Keith Frankish Open University (UK), University of Crete
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  • Faculty, Open University (UK)
  • Faculty, University of Crete
  • PhD, University of Sheffield, 2003.

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About me
I am an English philosopher, currently living in Crete. I am Adjunct Professor with the Brain and Mind Programme at the University of Crete and a Senior Visiting Research Fellow with The Open University, UK (where I was until recently a Senior Lecturer). My research focuses primarily on topics in philosophy of psychology, including the nature of belief, mental architecture (especially dual-process theories of reasoning), consciousness, and cognitive theories of psychopathology.
My works
37 items found.
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  1. K. Frankish (forthcoming). Soul Dust: The Magic of Consciousness. Philosophical Quarterly.
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  2. W. Ramsey & K. Frankish (eds.) (forthcoming). Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science. Cambridge University Press.
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  3. Keith Frankish (2012). A Diet, but Not the Qualia Plan: Reply to Amy Kind. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):679-680.
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  4. Keith Frankish (2012). Cognitive Capacities, Mental Modules, and Neural Regions. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (4):279-282.
    Dan lloyd (2011) issues a salutary warning against the assumption of what I shall call neural modularity—the view that there is a one-to-one mapping between cognitive functions and distinct brain regions. He shows how the assumption can distort the interpretation of neuroimaging studies and blind researchers to global structures and activity patterns that may be crucial to many aspects of cognitive function and dysfunction.In this note, I want to add a further dimension to the discussion by making connections with the (...)
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  5. Keith Frankish (2012). Delusions, Levels of Belief, and Non-Doxastic Acceptances. Neuroethics 5 (1):23-27.
    In Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs , Lisa Bortolotti argues that the irrationality of delusions is no barrier to their being classified as beliefs. This comment asks how Bortolotti’s position may be affected if we accept that there are two distinct types of belief, belonging to different levels of mentality and subject to different ascriptive constraints. It addresses some worries Bortolotti has expressed about the proposed two-level framework and outlines some questions that arise for her if the framework is adopted. (...)
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  6. Keith Frankish (2012). Dual Systems and Dual Attitudes. Mind and Society 11 (1):41-51.
    It can be argued that dual-system theorists should adopt an action - based view of System 2 (S2), on which S2 reasoning is an intentional activity. It can also be argued that they should adopt a dual - attitude theory, on which the two systems have distinct sets of propositional attitudes. However, Peter Carruthers has argued that on the action-based view there are no S2 attitudes. This paper replies to Carruthers, proposing a view of S2 attitudes as virtual ones, which (...)
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  7. Keith Frankish (2012). Quining Diet Qualia. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):667-676.
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  8. Keith Frankish & William Ramsey (eds.) (2012). The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science. Cambridge University Press.
    Machine generated contents note: Introduction; Part I. Foundations: 1. History and core themes; 2. The representational theory of mind; 3. Cognitive architectures; Part II. Aspects of Cognition: 4. Perception; 5. Action; 6. Human learning and memory; 7. Reasoning and decision making; 8. Concepts; 9. Language; 10. Emotion; 11. Consciousness; Part III. Research Programs: 12. Cognitive neuroscience; 13. Evolutionary psychology; 14. Embodied, embedded, and extended cognition; 15. Animal cognition; Glossary.
     
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  9. Keith Frankish (2011). Conscious Thinking, Acceptance, and Self-Deception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (1):20-21.
    This commentary describes another variety of self-deception, highly relevant to von Hippel & Trivers's (VH&T's) project. Drawing on dual-process theories, I propose that conscious thinking is a voluntary activity motivated by metacognitive attitudes, and that our choice of reasoning strategies and premises may be biased by unconscious desires to self-deceive. Such biased reasoning could facilitate interpersonal deception, in line with VH&T's view.
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  10. Keith Frankish (2011). Reasoning, Argumentation, and Cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (2):79-80.
    This commentary does three things. First, it offers further support for the view that explicit reasoning evolved for public argumentation. Second, it suggests that promoting effective communication may not be the only, or even the main, function of public argumentation. Third, it argues that the data Mercier and Sperber (M&S) cite are compatible with the view that reasoning has subsequently been co-opted to play a role in individual cognition.
