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• Faculty, Western Washington University
• PhD, Syracuse University, 1992.

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Daniel Howard-Snyder is Professor of Philosophy at Western Washington University. He has a PhD from Syracuse University and a BA from Seattle Pacific University. His primary research interests are in philosophy of religion and epistemology. He has taught at Syracuse University, Wayne State University, and Seattle Pacific University; he now teaches at Western Washington University. He is the editor or co-editor of three books, The Evidential Argument from Evil (Indiana University Press, 1996), Faith, Freedom, and Rationality (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), and Divine Hiddenness (Cambridge, 2002). He has published articles in, among other places, Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Southern Journal of Philosophy, American Philosophical Quarterly, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Erkenntnis, Journal of Philosophical Research, International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion, Religious Studies, Sophia, Faith and Philosophy, and Philosophia Christi. Current projects include a book on arguments against the existence of God, agnosticism, and faith, and papers on various topics in the philosophy of religion and epistemology. When he’s not doing philosophy, he likes to garden, hike, fish, smoke (the fish), play chess, and edit the philosophy of religion page on PhilPapers. But his chief love is his family—Frances, William, and Peter—without whom his life would be bereft of all joy.

35 items found. Sort by: publication yearfirst authorviewingsaddition date Daniel Howard-Snyder, Epistemic Humility, Arguments From Evil, and Moral Skepticism. Many arguments from evil at least tacitly rely on something like the following line of thought: The Inference. On sustained reflection, we don’t see how any reason we know of would justify God in permitting all the evil in the world; therefore, there is no reason that would justify God.1 The conclusion is frequently more nuanced: “it is very likely that there is no such reason” or “more likely than not” or “more likely than it otherwise would be”. Some critics (...) reject the premise: we do see how some reason would justify God. These are the theodicists. Others accept the premise but reject the conclusion: the evidence or non-evidential warrant for God’s existence is much better than the evidence for no justifying reason. These are the natural theologians and Reformed epistemologists. Some critics, however, insist that even if the premise is true and even if there isn’t better evidence or non-evidential warrant for God’s existence, we should not infer that there is no justifying reason.2 These are the agnostics about the Inference. In this essay I aim to assess an increasingly popular objection to agnosticism. There are different versions of agnosticism about the Inference. The one I have in mind— henceforth Agnosticism with a capital A—affirms at least two theses. (shrink) Moral Skepticism in Meta-Ethics The Argument from Evil in Philosophy of Religion In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: wwu.edu   | Scholar | More.. Daniel Howard-Snyder, How an Unsurpassable Being Can Create a Surpassable World. Imagine that there exists a good, essentially omniscient and omnipotent being named Jove, and that there exists nothing else. No possible being is more powerful or knowledgable. Out of his goodness, Jove decides to create. Since he is all-powerful, there is nothing but the bounds of possibility to prevent him from getting what he wants. Unfortunately, as he holds before his mind the host of worlds, Jove sees that for each there is a better one. Although he can create any (...) of them, he can't create the best of them because there is no best. Faced with this predicament, Jove first sorts the worlds according to certain criteria. For example, he puts on his left worlds in which some inhabitants live lives that aren't worth living and on his right worlds in which every inhabitant's life is worth living; he puts on his left worlds in which some horrors fail to serve an outweighing good and on his right worlds in which no horror fails to serve an outweighing good. (We encourage the reader to use her own criteria.) Then he orders the right hand worlds according to their goodness and assigns to each a positive natural number, the worst of the lot receiving '1', the second worst '2', and so on. Next, he creates a very intricate device that, at the push of a button, will randomly select a number and produce the corresponding world. Jove pushes the button; the device hums and whirs and, finally, its digital display reads '777': world no. 777 comes into being. (shrink) No categories In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | More.. Daniel Howard-Snyder, Hiddenness of God. Many people are perplexed that God (if such there be) does not make His existence more evident. For many