Online research in philosophy

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• Faculty, Carleton University
• PhD, London School of Economics, 2007.

• Metaphysics
• General Philosophy of Science

• Epistemology
• Philosophy of Language
• Philosophy of Physical Science
• Philosophy of Mathematics
• Philosophy of Mind
• Philosophy of Cognitive Science

My philosophical views

I work primarily in philosophy of science (especially, scientific representation, scientific models, scientific realism, evidence and confirmation, and explanation) and metaphysics (especially modality, laws of nature, properties, dispositions, possible worlds, and causation). I am currently Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada. I founded, administer, and contribute to Matters of Substance: A Group Blog Devoted to Metaphysics and It's Only A Theory: A Group Blog Devoted to Metaphysics. I am the PhilPapers field editor for General Philosophy of Science and area editor for Models and Idealization, Scientific Realism, and Properties.

16 items found. Sort by: publication yearfirst authorviewingsaddition date Gabriele Contessa (forthcoming). Do Extrinsic Dispositions Need Extrinsic Causal Bases? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. In this paper, I distinguish two often-conflated theses—the thesis that all dispositions are intrinsic properties and the thesis that the causal bases of all dispositions are intrinsic properties—and argue that the falsity of the former does not entail the falsity of the latter. In particular, I argue that extrinsic dispositions are a counterexample to first thesis but not necessarily to the second thesis, because an extrinsic disposition does not need to include any extrinsic property in its causal basis. I conclude (...) by drawing some general lessons about the nature of dispositions and their relation to their causal bases. (shrink) Dispositions and Bases in Metaphysics Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Gabriele Contessa (2011). Scientific Models and Representation. In Steven French & Juha Saatsi (eds.), The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Science. Continuum Press. Models in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Representation in General Philosophy of Science Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Sheldon Steed, Gabriele Contessa & Nancy Cartwright (2011). Keeping Track of Neurath's Bill: Abstract Concepts, Stock Models, and the Unity of Classical Physics. In Olga Pombo, John Symons & Juan Manuel Torres (eds.), Otto Neurath and the Unity of Science. Kluwer. Classical Mechanics in Philosophy of Physical Science Models in General Philosophy of Science Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Gabriele Contessa (2010). Empiricist Structuralism, Metaphysical Realism, and the Bridging Problem. Analysis 70 (3):514-524. (No abstract is available for this citation). Alternatives to Scientific Realism, Misc in General Philosophy of Science Metaphysical Realism in Metaphysics Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: analysis.oxfordjournals.org dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Gabriele Contessa (2010). Introduction. Synthese 172 (2). Models in General Philosophy of Science Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Gabriele Contessa (2010). Modal Truthmakers and Two Varieties of Actualism. Synthese 174 (3). In this paper, I distinguish between two varieties of actualism—hardcore actualism and softcore actualism—and I critically discuss Ross Cameron’s recent arguments for preferring a softcore actualist account of the truthmakers for modal truths over hardcore actualist ones. In the process, I offer some arguments for preferring the hardcore actualist account of modal truthmakers over the softcore actualist one. Actualism in Metaphysics Modal Ersatizism in Metaphysics Powers in Metaphysics Truthmakers in Metaphysics Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Gabriele Contessa (2010). Scientific Models and Fictional Objects. Synthese 172 (2). In this paper, I distinguish scientific models in three kinds on the basis of their ontological status—material models, mathematical models and fictional models, and develop and defend an account of fictional models as fictional objects—i.e. abstract objects that stand for possible concrete objects. Abstract Objects, Misc in Metaphysics Models in General Philosophy of Science Nonexistent Objects in Metaphysics Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Gabriele Contessa (2009). Review of Bas C. Van Fraassen, Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (3). Alternatives to Scientific Realism, Misc in General Philosophy of Science Constructive Empiricism in General Philosophy of Science Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Gabriele Contessa (2009). Who is Afraid of Imaginary Objects? In Nicholas Griffin & Dale Jacquette (eds.), Russell Vs. Meinong: The Legacy of "on Denoting". Routledge. Fictional Characters in Aesthetics Nonexistent Objects in Metaphysics Specific Expressions in Philosophy of Language Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Gabriele Contessa (2008). A Note on the Nomic Possibility of a Dynamic Shift. Erkenntnis 68 (2):187 - 190. In this note, I argue that a dynamically shifted world—i.e. a world identical to our own except for a fixed constant difference in the absolute acceleration of each object—is nomically impossible in a Newtonian world populated by finitely many objects. A dynamic shift however seems to be nomically possible in a world populated by infinitely many objects, but only in a broad sense of nomic possibility. Absolute Spacetime in Philosophy of Physical Science Metaphysics of Spacetime, Misc in Philosophy of Physical Science Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: jstor.