Fred Dretske Duke University
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  1. Fred Dretske (forthcoming). Awareness of Thingss. Mind:283.
     
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  2. Fred Dretske (2013). Challenging Closure: Is It A Way To Answer The Skeptic? The Harvard Review of Philosophy 19:61-68.
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  3. Fred Dretske (2013). Justified True Belief. The Philosophers' Magazine 61 (61):31-36.
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  4. Fred Dretske (2012). Awareness and Authority: Skeptical Doubts About Self-Knowledge. In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press 49.
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  5. Fred Dretske (2012). Chris Hill's Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 161 (3):497-502.
    Chris Hill’s consciousness Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-6 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9812-4 Authors Fred Dretske, 212 Selkirk, Durham, NC 27707, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  6. Fred Dretske (2012). Doubts About Cogito. Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (1):1-17.
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  7. Fred Dretske (2010). About Self-Knowledge. In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. New York: Routledge 425.
     
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  8. Fred Dretske (2010). Información, computación y cognición. Agora 29 (2):113-120.
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  9. Fred Dretske (2010). 9 Knowing It Hurts. In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O.’Rourke & Harry S. Silverstein (eds.), Knowledge and Skepticism. MIT Press 203.
     
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  10. Fred Dretske (2010). What We See : The Texture of Conscious Experience. In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press
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  11. Fred Dretske (2010). What We See. In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press 54.
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  12. Fred Dretske (2009). Information-Theoretic Semantics. In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. OUP Oxford
  13. Fred Dretske (2009). What Must Actions Be for Reasons to Explain Them? In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave Macmillan 13--21.
  14. Fred Dretske (2008). The Metaphysics of Information. In Herbert Hrachovec & Alois Pichler (eds.), Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Information: Proceedings of the 30th International Ludwig Wittgenstein-Symposium in Kirchberg, 2007. De Gruyter 273-284.
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  15. Fred Dretske (2007). What Change Blindness Teaches About Consciousness. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):215–220.
  16. Fred Dretske (2006). Information and Closure. Erkenntnis 64 (3):409 - 413.
    Peter Baumann and Nicholas Shackel defend me against a serious criticism by Christoph Jäger. They argue that my account of information is consistent with my denial of closure for knowledge. Information isn’t closed under known entailment either. I think that, technically speaking, they are right. But the way they are right doesn’t help me much in my effort to answer the skeptic. I describe a way in which information, like knowledge, fails to be closed in a way that makes an (...)
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  17. Fred Dretske (2006). Minimal Rationality. In Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press
     
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  18. Fred Dretske (2006). Perception Without Awareness. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press 147--180.
  19. Fred Dretske (2006). Representation, Teleosemantics, and the Problem of Self-Knowledge. In Graham F. Macdonald & David Papineau (eds.), Teleosemantics. Oxford University Press
  20. Fred Dretske (2005). Is Knowledge Closed Under Known Entailment? The Case Against Closure. In Matthias Steup & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell 13-26.
     
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  21. Fred Dretske (2005). Review of Mohan Matthen, Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (9).
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  22. Fred Dretske (2005). Reply to Hawthorne. In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell 43--46.
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  23. Fred Dretske (2005). The Epistemology of Pain. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/MIT Press 3-20.
     
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  24. Fred I. Dretske (2005). ``The Case Against Closure". In M. Steup & Earnest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Malden, Ma: Blackwell 13--25.
     
