Jonathan Kvanvig Baylor University
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  • PhD, University of Notre Dame, 1982.

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  1. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (unknown). Phil 418: Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 99:211 - 227.
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  2. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (forthcoming). , An Epistemic Theory of Creation. In Destiny and Decision: Essays in Philosophical Theology. 233-297 ms..
  3. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2013). Affective Theism and People of Faith. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 37 (1):109-128.
  4. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2013). Theories of Providence and Creation. Res Philosophica 90 (1):49-67.
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  5. Jonathan Kvanvig (2012). Coherentism and Justified Inconsistent Beliefs: A Solution. Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):21-41.
    The most pressing difficulty coherentism faces is, I believe, the problem of justified inconsistent beliefs. In a nutshell, there are cases in which our beliefs appear to be both fully rational and justified, and yet the contents of the beliefs are inconsistent, often knowingly so. This fact contradicts the seemingly obvious idea that a minimal requirement for coherence is logical consistency. Here, I present a solution to one version of this problem.
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  6. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2012). ``Curiosity and a Response-Dependent Account of the Value of Understanding&Quot. In Timothy Henning & David Schweikard (eds.), Epistemic Virtues.
     
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  7. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2012). ``Disagreement and Reflective Ascent&Quot. In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), New Essays on Disagreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
     
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  8. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2012). ``Epistemic Encroachment and Responsibility: Two Approaches to Norms of Assertion&Quot. In John Turri (ed.), Epistemic Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
     
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  9. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2012). ``Infinitism, Holism, and the Regress Argument&Quot. In Peter Klein & John Turri (eds.), Infinitism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
     
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  10. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2012). ``Skeptical Theism&Quot. In Trent Dougherty, Justin McBrayer & Daniel Howard-Snyder (eds.), New Essays on Skeptical Theism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
     
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  11. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2012). ``Truth-Tracking and the Value of Knowledge&Quot. In Kelly Becker (ed.), New Essays on Sensitivity and Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
     
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  12. Jonathan Kvanvig (2011). Norms of Assertion. In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. 233--250.
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  13. Jonathan Kvanvig (2011). Of Reflective Ascent. In T. Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press. 34.
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  14. Jonathan Kvanvig (2011). The Rational Significance of Reflective Ascent. In T. Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.
     
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  15. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2011). Destiny and Deliberation: Essays in Philosophical Theology. Oxford University Press.
    Instead, it is a theory of what one should do, and assesses decisions based on probabilities and utilities. ... Adopting the plan of applying modern decision theory to one's choices might have lower expected utility than using other ...
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  16. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2011). Millar on the Value of Knowledge. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):83-99.
    Alan Millar's paper (2011) involves two parts, which I address in order, first taking up the issues concerning the goal of inquiry, and then the issues surrounding the appeal to reflective knowledge. I argue that the upshot of the considerations Millar raises count in favour of a more important role in value-driven epistemology for the notion of understanding and for the notion of epistemic justification, rather than for the notions of knowledge and reflective knowledge.
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  17. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.) (2011). Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion is an annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth of interest over the past half century. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board, it publishes exemplary papers in any area of philosophy of religion.
     
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  18. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2011). ``The Rational Significance of Reflective Ascent&Quot. In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Critics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
     
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  19. Jonathan Kvanvig (2010). Epistemic Justification. In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. New York: Routledge. 25--36.
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  20. Jonathan Kvanvig (2010). The Incarnation and the Knowability Paradox. Synthese 173 (1):89 - 105.
    The best defense of the doctrine of the Incarnation implies that traditional Christianity has a special stake in the knowability paradox, a stake not shared by other theistic perspectives or by non-traditional accounts of the Incarnation. Perhaps, this stake is not even shared by antirealism, the view most obviously threatened by the paradox. I argue for these points, concluding that these results put traditional Christianity at a disadvantage compared to other viewpoints, and I close with some comments about the extent (...)
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  21. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2010). ``Coherentism&Quot. In Andrew Cullison (ed.), A Companion to Epistemology. New York: Continuum Press.
     
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  22. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2010). ``Epistemic Justification&Quot. In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. New York: Routledge.
     
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  23. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2010). ``Norms of Assertion&Quot. In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappellan (eds.), Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
     
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  24. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2010). Sosa's Virtue Epistemology. Critica 42 (125):47 - 62.
    Ernest Sosa's latest epistemology remains a version of virtue epistemology, and I argue here that it faces two central problems, pressing a point I have made elsewhere, that virtue epistemology does not present a complete answer to the problem of the value of knowledge. I will press this point regarding the nature of knowledge through variations on two standard Gettier examples here. The first is the Fake Barn case and the second is the Tom Grabit case. I will argue that (...)
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  25. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2010). ``The Swamping Problem Redux: Pith and Gist&Quot. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 89-112.
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  26. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2010). ``Virtue Epistemology&Quot. In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. New York: Routledge.
     
