Carlos M. Muñoz-Suárez Universitat de Barcelona
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About me
I'm a PhD student member of the PERSP Project (Universität de Barcelona) and the LOGOS. Language, Logic, and Cognition at the University of Barcelona. I've been assistant professor of Philosophy and Psychology at some universities in Colombia (since 2007 til 2010). I've also worked as researcher for the Colombian Givernment (COLCIENCIAS). My main research areas are Philosophy of Mind, Perceptual and Cogntive Psychology, and Experimental Philosophy. Before moving to Barcelona (2011), I did a master (MPhil) in phiosophy of mind and cognitive science at the Universidad del Valle (Colombia- 2007-2009). I did undergraduate studies in philosophy (2002-2006) and psychology (2003-2010) at the same university. In philosophy, I mainly work in philosophy of mind. In psychology, I've made research work in clinical neuropsychology from a neurocomputational point of view. I'm dedicated, in general, to developing the core underpinnings for a new theory of vision. I'm currently co-editing (with Felipe DeBrigard (Harvard University)) a volume titled Content and Consciousness Revisited (original papers updating the main tenets introduced in Dennett's Content and Consciousness. The book will include replies by Dennett to each chapter). This has been a very long-term project that eventually will be born by Springer in its Brain and Mind Series during late 2014.
My works
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  1. Carlos Muñoz-Suárez, Transparency, Revelation and Sensory Knowledge. Gauging the Explananda to a Theory of Phenomenal Presence.
    There are two arguments in contemporary philosophy of consciousness and perception with which every theory of sensory awareness and phenomenal presence must deal: the Argument from Transparency and the Argument from Revelation. The first one is about the intentionality of sensations or conscious sensory states and the second one is about their epistemic role. These both arguments depend, on the one hand, on specific interpretations of ‘transparency’ and ‘revelation’ and, on the other hand, on specifying the formal structures that they (...)
     
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  2. Carlos Mario Muñoz-Suárez (2011). The Argument From Revelation. In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  3. Carlos Mario Muñoz-Suárez (2011). The Transparency of Experience Argument. In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  4. Carlos Mario Muñoz-Suárez (2009). Sensations, Perceptions and Conceptions. Remarks on Assessability for Accuracy. In V. Munz, J. Wang & K. Puhl (eds.), Language and World. Niederösterreichkultur.
    I shall specify about what we are thinking when we are talking about regulating something by specifying accuracy conditions. The main thesis is that we couldn’t describe representational relations as perceptual relationships if we lack a normative conception of relationships between representing and represented. Hence, searching for what it is assessable for accuracy depends on specifying the kind of intentional content which is normatively individuated and attributed.
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  5. Carlos Mario Muñoz-Suárez & René J. Campis (2008). Did I Do It? Yeah, You Did! On Wittgenstein and Libet on Free Will. In Hannes Leitgeb & Alexander Hieke (eds.), Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences: Papers of the 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
    In this paper we analyze Libet’s conclusions on «free will» (FW), rejecting his view of the concept and defending a partially aligned view with Wittgenstein’s early remarks on FW. First, the concept of Readiness Potential (RP) and Libet’s view are presented. Second, we offer an account of Wittgenstein´s point of view. Third, a dual-domain analysis is proposed; finally, we offer our conclusions. This article´s conclusions are part of an ongoing research.
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