- Faculty, Carleton University
- PhD, London School of Economics, 2007.
Areas of specialization
Areas of interest
My philosophical views
My current work lies mostly at the intersection of metaphysics and philosophy of science. I work primarily on the nature/identity of properties (where I defend the view that the fundamental natural properties are both qualities and powers (see, e.g., my "Only Properties Can Confer Dispositions" below), dispositions (where I developed and defended a general, detailed and non-circular version of the Simple Counterfactual Analysis, which I call the Interference-Free Counterfactual Analysis (see my "Dispositions and Interferences" below)), modality (where I am working on a global form of dispositionalism about modality, which I call Lockean Supervenience), composition (where I defended a view that I call non-eliminative nihilism (see my "One's A Crowd: Mereological Nihilism Without Ordinary-Object Eliminativism" below)), and fictionalism about abstract objects. In the past I have done work on scientific representation and the scientific realism debate. I am currently Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada. I founded, administer, and contribute to Matters of Substance: A Group Blog Devoted to Metaphysics and It's Only A Theory: A Group Blog Devoted to Metaphysics.
- Gabriele Contessa (forthcoming). It Ain't Easy: Fictionalism, Deflationism, and Easy Arguments in Ontology. Mind.
- Gabriele Contessa (2015). Only Powers Can Confer Dispositions. Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259):160-176.
- Gabriele Contessa (2014). One's a Crowd: Mereological Nihilism Without Ordinary‐Object Eliminativism. Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):199-221.
- Gabriele Contessa (2013). Dispositions and Interferences. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):401-419.
- Gabriele Contessa (2013). Does Your Metaphysics Need Structure? Analysis 73 (4):715-721.
- Gabriele Contessa (2012). Do Extrinsic Dispositions Need Extrinsic Causal Bases? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):622-638.
- Gabriele Contessa (2012). Sweet Nothings. Analysis 72 (2):354-366.
- Gabriele Contessa (2012). The Junk Argument: Safe Disposal Guidelines for Mereological Universalists. Analysis 72 (3):455-457.
- Gabriele Contessa (2011). Scientific Models and Representation. In Steven French & Juha Saatsi (eds.), The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Science. Continuum Press. 120--137.
- Sheldon Steed, Gabriele Contessa & Nancy Cartwright (2011). Keeping Track of Neurath's Bill: Abstract Concepts, Stock Models, and the Unity of Classical Physics. In Olga Pombo, John Symons & Juan Manuel Torres (eds.), Otto Neurath and the Unity of Science. Kluwer.
- Gabriele Contessa (2010). Empiricist Structuralism, Metaphysical Realism, and the Bridging Problem. Analysis 70 (3):514-524.
- Gabriele Contessa (2010). Introduction. Synthese 172 (2):193-195.
- Gabriele Contessa (2010). Modal Truthmakers and Two Varieties of Actualism. Synthese 174 (3):341 - 353.
- Gabriele Contessa (2010). Scientific Models and Fictional Objects. Synthese 172 (2):215 - 229.
- Gabriele Contessa (2009). Review of Bas C. Van Fraassen, Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (3).
- Gabriele Contessa (2009). Who is Afraid of Imaginary Objects? In Nicholas Griffin & Dale Jacquette (eds.), Russell Vs. Meinong: The Legacy of "On Denoting". Routledge.
- Gabriele Contessa (2008). A Note on the Nomic Possibility of a Dynamic Shift. Erkenntnis 68 (2):187 - 190.
- Gabriele Contessa (2007). Representing Reality: The Ontology of Scientific Models and Their Representational Function. Dissertation, University of London
- Gabriele Contessa (2007). Scientific Representation, Interpretation, and Surrogative Reasoning. Philosophy of Science 74 (1):48-68.
- Gabriele Contessa (2007). There Are Kinds and Kinds of Kinds: Ben-Yami on the Semantics of Kind Terms. Philosophical Studies 136 (2):217-248.
- Gabriele Contessa (2006). Constructive Empiricism, Observability, and Three Kinds of Ontological Commitment. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 37 (4):454–468.
- Gabriele Contessa (2006). On the Supposed Temporal Asymmetry of Counterfactual Dependence; Or: It Wouldn't Have Taken a Miracle! Dialectica 60 (4):461–473.
- Gabriele Contessa (2006). Scientific Models, Partial Structures and the New Received View of Theories. [REVIEW] Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (2):370-377.
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