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• Faculty, Western Washington University
• PhD, Syracuse University, 1992.

• Epistemology
• Philosophy of Religion

• Epistemology
• Philosophy of Religion
• Metaphysics
• Philosophy of Action
• Philosophy of Mind
• Philosophy of Probability
• Philosophy of Cognitive Science
• Meta-Ethics
• Normative Ethics
• Philosophy of Language

I am Professor of Philosophy at Western Washington University. I have a PhD from Syracuse University and a BA from Seattle Pacific University. My primary research interests are in philosophy of religion, philosophical theology, and epistemology. I am the editor or co-editor of The Evidential Argument from Evil (Indiana 1996), Faith, Freedom, and Rationality (Rowman & Littlefield 1996), Divine Hiddenness: New Essays (Cambridge 2002), A Companion to the Problem of Evil (Blackwell 2013) and a special issue of Religious Studies entitled J.L. Schellenberg's Philosophy of Religion (2013). I have published articles in, among other places, Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Southern Journal of Philosophy, American Philosophical Quarterly, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Erkenntnis, Journal of Philosophical Research, International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion, Religious Studies, Sophia, Faith and Philosophy, European Journal for the Philosophy of Religion, and Philosophia Christi. Current main projects include continued work on evil and divine hiddenness, agnosticism, faith as a psychological attitude (faith that, faith in, and faithfulness to), and intellectual humility. Minor projects involve foundationalism, infinitism, Whitcomb's grounding argument for atheism, the epistemic implications of the cognitive science of religion, Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism, debunking arguments in general, the fine-tuning argument, and so on. I am a team member of two Templeton projects: the Intellectual Humility Project and The Development, Validation, and Dissemination of Measures of Intellectual Humility and Humility. I am the coordinator of WWU's Bellingham Lectures in Philosophy and Religion, the faculty advisor of the WWU Theistic Thinkers student club, and the organizer of WWU's Philosophers at Work.

54 items found. Sort by: publication yearfirst authorviewingsaddition date Daniel Howard-Snyder, The Fellowship of Confessing Anglicans: Should Conservative Anglicans Sign Up? The Fellowship of Confessing Anglicans (FCA), whose leaders govern well over half of the 80 million Anglicans worldwide, have put forward ‘a contemporary rule,’ called The Jerusalem Declaration, to guide the Anglican realignment movement. The FCA and its affiliates, e.g. the newly-formed Anglican Church in North America, require assent to the Declaration. To date, there has been little serious appraisal of the Declaration and the status accorded to it. I aim to correct that omission. Unlike ap-praisals in the social media, (...) however, mine grants the FCA’s conservative stand on same-sex unions and homosexual practice. Nevertheless, I argue, the Declaration mischaracterizes the traditional Christian teaching on marriage, binds Anglicans to falsehoods and dubieties in the Thirty-Nine Articles, and adds to the gospel. Two things follow. First, no one—especially no Anglican who identifies herself as con-servative, traditional, orthodox, evangelical, Anglo-catholic or simply concerned with the truth—should assent to the Jerusalem Declaration. Second, since the FCA and its affiliates know that these defects ex-ist in the Declaration, they should fess up to these shortcomings and retract the Declaration’s status as ‘a contemporary rule’ and they should stop requiring assent to it. Anything less constitutes intellectual dis-honesty of a most egregious sort. (shrink) Homosexuality and Religion in Philosophy of Gender, Race, and Sexuality Religion and Society in Philosophy of Religion Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder (forthcoming). Faith. In Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Cambridge. A brief article on faith as a psychological attitude. Belief in Philosophy of Mind Desire in Philosophy of Mind Mental States, Misc in Philosophy of Mind $2.79 used   $24.82 direct from Amazon   $59.95 new   (collection)   Amazon page Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder (forthcoming). Panmetaphoricism and Abrahamic Religion. Journal of Philosophical Research. This is a critique of panmetaphoricism, the idea that all talk about God is irreducibly metaphorical. Religious Topics, Misc in Philosophy of Religion Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder (forthcoming). Propositional Faith: What It is and What It is Not. American Philosophical Quarterly. Reprinted in Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, Wadsworth 2013, 6th edition, with an additional section entitled, "Reasons for the Common View," eds Michael Rea and Louis Pojman. What is propositional faith? At a first approximation, we might answer that it is the psychological attitude picked out by standard uses of the English locution “S has faith that p,” where p takes declarative sentences as instances, as in “He has faith that they’ll win”. Although correct, this answer is not nearly as (...) informative as we might like. Many people say that there is a more informative answer. They say that, at the very least, propositional faith requires propositional belief. More precisely, they say that faith that p requires belief that p or that it must be partly