experience of time be structured in time? In particular, does the following principle, which I will call inheritance, hold: for any temporal property apparently presented in perceptual experience, experience itself has that same temporal property. For instance, if I hear Paul McCartney singing ‘Hey Jude’, must my auditory experience of the ‘Hey’ itself precede my auditory experience of the ‘Jude’, or can the temporal order of these experiences come apart from the order the words are experienced as having? (...)
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  7. I. B. Phillips (2013). Perceiving the Passing of Time. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3):225-252.
    Duration distortions familiar from trauma present an apparent counterexample to what we might call the naive view of duration perception. I argue that such distortions constitute a counterexample to naiveté only on the assumption that we perceive duration absolutely. This assumption can seem mandatory if we think of the alternative, relative view as limiting our awareness to the relative durations of perceptually presented events. However, once we recognize the constant presence of a stream of non-perceptual conscious mental activity, we can (...)
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  8. Ian Phillips (2013). Afterimages and Sensation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):417-453.
  9. Ian Phillips (2013). 15 Hearing and Hallucinating Silence. In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination. Mit Press. 333.
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  10. I. Phillips (2012). Memory: A Philosophical Study, by Sven Bernecker. Mind 121 (482):474-478.
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  11. Ian Phillips (2012). Attention to the Passage of Time. Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):277-308.
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  12. I. B. Phillips (2011). Attention and Iconic Memory. In Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies and W. & Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. OUP.
    Orthodox interpretations of Sperling‘s partial report paradigm support the idea that there is substantially more in our streams of consciousness than we can attend to or recall. I propose an alternative, postdictive interpretation which fails to support any such conclusion. This account is defended at greater length in my ‗Perception and iconic memory‘. Here I focus on the role ascribed to attention by the rival interpretations. I argue that orthodox accounts fail to assign a plausible role to attention. In contrast, (...)
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  13. Ian B. Phillips (2011). Perception and Iconic Memory: What Sperling Doesn't Show. Mind and Language 26 (4):381-411.
    Philosophers have lately seized upon Sperling's partial report technique and subsequent work on iconic memory in support of controversial claims about perceptual experience, in particular that phenomenology overflows cognitive access. Drawing on mounting evidence concerning postdictive perception, I offer an interpretation of Sperling's data in terms of cue-sensitive experience which fails to support any such claims. Arguments for overflow based on change-detection paradigms (e.g. Landman et al., 2003; Sligte et al., 2008) cannot be blocked in this way. However, such paradigms (...)
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  14. I. B. Phillips (2010). Stuck in the Closet: A Reply to Ahmed. Analysis 71 (1):86-91.
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  15. Ian Phillips (2010). Perceiving Temporal Properties. European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):176-202.
    Philosophers have long struggled to understand our perceptual experience of temporal properties such as succession, persistence and change. Indeed, strikingly, a number have felt compelled to deny that we enjoy such experience. Philosophical puzzlement arises as a consequence of assuming that, if one experiences succession or temporal structure at all, then one experiences it at a moment. The two leading types of theory of temporal awareness—specious present theories and memory theories—are best understood as attempts to explain how temporal awareness is (...)
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  16. Ian B. Phillips (2010). Review of Matthew Nudds & Casey O’Callaghan, 'Sounds & Perception: New Philosophical Essays'. [REVIEW] Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (9-10):245-248.
    A Martian reading contemporary work on perception might be forgiven for thinking that humans had only one sense: vision. Witness the title of one popular recent collection: Vision and mind: selected readings in the philosophy of perception. Our obsession with sight is stifling. It leads to distorted vision-based models of the other senses, and it means that the distinctive puzzles raised by non-visual modalities are routinely neglected. With this pioneering and long-overdue collection of essays on auditory perception, Nudds and O’Callaghan (...)
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  17. Ian Phillips (2009). Experience and Time. Dissertation, UCL
    We are no less directly acquainted with the temporal structure of the world than with its spatial structure. We hear one word succeeding another; feel two taps as simultaneous; or see the glow of a firework persisting, before it finally fizzles and fades. However, time is special, for we not only experience temporal properties; experience itself is structured in time. -/- Part One articulates a natural framework for thinking about experience in time. I claim (i) that experience in its experiential (...)
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  18. Ian Phillips (2009). Rate Abuse: A Reply to Olson. Analysis 69 (3):503-505.
    Olson (2009) argues that time does not pass because (i) if it did it would have to pass at some rate, and (ii) there is no rate at which it could pass. This paper exposes a confusion about the nature of rates upon which this argument rests.
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  19. Ian B. Phillips (2009). Robin le Poidevin the Images of Time: An Essay on Temporal Representation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (2):439-446.
  20. Ian Phillips (2007). Morgenbesser Cases and Closet Determinism. Analysis 67 (293):42–49.
    Sidney Morgenbesser brought to attention cases of the following form: (MC1) Chump tosses an indeterministic coin and, whilst it is in mid-air, calls heads. The coin lands tails, and Chump loses. His betting was causally independent of the coin’s fall. Chump seems right to say: ‘If I had bet tails, I would have won.’1 (MC2).
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  21. Andrew McCarthy & Ian Phillips (2006). No New Argument Against the Existence Requirement. Analysis 66 (289):39–44.
    Yagisawa (2005) considers two old arguments against the existence requirement. Both arguments are significantly less appealing than Yagisawa suggests. In particular, the second argument, first given by Kaplan (1989: 498), simply assumes that existence is contingent (§1). Yagisawa’s ‘new’ argument shares this weakness. It also faces a dilemma. Yagisawa must either treat ‘at @’ as a sentential operator occupying the same grammatical position as ‘∼’ or as supplying an extra argument place. In the former case, Yagisawa’s argument faces precisely the (...)
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  22. Ian Phillips (2005). Experience and Intentional Content. Dissertation, Oxford University
    Strong or Pure Intentionalism is the claim that the phenomenal character of any perceptual experience can be exhaustively characterized solely by reference to its Intentional content. Strong or Pure Anti-Intentionalism is the claim that the phenomenal character of any perceptual experience can be exhaustively characterized solely by reference to its non-Intentional properties. In Chapters One and Two, I consider how best to delineate the opposition between these positions. I reject various characterizations of the distinction, in particular, that it can be (...)
     
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  23. Ian Phillips, Perception and Context.
    I develop a seeming antinomy in relation to the question, Do natural kind properties, strictly speaking, characterize the phenomenology of experience? Or, in Peacockean terms, Are natural kind concepts observational? On the one hand, naïve descriptions of experience are rich descriptions, often characterizing our experience in terms of the presence of natural kinds. Thus, negative answers to such questions falsify how our experience seems to us. On the other hand, attributing rich contents to experience forces us to treat certain matching (...)
     
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