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  27. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2010). Virtue Epistemology. In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. New York: Routledge. 199--207.
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  28. Jonathan Kvanvig (2009). Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries. In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 140--160.
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  29. Jonathan Kvanvig (ed.) (2009). Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 2. OUP Oxford.
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion is an annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth of interest over the past half century. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board, it publishes exemplary papers in any area of philosophy of religion.
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  30. Jonathan Kvanvig (2009). ``Precìs of T He Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding &Quot. In Pritchard, Haddock & MIllar (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 309-313.
    Reflection on the issues surrounding the value of knowledge and other cognitive states of interest to epistemologists can be traced to the conversation between Socrates and Meno in Plato’s dialogue named after the latter. The context of discussion concerns the hiring of a guide to get one to Larissa, and the proposal on the table is that one would want a guide who knows the way. Socrates sees a problem, however, for it is not clear why a guide with merely (...)
     
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  31. Jonathan Kvanvig (2009). Restriction Strategies for Knowability : Some Lessons in False Hope. In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press.
    The knowability paradox derives from a proof by Frederic Fitch in 1963. The proof purportedly shows that if all truths are knowable, it follows that all truths are known. Antirealists, wed as they are to the idea that truth is epistemic, feel threatened by the proof. For what better way to express the epistemic character of truth than to insist that all truths are knowable? Yet, if that insistence logically compels similar assent to some omniscience claim, antirealism is in jeopardy. (...)
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  32. Jonathan Kvanvig (2009). Responses to Critics. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oup Oxford.
    I begin by expressing my sincere thanks to my critics for taking time from their own impressive projects in epistemology to consider mine. Often, in reading their criticisms, I had the feeling of having received more help than I really wanted! But the truth of the matter is that we learn best by making mistakes, and I appreciate the conscientious attention to my work that my critics have shown.
     
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  33. Jonathan Kvanvig (2009). The Value of Understanding. In Pritchard, Haddock & MIllar (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 95--112.
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  34. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2009). ``Knowledge, Assertion, and Lotteries&Quot. In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 140--160.
     
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  35. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2009). Précis of the Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. In Pritchard, Haddock & MIllar (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 309--313.
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  36. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2009). ``Resurrection, Heaven, and Hell&Quot. In Charles Taliaferro & Paul Draper (eds.), A Companion to Philosophy of Religion. Routledge. 630-639.
     
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  37. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2009). Religious Pluralism and the Buridan's Ass Paradox. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 1 (1):1-26.
    The paradox of ’Buridan’s ass’ involves an animal facing two equally adequate and attractive alternatives, such as would happen were a hungry ass to confront two bales of hay that are equal in all respects relevant to the ass’s hunger. Of course, the ass will eat from one rather than the other, because the alternative is to starve. But why does this eating happen? What reason is operative, and what explanation can be given as to why the ass eats from, (...)
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  38. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2009). ``Restriction Strategies for Knowability: Lessons in False Hope&Quot. In Joseph Salerno (ed.), New Essays on Knowability. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 205-222.
  39. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2009). ``Responses to Critics&Quot. In Pritchard, Haddock & Millar (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 339-353.
     
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  40. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2009). The Value of Understanding. In Pritchard, Haddock & Millar (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 95-112.
     
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  41. J. Kvanvig (2008). Epistemic Luck by Duncan Pritchard. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):272.
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  42. Jonathan Kvanvig, Creation and Conservation. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  43. Jonathan Kvanvig (2008). Contrastivism and Closure. Social Epistemology 22 (3):247 – 256.
    This paper argues for a solution to a problem that contrastivism faces. The problem is that contrastivism cannot preserve closure, in spite of claims to the contrary by its defenders. The problem is explained and a response developed.
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  44. Jonathan Kvanvig (2008). ``Critical Notice of Pritchard's E Pistemic Luck &Quot. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77:272-281.
    Duncan Pritchard’s book (Epistemic Luck, Oxford University Press, 2005) concerns the interplay between two disturbing kinds of epistemic luck, termed “reflective” and “veritic,” and two types of arguments for skepticism, one based on a closure principle for knowledge and the other on an underdetermination thesis about the quality of our evidence for the everyday propositions we believe. Pritchard defends the view that a safety-based account of knowledge can answer the closure argument and provide an account of how veritic epistemic luck (...)
     
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  45. Jonathan Kvanvig, Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  46. Jonathan Kvanvig (2008). Epistemic Luck. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):272-281.
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  47. Jonathan Kvanvig (2008). Pointless Truth. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):199-212.
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  48. Jonathan Kvanvig (2008). The Valueof Know Ledgeis External to It. In Duncan Pritchard & Ram Neta (eds.), Arguing About Knowledge. Routledge. 37.
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  49. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2008). ``Closure and Alternative Possibilities&Quot. In John Greco (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 456-484.
  50. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2008). ``Contrastivism and Closure&Quot. Social Epistemology 22:247-256.
     
