Joshua May University of Alabama, Birmingham
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My philosophical views

The answers shown here are not necessarily the same provided as part of the 2009 PhilPapers Survey. These answers can be updated at any time.

See also:

QuestionAnswerComments
A priori knowledge: yes or no?Lean toward: yes
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism?Lean toward: PlatonismI don't put much weight on spookiness objections, which seems to be a key complaint against non-nominalism ("Platonism" just seems derogatory!).
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective?Lean toward: subjective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no?Lean toward: yes
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism?Lean toward: externalism
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism?Accept: non-skeptical realism
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will?Accept: compatibilism
God: theism or atheism?Accept: atheism
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism?The question is too unclear to answerIf rationalism is just the denial of empiricism (where this is the view that all knowledge is in some sense grounded in sensory experience or impressions), then I suppose I'm probably a rationalist.
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism?Lean toward: invariantism
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean?Lean toward: non-Humean
Logic: classical or non-classical?Accept: classical
Mental content: internalism or externalism?Accept: externalism
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism?Lean toward: moral realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism?Accept: naturalismIt's unclear what "naturalism" means here. But I certainly wouldn't describing my view on anything as non-naturalistic.
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism?Lean toward: physicalismOf the non-reductionist variety.
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism?Accept: cognitivism
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism?Lean toward: externalismI'm assuming "internalism" here means the relatively strong, traditional version that making a moral judgment necessarily entails possession of the corresponding (though defeasible) motivation. But if "internalism" means something weaker, then I'd lean toward it (like what Michael Smith calls "the practicality requirement," according to which making the moral judgment entails the existence of the motivation unless the agent is practically irrational).
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes?Agnostic/undecided
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics?Lean toward: deontology
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory?Lean toward: representationalism
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view?Lean toward: psychological view
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism?Agnostic/undecided
Proper names: Fregean or Millian?Lean toward: Millian
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism?Accept: scientific realism
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death?Lean toward: survival
Time: A-theory or B-theory?Lean toward: A-theory
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch?Agnostic/undecidedI know I'm supposed to say "switch!" but I'm not so sure...
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic?Lean toward: correspondence
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible?Lean toward: conceivable but not metaphysically possible