of them, the hiddenness of God puts their faith in God to the test. Others, however, claim that God’s hiddeness is the basis of an argument against God’s existence. While this claim is no newcomer to religious reflection, it has been the focus of renewed debate since the 1990’s. No categories In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | More.. Daniel Howard-Snyder, Infallibilism and Gettier's Legacy. Infallibilism is the view that a belief cannot be at once warranted and false. In this essay we assess three nonpartisan arguments for infallibilism, arguments that do not depend on a prior commitment to some substantive theory of warrant. Three premises, one from each argument, are most significant: (1) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then the Gettier Problem cannot be solved; (2) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then its warrant can (...) be transferred to an accidentally true belief; (3) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then it can be warranted and accidentally true. We argue that each of these is either false or no more plausible than its denial. Along the way, we offer a solution to the Gettier Problem that is compatible with fallibilism. (shrink) No categories In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | More.. Daniel Howard-Snyder, In Defense of Naïve Universalism. Michael J. Murray defends the traditional doctrine of hell by arguing directly against its chief competitor, universalism. Universalism, says Murray, comes in “naïve” and “sophisticated” forms. Murray poses two arguments against naïve universalism before focusing on sophisticated universalism, which is his real target. He proceeds in this fashion because he thinks that his arguments against sophisticated universalism are more easily motivated against naïve universalism, and once their force is clearly seen in the naïve case they will be more clearly seen (...) in the sophisticated. In this essay, I argue that Murray’s arguments against naïve universalism have no force whatsoever. (shrink) No categories In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | More.. Daniel Howard-Snyder, INTRODUCTION: The Evidential Argument From Evil. Evil, it is often said, poses a problem for theism, the view that there is an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good being, "God," for short. This problem is usually called "the problem of evil." But this is a bad name for what philosophers study under that rubric. They study what is better thought of as an argument, or a host of arguments, rather than a problem. Of course, an argument from evil against theism can be both an argument and a (...) problem. Some people realize this for the first time when they assert an argument from evil in print and someone publishes a .reply in which numerous defects and oversights are laid bare for the public eye. And if it turns out that there is a God and He doesn't take kindly to such arguments, then an argument from evil might be a big problem, a very big problem, for one who sincerely propounds it. Typically, however, an argument from evil is not thought to be a problem for the atheist. But if not for the atheist, for whom is an argument from evil a "problem"? (shrink) The Argument from Evil in Philosophy of Religion In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | More.. Daniel Howard-Snyder, Keith E. Yandell, the Epistemology of Religious Experience. Cambridge: Cambridge Univerity Press, 1993. VIII and 371 Pages. $00.00. Consider the following simple argument: 1. Someone had what seemed to be an experience of God. 2. If someone has what seems to be an experience of God, then there is evidence that God exists. 3. So, there is evidence that God exists. Yandell aims to qualify and defend this argument (33). By the time the qualifying is done, however, we have this. Religious Experience in Philosophy of Religion In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | More.. Daniel Howard-Snyder, On a “Fatal Dilemma” for Moderate Foundationalism. Contemporary foundationalists prefer Moderate Foundationalism over Strong Foundationalism. In this paper, we assess two arguments against the former which have been recently defended by Timothy McGrew. Three theses are central to the discussion: that only beliefs can be probabilifying evidence, that justification is internal, in McGrew’s sense of the term, and that only beliefs can be nonarbitrary justifying reasons. Foundationalism in Epistemology In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | More.. Daniel Howard-Snyder, On Rowe's Argument From Particular Horrors. Suppose God and evil are incompatible; then, since there clearly is evil, we have enormously strong evidence for atheism. Very few philosophers today who study our topic would endorse this argument, however. Why? Because it seems that God and evil are, strictly speaking, compatible. We can think of various reasons God might have to permit a fair bit of evil; and to the extent that we cannot think of any reason for God to permit so much, we have no good (...) grounds to think that there could not be a justifying reason we do not know of. (shrink) The Argument from Evil in Philosophy of Religion In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | More.. Daniel Howard-Snyder, Review of J.L. Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1993), I-X, 219 Pages. Do we rightly expect God to bring it about that, right now, we believe that He exists, on the basis of adequate grounds? It seems so. For if God exists, then He is perfect in love, and love at its best seeks the well-being of its object, not from a distance, but up close, explicitly participating in the beloved's life in a personal fashion, allowing her to draw from that relationship what she may need to flourish. Would an explicit, reciprocal (...) personal relationship with God enhance our well-being? It seems so. There would be broadly moral and experiential benefits; hence, our relationships with others would improve. Moreover, the best love wants a personal relationship not simply for the sake of the beloved but for its own sake as well. So, God would want to develop a personal relationship with us. (shrink) No categories In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | More.. Daniel Howard-Snyder, Reply to Rowe. First, on p. $$ he says: "the idea that none of those instances of suffering could have been prevented by an all-powerful being without loss of a greater good must strike us as an extraordinary idea, quite beyond belief". But if we are in the dark about what goods there are and what omnipotence-constraining connections there are between such goods and the permissions of such evils, how could that idea seem “extraordinary…quite beyond belief”? Only if we assume that there probably (...) aren’t any such goods or omnipotence-constraining connections if we don’t detect any. (shrink) The Argument from Evil in Philosophy of Religion In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | More.. Daniel Howard-Snyder, Theodicy. Not long ago, an issue of my local paper reminded its readers of Susan Smith, the Carolinan mother who rolled her Mazda into a lake, drowning her two little sons strapped inside. It also reported the abduction and gang rape of an eleven-year old girl by eight teenage members of Angelitos Sur 13, and the indictment of the "Frito Man" on 68 counts of sexual abuse, a fortyfive year old man who handed out corn chips to neighborhood children in order (...) to lure them to a secluded location. More recently, the headlines announced the untimely death of Ashley Jones, a twelve-year old girl from nearby Stanwood, Washington—she was raped and bludgeoned to death while babysitting her neighbor's kids. These are particularly disgusting, appalling cases of evil, all the more so because children are the victims. One might think that such cases occur only very rarely. I wish that were so. ABC News recently reported that in the United States a child dies from abuse by a parent or guardian every six hours. One is left with the disturbing thought: if that is how frequently a child dies from abuse in the US, how frequently are children merely abused? A sinister side-effect of familial abuse is that abused children are much more likely to abuse their own children; and so the attitudes and habits of abuse pass from generation to generation, a cycle of evil and suffering from which it can be enormously difficult to extricate oneself. Frequently, a child's suffering is unintentionally caused by those who love them most. Alvin Plantinga recalls a story about.. (shrink) The Argument from Evil in Philosophy of Religion In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | More.. Daniel Howard-Snyder, The Argument From Divine Hiddenness. Do we rightly expect a perfectly loving God to bring it about that, right now, we reasonably believe that He exists? It seems so. For love at its best desires the well-being of the beloved, not from a distance, but up close, explicitly participating in her life in a personal fashion, allowing her to draw from that relationship what she may need to flourish. But why suppose that we would be significantly better off were God to engage in an explicit, (...) personal relationship with us? Well, first, there would be broadly moral benefits. We would be able to draw on the resources of that relationship to overcome seemingly everpresent flaws in our character. And we would be more likely to emulate the self-giving love with which we were loved. So loved, we would be more likely to flourish as human beings. Secondly, there would be experiential benefits. We would be, for example, more likely to experience peace and joy stemming from the strong conviction that we were properly related to our Maker, security in suffering knowing that, ultimately, all shall be well, and there would be the sheer pleasure of God's loving presence. As a consequence of these moral and experiential benefits, our relationships with others would likely improve. Thirdly, to be personally related to God is intrinsically