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  51. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2008). Five Questions About Epistemology. In Duncan Pritchard & Vincent Hendricks (eds.), Epistemology: 5 Questions. London: Automatic Press/Vip.
     
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  52. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2008). ``Hell&Quot. In Jerry L. Walls (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Eschatology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 413-427.
     
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  53. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2008). ``Pointless Truth&Quot. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32:199-212.
     
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  54. Jonathan Kvanvig (2007). Propositionalism and the Metaphysics of Experience. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):165–178.
    The view I've been defending in the theory of justification I have termed ‘propositionalism’. It counsels beginning inquiry into the nature of justification by adopting a particular form of evidentialism, according to which the first task is to describe the abstract relation of evidencing that holds between propositional contents. Such an approach has a variety of implications for the theory of justification itself, and many of the motivations for the view are of a standard internalist variety. Some of these motivations (...)
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  55. Jonathan Kvanvig (2007). Two Approaches to Epistemic Defeat. In Deane-Peter Baker (ed.), Alvin Plantinga. Cambridge University Press. 107-124.
    There are two different kinds of theories of the concept of epistemic defeat. One theory begins with propositional relationships, only by implication describing what happens in the context of a noetic system. Such a theory places inforrmation about defeat up front, not informing us of how the defeat relationships play out in the context of actual belief, at least not initially. The other theory takes a back door to the concept of defeat, assuming a context of (...)
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  56. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2007). Contextualism, Contrastivism, Relevant Alternatives, and Closure. Philosophical Studies 134 (2):131-140.
    Contextualists claim two important virtues for their view. First, contextualism is a non-skeptical epistemology, given the plausible idea that not all contexts invoke the high standards for knowledge needed to generate the skeptical conclusion that we know little or nothing. Second, contextualism is able to preserve closure concerning knowledge – the idea that knowledge is extendable on the basis of competent deduction from known premises. As long as one keeps the context fixed, it is plausible to think that some closure (...)
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  57. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2006). Closure Principles. Philosophy Compass 1 (3):256–267.
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  58. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2006). ``Epistemic Closure Principles&Quot. Philosophy Compass 1:256-267.
     
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  59. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2006). The Knowability Paradox. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This book thus provides a thorough investigation of the literature on the paradox, and also proposes a solution to the deeper of the two problems raised by ...
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  60. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2006). ``The Value of Knowledge and Truth&Quot. In D. M. Borchert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Macmillan Reference Books.
     
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  61. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2005). On Denying a Presupposition of Sellars' Problem:A Defense of Propositionalism. Veritas 50 (4):173-190.
    There is a great divide between two approaches to epistemology over the past thirty to forty years. Some label the divide that between internalists and externalists, and that characterization may be accurate on some account of the distinction. I will pursue the divide from a different direction, in part because the literature on the distinction between internalism and externalism has become a mess, and I don’t want to clean up the mess here.
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  62. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2005). Ontology, Identity, and Modality. Faith and Philosophy 22 (1):105-106.
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  63. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2005). ``Truth and the Epistemic Goal&Quot. In Matthias Steup & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Malden, Ma: Blackwell. 285-295.
     
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  64. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2004). Nozickian Epistemology and the Value of Knowledge. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):201–218.
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  65. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2004). ``Nozickian Epistemology and the Question of Closure&Quot. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):351-364.
    Nozick’s contribution to the epistemology of the last half of the twentieth century includes addressing the question of whether knowledge is closed under known implication. I argue that the question of closure provides a serious obstacle to Nozickian approaches to epistemology.
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  66. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2004). Review of John Greco (Ed.), Ernest Sosa and His Critics. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (12).
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  67. C. S. Lewis, R. Swinburne, E. Stump, W. L. Craig, J. Kvanvig & J. Walls (2004). Problem Piekła-Uniwersalizm ThomasA Talbotta1. Kwartalnik Filozoficzny 32 (3).
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  68. Jonathan Kvanvig (2003). ``Propositionalism and the Perspectival Character of Justification&Quot. American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (1):3-18.
    The flight from foundationalism in the earlier part of this century left several options in its wake. Distress over the possibility of foundationalist replies to the regress problem, coupled with consternation over the thought of circular reasoning mysteriously becoming acceptable as the circle gets large led to the attraction of holistic theories of a coherentist variety. Yet, such coherentisms seemed to leave the belief system cut off from the world, and perhaps a better idea was to abandon the approach to (...)
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  69. Jonathan Kvanvig (2003). Review: Simple Reliabilism and Agent Reliabilism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):451 - 456.
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  70. Jonathan Kvanvig (2003). Simple Reliabilism and Agent Reliabilism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):451–456.
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  71. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2003). Justification and Proper Basing. In Erik Olsson (ed.), The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer. Dordrecht: Kluwer Publishing Co.. 43-62.
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  72. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2003). ``Jonathan Edwards on Hell&Quot. In Paul Helm & Oliver Crisp (eds.), Jonathan Edwards: Philosophical Theologian. Burlington, Vt: Ashgate Publishing Co.. 1-12.
     