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  25. Fred Dretske (2004). Change Blindness. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):1-18.
  26. Fred Dretske (2004). Externalism and Modest Contextualism. Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):173 - 186.
    Externalism about knowledge commits one to a modest form of contextualism: whether one knows depends (or may depend) on circumstances (context) of which one has no knowledge. Such modest contextualism requires the rejection of the KK Principle (If S knows that P, then S knows that S knows that P) - something most people would want to reject anyway - but it does not require (though it is compatible with) a rejection of closure. Radical contextualism, on the other hand, goes (...)
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  27. Fred Dretske (2004). Knowing What You Think Vs. Knowing That You Think It. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter
  28. Fred Dretske (2004). Mental Causation: Dretske Mental Causation. Think 3 (7):7-16.
    When we explain someone's behaviour, we do so by appealing to their mental states – their beliefs, desires, and so on. But, as Fred Dretske explains below, materialists have a hard time explaining how our mental states could have any effect on our behaviour.
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  29. Fred Dretske (2004). Psychological Vs. Biological Explanations of Behavior. Behavior and Philosophy 32 (1):167-177.
    Causal explanations of behavior must distinguish two kinds of cause. There are (what I call) triggering causes, the events or conditions that come before the effect and are followed regularly by the effect, and (what I call) structuring causes, events that cause a triggering cause to produce its effect. Moving the mouse is the triggering cause of cursor movement; hardware and programming conditions are the structuring causes of cursor movement. I use this distinction to show how representational facts (how an (...)
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  30. Fred Dretske (2003). Burge on Mentalistic Explanations, or Why I Am Still Epiphobic. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press
  31. Fred Dretske (2003). Experience as Representation. Philosophical Issues 13 (1):67-82.
  32. Fred Dretske (2003). Externalism and Self-Knowledge. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press
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  33. Fred Dretske (2003). Essays on Nonconceptual Content. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
  34. Fred Dretske (2003). How Do You Know You Are Not a Zombie? In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate 1--14.
  35. Fred Dretske (2003). Sensation and Perception (1981). In Essays on Nonconceptual Content. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press
  36. Fred Dretske (2003). Skepticism: What Perception Teaches. In The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing
     
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  37. Fred Dretske (2003). The Intentionality of Perception. In Barry Smith (ed.), John Searle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
     
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  38. Fred Dretske (2003). The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.
     
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  39. Fred Dretske (2002). A Recipe for Thought. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Minds and Machines. OUP Usa
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  40. Fred Dretske (2001). First Person Warrant: Comments on Siewert's The Significance of Consciousness. Psyche 7 (11).
    I agree with Siewert's claims about the special character and importance of phenomenal consciousness and the impossibility of providing a satisfactory functionalist reduction of it. I question, however, his dismissal of a representational theory of conscious experience. I also question his account of how conscious agents are supposed to know, or enjoy first person warrant, for their belief that they are conscious.
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  41. Fred Dretske (2001). Norms, History, and the Mental. In D. Walsh (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press 87-104.
    Many people think the mind evolved. Some of them think it had to evolve. They think the mind not only has a history, but a history essential to its very existence.
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  42. Fred Dretske (2001). Where is the Mind? In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Explaining Beliefs. Csli
  43. Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.) (2000). Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    In this anthology, distinguished editors Sven Bernecker and Fred Dretske offer the most comprehensive review available of contemporary epistemology. They bring together the most important and influential writings in the field, including frequently neglected topics such as dominant responses to skepticism, introspection, memory, and testimony. Knowledge is divided into fifteen subject areas and includes forty-one readings by eminent contributors. An accessible introduction to each subject area outlines the problems discussed in the essays that follow so that students can focus on (...)
     
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  44. Fred Dretske (2000). Entitlement: Epistemic Rights Without Epistemic Duties? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):591-606.
  45. Fred Dretske (2000). Perception, Knowledge and Belief: Selected Essays. Cambridge University Press.
    This collection of essays by eminent philosopher Fred Dretske brings together work on the theory of knowledge and philosophy of mind spanning thirty years. The two areas combine to lay the groundwork for a naturalistic philosophy of mind. The fifteen essays focus on perception, knowledge, and consciousness. Together, they show the interconnectedness of Dretske's work in epistemology and his more contemporary ideas on philosophy of mind, shedding light on the links which can be made between the two. The first section (...)
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  46. Fred Dretske (2000). Reply to Lopes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):455-459.
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  47. Fred Dretske (2000). Reply to Lopes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):455 - 459.
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  48. Robert Audi, Frank B. Dilley, John McCumber, Fred Dretske, John Lachs, Philip Quinn & Eric Hoffman (1999). Letters to the Editor. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 72 (5):133 - 138.
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  49. Fred Dretske (1999). Mental Causation. In Kevin A. Stoehr (ed.), The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Bowling Green: Philosophy Doc Ctr 81-88.
    Materialist explanations of cause and effect tend to embrace epiphenomenalism. Those who try to avoid epiphenomenalism tend to deny either the extrinsicness of meaning or the intrinsicness of causality. I argue that to deny one or the other is equally implausible. Rather, I prefer a different strategy: accept both premises, but deny that epiphenomenalism is necessarily the conclusion. This strategy is available because the premises do not imply the conclusion without the help of an additional premise—namely, that behavior explained by (...)
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  50. Fred Dretske (1999). Mental Causation. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1999 (7):81-88.
    Materialist explanations of cause and effect tend to embrace epiphenomenalism. Those who try to avoid epiphenomenalism tend to deny either the extrinsicness of meaning or the intrinsicness of causality. I argue that to deny one or the other is equally implausible. Rather, I prefer a different strategy: accept both premises, but deny that epiphenomenalism is necessarily the conclusion. This strategy is available because the premises do not imply the conclusion without the help of an additional premise—namely, that behavior explained by (...)
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  51. Fred Dretske (1999). The Mind's Awareness of Itself. Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):103-24.
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  52. Fred Dretske (1999). The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 2: Metaphysics. Bowling Green: Philosophy Doc Ctr.
     