constituted by belief that p. This view is common enough; call it the Common View. I have two main aims in this paper: (i) to exhibit the falsity of the Common View and the paucity of reasons for it, and (ii) to sketch a more accurate and comprehensive account of what propositional faith is. (shrink) Attitude Ascriptions, Misc in Philosophy of Language Belief, Misc in Philosophy of Mind Desire, Misc in Philosophy of Mind Religious Topics in Philosophy of Religion Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder (forthcoming). The Logical Problem of Evil: Mackie and Plantinga. In Justin McBrayer & Daniel Howard-Snyder (eds.), A Companion to the Problem of Evil. Wiley-Blackwell. J.L. Mackie’s version of the logical problem of evil is a failure, as even he came to recognize. Contrary to current mythology, however, its failure was not established by Alvin Plantinga’s Free Will Defense. That’s because a defense is successful only if it is not reasonable to refrain from believing any of the claims that constitute it, but it is reasonable to refrain from believing the central claim of Plantinga’s Free Will Defense, namely the claim that, possibly, every essence suffers (...) from transworld depravity. (shrink) The Argument from Evil in Philosophy of Religion Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder, Joshua Rasmussen & Andrew Cullison (forthcoming). On Whitcomb's Grounding Argument for Atheism. Faith and Philosophy. Dennis Whitcomb argues that there is no God on the grounds that (i) God is omniscient, yet (ii) nothing could be omniscient due to the nature of grounding. We give a formally identical argument that concludes that one of the present co-authors does not exist. Since he does exist, Whitcomb’s argument is unsound. But why is it unsound? That is a difficult question. We venture two answers. First, one of the grounding principles that the argument relies on is false. Second, (...) the argument equivocates between two kinds of grounding: instance-grounding and quasi-mereological grounding. Happily, the equivocation can be avoided; unhappily, avoidance comes at the price of a false premise. (shrink) Arguments Against Theism in Philosophy of Religion Atheism in Philosophy of Religion Divine Omniscience, Misc in Philosophy of Religion Theories of Omniscience in Philosophy of Religion Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Justin McBrayer & Daniel Howard-Snyder (eds.) (forthcoming). A Companion to the Problem of Evil. Wiley-Blackwell. This book is a collection of 33 new articles on the problem of evil. The Argument from Evil in Philosophy of Religion   My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder (2013). Schellenberg on Propositional Faith. Religious Studies. This paper assesses J. L. Schellenberg’s account of propositional faith and, in light of that assessment, sketches an alternative that avoids certain objections and coheres better with Schellenberg’s aims. Belief in Philosophy of Mind Desire in Philosophy of Mind Religious Topics in Philosophy of Religion Direct download (3 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder, Frances Howard-Snyder & Ryan Wasserman (2013). The Power of Logic. McGraw-Hill. This is a basic logic text for first-time logic students. Custom-made texts from the chapters is an option as well. And there is a website to go with text too: http://www.poweroflogic.com/cgi/menu.cgi . Aristotelian Logic in Logic and Philosophy of Logic Informal Logic in Logic and Philosophy of Logic Predicate Logic in Logic and Philosophy of Logic Propositional Logic in Logic and Philosophy of Logic Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder (2012). Foundationalism. In Andrew Cullison (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Epistemology. Continuum. Foundationalists distinguish basic from nonbasic beliefs. At a first approximation, to say that a belief of a person is basic is to say that it is epistemically justified and it owes its justification to something other than her other beliefs, where “belief” refers to the mental state that goes by that name. To say that a belief of a person is nonbasic is to say that it is epistemically justified and not basic. Two theses constitute Foundationalism: (a) Minimality: There are (...) some basic beliefs, and (b) Exclusivity: If there are any nonbasic beliefs, that is solely because they (ultimately) owe their justification to some basic belief. Proponents of Minimality but not Exclusivity endorse Minimal Foundationalism. Proponents of Exclusivity but not Minimality endorse either Epistemic Nihilism, the view that there are no justified beliefs, or some non-foundationalist epistemology such as Coherentism or Infinitism. In this essay I aim to characterize the notion of a basic belief more precisely and to assess some arguments for and against Foundationalism. In the process, I hope to exhibit the resilience and attractiveness of Foundationalism. (shrink) Epistemic Regress in Epistemology Foundationalism and Coherentism in Epistemology The Given in Philosophy of Mind Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder & Frances Howard-Snyder (2010). The Puzzle of Petitionary Prayer. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2 (2):43 - 68. The fact that our asking God to do something can make a difference to what he does underwrites the point of petitionary prayer. Here, however, a puzzle arises: Either doing what we ask is the best God can do or it is not. If it is, then our asking won’t make any difference to whether he does it. If it is not, then our asking won’t make any difference to whether he does it. So, our asking won’t make any difference (...) to whether God does it. Our asking is therefore pointless. In this paper, we try to solve this puzzle without denying either that God must do the best he can or that petitioning God can make a difference to what he does. (shrink) Prayer in Philosophy of Religion Religious Topics, Misc in Philosophy of Religion Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder (2009). Epistemic Humility, Arguments From Evil, and Moral Skepticism. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 2:17-57. Reprinted in Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, Wadsworth, 2013, 6th edition, eds. Michael Rea and Louis Pojman. In this essay, I argue that the moral skepticism objection to what is badly named "skeptical theism" fails. Atheism in Philosophy of Religion Moral Skepticism in Meta-Ethics The Argument from Evil in Philosophy of Religion Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder (2009). The Puzzle of Prayers of Thanksgiving and Praise. In Yujin Nagasawa & Erik J. Wielenberg (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Religion. Palgrave Macmillan. in eds. Yujin Nagasawa and Erik Wielenberg, New Waves in Philosophy of Religion (Palgrave MacMillan 2008). Divine Freedom in Philosophy of Religion Divine Goodness in Philosophy of Religion Prayer in Philosophy of Religion Religious Topics, Misc in Philosophy of Religion $10.98 used   $26.55 new   $41.00 direct from Amazon   (collection)   Amazon page Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder (2008). Theodicy. In Kelly Clark (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Religion. Broadview. This paper summarizes a version of the argument from evil for atheism and then assesses several theodicies, including those that appeal to punishment, evil as a necessary counterpart for good, free will, natural evil as natural consequence, natural law, higher-order goods, and the conjunctive "Big Reason" including all the above and more beside. Atheism in Philosophy of Religion The Argument from Evil in Philosophy of Religion Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder & E. J. Coffman (2007). Three Arguments Against Foundationalism: Arbitrariness, Epistemic Regress, and Existential Support. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):535-564. Foundationalism is false; after all, foundational beliefs are arbitrary, they do not solve the epistemic regress problem, and they cannot exist withoutother (justified) beliefs. Or so some people say. In this essay, we assess some arguments based on such claims, arguments suggested in recent work by Peter Klein and Ernest Sosa. Epistemic Regress in Epistemology Foundationalism in Epistemology Infinitism in Epistemology The Given in Philosophy of Mind Direct download (6 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder (2006). Hiddenness of God. In Donald Borchert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy. MacMillan. This is a 5,000 word article on divine hiddeness, with special attention to John Schellenberg's work on the topic. Arguments Against Theism in Philosophy of Religion Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder (2005). William P. Alston. In John Shook (ed.), Dictionary of Modern American Philosophy. Thoemmes. This is an encyclopedia entry for William P. Alston. 20th Century Analytic Philosophy in 20th Century Philosophy Epistemology Philosophy of Language Philosophy of Mind Philosophy of Religion $322.49 used   $322.50 new   $1045.86 direct from Amazon   (collection)   Amazon page   My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder (2005). Foundationalism and Arbitrariness. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (1):18–24. Nonskeptical foundationalists say that there are basic beliefs. But, one might object, either there is a reason why basic beliefs are likely to be true or there is not. If there is, then they are not basic; if there is not, then they are arbitrary. I argue that this dilemma is not nearly as decisive as its author, Peter Klein, would have us believe. Epistemic Regress in Epistemology Foundationalism, Misc in Epistemology Infinitism in Epistemology Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder (2005). On Rowe's Argument From Particular Horrors. In Kelly Clark (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Religion. Broadview. This article assesses Bill Rowe's 1979 version of the evidential argument from evil. The Argument from Evil in Philosophy of Religion Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder & Christian Lee (2005). On a “Fatal Dilemma” for Moderate Foundationalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:251-259. Contemporary foundationalists prefer Moderate Foundationalism over Strong Foundationalism. In this paper, we assess two arguments against the former which have been recently defended by Timothy McGrew. Three theses are central to the discussion: that only beliefs can be probabilifying evidence, that justification is internal, in McGrew’s sense of the term, and that only beliefs can be nonarbitrary justifying reasons. Epistemic Regress in Epistemology Foundationalism, Misc in Epistemology Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder (2004). Lehrer's Case Against Foundationalism. Erkenntnis 60 (1):51-73. In this essay, I assess Keith Lehrer's case against Foundationalism, which consists of variations on three objections: The Independent Information or Belief Objection, The Risk of Error Objection, and the Hidden Argument