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  73. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2003). ``Scientific Naturalism and the Value of Knowledge&Quot. In Thomas F. Crisp (ed.), Knowledge and Reality: Essays in Honor of Alvin Plantinga. Dordrecht: Kluwer Publishing Co.. 193-214.
     
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  74. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2003). The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. Cambridge University Press.
    Epistemology has for a long time focused on the concept of knowledge and tried to answer questions such as whether knowledge is possible and how much of it there is. Missing from this inquiry, however, is a discussion on the value of knowledge. In The Pursuit of Knowledge and the Value of Understanding Jonathan Kvanvig argues that epistemology properly conceived cannot ignore the question of the value of knowledge. He also questions one of the most fundamental assumptions in epistemology, namely (...)
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  75. Jonathan Kvanvig (2002). On Behalf of Maverick Molinism. Faith and Philosophy 19 (3):348-357.
    In clarifying and defending Molinism, Thomas Flint argues against a position he terms Maverick Molinism. This version of Molinism maintains that, though counterfactuals of freedom have their truth-value logically prior to God’s acts of will, God could have so acted that these counterfactuals would have had a different truth value from that which they actually have. Flint believes this position is flawed, and presents an argument for rejecting it. I argue that Flint’s argument against Maverick Molinism is flawed, and suggest (...)
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  76. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2002). ``On Behalf of Maverick Molinism&Quot. Faith and Philosophy 19:348-357.
     
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  77. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2001). ``Divine Hiddenness: What is the Problem?&Quot. In Daniel Howard-Snyder & Paul Moser (eds.), The Hiddenness of God. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 149-163.
     
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  78. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2001). ``Omniscience and Eternity: A Reply to Craig&Quot. Faith and Philosophy 18 (3):369-376.
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  79. Jonathan Kvanvig (2000). Review: Zagzebski on Justification. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):191 - 196.
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  80. Jonathan Kvanvig (2000). Zagzebski on Justification. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):191-196.
    The heart of the epistemological interest of Zagzebski’s book is found in the tasks of clarifying the natures of justification and knowledge in terms of the intellectual virtues. It is in virtue of undertaking this task that Zagzebski presents a version of virtue epistemology. Though the book has several interesting features apart from this task, I want to argue that in its fundamental tasks, the book is a failure. In particular, I will argue that Zagzebski’s virtue account of justification is (...)
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  81. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2000). Divine Omniscience. In Adrian Hastings, Alistair Mason & Hugh Pyper (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Christian Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 498-499.
     
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  82. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2000). Externalism and Epistemology Worth Doing. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (S1):27-42.
  83. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2000). ``Epistemology Worth Doing&Quot. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38:27-42.
     
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  84. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2000). ``Zagzebski on Justification&Quot. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60:191--196.
     
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  85. Michael Hand & Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1999). Tennant on Knowability. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (4):422 – 428.
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  86. Michael Hand & Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1999). ``Tennant on Knowability&Quot. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77:422-428.
     
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  87. Jonathan Kvanvig (1999). Tennant on Knowability. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (4):422-428.
    The knowability paradox threatens metaphysical or semantical antirealism, the view that truth is epistemic, by revealing an awful consequence of the claim [i] that all truths are knowable. Various attempts have been made to find a way out of the paradox.
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  88. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1999). Lewis on Finkish Dispositions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):703-710.
    Finkish dispositions, those dispositions that are lost when their conditions of realization occur, pose deep problems for counterfactual accounts of dispositions. David Lewis has argued that the counterfactual approach can be rescued, offering such an account that purports to handle finkish as well as other dispositions. The paper argues that Lewis's account fails to account for several kinds of dispositions, one of which involves failure to distinguish parallel processes from unitary processes.
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  89. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1999). ``Lewis on Finkish Dispositions&Quot. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59:703-710.
     
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  90. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1999). Lewis on Finkish Dispositions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):703 - 710.
    Finkish dispositions, those dispositions that are lost when their conditions of realization occur, pose deep problems for counterfactual accounts of dispositions. David Lewis has argued that the counterfactual approach can be rescued, offering such an account that purports to handle finkish as well as other dispositions. The paper argues that Lewis's account fails to account for several kinds of dispositions, one of which involves failure to distinguish parallel processes from unitary processes.
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  91. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1999). ``Truth and Superassertibility&Quot. Philosophical Studies 93:1-19.
     