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  53. Fred I. Dretske (1999). Machines, Plants and Animals: The Origins of Agency. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 51 (1):523-535.
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  54. Fred Dretske (1998). Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
  55. Fred Dretske (1998). Minds, Machines, and Money: What Really Explains Behavior. In J. A. M. Bransen & S. E. Cuypers (eds.), Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Dordrecht: Kluwer 157--173.
  56. Edwin B. Allaire, Peter Carruthers, B. Allaire, John Charvet, Terry Pinkard, Gerald A. Cohen, Stephen Darwall, Herbert A. Davidson, William Demopoulos & Fred Dretske (1997). BAIER, KURT, The Rational and the Moral Order: The Social Roots of Reason and Morality, Reviewed by Sarah Stroud.. 577. Philosophical Review 106 (4).
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  57. Fred Dretske (1997). So Do We Know or Don't We? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (2):407 - 409.
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  58. Fred Dretske (1997). What Good is Consciousness? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):1-15.
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  59. Fred Dretske (1996). Absent Qualia. Mind and Language 11 (1):78-85.
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  60. Fred Dretske (1996). How Reasons Explain Behaviour: Reply to Melnyk and Noordhof. Mind and Language 11 (2):223-229.
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  61. Fred Dretske (1996). Phenomenal Externalism. Philosophical Issues 7.
     
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  62. Fred Dretske (1996). Phenomenal Externalism, or If Meanings Ain't in the Head, Where Are Qualia? Philosophical Issues 7:143-158.
  63. Fred Dretske (1996). Reply to Commentators: [Horwich, Biro, Kim, Lara]. Philosophical Issues 7:179-183.
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  64. Fred Dretske (1995). Are Experiences Conscious? In Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press
  65. Fred Dretske (1995). Dretske's Awful Answer. Philosophia 24 (3-4):459-464.
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  66. Fred Dretske (1995). Differences That Make No Difference. Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2):41-57.
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  67. Fred Dretske (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press.
    In this provocative book, Fred Dretske argues that to achieve an understanding of the mind it is not enough to understand the biological machinery by means of...
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  68. F. Dretske (1994). Misinterpretation. In Steven Stich & Ted Warfield (eds.), Mental Representation. Blackwell 157--173.
     
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  69. Fred Dretske (1994). Introspection. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94:263-278.
  70. Fred Dretske (1994). Mind and Brain. In The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Cambridge: Blackwell
     
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  71. Fred Dretske (1994). Reply to Slater and Garcia-Carpintero. Mind and Language 9 (2):203-8.
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  72. Fred Dretske (1994). If You Can't Make One, You Don't Know How It Works. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):468-482.
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  73. F. Dretske (1993). Conscious Perception. Mind 102:263-283.
     
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  74. F. Dretske (1993). Explaining Behaviour. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (1):157-165.
     
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  75. Fred Dretske (1993). " 1 A Misrepresentation. In Alvin Goldman (ed.), Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Cambridge: MIT Press 297.
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  76. Fred Dretske (1993). Conscious Experience. Mind 102 (406):263-283.
  77. Fred Dretske (1993). Can Intelligence Be Artificial? Philosophical Studies 71 (2):201-16.
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  78. Fred Dretske (1993). Mental Events as Structuring Causes of Behavior. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press
    1. Causal explanations depend on our interests, our purposes, and our prior knowledge. ⇒ No uniquely real causal explanation.
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  79. Fred Dretske (1993). Modes of Perceptual Representation. In Christopher Hookway (ed.), Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Cambridge University Press 147--157.
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  80. Fred Dretske (1993). Of Behavior, Mental Events, and Structuring Causes. In John Heil & Alfred Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Clarendon Press 121--135.
     