Objection. I conclude that each objection fails for reasons that can be endorsed – indeed, I would say for reasons that should be endorsed – by antifoundationalists and foundationalists alike. Epistemic Regress in Epistemology Foundationalism, Misc in Epistemology The Given in Philosophy of Mind Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder (2004). Was Jesus Mad, Bad, or God? . . . Or Merely Mistaken? Faith and Philosophy 21 (4):456-479. Reprinted in Oxford Readings in Philosophical Theology, Volume 1: Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement, Oxford 2009, ed. Michael Rea. A popular argument for the divinity of Jesus goes like this. Jesus claimed to be divine, but if his claim was false, then either he was insane (mad) or lying (bad), both of which are very unlikely; so, he was divine. I present two objections to this argument. The first, the dwindling probabilities objection, contends that even if we make generous probability assignments (...) to the relevant pieces of evidence for Jesus’ divinity, the probability calculus tell us to suspend judgement on the matter. The second, and more telling objection in my opinion, the merely mistaken objection, contends that it is no less plausible to suppose that Jesus was neither mad nor bad but merely mistaken than that he was divine. (shrink) Arguments for Theism, Misc in Philosophy of Religion Christianity, Misc in Philosophy of Religion Incarnation in Philosophy of Religion Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder (2003). Infallibilism and Gettier's Legacy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):304-327. lnfallibilism is the view that a belief cannot be at once warranted and false. In this essay we assess three nonpartisan arguments for infallibilism, arguments that do not depend on a prior commitment to some substantive theory of warrant. Three premises, one from each argument, are most significant: (1) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then the Geltier Problem cannot be solved; (2) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then its warrant can (...) be transferred to an accidentally true belief; (3) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then it can be warranted and accidentally true. We argue that each of these is either false or no more plausible than its denial. Along the way, we offer a solution to the Gettier Problem that is compatible with fallibilism. (shrink) Defining Knowledge, Misc in Epistemology Infallibility in Epistemology The Gettier Problem in Epistemology Theories of Knowledge, Misc in Epistemology Direct download (3 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder (2003). In Defense of Naïve Universalism. Faith and Philosophy 20 (3):345-363. Michael J. Murray defends the traditional doctrine of hell by arguing directly against its chief competitor, universalism. Universalism, says Murray, comes in “naïve” and “sophisticated” forms. Murray poses two arguments against naïve universalism before focusing on sophisticated universalism, which is his real target. He proceeds in this fashion because he thinks that his arguments against sophisticated universalism are more easily motivated against naïve universalism, and once their force is clearly seen in the naïve case they will be more clearly seen (...) in the sophisticated. In this essay, I argue that Murray’s arguments against naïve universalism have no force whatsoever. (shrink) Christianity, Misc in Philosophy of Religion Heaven and Hell in Philosophy of Religion Direct download (3 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder (2003). On Hume's Philosophical Case Against Miracles. In Christopher Bernard (ed.), God Matters: Readings in the Philosophy of Religion. Longman Publications. According to the Christian religion, Jesus was “crucified under Pontius Pilate; he suffered death and was buried. On the third day he rose again”. I take it that this rising again—the Resurrection of Jesus, as it’s sometimes called—is, according to the Christian religion, an historical event, just like his crucifixion, death, and burial. And I would have thought that to investigate whether the Resurrection occurred, we would need to do some historical research: we would need to assess the reliability of (...) the New Testament documents and related manuscripts; we would need to look into the credibility of the witnesses to his post-mortem appearances, the empty tomb, and the like. The task looks rather daunting. But, according to David Hume, we don’t have to do anything of the kind. For no matter how strong the testimony in favor of a miracle is—indeed, even if we “suppose…that the testimony considered apart and in itself, amounts to an entire proof”—we have at our disposal a “full proof…against the existence of any miracle”. So we can avoid all that tedious historical work. We can simply use Hume’s shortcut, a proof against the existence of any miracle, and hence a proof against the Resurrection. So Hume says he has a “a decisive argument,” “an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion,” superstitious delusions like the Resurrection. There is good news and bad news in Hume’s proclamation. The good news is that he really has two arguments, not just one—or, at any rate, many scholars discern in his writings two arguments. The bad news is that neither succeeds; at any rate, try as I might, I can’t see how they do. (shrink) Arguments from Miracles in Philosophy of Religion Atheism in Philosophy of Religion Hume's Argument against Miracles in Philosophy of Religion Miracles, Misc in