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  92. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1998). Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Boston: Routledge.
     
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  93. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1998). ``The Epistemic Paradoxes&Quot. In Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Boston: Routledge.
  94. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1998). ``Why Should Inquiring Minds Want to Know?&Quot. The Monist 81 (3):426--451.
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  95. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1998). Why Should Inquiring Minds Want to Know?: "Meno" Problems and Epistemological Axiology. The Monist 81 (3):426 - 451.
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  96. Jonathan Kvanvig (1997). In Defense of Coherentism. Journal of Philosophical Research 22:299-306.
    Alvin Plantinga and John Pollock both think that coherentism is a mistaken theory of justification, and they do so for different reasons. In spite of these differences, there are remarkable connections between their criticisms. Part of my goal here is to show what these connections are. I will show that Plantinga’s construal of coherentism presupposes Pollock’s arguments against that view, and I will argue that coherentists need not breathe their last in response to the contentions of either. Coherentism may be (...)
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  97. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1997). ``Heaven and Hell&Quot. In Philip L. Quinn & Charles Taliaferro (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Religion. Oxford: Blackwell. 562-568.
     
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  98. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1997). ``In Defense of Coherentism&Quot. Journal of Philosophical Research 22:299-306.
     
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  99. Jonathan Kvanvig (1996). Plantinga's Proper Function Account of Warrant. In J. J. Kvanvig (ed.), Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology. Rowman and Littlefield, Savage, Maryland.
    Plantinga thus offers an approach that begins by assessing the faculties or abilities of a cognitive system or agent. Once such an assessment is complete, the epistemologist is in a position to infer the epistemic status of the doxastic products of those faculties or abilities.
     
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  100. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1996). Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):970-973.
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  101. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1996). ``Plantinga's Proper Function Theory of Warrant&Quot. In , Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology. Savage, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield. 281-306.
     
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  102. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1996). ``The Knowability Paradox and the Prospects for Anti-Realism&Quot. Noûs 29:481-500.
     
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  103. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.) (1996). Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge. Savage, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield.
    Alvin Plantinga responds to the essays in a concluding chapter.
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  104. Jonathan Kvanvig (1995). Coherentists' Distractions. Philosophical Topics 23 (1):257-274.
    The heart of coherentism is found in two aspects, one negative and one positive. On the negative side, coherentism is a contrary of foundationalism, the view that the epistemic status of our beliefs ultimately traces to, or derives from, basic beliefs.
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  105. Jonathan Kvanvig (1995). ``Coherentism: Misconstrual and Misapprehension&Quot. Southwest Philosophy Review 11 (1):159-169.
    Some critics of coherentism have depicted it so that it founders on the distinction between warrant for the content of a belief and warrant for the believing itself. This distinction has to do with the basing relation: one might have warrant for the content of what one believes without basing one's belief properly, without holding the belief because of what warrants it. When the first kind of warrant obtains, I will say that a belief is propositionally warranted.
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  106. Jonathan Kvanvig (1995). Does God's Existence Need Proof? Philosophical Books 36 (3):213-215.
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  107. Jonathan Kvanvig (1995). The Knowability Paradox and the Prospects for Anti-Realism. Noûs 29 (4):481-500.
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  108. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1995). ``Coherentists' Distractions&Quot. Philosophical Topics 23:257-275.
     
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  109. Steven D. Hales & Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1994). The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (175):254.
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  110. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1994). ``A Critical Notice of Alston's P Erceiving God &Quot. Faith and Philosophy 11:311-321.
     
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  111. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1994). A Critique of Van Fraassen's Voluntaristic Epistemology. Synthese 98 (2):325-348.
    Van Fraassen's epistemology is forged from two commitments, one to a type of Bayesianism and the other to what he terms voluntarism. Van Fraassen holds that if one is going to follow a rule in belief-revision, it must be a Bayesian rule, but that one does not need to follow a rule in order to be rational. It is argued that van Fraassen's arguments for rejecting non-Bayesian rules is unsound, and that his voluntarism is subject to a fatal dilemma arising (...)
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  112. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1994). He Who Lapse Last Lapse Best: Plantinga on Leibniz'Lapse. Southwest Philosophy Review 10:137-146.
    Alvin Plantinga thinks Leibniz made a mistake. Leibniz claimed that God could have created any possible world, but Plantinga thinks this view amounts to a lapse in judgment on Leibniz =s part. = Plantinga terms this mistake ALeibniz= Lapse,@ and his rejection of this Leibuizian claim plays an important role in Plantinga =s free wili defense against the problem of evil. I will argue that Plantinga fails to show that Leibniz lapsed in thinking about which worlds are actualizable by God; (...)
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  113. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1994). ``He Who Lapse Last Lapse Best: Plantinga on Leibniz' Lapse&Quot. Southwest Philosophy Review 10 (1):137-146.
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  114. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1994). Perceiving God. Faith and Philosophy 11 (2):311-321.
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  115. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1994). The Incomplete Universe: Totality, Knowledge, and Truth. Philosophical Books 35 (2):117-119.
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  116. David Wisdo, Jonathan L. Kvanvig & Donald Wayne Viney (1994). Book Reviews. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 36 (1):57-63.
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  117. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1993). The Problem of Hell. New York: Oxford University Press.
    This work develops an understanding of hell that is common to a broad variety of religious perspectives, and argues that the usual understandings of hell are ...
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  118. Jonathan Kvanvig (1992). Hasker on Fatalism. Philosophical Studies 65 (1-2):91 - 101.
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  119. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1992). ``Hasker on Fatalism&Quot. Philosophical Studies 67:91-101.
     
