Contact
Affiliations
- Faculty, Oxford University
- Research staff, University of Melbourne
- Research staff, Oxford University
- PhD, Monash University, 2006.
Areas of specialization
Areas of interest
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About me
I am a Principal Research Fellow at the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, University of Melbourne, and Director of Research at the Oxford Centre for Neuroethics.
My works
- Neil Levy, Are Zombies Responsible? The Role of Consciousness in Moral Responsibility.
- Neil Levy, The Luck Problem for Compatibilists.
- Neil Levy, Closing the Door on the Belief in Ability Thesis.
- Neil Levy, Closing the Door on BAT.
- Neil Levy, Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Explaining the Differences.
- Neil Levy, Epistemic Akrasia and the Subsumption of Evidence: A Reconsideration.
- Neil Levy, Frankfurt Enablers and Frankfurt Disablers.
- Neil Levy, Why Frankfurt-Style Cases Don't Help (Much).
- Neil Levy (forthcoming). Restrictivism is a Covert Compatibilism. In N. Trakakis (ed.), Essays on Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Cambridge Scholars Press.
- Neil Levy (forthcoming). Resisting Weakness of the Will. Philosophy & Phenomenological Research.
- Neil Levy (forthcoming). Self-Deception Without Thought Experiments. In J. Fernandez & T. Bayne (eds.), Delusions, Self-Deception and Affective Influences on Belief-Formation. Psychology Press.
- Neil Levy (2009). Autonomy is (Largely) Irrelevant. American Journal of Bioethics 9 (1):50 – 51.
- Neil Levy (2009). Culpable Ignorance and Moral Responsibility: A Reply to FitzPatrick. Ethics 119 (4).
- Neil Levy (2009). Empirically Informed Moral Theory: A Sketch of the Landscape. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1).
- Neil Levy (2009). Luck and History-Sensitive Compatibilism. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):237-251.
- Neil Levy (2009). Neuroethics: Ethics and the Sciences of the Mind. Philosophy Compass 4 (1):69-81.
- Neil Levy & Michael McKenna (2009). Recent Work on Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133.
- Neil Levy & Julian Savulescu (2009). Moral Significance of Phenomenal Consciousness. Progress in Brain Research.
- Neil Levy (2008). Bad Luck Once Again. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):749-754.
- Neil Levy (2008). Counterfactual Intervention and Agents' Capacities. Journal of Philosophy 105 (5).
- Neil Levy (2008). Does Phenomenology Overflow Access? Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (7):29-38.
- Neil Levy (2008). Editorial. Neuroethics 1 (2).
- Neil Levy (2008). Going Beyond the Evidence. American Journal of Bioethics 8 (9):19 – 21.
- Neil Levy (2008). Introducing Neuroethics. Neuroethics 1 (1).
- Neil Levy (2008). Restoring Control: Comments on George Sher. Philosophia 36 (2).
- Neil Levy (2008). Review of Experimental Philosophy. Metapsychology 12 (33).
- Neil Levy (2007). Agents and Mechanisms: Fischer's Way. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):123–130.
- Neil Levy (2007). Doxastic Responsibility. Synthese 155 (1).
- Neil Levy (2007). Norms, Conventions, and Psychopaths. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 163-170.
- Neil Levy (2007). Rethinking Neuroethics in the Light of the Extended Mind Thesis. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (9):3-11.
- Neil Levy (2007). The Responsibility of the Psychopath Revisited. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 129-138.
- Neil Levy (2007). The Social: A Missing Term in the Debate Over Addiction and Voluntary Control. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (1):35 – 36.
- Neil Levy & Michael Mckenna (2007). Symposium on Free Will and Luck. Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):151 – 152.
- Timothy J. Bayne & Neil Levy (2006). The Feeling of Doing: Deconstructing the Phenomenology of Agnecy. In Natalie Sebanz & Wolfgang Prinz (eds.), Disorders of Volition. MIT Press.
- Neil Levy (2006). Autonomy and Addiction. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (3).
- Neil Levy (2006). Addiction, Autonomy and Ego-Depletion: A Response to Bennett Foddy and Julian Savulescu. Bioethics 20 (1):16–20.
- Neil Levy (2006). Cognitive Scientific Challenges to Morality. Philosophical Psychology 19 (5):567 – 587.
- Neil Levy (2006). Determinist Deliberations. Dialectica 60 (4):453-459.
- Neil Levy (2006). On Determinism and Freedom. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):310-312.
- Neil Levy (2006). The Wisdom of the Pack. Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):99 – 103.
- Tim Bayne & Neil Levy (2005). Amputees by Choice: Body Integrity Identity Disorder and the Ethics of Amputation. Journal of Applied Philosophy 22 (1):75–86.
- Neil Levy (2005). Contrastive Explanations: A Dilemma for Libertarians. Dialectica 59 (1):51-61.
- Neil Levy (2005). Downshifting and Meaning in Life. Ratio 18 (2):176–189.
- Neil Levy (2005). Imaginative Resistance and the Moral/Conventional Distinction. Philosophical Psychology 18 (2):231 – 241.
- Neil Levy (2005). Libet's Impossible Demand. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (12):67-76.
- Neil Levy (2004). Book Review: Understanding Blindness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (3).
- Neil Levy (2004). Cohen and Kinds: A Response to Nathan Nobis. Journal of Applied Philosophy 21 (2):213–217.
- Neil Levy (2004). Evolutionary Psychology, Human Universals, and the Standard Social Science Model. Biology and Philosophy 19 (3):459-72.
- Neil Levy (2004). Good Character: Too Little, Too Late. Journal of Mass Media Ethics 19 (2):108 – 118.
- Neil Levy (2004). Self-Deception and Moral Responsibility. Ratio 17 (3):294-311.
- Neil Levy (2004). Why Frankfurt Examples Don't Beg the Question: A Reply to Woodward. Journal of Social Philosophy 35 (2):211–215.
- Neil Levy & Timothy J. Bayne (2004). A Will of One's Own: Consciousness, Control, and Character. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 27 (5):459-470.
- Neil Levy (2003). Descriptive Relativism: Assessing the Evidence. Journal of Value Inquiry 37 (2).
- Neil Levy (2003). Self-Deception and Responsibility for Addiction. Journal of Applied Philosophy 20 (2):133–142.
- Neil Levy (2003). What (If Anything) is Wrong with Bestiality? Journal of Social Philosophy 34 (3):444–456.
- Neil Levy (2002). Excusing Responsibility for the Inevitable. Philosophical Studies 111 (1).
- Neil Levy (2002). In Defence of Entrapment in Journalism (and Beyond). Journal of Applied Philosophy 19 (2):121–130.
- Neil Levy (2002). Reconsidering Cochlear Implants: The Lessons of Martha's Vineyard. Bioethics 16 (2):134–153.
- Neil Levy (2002). The Apology Paradox and the Non-Identity Problem. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (208):358-368.
- Neil Levy (2002). Virtual Child Pornography: The Eroticization of Inequality. Ethics and Information Technology 4 (4).
- Neil Levy (2000). Charles Taylor on Overcoming Incommensurability. Philosophy and Social Criticism 26 (5).
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