Keith A. Wilson University of Glasgow
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About me
I am a Postdoctoral Researcher in Philosophy on the AHRC large-grant project ‘Rethinking the Senses: Uniting the Neuroscience and Philosophy of Perception’, based at the University of Glasgow. My research concerns the role of representational content in perceptual experience, its relation to phenomenal character and perceptual belief, and the impact of the ‘multisensory turn’ on the philosophy and science of perception, though I am interested in a wide range of topics concerning the philosophy of mind and perception more generally. Other research interests include epistemology (specifically, though not exclusively, of perception), philosophy of psychology, cognitive and neuroscience, the metaphysics and consciousness of time and temporal passage, and the work of Scottish Enlightenment philosopher Thomas Reid.
My works
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  1.  17
    Keith A. Wilson (2014). Review of Charles Travis, Perception: Essays After Frege. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2014 (April).
    Charles Travis’s new collection on perception brings together eleven of his previously published essays on this topic, some of which are substantially revised, plus one new essay. The intentionally ambiguous subtitle hints at the author’s endorsement of Fregean anti-psychologism, though influences from Wittgenstein and Austin are equally apparent. The work centres around two major questions in the philosophy of mind and perception. First, Travis argues against the view that perceptual experience, as distinct from perceptual judgement or belief, is representational, and (...)
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  2. Keith Wilson (2013). Perception and Reality. New Philosopher 1 (2):104-107.
    Taken at face value, the picture of reality suggested by modern science seems radically opposed to the world as we perceive it through our senses. Indeed, it is not uncommon to hear scientists and others claim that much of our perceptual experience is a kind of pervasive illusion rather than a faithful presentation of various aspects of reality. On this view, familiar properties such as colours and solidity, to take just two examples, do not belong to external objects, but are (...)
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  3.  74
    Keith A. Wilson (2013). Representationalism and Anti-Representationalism About Perceptual Experience. Dissertation, University of Warwick
    Many philosophers have held that perceptual experience is fundamentally a matter of perceivers being in particular representational states. Such states are said to have representational content, i.e. accuracy or veridicality conditions, capturing the way that things, according to that experience, appear to be. In this thesis I argue that the case against representationalism — the view that perceptual experience is fundamentally and irreducibly representational — that is set out in Charles Travis’s ‘The Silence of the Senses’ (2004) constitutes a powerful, (...)
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  4. Keith A. Wilson (2013). Reid's Direct Realism and Visible Figure. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253):783-803.
    In his account of visual perception, Thomas Reid describes visible figure as both ‘real and external’ to the eye and as the ‘immediate object of sight’. These claims appear to conflict with Reid's direct realism, since if the ‘immediate’ object of vision is also its direct object, then sight would be perceptually indirect due to the role of visible figure as a perceptual intermediary. I argue that this apparent threat to Reid's direct realism may be resolved by understanding visible figure (...)
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  5.  9
    Keith Wilson, Does Attention Exist?
    In the introduction to the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty states that ‘Attention, [...] as a general and formal activity, does not exist’. This paper examines the meaning and truth of this difficult and surprising statement, along with its implications for the account of perception given by theorists such as Dretske and Peacocke. In order to elucidate Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological account of human perception, I will present two alternative models1 of how attention might be thought to operate. The first is derived from (...)
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