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  120. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1992). The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind: On the Place of the Virtues in Contemporary Epistemology. Savage, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield.
     
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  121. Jonathan L. Kvanvig & Wayne D. Riggs (1992). Can a Coherence Theory Appeal to Appearance States? Philosophical Studies 67 (3):197-217.
    Coherence theorists have universally defined justification as a relation only among (the contents of) belief states, in contradistinction to other theories, such as some versions of founda­tionalism, which define justification as a relation on belief states and appearance states.
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  122. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1991). Philosophical Perspectives, Volume 2, Epistemology, Ed. James E. Tomberlin. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (3):700-703.
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  123. Hugh J. McCann & Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1991). The Occasionalist Proselytizer: A Modified Catechism. Philosophical Perspectives 5:587-615.
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  124. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1990). ``Theism, Reliabilism, and the Cognitive Ideal&Quot. In Michael J. Beaty (ed.), Philosophy and the Christian Faith. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 71-91.
     
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  125. Jonathan L. Kvanvig & Christopher Menzel (1990). The Basic Notion of Justification. Philosophical Studies 59 (3):235-261.
    Epistemologists often offer theories of justification without paying much attention to the variety and diversity of locutions in which the notion of justification appears. For example, consider the following claims which contain some notion of justification: B is a justified belief, S's belief that p is justified, p is justified for S, S is justified in believing that p, S justifiably believes that p, S's believing p is justified, there is justification for S to believe that p, there is justification (...)
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  126. Jonathan Kvanvig (1989). The Analogy Argument for a Limited Acccount of Omniscience. International Philosophical Quarterly 29 (2):129-138.
    IN COMPARISON with other doctrines Cthe doctrine of omnipotence, for example Cthe proper formulation of the doctrine of omniscience has not seemed especially problematic. Once we accept the contemporary wisdom that knowledge is knowledge of truths, the formulation of the traditional doctrine seems straightforward: to be omniscient is just to know all truths. What has seemed problematic, rather, is whether the doctrine is itself true. In particular, many have wondered whether anyone can know the parts of the future not necessitated (...)
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  127. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1989). Adams on Actualism and Presentism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (2):289-298.
    According to the TDT, no singular propositions about an individual and no "thisnesses" of individuals exist prior to the existence of the indivi­dual in question, where a thisness "is the property of being x, or of being identical with x" and a "singular proposition about an individual x is a proposition that involves or refers to x directly, perhaps by having x or the thisness of x as a constituent, and not merely by way of x's qualitative properties or relations (...)
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  128. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1989). &Quot;adams on Actualism and Presentism&Quot;. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (2):289-298.
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  129. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1989). Conservatism and its Virtues. Synthese 79 (1):143 - 163.
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  130. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1989). ``Conservatism and its Virtues&Quot. Synthese 79:143-163.
     
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  131. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1989). Joseph Mendola. International Philosophical Quarterly 29 (2).
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  132. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1989). The Haecceity Theory and Perspectival Limitation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (September):295-305.
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  133. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1989). Unknowable Truths and the Doctrine of Omniscience. Journal of the American Academy of Religion 57:485-507.
    THE DOCTRINE OF omniscience has been understood in two ways. Roughly, it has been taken either as the claim that God knows all that is true (Geach, Kvanvig 1986) or as the claim that God knows all that can be known (Swinbume; Mavrodes). The first construal I shall call the traditional construal, and the second I shall call a limited construal. Though the traditional construal would seem to be the natural one to hold, considerations of the analogy between the best (...)
     
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  134. Jonathan L. Kvanvig & Hugh J. McCann (1988). ``Divine Conservation and the Persistence of the World&Quot. In Thomas V. Morris (ed.), Divine and Human Action: Essays in the Metaphysics of Theism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 13-49.
     