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  81. Fred Dretske (1993). The Nature of Thought. Philosophical Studies 70 (2):185-99.
  82. Fred Dretske (1992). The Fragility of Reason. Dialogue 31 (02):311-.
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  83. Fred Dretske (1992). The Metaphysics of Freedom. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (1):1-13.
  84. Fred Dretske (1992). What Isn't Wrong with Folk Psychology. Metaphilosophy 23 (1-2):1-13.
  85. Fred Dretske (1991). Conscious Acts and Their Objects. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):676-677.
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  86. Fred Dretske (1991). Dretske and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
     
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  87. Fred Dretske (1991). Dretske's Replies. In Dretske and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell
     
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  88. Fred Dretske (1991). How Beliefs Explain: Reply to Baker. Philosophical Studies 113 (July):113-117.
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  89. Fred Dretske (1991). Knowledge: Sanford and Cohen. In Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics. Basil Blackwell 185--96.
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  90. Fred Dretske (1991). Replies to Critics. In Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics. Basil Blackwell
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  91. Fred Dretske (1991). Two Conceptions of Knowledge. Grazer Philosophische Studien 40:15-30.
    There are two ways to think about knowledge: From the bottom-up point of view, knowledge is an early arrival on the evolutionary scene; it is what animals need in order to coordinate their behavior with the environmental conditions. The top-down approach, departing from Descartes, considers knowledge constituted by a justified belief which gains its justification only in so far as the process by means of which it is reached conforms to canons of sciemific inference and rational theory choice. Keith Lehrer's (...)
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  92. Fred Dretske (1991). Two Conceptions of Knowledge: Rational Vs. Reliable Belief. Grazer Philosophische Studien 40:15-30.
    There are two ways to think about knowledge: From the bottom-up point of view, knowledge is an early arrival on the evolutionary scene; it is what animals need in order to coordinate their behavior with the environmental conditions. The top-down approach, departing from Descartes, considers knowledge constituted by a justified belief which gains its justification only in so far as the process by means of which it is reached conforms to canons of sciemific inference and rational theory choice. Keith Lehrer's (...)
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  93. Fred Dretske (1990). Does Meaning Matter? In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Information, Semantics, and Epistemology. Blackwell
     
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  94. Fred Dretske (1990). Putting Information to Work. In Philip P. Hanson (ed.), Information, Language and Cognition. University of British Columbia Press
     
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  95. Fred Dretske (1990). Précis of "Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4):783 - 786.
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  96. Fred Dretske (1990). Reply: Causal Relevance and Explanatory Exclusion. In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Information, Semantics, and Epistemology. Blackwell
     
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  97. Fred Dretske (1990). Reply to Reviewers of Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4):819-839.
  98. Fred Dretske (1990). Reply to Reviewers. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4):819 - 839.
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  99. Fred Dretske (1989). Reasons and Causes. Philosophical Perspectives 3:1-15.
  100. Fred Dretske (1989). The Likelihood of Knowledge. Review of Metaphysics 42 (3):632-633.
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  101. Fred Dretske (1989). The Need to Know. In Marjorie Clay & Keith Lehrer (eds.), Knowledge and Skepticism. Westview Press
     
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  102. Fred Dretske (1989). The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. International Studies in Philosophy 21 (3):101-102.
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  103. Fred Dretske (1989). Book Review:Observation and Objectivity Harold I. Brown. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 56 (3):544-.
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  104. F. Dretske (1988). Sensation and Perception. In Jonathan Dancy (ed.), Perceptual Knowledge. Oxford University Press
     
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  105. Fred Dretske (1988). Apistemology and Cognition by Alvin Goldman. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 85 (5):265-270.
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  106. Fred Dretske (1988). Bogdan on Information: Commentary. Mind and Language 3 (2):141-144.
  107. Fred Dretske (1988). Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes. MIT Press.
    In this lucid portrayal of human behavior, Fred Dretske provides an original account of the way reasons function in the causal explanation of behavior.
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  108. Fred Dretske (1988). The Explanatory Role of Content. In Robert H. Grimm & D. D. Merrill (eds.), Contents of Thought. University of Arizona Press
     
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  109. Fred Dretske (1988). The Stance Stance. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):511.
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  110. Fred Dretske (1987). Perception, Learning and the Self. International Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):82-83.
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  111. F. Dretske (1986). Minds, Machines and Meaning in Philosophy and Technology II. Information Technology and Computers in Theory and Practice. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 90:97-109.
     
