My philosophical views

The answers shown here are not necessarily the same provided as part of the 2009 PhilPapers Survey. These answers can be updated at any time.

See also:

QuestionAnswerComments
A priori knowledge: yes or no?Accept: yes
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism?Accept: nominalism
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective?Accept: subjective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no?Accept: no
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism?Accept bothI tend to a communicative co-construction between both.
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism?Lean toward: idealismMy view could be described as critical monadism (see Alex Hutter). Much of my view is congruent with the metaphysics of John McTaggart, but I would not limit the "ilusion" of time or existence to be a mental construction. I see rather mind and body as two qualia of the same person. In that sense, I'm inclined to base my ideas on personalism.
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will?Accept: libertarianism
God: theism or atheism?Accept: atheism
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism?Accept another alternativeI accept both as partial. The third element would be ethics which is the communicative impulse that links or transcendes the I to the Other, a particular to a general/universal and is a condition for all knowledge.
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism?Accept: contextualism
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean?Accept: non-Humean
Logic: classical or non-classical?Accept: non-classical
Mental content: internalism or externalism?Accept an intermediate view
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism?Lean toward: moral anti-realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism?Lean toward: non-naturalism
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism?Reject bothI follow a sort of critical monadism. All that has material and spiritual qualities. Neither of them can be a property of the other. Both of them are essential qualities of substances that are considered subjects or persons. If a substance presents only the material quality, I would consider it an object. If real objects exist, however, cannot be proved. Only a positive prove for personhood through spritual (mindful, willful) interaction can be tested.
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism?Lean toward: non-cognitivism
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism?Accept an intermediate viewI would rather tend to a communicatively constituted motivation.
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes?Accept: one boxI do not see this as a matter of calculation but of trust. Game theory would propose A and B under any circumstances, but I do not believe this game in game theory has anything to do with life.
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics?Accept: deontology
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory?Lean toward: qualia theory
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view?OtherProbabely, anticriterialism is best describing my view.
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism?Accept: libertarianism
Proper names: Fregean or Millian?Lean toward: FregeanI would mention Russel and Bergson here, too. Most prominently also Alfred Schutz about his theory on meaning and meaning-contexts.
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism?Lean toward: scientific anti-realismProbabely, instrumentalism is what best fits my personal approach.
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death?Reject bothThis answer can only be given by the teletransported person and the persons related to it. Death and life cannot be "observed" only "experienced" and communicated or, in the case of death, lack communication.
Time: A-theory or B-theory?Accept bothFollowing Bergson, I would describe the perception of "outer time" along A-theory and "inner time" along B-theory. The paradox lies in the fact that both theories depend on each other or emerge from each other, similar to ideas of other absolutes like "black and white", "good and bad", etc. They are ideals which are abstracted by a point of unity. We experience this point of unity in the phenomenon of "personality" or "subjectivity".
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch?OtherTo find a solution which saves all would be the correct thing (creative solution) otherwise we are guilty in any case. Probabely, I would save those who I favor for some reason (perhaps family, friends or similar). But it would not be more correct. I remain indepted with those I failed.
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic?Accept: deflationary
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible?The question is too unclear to answerIt depends on the definition of Zombie. If it is understood as a human body controlled by a mind, in the sense that a different mind is directly acting on the physical movements, which implies body-mind separation to be possible, I am inclined to say it is not metaphysically possible. If we see Zombies as persons who lake their higher abilities of thought, for one or the other reasons, and are therefore easily manipulated to do certain actions planned by another mind, then, I held it as rather possible. The whole issue would also imply a more concrete definition of the state of the body as "death" or whatever.