Philosophy of Religion Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder (2003). Trinity Monotheism. Philosophia Christi 5 (2):375 - 403. Reprinted in Philosophical and Theological Essays on the Trinity, Oxford, 2009, eds Michael Rea and Thomas McCall. In this essay, I assess a certain version of ’social Trinitarianism’ put forward by J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, ’trinity monotheism’. I first show how their response to a familiar anti-Trinitarian argument arguably implies polytheism. I then show how they invoke three tenets central to their trinity monotheism in order to avoid that implication. After displaying these tenets more fully, I argue (...) that Trinitarians would do well to hold Moreland’s and Craig’s trinity monotheism at arms length. (shrink) The Trinity in Philosophy of Religion Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder & Michael Bergmann (2003). Grounds for Belief in God Aside, Does Evil Make Atheism More Reasonable Than Theism? In Michael Peterson & Raymond Van Arrogan (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion. Blackwell. Preprinted in God and the Problem of Evil(Blackwell 2001), ed. William Rowe. Many people deny that evil makes belief in atheism more reasonable for us than belief in theism. After all, they say, the grounds for belief in God are much better than the evidence for atheism, including the evidence provided by evil. We will not join their ranks on this occasion. Rather, we wish to consider the proposition that, setting aside grounds for belief in God and relying only on (...) the background knowledge shared in common by nontheists and theists, evil makes belief in atheism more reasonable for us than belief in theism. Our aim is to argue against this proposition. We recognize that in doing so, we face a formidable challenge. It’s one thing to say that evil presents a reason for atheism that is, ultimately, overridden by arguments for theism. It’s another to say that it doesn’t so much as provide us with a reason for atheism in the first place. In order to make this latter claim seem initially more plausible, consider the apparent design of the mammalian eye or the apparent fine-tuning of the universe to support life. These are often proposed as reasons to believe in theism. Critics commonly argue not merely that these supposed reasons for theism are overridden by arguments for atheism but rather that they aren’t good reasons for theism in the first place. Our parallel proposal with respect to evil and atheism is, initially at least, no less plausible than this proposal with respect to apparent design and theism. (shrink) Atheism in Philosophy of Religion The Argument from Evil in Philosophy of Religion $24.92 used   $34.65 new   $40.65 direct from Amazon   (collection)   Amazon page Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder & Michael Bergmann (2003). Reply to Rowe. In Michael Peterson (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion. Blackwell. Preprinted in God and the Problem of Evil (Blackwell 2001), ed. William Rowe. In this article, we reply to Bill Rowe's "Evil is Evidence Against Theistic Belief" in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion (Blackwell 2003). Atheism in Philosophy of Religion The Argument from Evil in Philosophy of Religion $24.92 used   $34.65 new   $40.65 direct from Amazon   (collection)   Amazon page Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder (2002). On an “Unintelligible” Idea: Donald Davidson's Case Against Experiential Foundationalism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):523-555. Donald Davidson’s epistemology is predicated on, among other things, the rejection of Experiential Foundationalism, which he calls ‘unintelligible’. In this essay, I assess Davidson’s arguments for this conclusion. I conclude that each of them fails on the basis of reasons that foundationalists and antifoundationalists alike can, and should, accept. Donald Davidson in 20th Century Philosophy Foundationalism in Epistemology The Given in Philosophy of Mind Direct download (5 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder & Paul K. Moser (eds.) (2002). Divine Hiddenness: New Essays. Cambridge University Press. For many people the existence of God is by no means a sufficiently clear feature of reality. This problem, the fact of divine hiddenness, has been a source of existential concern and has sometimes been taken as a rationale for support of atheism or agnosticism. In this new collection of essays, a distinguished group of philosophers of religion explore the question of divine hiddenness in considerable detail. The issue is approached from several perspectives including Jewish, Christian, atheist and agnostic. There (...) is coverage of the historical treatment of divine hiddenness as found in the work of Maimonides, St. John of the Cross, Jonathan Edwards, Kierkegaard, and various Biblical writers. A substantial introduction clarifies the main problems of and leading solutions to divine hiddenness. Primarily directed at philosophers of religion, theologians, and scholars of religious studies, this collection could also serve as a textbook for upper-level courses in philosophy of religion. (shrink) Arguments Against Theism, Misc in Philosophy of Religion $15.61 used   $16.48 new   $31.13 direct from Amazon   Amazon page Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder (2001). Review of David O'Connor, God and Inscrutable Evil. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review. This is a critical review of David O'Connor's book, God and Inscrutable Evil. The Argument from Evil in Philosophy of Religion Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder (1999). God, Evil, and Suffering. In Michael Murray (ed.), Reason for the Hope Within. Eerdmans. This essay is aimed at a theistic audience, mainly those who are new to thinking hard about the problem of evil. Atheism in Philosophy of Religion The Argument from Evil in Philosophy of Religion $5.00 used   $13.47 new   $27.94 direct from Amazon   (collection)   Amazon page Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder & Frances Howard-Snyder (1999). Is Theism Compatible with Gratuitous Evil? American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (2):115 - 130. We argue that Michael Peterson's and William Hasker's attempts to show that God and gratuitous evil are compatible constitute miserable failures. We then sketch Peter van Inwagen's attempt to do the same and conclude that, to date, no one has shown his attempt a failure. Atheism in Philosophy of Religion The Argument from Evil in Philosophy of Religion Direct download (3 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder (1998). BonJour's 'Basic Antifoundationalist Argument' and the Doctrine of the Given. Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):163-177. Laurence BonJour observes that critics of foundationalism tend to argue against it by objecting to "relatively idiosyncratic" versions of it, a strategy which has "proven in the main to be superficial and ultimately ineffective" since answers immune to the objections emerge quickly (1985: 17). He aims to rectify this deficiency. Specifically, he argues that the very soul of foundationalism, "the concept of a basic empirical belief," is incoherent (1985: 30). This is a bold strategy from which we can learn even (...) if, in the end, as I shall argue, it fails. (shrink) Epistemic Regress in Epistemology Foundationalism in Epistemology The Given in Philosophy of Mind Direct download (5 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder (1998). Transworld Sanctity and Plantinga's Free Will Defense. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 44 (1):1-21. It used to be widely held by philosophers that God and evil are incompatible.1 Not any longer. Alvin Plantinga's Free Will Defense is largely responsible for this shift. Indeed, Robert Adams avers that "it is fair to say that Plantinga has solved this problem. That is, he has argued convincingly for the consistency of [God and evil]."2 And William Alston writes that "Plantinga...has established the possibility that God could not actualize a world containing free creatures that always do the right (...) thing."3 You might expect praise like this from Christian philosophers. You might not expect it from William Rowe, one of the foremost atheistic philosophers of our day, but this is precisely what we find. Rowe writes. (shrink) Libertarianism about Free Will in Philosophy of Action The Argument from Evil in Philosophy of Religion Direct download (7 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder & Frances Howard-Snyder (1998). God, Knowledge, and Mystery. [REVIEW] Faith and Philosophy 15 (3):397-399. This is a review of Peter van Inwagen's collection of essays. Philosophy of Religion Direct download (4 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder (1997). The Epistemology of Religious Experience. [REVIEW] International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion. This is a review of Keith Yandell's book. Epistemology of Religion, Misc in Philosophy of Religion Religious Experience in Philosophy of Religion Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   John Hawthorne & Daniel Howard-Snyder (1996). Are Beliefs About God Theoretical Beliefs? Reflections on Aquinas and Kant. Religious Studies 32 (2):233 - 258. The need to address our question arises from two sources, one in Kant and the other in a certain type of response to so-called Reformed epistemology. The first source consists in a tendency to distinguish theoretical beliefs from practical beliefs (commitments to the world's being a certain way versus commitments to certain pictures to live by), and to treat theistic belief as mere practical belief. We trace this tendency in Kant's corpus, and compare and contrast it with Aquinas's view and (...) a more conservative Kantian view. We reject the theistic-belief-as-mere-practical-belief view: it is bad descriptive anthropology, it embraces a misguided ideal of a fragmented self unattainable by human beings, and it will deter people from the most desirable sort of faith. The second source consists in the idea that since theistic beliefs function as answers to why-questions, their epistemic status hangs on whether they meet certain distinctively explanatory standards, whatever support they might receive from other sources. We argue that this is a non-sequitur and suggest questions for further research. (shrink) Kant: Assent in 17th/18th Century Philosophy Kant: Rational Theology in 17th/18th Century Philosophy Philosophy of Religion, Misc in Philosophy of Religion Reformed Epistemology in Philosophy of Religion Direct download (3 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder (1996). Rationality and Theistic Belief. [REVIEW] Faith and Philosophy. This is a review of Mark McLeod's book, Rationality and Theistic Belief. Philosophy of Religion Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder (1996). The Problem of Evil. [REVIEW] The Christian Scholar's Review. This is a review of Michael Peterson's The