Tristan Haze University of Sydney

  • Graduate student, University of Sydney

Areas of specialization
  • None specified

Areas of interest

About me
I am currently working on a PhD on modality and the philosophy of language, the centrepiece of which is a new account of the conditions under which a proposition is necessarily true. Blog: (founded early 2011). An outline of some of my main ideas, with links to further exposition at my own blog, can be found here:
My works
5 items found.
  1.  68
    Tristan Haze (forthcoming). A Counterexample to the Breckenridge-Magidor Account of Instantial Reasoning. Journal of Philosophical Research 41.
    In a recent paper, Breckenridge and Magidor argue for an interesting and counterintuitive account of instantial reasoning. According to this account, in arguments such as one beginning with 'There is some x such that x is mortal. Let O be such an x. ...', the 'O' refers to a particular object, although we cannot know which. I give and defend a simple counterexample involving the notion of an unreferred-to object.
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  2.  40
    Tristan Haze (2016). Against the Brogaard-Salerno Stricture. The Reasoner 10 (4):29-30.
    'It is widely agreed that contraposition, strengthening the antecedent and hypothetical syllogism fail for subjunctive conditionals', write Brogaard and Salerno in (2008: Counterfactuals and context, Analysis 68.1, 39–46). In that article they argue that the putative counterexamples to these principles are actually no threat, on the grounds that they involve a certain kind of illicit contextual shift. -/- Here I argue that this particular kind of contextual shift, if it is properly so called, is not generally illicit, and that therefore (...)
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  3. Tristan Haze (2015). A Problem for Hofweber’s Ontological Project. Philosophia 43 (3):843-846.
    Thomas Hofweber's well-known ontological project crucially involves inferring negative existential statements from statements of non-reference, i.e. statements that say that some term or terms do not refer. Here, after explaining the context of this move, I aim to show that it is fallacious, and that this vitiates Hofweber's ontological project.
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  4. Tristan Haze (2015). Two New Counterexamples to the Truth-Tracking Theory of Knowledge. Logos and Episteme (3):309-311.
    I present two counterexamples to the recently back-in-favour truth-tracking account of knowledge: one involving a true belief resting on a counterfactually robust delusion, one involving a true belief acquired alongside a bunch of false beliefs. These counterexamples carry over to a recent modification of the theory due to Briggs and Nolan (2012), and seem invulnerable to a recent defence of the theory against known counterexamples, by Adams and Clarke (2005).
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  5.  61
    Tristan Haze, Outline of a System.
    What follows is a brief outline of a system of ideas in analytic philosophy which I have been developing. The system is not closed or final, and there is ample opportunity for further research connected with it. Here I have confined myself to stating the points I am most confident are correct. -/- I take certain parts of Kripke's work as a starting-point, especially the idea that there are necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori truths, and the idea that (...)
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