Simon Kittle University of Sheffield

  • Graduate student, University of Sheffield

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About me
I am a PhD student in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Sheffield. My main research is in the area of philosophy of action, especially the metaphysics of free will.
My works
5 items found.
  1.  27
    Simon Kittle (2015). Abilities to Do Otherwise. Philosophical Studies 172 (11):3017-3035.
    In this paper I argue that there are different ways that an agent may be able to do otherwise and that therefore, when free will is understood as requiring that an agent be able to do otherwise, we face the following question: which way of being able to do otherwise is most relevant to free will? I answer this question by first discussing the nature of intrinsic dispositions and abilities, arguing that for each action type there is a spectrum of (...)
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  2.  3
    Simon Kittle (2015). Grace and Free Will: Quiescence and Control. Journal of Analytic Theology 3:89-108.
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  3.  11
    Simon Kittle (2015). Powers Opposed and Intrinsic Finks. Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):372-380.
    Philosophers disagree over whether dispositions can be intrinsically finked or masked. Choi suggests that there are no clear, relevant differences between cases where intrinsic finks would be absurd and those where they seem plausible, and as a result rejects them wholesale. Here, I highlight two features of dispositional properties which, when considered together, provide a plausible explanation for when dispositions can be subject to intrinsic finks and when not.
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  4.  75
    Simon Kittle (2014). Vihvelin and Fischer on ‘Pre-Decisional’ Intervention. Philosophia 42 (4):987-997.
    Vihvelin argues that Frankfurt-style cases should be divided into two kinds, according to when the trigger for the intention takes place: either prior to the agent's choice or after it. Most agree that only the former, which I call pre-decisional intervention, stands a chance of removing all of an agent's alternatives. Vihvelin notes that both sides in the dispute over whether there is a successful case of pre-decisional intervention assume that if there is a successful case, then it will be (...)
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  5.  21
    Simon Kittle (2013). Freedom of the Will: A Conditional Analysis, by Ferenc Huoranszki. Disputatio (37):368-374.
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