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  112. Fred Dretske (1986). Aspects of Cognitive Representation. In Myles Brand & Robert M. Harnish (eds.), The Representation of Knowledge and Belief. University of Arizona Press
  113. Fred Dretske (1986). Misrepresentation. In R. Bogdan (ed.), Belief: Form, Content, and Function. Oxford University Press 17--36.
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  114. Fred I. Dretske (1986). Stalking Intentionality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (1):142.
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  115. Fred Dretske (1985). Constraints and Meaning. Linguistics and Philosophy 8 (1):9 - 12.
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  116. Fred Dretske (1985). Machines and the Mental. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 59 (1):23-33.
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  117. Fred I. Dretske (1985). Reviews. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (1):79-81.
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  118. Fred I. Dretske (1985). RMSTRONG, D. M.: "What is a Law of Nature"? [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36:79.
     
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  119. Fred Dretske (1984). Abstract of Comments: Seeing Through Pictures. Noûs 18 (1):73 - 74.
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  120. Fred Dretske & Berent Enç (1984). Causal Theories of Knowledge1. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):517-528.
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  121. Fred Dretske (1983). Precis of Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):55-90.
    A theory of information is developed in which the informational content of a signal (structure, event) can be specified. This content is expressed by a sentence describing the condition at a source on which the properties of a signal depend in some lawful way. Information, as so defined, though perfectly objective, has the kind of semantic property (intentionality) that seems to be needed for an analysis of cognition. Perceptual knowledge is an information-dependent internal state with a content corresponding to the (...)
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  122. Fred I. Dretske (1983). The Epistemology of Belief. Synthese 55 (1):3 - 19.
    By examining the general conditions in which a structure could come to represent another state of affairs, it is argued that beliefs, a special class of representations, have their contents limited by the sort of information the system in which they occur can pick up and process. If a system — measuring instrument, animal or human being — cannot process information to the effect that something is Q, it cannot represent something as Q. From this it follows (for simple, ostensively (...)
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  123. Fred Dretske & Palle Yourgrau (1983). Lost Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 80 (6):356-367.
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  124. Fred Dretske (1982). Richard Rorty., Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. [REVIEW] International Studies in Philosophy 14 (1):96-98.
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  125. Fred Dretske (1982). The Informational Character of Representations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (3):376.
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  126. Fred I. Dretske (1982). A Cognitive Cul-de-Sac. Mind 91 (361):109-111.
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  127. Fred Dretske (1981/1999). Knowledge and the Flow of Information. MIT Press.
    This book presents an attempt to develop a theory of knowledge and a philosophy of mind using ideas derived from the mathematical theory of communication developed by Claude Shannon. Information is seen as an objective commodity defined by the dependency relations between distinct events. Knowledge is then analyzed as information caused belief. Perception is the delivery of information in analog form (experience) for conceptual utilization by cognitive mechanisms. The final chapters attempt to develop a theory of meaning (or belief content) (...)
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  128. Fred Dretske (1981). The Pragmatic Dimension of Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 40 (3):363--378.
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  129. Fred I. Dretske (1981). Scepticism: A Critical Appraisal. Philosophical Topics 12 (2):299-303.
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  130. Fred Dretske (1980). The Intentionality of Cognitive States. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):281-294.
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  131. Fred Dretske (1979). Chisholm on Perceptual Knowledge. Grazer Philosophische Studien 8:253-269.
    Two general approaches to the analysis of knowledge are distinguished: a liberal view that takes the truth of what is known as a condition independent of the justificatory condition, and a conservative view that regards the truth of what is known as implied by the level of justification required for knowledge. Chisholm is classified as a liberal on perceptual knowledge, and his analysis is criticized from a conservative standpoint.
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  132. Fred I. Dretske (1979). Simple Seeing. In Donald F. Gustafson & Bangs L. Tapscott (eds.), Body, Mind, and Method. Kluwer 1--15.
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  133. Fred I. Dretske (1978). Perception. International Studies in Philosophy 10:199-201.
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  134. Fred I. Dretske (1978). Reply to Niiniluoto. Philosophy of Science 45 (3):440-444.
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  135. Fred I. Dretske (1977). Causal Theories of Reference. Journal of Philosophy 74 (10):621-625.
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  136. Fred I. Dretske (1977). Laws of Nature. Philosophy of Science 44 (2):248-268.
    It is a traditional empiricist doctrine that natural laws are universal truths. In order to overcome the obvious difficulties with this equation most empiricists qualify it by proposing to equate laws with universal truths that play a certain role, or have a certain function, within the larger scientific enterprise. This view is examined in detail and rejected; it fails to account for a variety of features that laws are acknowledged to have. An alternative view is advanced in which laws are (...)
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  137. Fred I. Dretske (1977). Referring to Events. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1):90-99.
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  138. Fred I. Dretske (1976). Comments on Shapere and Hesse. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1976:299 - 303.
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  139. Fred I. Dretske (1975). Belief, Truth and Knowledge. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 72 (21):793-802.
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  140. Fred Dretske (1973). Perception and Other Minds. Noûs 7 (March):34-44.
    We ordinarily speak of being able to see that there are people on the bus, Students in the class, And children playing in the street. If human beings are understood to be conscious entities, Then one of our ways of knowing that there are other conscious entities in the world besides ourselves is by seeing that there are. We also speak of seeing that he is angry, She is depressed, And so on. It is argued that this is, Indeed, One (...)
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  141. Fred I. Dretske & Aaron Snyder (1973). Causality and Sufficiency: Reply to Beauchamp. Philosophy of Science 40 (2):288-291.
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  142. Fred I. Dretske (1972). Contrastive Statements. Philosophical Review 81 (4):411-437.
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  143. Fred I. Dretske (1972). Reason and Scepticism. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 69 (2):47-53.
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  144. Fred I. Dretske & Aaron Snyder (1972). Causal Irregularity. Philosophy of Science 39 (1):69-71.
  145. Fred Dretske (1971). Conclusive Reasons. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1 – 22.
  146. Fred Dretske (1971). Conclusive Reasons. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1-22.
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  147. Fred I. Dretske (1971). ``Conclusive Reasons&Quot. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49:1-22.
     