valuable, indeed, according to the Christian tradition, the greatest intrinsic good. In these ways our well-being would be enhanced if God were to relate personally to us. Moreover, the best love does not seek a personal relationship only for the sake of the beloved. As Robert Adams rightly notes, "It is an abuse of the word 'love' to say that one loves a person, or any other object, if one does not care, except instrumentally, about one's relation to that object."1 Thus, God would want a personal relationship with us not only for the benefit we would receive from it but for its own sake as well. So, if a perfectly loving God exists, He wants a personal relationship with us, or more accurately, every capable creature, those cognitively and affectively equipped to relate personally with Him.. (shrink) No categories In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | More.. Daniel Howard-Snyder, The Argument From Charity Against Revisionary Ontology. Revisionary ontologists are making a comeback. Quasi-nihilists, like Peter van Inwagen and Trenton Merricks, insist that the only composite objects that exist are living things. Unrestriced universalists, like W.V.O. Quine, David Lewis, Mark Heller, and Hud Hudson, insist that any collection of objects composes something, no matter how scattered over time and space they may be. And there are more besides.1 The result, says Eli Hirsch, is that many commonsense judgments about the existence or identity of highly visible physical objects (...) are a priori necessarily false. In a “last ditch effort” to bring revisionary ontologists back to their senses, Hirsch marshalls what he calls the Argument from Charity.2 We can be sure that there are tables and chairs and that there are no fusions of Plato’s nose and the Eiffel Tower, says Hirsch, because these commonsense platitudes are a logical consequence of the well-known principle of interpretive charity applied to natural languages, like English. In what follows, I assess the Argument from Charity. My conclusion is that if this is the best we can do to save revisionary ontologists, they are surely lost forever. (shrink) No categories In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | More.. Daniel Howard-Snyder, The Christian Theodicist's Appeal to Love. Many Christian theodicists believe that God's creating us with the capacity to love Him and each other justifies, in large part, God's permitting evil. For example, after reminding us that, according to Christian doctrine, the supreme good for human beings is to enter into a reciprocal love relationship with God, Vincent Brummer recently wrote: In creating human persons in order to love them, God necessarily assumes vulnerability in relation to them. In fact, in this relation, he becomes even more vulnerable (...) than we do, since he cannot count on the steadfastness of our love the way we can count on his steadfastness.... If God did not grant us the ability to sin and cause affliction to him and to one another, we would not have the kind of free and autonomous existence necessary to enter into a relation of love with God and with one another.... Far from contradicting the value which the free will defence places upon the freedom and responsibility of human persons, the idea of a loving God necessarily entails it. In this way we can see that the free will defence is based on the love of God rather than on the supposed intrinsic value of human freedom and responsibility.1 And Peter van Inwagen recently put the same point this way. (shrink) The Argument from Evil in Philosophy of Religion In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | More.. Daniel Howard-Snyder, Theism, the Hypothesis of Indifference, and the Biological Role of Pain and Pleasure. Following Hume’s lead, Paul Draper argues that, given the biological role played by both pain and pleasure in goal-directed organic systems, the observed facts about pain and pleasure in the world are antecedently much more likely on the Hypothesis of Indifference than on theism. I examine one by one Draper’s arguments for this claim and show how they miss the mark. Pleasure in Philosophy of Mind Pain in Philosophy of Mind In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | More.. Daniel Howard-Snyder, Was Jesus Mad, Bad, or God?…Or Merely Mistaken? A popular argument for the divinity of Jesus goes like this. Jesus claimed to be divine, but if his claim was false, then either he was insane (mad) or lying (bad), both of which are very unlikely; so, he was divine. I present two objections to this argument. The first, the dwindling probabilities objection, contends that even if we make generous probability assignments to the relevant pieces of evidence for Jesus’ divinity, the probability calculus tell us to suspend judgement on (...) the matter. The second, and more telling objection in my opinion, the merely mistaken objection, contends that it is no less plausible to suppose that Jesus was neither mad nor bad but merely mistaken than that he was divine. (shrink) No categories