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  11. Jesús H. Aguilar, Andrei A. Buckareff & Keith Frankish (eds.) (2010). New Waves in Philosophy of Action. Palgrave Macmillan.
  12. A. Buckareff, J. Aguilar & K. Frankish (eds.) (2010). New Waves in the Philosophy of Action. Palgrave Macmillan.
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  13. Keith Frankish (2010). Dual-Process and Dual-System Theories of Reasoning. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):914-926.
  14. Keith Frankish (2010). Evolving the Linguistic Mind. Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 9:206-214.
  15. Keith Frankish (2009). Adaptive Misbelief or Judicious Pragmatic Acceptance? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):520.
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  16. Keith Frankish (2009). Delusions: A Two-Level Framework. In Matthew Broome & Lisa Bortolotti (eds.), Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. 269--284.
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  17. Keith Frankish (2009). How We Know Our Conscious Minds: Introspective Access to Conscious Thoughts. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):145-146.
    Carruthers considers and rejects a mixed position according to which we have interpretative access to unconscious thoughts, but introspective access to conscious ones. I argue that this is too hasty. Given a two-level view of the mind, we can, and should, accept the mixed position, and we can do so without positing additional introspective mechanisms beyond those Carruthers already recognizes.
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  18. Keith Frankish (2009). Partial Belief and Flat-Out Belief. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer. 75--93.
    There is a duality in our everyday view of belief. On the one hand, we sometimes speak of credence as a matter of degree. We talk of having some level of confidence in a claim (that a certain course of action is safe, for example, or that a desired event will occur) and explain our actions by reference to these degrees of confidence – tacitly appealing, it seems, to a probabilistic calculus such as that formalized in Bayesian decision theory. On (...)
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  19. Keith Frankish (2009). Systems and Levels: Dual-System Theories and the Personal-Subpersonal Distinction. In Jonathan Evans & Keith Frankish (eds.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond. Oup Oxford.
  20. Keith Frankish (2009). The Architecture of the Mind – Peter Carruthers. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):371-375.
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  21. Keith Frankish & Jsbt Evans (2009). The Duality of Mind: An Historical Perspective. In Keith Frankish & Jonathan St B. T. Evans (eds.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond. Oxford University Press.
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  22. Keith Frankish & Maria Kasmirli (2009). Mind and Consciousness. In John Shand (ed.), Central Issues of Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell. 107--120.
    This chapter contains sections titled: The Mind-Body Problem: Old and New Property Dualism Physicalist Approaches Conclusion: A Matter of Perspective? Further Reading References.
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  23. Keith Frankish & Jonathan St B. T. Evans (eds.) (2009). In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond. Oxford University Press.
    This book explores the idea that we have two minds - automatic, unconscious, and fast, the other controlled, conscious, and slow. In recent years there has been great interest in so-called dual-process theories of reasoning and rationality. According to such theories, there are two distinct systems underlying human reasoning - an evolutionarily old system that is associative, automatic, unconscious, parallel, and fast, and a more recent, distinctively human system that is rule-based, controlled, conscious, serial, and slow. Within the former, processes (...)
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  24. Keith Frankish (2007). Deciding to Believe Again. Mind 116 (463):523 - 547.
    This paper defends direct activism-the view that it is possible to form beliefs in a causally direct way. In particular, it addresses the charge that direct activism entails voluntarism-the thesis that we can form beliefs at will. It distinguishes weak and strong varieties of voluntarism and argues that, although direct activism may entail the weak variety, it does not entail the strong one. The paper goes on to argue that strong voluntarism is non-contingently false, sketching a new argument for that (...)
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  25. Keith Frankish (2007). The Anti-Zombie Argument. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):650–666.
    In recent years the 'zombie argument' has come to occupy a central role in the case against physicalist views of consciousness, in large part because of the powerful advocacy it has received from David Chalmers.1 In this paper I seek to neutralize it by showing that a parallel argument can be run for physicalism, an argument turning on the conceivability of what I shall call anti-zombies. I shall argue that the result is a stand-off, and that the zombie argument offers (...)
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  26. Keith Frankish (2007). Mind - by Eric Matthews. Philosophical Books 48 (2):185-187.
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  27. K. Frankish (2006). Review: Consciousness in Action. [REVIEW] Mind 115 (457):156-159.