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  135. Jonathan Kvanvig (1987). On Lemke's Defence of a Causal Basing Requirement. Analysis 47 (3):162 - 167.
    LEMKE has recently taken issue (see ANALYSIS 46.3, June 1986, pp. 138-44) with my claim that no counterfactual causal account of the basing relation is plausible (see ANALYSIS 45.3, June 1985, pp. 153-8). Intuitively, a counterfactual causal account claims that belief is based on evidence if and only if the evidence either causes the belief or would have caused it had the actual cause been absent. This intuitive formulation accounts only for counterfactual causes of level one: events which would have (...)
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  136. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1987). On Lemke's Defense of a Causal Basing Relation. Analysis 47:162--167.
     
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  137. Jonathan Kvanvig (1986). How to Be a Reliabilist. American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (2):189 - 198.
    In recent years, epistemologists have become increasingly impressed with reliabilist theories of justification. 1 Reliabilism is often formulated as the claim that a belief is justified 2 just in case it is a reliable belief; however, this formulation can be somewhat misleading. There is a sense in which a set of beliefs can be reliable, just as a certain history or testimony can be reliable: what one means is that a certain set of propositions is highly accurate, has mostly true (...)
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  138. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1986). ``How to Be a Reliabilist&Quot. American Philosophical Quarterly 23:189-198.
  139. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1986). The Confusion Over Foundationalism. Philosophia 16 (3-4):345-354.
    Foundationalism came under attack in two areas in the first half of this century. First, some doubted whether the foundations were adequate to support the entire structure of knowledge, and second, the doctrine of the Agiven@ came under serious attack. = However, many epistemologists were not convinced that foundationalism was to be abandoned even if the criticisms were granted. According to these epistemologist, far from having shown that foundationalism itself was at fault, the critics of foundationalism had only been attacking (...)
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  140. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1986). The Possibility of an All-Knowing God. London: Macmillan Press.
     
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  141. Jonathan Kvanvig (1985). Swain on the Basing Relation. Analysis 45 (3):153 - 158.
    Suppose we want to know whether a person justifiably believes a certain claim. Further, suppose that our interest in this question is because we take such justification to be necessary for knowledge. To justifiably believe a claim requires more than there being a justification for that claim. Presumably, there is a justification for accepting all sorts of scientific theories of which I have no awareness; because of my lack of awareness, I do not justifiably believe those theories. Further, even if (...)
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  142. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1985). Is There an 'Us' in 'Justification'? Synthese 62 (1):63 - 73.
    A critical question for epistemologists is whether there are any inter-subjective requirements for having a justified belief C whether there is an >us= in >justification=. One recent epistemologist that has addressed this issue is Keith Lehrer. In Knowledge, Lehrer presents a..
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  143. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1985). Swain on the Basing Relation. Analysis 45 (3):153-158.
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  144. Jonathan Kvanvig (1984). Divine Transcendence. Religious Studies 20 (3):377 - 387.
    representations, for the unconditioned transcendent surpasses every possible conception of a being, including even the conception of a Supreme Being... It is the religious function of atheism ever to remind us that the religious act has to do with the unconditioned transcendent, and that the representations of the Unconditioned are not objects concerning whose existence.., a discussion would be possible. The word >God= involves a double meaning: it connotes the unconditioned transcendent, the ultimate, and also an object somehow endowed with (...)
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  145. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1984). Credulism. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16 (2):101 - 109.
    Some recent philosophers of religion have addressed the question of how, and whether it is possible, that the religious experiences some persons have had can give reasons for believing that God exists. Swinburne, for example, claims that what he calls the principle of credulity implies that the religious experiences of those that have them do provide evidence for others that God exists. He formulates the principle as follows: 1 (1) if it seems (epistemically) to a subject that x is present, (...)
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  146. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1984). ``Credulism&Quot. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16:101-110.
     
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  147. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1984). Comment: Jonathan L. Kvanvig. Southwest Philosophy Review 1:182-186.
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  148. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1984). ``Divine Transcendence&Quot. Religious Studies 20:377-387.
     
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  149. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1984). ``Descriptional Theories of Meaning&Quot. Southwest Philosophy Review 1:182-187.
     
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  150. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1984). Subjective Justification. Mind 93 (369):71-84.
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  151. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1984). ``Subjective Justification&Quot. Mind 93:71-84.
     
