Mark van Roojen University of Nebraska, Lincoln
Contact

Affiliations
  • Faculty, University of Nebraska, Lincoln
  • PhD, Princeton University, 1993.

Areas of specialization

Areas of interest

My philosophical views


blank
About me
Not much to say..
My works
30 items found.
Sort by:
  1. Mark van Roojen (forthcoming). Moral Cognitivism Vs . Non-Cognitivism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Non-cognitivism is a variety of irrealism about ethics with a number of influential variants. Non-cognitivists agree with error theorists that there are no moral properties or moral facts. But rather than thinking that this makes moral statements false, noncognitivists claim that moral statements are not in the business of predicating properties or making statements which could be true or false in any substantial sense. Roughly put, noncognitivists think that moral statements have no truth conditions. Furthermore, according to non-cognitivists, when people (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Mark van Roojen (forthcoming). Moral Intuitionism, Experiments and Skeptical Arguments. In Anthony Booth & Darrell Rowbottom (eds.), Intuitions. Oxford University Press.
    Over the last decade there have been various attempts to use empirical data about people’s dispositions to choose to undermine various moral positions by arguing that our judgements about what to do are unreliable. Usually they are directed at non-consequentialists by consequentialists, but they have also been directed at all moral theories by skeptics about morality. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has been one of the leading proponents of such general skepticism. He has argued that empirical results particularly undermine intuitionist moral epistemology. This (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Mark van Roojen (2015). Metaethics: A Contemporary Introduction. Routledge.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Mark Roojen (2013). Commonsense Consequentialism. By Douglas W. Portmore. (Oxford UP, 2011. Pp. Xi + 266. Price £27.50.). [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252):626-629.
  5. Mark Roojen (2013). Internalism, Motivational. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Mark van Roojen (2013). Scanlon's Promising Proposal and the Righ Kind of Reasons to Believe. In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 3. 59-78.
    T. M. Scanlon suggests that the binding nature of promises itself plays a role in allowing a promisee rationally to expect follow through even while that binding nature itself depends on the promisee’s rational expectation of follow through. Kolodny and Wallace object that this makes the account viciously circular. The chapter defends Scanlon’s theory from this objection. It argues that the basic complaint is a form of wrong kinds of reason objection. The thought is that the promisee’s reason to expect (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Mark van Roojen (2011). Review of Joshua Gert, Brute Rationality: Normativity and Human Action. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):543-546.
  8. Mark van Roojen (2010). A Fork in the Road for Expressivism. Ethics 120 (2):357-381.
    This is a review essay discussing Mark Schroeder's book, Being For.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Mark van Roojen (2010). Moral Rationalism and Rational Amoralism. Ethics 120 (3):495–525.
  10. Erik J. Wielenberg, Gopal Sreenivasan, Mark van Roojen, Edward S. Hinchman, Judith Lichtenberg & John Brunero (2010). 10. David Sobel and Steven Wall, Eds., Reasons for Action David Sobel and Steven Wall, Eds., Reasons for Action (Pp. 631-635). [REVIEW] Ethics 120 (3).
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Mark van Roojen (2008). Some Advantages of One Form of Argument for the Maximin Principle. Acta Analytica 23 (4):319-335.
    This paper presents a non-consequentialist defense of Rawls’s general conception of justice requiring that primary social goods be distributed so that the least share is as great as possible. It suggests that a defense of this idea can be offered within a Rossian framework of prima facie duties. The prima facie duty not to harm constrains people from supporting social institutions which do not leave their fellows with goods and resources above a certain threshold. The paper argues that societies in (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Mark van Roojen (2006). Knowing Enough to Disagree: A New Response to the Moral Twin Earth Argument. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies In Metaethics, Volume 1. Clarendon Press. 161-94.
    At the beginning of the twentieth century, G. E. Moore’s open question argument convinced many philosophers that moral statements were not equivalent to statements made using non-moral or descriptive terms. For any non-moral description of an object or object it seemed that competent speakers could without confusion doubt that the action or object was appropriately characterized using moral terms such as ‘good’ or ‘right’. The question of whether the action or object so described was good or right was always open, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Mark van Roojen (2005). Rationalist Realism and Constructivist Accounts of Morality. Philosophical Studies 126 (2):285-295.
    This is a review essay about Russ Shafer-Landau's Moral Realism. In Moral Realism, Russ Shafer-Landau divides cognitivist moral theories between realist and constructivist versions, where constructivists characterize morality as necessarily connected to the responses of agents under some conditions. This division is misleading; some constructivist or response-invoking characterizations of ethics are fully realist. We need not deny that reasons must be able to motivate rational agents in order to vindicate realism. Rationalists such as Shafer-Landau are committed to the truth of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Mark van Roojen (2005). Expressivism, Supervenience and Logic. Ratio 18 (2):190–205.
    Expressivist analyses of evaluative discourse characterize unembedded moral claims as functioning primarily to express noncognitive attitudes. The most thorny problem for this project has been explaining the logical relations between such evaluative judgements and other judgements expressed using evaluative terms in unasserted contexts, such as when moral judgements are embedded in conditionals. One strategy for solving the problem derives logical relations among moral judgements from relations of "consistency" and "inconsistency" which hold between the attitudes they express. This approach has been (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Mark Van Roojen (2004). The Plausibility of Satisficing and the Role of Good in Ordinary Thought. In Michael Byron (ed.), Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason. Cambridge University Press.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Mark van Roojen (2002). Humean and Anti-Humean Internalism About Moral Judgements. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):26-49.