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  28. Keith Frankish (2006). Review of Consciousness in Action, by Susan Hurley. [REVIEW] Mind 115:156-9.
    Questions about the relation between mind and world have long occupied philosophers of mind. In _Consciousness in Action_ Susan Hurley invites us to adopt a ninety-degree shift and consider the relation between perception and action. The central theme of the book is an attack on what Hurley dubs the _Input-Output Picture_ of perception and actionthe picture of perceptions as sensory inputs to the cognitive system and intentions as motor outputs from it, with the mind occupying the buffer zone in between. (...)
     
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  29. Keith Frankish (2005). Non-Monotonic Inference. In Alex Barber (ed.), Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics. Elsevier.
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  30. Keith Frankish (2004). Mind and Supermind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Mind and Supermind offers a new perspective on the nature of belief and the structure of the human mind. Keith Frankish argues that the folk-psychological term 'belief' refers to two distinct types of mental state, which have different properties and support different kinds of mental explanation. Building on this claim, he develops a picture of the human mind as a two-level structure, consisting of a basic mind and a supermind, and shows how the resulting account sheds light on a number (...)
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  31. Keith Frankish (2002). Language, Consciousness, and Cross-Modular Thought. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):685-686.
    Carruthers suggests that natural language, in the form of inner speech, may be the vehicle of conscious propositional thought, but he argues that its fundamental cognitive role is as the medium of cross-modular thinking, both conscious and nonconscious. I argue that there is no evidence for nonconscious cross-modular thinking and that the most plausible view is that cross-modular thinking, like conscious propositional thinking, occurs only in inner speech.
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  32. Keith Frankish (1998). A Matter of Opinion. Philosophical Psychology 11 (4):423-442.
    This paper sets out the case for a two-level theory of human psychology. It takes its start from Daniel Dennett.
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  33. Keith Frankish (1998). Natural Language and Virtual Belief. In Peter Carruthers & Jill Boucher (eds.), Language and Thought: Interdisciplinary Themes. Cambridge University Press. 248.
    This chapter outlines a new argument for the view that language has a cognitive role. I suggest that humans exhibit two distinct kinds of belief state, one passively formed, the other actively formed. I argue that actively formed beliefs (_virtual beliefs_, as I call them) can be identified with _premising policies_, and that forming them typically involves certain linguistic operations. I conclude that natural language has at least a limited cognitive role in the formation and manipulation of virtual beliefs.
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  34. Keith Frankish (1996). How Should We Revise the Paratactic Theory? Analysis 56 (4):251–262.
    This paper takes another look at Davidson's paratactic theory of indirect discourse and evaluates some revisions to it, proposed recently by Ian Rumfitt (Mind, 1993). Davidson's original version of the theory – according to which indirect speech reports refer to token utterances – has a problem dealing with ambiguity. Rumfitt suggests that we can solve this problem by supposing that the immediate objects of verbs in indirect speech are token representations of disambiguated LF tree-structures. I argue that this proposal is (...)
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  35. K. Frankish & M. Kasmirli, Saying One Thing and Meaning Another: A Dual Process Approach to Conversational Implicature.
    [About the book]: This volume is a state-of-the-art survey of the psychology of reasoning, based around, and in tribute to, one of the field's most eminent figures: Jonathan St B.T. Evans.In this collection of cutting edge research, Evans' collaborators and colleagues review a wide range of important and developing areas of inquiry. These include biases in thinking, probabilistic and causal reasoning, people's use of 'if' sentences in arguments, the dual-process theory of thought, and the nature of human rationality. These foundational (...)
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  36. Keith Frankish & Jonathan St B. T. Evans, The Duality of Mind: An Historical Perspective.
    [About the book] This book explores the idea that we have two minds - automatic, unconscious, and fast, the other controlled, conscious, and slow. In recent years there has been great interest in so-called dual-process theories of reasoning and rationality. According to such theories, there are two distinct systems underlying human reasoning - an evolutionarily old system that is associative, automatic, unconscious, parallel, and fast, and a more recent, distinctively human system that is rule-based, controlled, conscious, serial, and slow. Within (...)
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  37. Keith Frankish, Qualia: The Real Thing.
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