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  152. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1984). What is Wrong with Minimal Foundationalism? Erkenntnis 21 (2):175-184.
    attacks new defenders of foundationalism. Some simply took on the critics, 2 but others attempted to argue that even if the critics were right, only one form of foundationalism was suspect, not foundationalism itself. For, according to these defenders, foundationalism is not to be identified with the view of Classical Foundationalism (CE) that all of our knowledge rests on incorrigible beliefs. Rather foundationalism is the view that all of our knowledge rests on beliefs that are self-warranting in some sense. Thus, (...)
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  153. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1983). ``The Evidentialist Objection&Quot. American Philosophical Quarterly 20:47-56.
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  154. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1983). The Evidentialist Objection. American Philosophical Quarterly 20 (1):47 - 55.
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  155. Jonathan Kvanvig, Further Thoughts on the Swamping Problem.
    The Swamping Problem is one of the central problems in the new valuedriven approach to epistemology that has arisen recently. Issues concerning epistemic value, however, are not new. We can find them first in Plato’s dialogue Meno, where Socrates and Meno have a discussion about what type of guide one should prefer if one wants to get to Larissa. The first suggestion is that one should want a guide who knows the way, but Socrates notes that a guide with true (...)
     
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  156. Jonathan Kvanvig, Heaven and Hell.
    Philosophical reflection concerning heaven and hell has focused on the place of such doctrines in the great monotheistic religions emanating from the religion of the ancient people of Israel--Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. The philosophical issues that arise concerning these doctrines is not limited to such traditions, however. Consider, for example, the doctrine of hell. Any religion promises certain benefits to its adherents, and these benefits require some contrast that befalls, or might befall, those who fail to adhere to the religion (...)
     
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  157. Jonathan Kvanvig, Jonathan Edwards on Hell.
    Every religion offers both hope and fear. They offer hope in virtue of the benefits promised to adherents, and fear in virtue of costs incurred by adversaries. In traditional Christianity, the costs incurred are expressed in terms of the doctrine of hell, according to which each person consigned to hell receives the same infinite punishment. This strong view of hell involves four distinct theses. First, it maintains that those in hell exist forever in that state (the Existence Thesis) and that (...)
     
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  158. Jonathan Kvanvig, Omniscience and Eternity: A Reply to Craig Jonathan L. Kvanvig.
    Craig claims that my treatment of temporal indexicals such as ‘now’ is inadequate, and that my theory gives no general account of tense. Craig’s argument misunderstands the theory of indexicals I give, and I show how to extend the theory to give a general account of tense.
     
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  159. Jonathan Kvanvig, Response to Flint.
    In defending his rejection of Maverick Molinism (Faith and Philosophy 20.1, (January 2003), pp. 91-100) from my criticisms (Faith and Philosophy 19 (2002), pp. 348-357), Tom Flint attributes three central claims to my argument, and disagrees with two of them. He also notes my request for a defense of the Law of Conditional Excluded Middle, which his argument employs. He portrays that discussion as taking “potshots” at his argument, in part because I denied that concerns about the Law are compelling, (...)
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  160. Jonathan Kvanvig, The Epistemic Paradoxes.
    The four primary epistemic paradoxes are the lottery, preface, knowability, and surprise examination paradoxes. The lottery paradox begins by imagining a fair lottery with a thousand tickets in it. Each ticket is so unlikely to win that we are justified in believing that it will lose.
     
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  161. Jonathan Kvanvig, Wright on Truth and Superassertibility.
    Crispin Wright argues persuasively that truth cannot be understood in terms of warranted assertibility, on the basis of some very simple facts about negation. The argument, he claims, undermines not only simply assertibility theories of truth, but more idealized ones according to which truth is to be understood in terms of what is assertible in the long run, or assertible within some ideal scientific theory.
     
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  162. Jonathan Kvanvig, “Five Questions” by Jonathan L. Kvanvig.
    I came to epistemology through an interest in the concept of rationality, and especially through the attacks on the rationality of religious believers. My thoughts at the time focused on the disappointing quality of the arguments for and against religious belief, and I recall being astonished at the time that philosophers capable of such penetrating insight in other areas had nothing that seemed either penetrating or original. The defenders sounded too much like mere apologists for the faith, and the attackers (...)
     
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  163. Jonathan Kvanvig, Resurrection, Heaven, and Hell.
    Philosophical reflection concerning the afterlife has focused on the place of such doctrines in the great monotheistic religions of the Abrahamic tradition--Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. The philosophical issues that arise concerning these doctrines is not limited to such traditions, however. Consider, for example, the doctrine of hell. Any religion promises certain benefits to its adherents, and these benefits require some contrast that befalls, or might befall, those who fail to adhere to the religion in question. This contrast to the benefits (...)
     
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  164. Jonathan L. Kvanvig, Traditional and Limited Doctrines of Omniscience.
     
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  165. Jonathan Kvanvig, The Value of Knowledge and Truth.
    The questions concerning the value of knowledge and truth range from complete skepticism about such value to more discriminating concerns about the precise nature of the value in question and the comparative judgment that one of the two is more valuable than the other.
     
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