Problem of Evil. The Argument from Evil in Philosophy of Religion Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder (1996). God Without the Supernatural: A Defense of Scientific Theism. [REVIEW] Journal of Religion. This is a review of Peter Forrest's book. Philosophy of Religion Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder (1996). The Argument From Divine Hiddenness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):433-453. Many people are perplexed that God (if such there be) does not make His existence more evident. For many of them, the hiddenness of God puts their faith in God to the test. Others, however, claim that God’s hiddeness is the basis of an argument against God’s existence. While this claim is no newcomer to religious reflection, it has been the focus of renewed debate since the 1990’s. In this essay, I examine J.L. Schellenberg's version of the argument from divine (...) hiddenness for atheism. (shrink) Philosophy of Religion Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder (ed.) (1996). The Evidential Argument From Evil. Indiana University Press. Is evil evidence against the existence of God? Even if God and evil are compatible, it remains hotly contested whether evil renders belief in God unreasonable. The Evidential Argument from Evil presents five classic statements on this issue by eminent philosophers and theologians and places them in dialogue with eleven original essays reflecting new thinking by these and other scholars. The volume focuses on two versions of the argument. The first affirms that there is no reason for God to permit (...) either certain specific horrors or the variety and profusion of undeserved suffering. The second asserts that pleasure and pain, given their biological role, are better explained by hypotheses other than theism. -/- Contributors include William P. Alston, Paul Draper, Richard M. Gale, Daniel Howard-Snyder, Alvin Plantinga, William L. Rowe, Bruce Russell, Eleonore Stump, Richard G. Swinburne, Peter van Inwagen, and Stephen John Wykstra. (shrink) The Argument from Evil in Philosophy of Religion Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder & Frances Howard-Snyder (1996). The Real Problem of No Best World. Faith and Philosophy 13 (3):422-425. This is a reply to William Rowe, "The Problem of No Best World," Faith and Philosophy (1994). Arguments Against Theism in Philosophy of Religion Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder & Jeff Jordan (eds.) (1996). Faith, Freedom, and Rationality. Rowman and Littlefield. This collection of essays is dedicated to William Rowe, with great affection, respect, and admiration. The philosophy of religion, once considered a deviation from an otherwise analytically rigorous discipline, has flourished over the past two decades. This collection of new essays by twelve distinguished philosophers of religion explores three broad themes: religious attitudes of faith, belief, acceptance, and love; human and divine freedom; and the rationality of religious belief. Contributors include: William Alston, Robert Audi, Jan Cover, Martin Curd, Peter van (...) Inwagen, Norman Kretzmann, George Nakhnikian, John Hawthorne, Philip Quinn, James Ross, Eleonore Stump, and William Wainwright. (shrink) Cosmological Arguments for Theism in Philosophy of Religion Libertarianism about Free Will in Philosophy of Action Rationality in Epistemology $39.67 used   $74.99 new   $86.00 direct from Amazon   Amazon page Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder (1995). Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason. [REVIEW] Mind. This is a review of John Schellenberg's book. Arguments Against Theism in Philosophy of Religion Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder (1994). Theism, the Hypothesis of Indifference, and the Biological Role of Pain and Pleasure. Faith and Philosophy 11 (3):452-466. Following Hume’s lead, Paul Draper argues that, given the biological role played by both pain and pleasure in goal-directed organic systems, the observed facts about pain and pleasure in the world are antecedently much more likely on the Hypothesis of Indifference than on theism. I examine one by one Draper’s arguments for this claim and show how they miss the mark. David Hume in 17th/18th Century Philosophy Pleasure and Pain in Philosophy of Mind The Argument from Evil in Philosophy of Religion Direct download (3 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder & John Hawthorne (1994). On the a Priori Rejection of Evidential Arguments From Evil. Sophia:33-47. Recent work on the evidential argument from evil offers us sundry considerations which are intended to weigh against this form of atheological arguments. By far the most provocative is that on a priori grounds alone, evil can be shown to be evidentially impotent. This astonishing thesis has been given a vigorous defense by Keith Yandell. In this paper, we shall measure the prospects for an a priori dismissal of evidential arguments from evil. The Argument from Evil in Philosophy of Religion Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder & Frances Howard-Snyder (1994). How an Unsurpassable Being Can Create a Surpassable World. Faith and Philosophy 11 (2):260-268. Imagine that there exists a good, essentially omniscient and omnipotent being named Jove, and that there exists nothing else. No possible being is more powerful or knowledgable. Out of his goodness, Jove decides to create. Since he is all-powerful, there is nothing but the bounds of possibility to prevent him from getting what he