    Motivational internalism about moral judgments is the plausible view that accepting a moral judgment is necessarily connected to motivation motivation. However, it conflicts with the Humean theory that motives must be constituted by desires. Simple versions of internalism run into problems with people who do not desire to do what they believe right. This has long been urged by David Brink. Hence, many internalists have adopted more subtle defeasible views, on which only rational agents will have a desire to act. (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Mark van Roojen (2002). Review of John Rawls's The Law of Peoples. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 36 (4):555-562.
  18. Mark van Roojen (2002). John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Book Review). Journal of Value Inquiry 36 (4):555-562.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Mark van Roojen (2002). Should Motivational Humeans Be Humeans About Rationality? Topoi 21 (1-2):209-215.
    Robust moral rationalism has long been regarded as incompatible with the Humean Theory of Motivation which requires desires to ground motives. Recently this orthodoxy has been challenged on the ground that rationality itself might require certain desires. This strategy does not remove the tension between rationalism and the Humean Theory. If rationalism is correct, new normative beliefs should engender new motives - motives not grounded in a means-ends fashion in rationally required existing desires. Thus the motivational responses we should expect (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. M. van Roojen (2001). Review of MArk Timmons', Morality Without Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 110 (2):283-286.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Mark van Roojen (2000). Motivational Internalism: A Somewhat Less Idealized Acount. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (199):233-241.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Mark van Roojen (2000). Motivational Internalism: A Somewhat Less Idealized Account. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (199):233-241.
    Contemporary internalists postulate a defeasible yet necessary connection between values and motives. Typically they idealize the conditions for motivation, claiming for example that motivation must be present in rational persons under certain conditions. Robert Johnson convincingly argues that these versions of internalism have trouble avoiding the "conditional fallacy". They overlook ways in which the conditions in the antecedent of the conditional expressing the analysis are incompatible with the claim under analysis. Moreover, avoiding the fallacy decouples internalism from its use to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Alan Nelson, Ram Neta, Nelson Pike & Mark van Roojen (1999). The Fourth Meditation1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):559-591.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Tamar Schapiro, A. John Simmons, Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Sarah Buss, Julia Driver, G. F. Schueler, James Montmarquet, Mark van Roojen & Samantha Brennan (1999). 10. Nicholas Rescher, Objectivity: The Obligations of Impersonal Reason Nicholas Rescher, Objectivity: The Obligations of Impersonal Reason (Pp. 917-919). [REVIEW] Ethics 109 (4).
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Mark van Roojen (1999). Reflective Moral Equilibrium and Psychological Theory. Ethics 109 (4):846-857.
    Tamara Horowitz criticizes the use of thought experiments by Warren Quinn and others to support a version of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. She argues that because a competing empirical explanatory hypothesis for our common agreement on the correct outcome in those thought experiments is true we should conclude that our intuitions concerning those examples do not provide support for the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. Other authors have reached similar conclusions. I argue that the argument misconstrues the role (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Mark Van Roojen (1997). Affirmative Action, Non-Consequentialism, and Responsibility for the Effects of Past Discrimination. Public Affairs Quarterly 11 (3):281-301.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Mark van Roojen (1996). Expressivism and Irrationality. Philosophical Review 105 (3):311-335.
    Geach's problem, the problem of accounting for the fact that judgements expressed using moral terms function logically like other judgements, stands in the way of most noncognitive analyses of moral judgements. The non-cognitivist must offer a plausible interpretation of such terms when they appear in conditionals that also explains their logical interaction with straightforward moral assertions. Blackburn and Gibbard have offered a series of accounts each of which interprets such conditionals as expressing higher order commitments. Each then invokes norms for (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Mark van Roojen (1996). Moral Functionalism and Moral Reductionism. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):77-81.
    Jackson and Pettit propose a "functionalist" analysis of evaluative content in service of a naturalistic reduction of moral terms. Though a broadly functionalist account may be correct, it does not immediately lead to a naturalistic theory for two reasons. First, a naturalistic theory should make clear in what sense the properties in question are naturalistic. The paper raises some doubts that this can be done consistent with the functionalist reduction. Second, even if we can construct true Ramsey sentences containing only (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Mark van Roojen (1995). Humean Motivation and Humean Rationality. Philosophical Studies 79 (1):37-57.
    Michael Smith's recent defence of the theory shows promise, in that it captures the most common reasons for accepting a Humean view. But, as I will argue, it falls short of vindicating the view. Smith's argument fails, because it ignores the role of rationality conditions on the ascription of motivating reason explanations. Because of these conditions, we must have a theory of rationality before we choose a theory of motivation. Thus, we cannot use Humean restrictions on motivation to argue for (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Mark Van Roojen (1995). Review of Dancy's Moral Reasons. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 45 (178):118-120.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
Is this list right?