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  148. Fred I. Dretske (1971). Perception From an Epistemological Point of View. Journal of Philosophy 68 (19):584-591.
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  149. Fred I. Dretske (1971). Reasons, Knowledge, and Probability. Philosophy of Science 38 (2):216-220.
    Though one believes that P is true, one can have reasons for thinking it false. Yet, it seems that one cannot know that P is true and (still) have reasons for thinking it false. Why is this so? What feature of knowledge (or of reasons) precludes having reasons or evidence to believe (true) what you know to be false? If the connection between reasons (evidence) and what one believes is expressible as a probability relation, it would seem that the only (...)
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  150. Fred I. Dretske (1970). Epistemic Operators. Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.
  151. Fred I. Dretske (1970). ``Epistemic Operators". Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.
  152. Fred Dretske (1969). Seeing And Knowing. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
  153. Fred I. Dretske (1968). Reasons and Consequences. Analysis 28 (5):166 - 168.
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  154. Fred Dretske (1966). Ziring Ziderata. Mind 75 (April):211-223.
  155. Fred I. Dretske (1965). Reasons and Falsification. Philosophical Quarterly 15 (58):20-34.
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  156. Fred Dretske (1964). Observational Terms. Philosophical Review 73 (January):25-42.
  157. Fred I. Dretske (1964). Particular Reidentification. Philosophy of Science 31 (2):133-142.
    A certain dilemma is inherent in relational accounts of space and time. If any objects endure through change, then temporal elements other than relations are required to describe them. If, on the other hand, no objects endure through change, no permanent reference system is available in terms of which to define the "same place" at different times. An argument which, by exploiting this latter difficulty, attempts to show that "objects with some endurance through time" must be accepted as fundamental is (...)
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  158. Fred I. Dretske (1962). Moving Backward in Time. Philosophical Review 71 (1):94-98.
  159. Fred I. Dretske (1961). Particulars and the Relational Theory of Time. Philosophical Review 70 (4):447-469.
  160. Fred Dretske & JeeLoo Liu, The Nature of Consciousness Handout.
    ___ (i) There is a difference between hearing Clyde play the piano and seeing him play the piano. ___ (ii) A perceptual belief that he is playing the piano must also be distinguished from a perceptual experience of this same event.
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