wants. Unfortunately, as he holds before his mind the host of worlds, Jove sees that for each there is a better one. Although he can create any (...) of them, he can't create the best of them because there is no best. Faced with this predicament, Jove first sorts the worlds according to certain criteria. For example, he puts on his left worlds in which some inhabitants live lives that aren't worth living and on his right worlds in which every inhabitant's life is worth living; he puts on his left worlds in which some horrors fail to serve an outweighing good and on his right worlds in which no horror fails to serve an outweighing good. (We encourage the reader to use her own criteria.) Then he orders the right hand worlds according to their goodness and assigns to each a positive natural number, the worst of the lot receiving '1', the second worst '2', and so on. Next, he creates a very intricate device that, at the push of a button, will randomly select a number and produce the corresponding world. Jove pushes the button; the device hums and whirs and, finally, its digital display reads '777': world no. 777 comes into being. (shrink) No categories Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder & John Hawthorne (1993). God, Schmod and Gratuitous Evil. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):861-874. It is common these days for theists to argue that we aren’t justified in believing atheism on the basis of evil. They claim that neither facts about particular horrors nor more holistic considerations pertaining to the magnitude, kinds and distribution of evil can ground atheism since we can't tell whether any evil is gratuitous.1 In this paper we explore a novel strategy for shedding light on these issues: we compare the atheist who claims that there is no morally sufficient reason (...) for certain evils with the physicist who claims that there is no causally sufficient reason for some events. (shrink) The Argument from Evil in Philosophy of Religion Direct download (3 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder & Frances Howard-Snyder (1993). The Christian Theodicist's Appeal to Love. Religious Studies 29 (2):185 - 192. Many Christian theodicists believe that God's creating us with the capacity to love Him and each other justifies, in large part, God's permitting evil. For example, after reminding us that, according to Christian doctrine, the supreme good for human beings is to enter into a reciprocal love relationship with God, Vincent Brummer recently wrote: In creating human persons in order to love them, God necessarily assumes vulnerability in relation to them. In fact, in this relation, he becomes even more vulnerable (...) than we do, since he cannot count on the steadfastness of our love the way we can count on his steadfastness.... If God did not grant us the ability to sin and cause affliction to him and to one another, we would not have the kind of free and autonomous existence necessary to enter into a relation of love with God and with one another.... Far from contradicting the value which the free will defence places upon the freedom and responsibility of human persons, the idea of a loving God necessarily entails it. In this way we can see that the free will defence is based on the love of God rather than on the supposed intrinsic value of human freedom and responsibility.1 And Peter van Inwagen recently put the same point this way. (shrink) Autonomy, Misc in Social and Political Philosophy Free Will and Foreknowledge in Philosophy of Action The Argument from Evil in Philosophy of Religion Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder (1992). Seeing Through CORNEA. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 32 (1):25 - 49. This essays assesses Steve Wykstra's original CORNEA. The Argument from Evil in Philosophy of Religion Direct download (3 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder (1990). Surplus Evil. Philosophical Quarterly 40:78-86. This is a defense of Bill Rowe's 1979 version of the evidential argument from evil. Atheism in Philosophy of Religion The Argument from Evil in Philosophy of Religion Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Daniel Howard-Snyder, The Argument From Charity Against Revisionary Ontology. Revisionary ontologists are making a comeback. Quasi-nihilists, like Peter van Inwagen and Trenton Merricks, insist that the only composite objects that exist are living things. Unrestriced universalists, like W.V.O. Quine, David Lewis, Mark Heller, and Hud Hudson, insist that any collection of objects composes something, no matter how scattered over time and space they may be. And there are more besides.1 The result, says Eli Hirsch, is that many commonsense judgments about the existence or identity of highly visible physical objects (...) are a priori necessarily false. In a “last ditch effort” to bring revisionary ontologists back to their senses, Hirsch marshalls what he calls the Argument from Charity.2 We can be sure that there are tables and chairs and that there are no fusions of Plato’s nose and the Eiffel Tower, says Hirsch, because these commonsense platitudes are a logical consequence of the well-known principle of interpretive charity applied to natural languages, like English. In what follows, I assess the Argument from Charity. My conclusion is that if this is the best we can do to save revisionary ontologists, they are surely lost forever. (shrink) No categories Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation

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