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Gabriele Contessa (2007). Representing Reality: The Ontology of Scientific Models and Their Representational Function. Dissertation, University of London Today most philosophers of science believe that models play a central role in science and that one of the main functions of scientific models is to represent systems in the world. Despite much talk of models and representation, however, it is not yet clear what representation in this context amounts to nor what conditions a certain model needs to meet in order to be a representation of a certain system. In this thesis, I address these two questions. First, I will (...) distinguish three senses in which something, a vehicle, can be said to be a representation of something else, a target—which I will call respectively denotation, epistemic representation, and faithful epistemic representation—and I will argue that the last two senses are the most important in this context. I will then outline a general account of what makes a vehicle an epistemic representation of a certain target for a certain user—which, according to the account I defend, is the fact that a user adopts what I call an interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target—and of what makes an epistemic representation of a certain target a faithful epistemic representation of it—which, according to the account I defend, is a specific sort of structural similarity between the vehicle and the target. (shrink) Models in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Representation in General Philosophy of Science Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Gabriele Contessa (2007). Scientific Representation, Interpretation, and Surrogative Reasoning. Philosophy of Science 74 (1):48-68. In this paper, I develop Mauricio Suárez’s distinction between denotation, epistemic representation, and faithful epistemic representation. I then outline an interpretational account of epistemic representation, according to which a vehicle represents a target for a certain user if and only if the user adopts an interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target, which would allow them to perform valid (but not necessarily sound) surrogative inferences from the model to the system. The main difference between the interpretational conception I (...) defend here and Suárez’s inferential conception is that the interpretational account is a substantial account—interpretation is not just a “symptom” of representation; it is what makes something an epistemic representation of a something else. (shrink) Models in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Representation in General Philosophy of Science Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: journals.uchicago.edu philsci-archive.pitt.edu dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Gabriele Contessa (2007). There Are Kinds and Kinds of Kinds: Ben-Yami on the Semantics of Kind Terms. Philosophical Studies 136 (2):217-248. Hanoch Ben-Yami has argued that the theory of the semantics of natural kind terms proposed by Kripke and Putnam is false and has proposed an allegedly novel account of the semantics of kind terms. In this article, I critically examine Ben-Yami’s arguments. I will argue that Ben-Yami’s objections do not show that Kripke and Putnam’s theory is false, but at most that the specific versions of it held by Kripke and Putnam have some weaknesses. Moreover, I will argue that Ben-Yami’s (...) account is not a novel account but it is only an unsatisfactory version of Kripke and Putnam’s theory. (shrink) Kind Terms in Philosophy of Language Natural Kinds in Metaphysics Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: jstor.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Gabriele Contessa (2006). Constructive Empiricism, Observability, and Three Kinds of Ontological Commitment. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 37 (4):454–468. In this paper, I argue against constructive empiricism that, as far as science is concerned, observability is not an adequate criterion as a guidance of cautious ontological commitment. My argument is in two stages. First, I argue that constructive empiricist choice of observability as a criterion for ontological commitment is based on the assumption that belief in the existence of unobservable entities is unreasonable because belief in the existence of an entity can only be vindicated by its observation. Second, I (...) argue that the kind of ontological commitment that is under consideration when accepting a theory is commitment to what I call a theoretical kind and that observation can vindicate commitment to kinds only in exceptional cases. (shrink) Constructive Empiricism in General Philosophy of Science Ontological Commitment in Metaphysics Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: philsci-archive.pitt.edu linkinghub.elsevier.com dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Gabriele Contessa (2006). On the Supposed Temporal Asymmetry of Counterfactual Dependence; Or: It Wouldn't Have Taken a Miracle! Dialectica 60 (4):461–473. The thesis that a temporal asymmetry of counterfactual dependence characterizes our world plays a central role in Lewis’s philosophy, as. among other things, it underpins one of Lewis most renowned theses—that causation can be analyzed in terms of counterfactual dependence. To maintain that a temporal asymmetry of counterfactual dependence characterizes our world, Lewis committed himself to two other theses. The first is that the closest possible worlds at which the antecedent of a counterfactual conditional is true is one in which (...) a small miracle occurs—i.e. one whose laws differ from the actual laws in a small spatiotemporal region. The second is that our world is characterized by a temporal asymmetry of miracles. In this paper, I will argue, first, that the latter thesis is either false or incompatible with the picture of the relations among temporal asymmetries endorsed by Lewis and, second, that former thesis conflicts with some of the intuitions which seem to guide us when engaging in counterfactual reasoning. If there is any fact of the matter as to which possible worlds in which the antecedent of a counterfactual conditional is true are closest to the actual world, these are not worlds at which a small miracle occurs. (shrink) Counterfactual Theories of Causation in Metaphysics Possible-World Theories of Counterfactuals in Philosophy of Language The Direction of Time in Metaphysics Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: blackwell-synergy.com   | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Gabriele Contessa (2006). Scientific Models, Partial Structures and the New Received View of Theories. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (2):370-377. Models in General Philosophy of Science Semantic View of Theories in General Philosophy of Science The Received View of Theories in General Philosophy of Science Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...

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