In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | More.. Daniel Howard-Snyder & John Hawthorne, On the a Priori Rejection of Evidential Arguments From Evil. Recent work on the evidential argument from evil offers us sundry considerations which are intended to weigh against this form of atheological arguments.1 By far the most provocative is that on a priori grounds alone, evil can be shown to be evidentially impotent. This astonishing thesis has been given a vigorous defense by Keith Yandell. In this paper, we shall measure the prospects for an a priori dismissal of evidential arguments from evil. Yandell's argument is a natural place to begin. (...) In section 1, then, we shall discuss whether we can claim on a priori grounds that evil is no evidence against theism, paying special attention to Yandell's argument. The claim, made by some theist, that atheological arguments from evil can be dismissed on an priori basis need not, of course, be interpreted as the claim that it can be shown on a priori grounds that evil cannot provide evidence for theism. The next three sections briefly consider three other readings of that claim. In section 2, we consider whether, on a priori grounds, we could have a good reason to think that no one could be justified in believing in gratuitous evil (evil for which there is no morally sufficient reason). In section 3, we consider whether one can show a priori that no one could reasonably believe atheism on the grounds of the facts about evil. In section 4, we consider whether the theist could show a priori that atheological arguments have no normative force against his own position (and hence that such arguments will, from his point of view, be devoid of epistemic interest). Working through these issues will, we hope, bring a measure of illumination to the whole debate. Before we begin in earnest, we offer three preliminary remarks. (shrink) The Argument from Evil in Philosophy of Religion In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | More.. Daniel Howard-Snyder (2009). The Puzzle of Prayers of Thanksgiving and Praise. In Yujin Nagasawa & Erik J. Wielenberg (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Religion. Palgrave Macmillan. in eds. Yujin Nagasawa and Erik Wielenberg, New Waves in Philosophy of Religion (Palgrave MacMillan 2008). No categories In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | More.. Daniel Howard-Snyder & E. J. Coffman (2006). Three Arguments Against Foundationalism: Arbitrariness, Epistemic Regress, and Existential Support. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (4). Epistemic Regress in Epistemology Foundationalism in Epistemology In my reading list   |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | More.. Daniel Howard-Snyder (2005). William P. Alston. In John Shook (ed.), Dictionary of Modern American Philosophy. Thoemmes. William P. Alston was born in Shreveport, Louisiana on 29 November 1921 to Eunice Schoolfield and William Alston. After graduating from high school at the age of fifteen, he studied music at Centenary College, majoring in piano. During the Second World War, he was stationed in Northern California (1942-46), playing clarinet and bass drum in an army band and piano in a dance band. It was during those years that he discovered his vocation, inspired by Somerset Maughan’s, The Razor’s Edge. (...) Unlike the hero of that novel, Alston had no guru to guide him in his quest for spiritual enlightenment; moreover, he was of a decidely intellectual bent. It is little wonder, then, that the nature of his quest found him at the Berkeley library, where he happened upon a book entitled, Introduction to Philosophy. Upon ingesting it, he instantly became a Thomist—the author was Jacques Maritain. According to Maritain, logic was the first part of philosophy and metaphysics a close second; and, according to Mortimer J. Adler, in How to Read a Book, which deeply impressed Alston, serious study should begin with the original sources. So Alston successively devoured, on his own, Aristotle’s logical treatises, Bacon’s Novum Organum, Mill’s System of Logic, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, several of Plato’s dialogues, Descartes’s Meditations and Discourse on Method, Spinoza’s Ethics, and Locke’s Essay. Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason curbed his appetite. Toward the end of the War, Alston so impressed Charner Perry, the chair of the Philosophy Department at the University of Chicago, that he was permitted to enter the PhD program—without ever having taken a class in philosophy. (shrink) No categories In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | More.. Daniel Howard-snyder (2005). Foundationalism and Arbitrariness. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (1):18–24. A particular belief of a person is basic just in case it is epistemically justified and it owes its justification to something other than her other justified beliefs or their interrelations; a person’s belief is nonbasic just in case it is epistemically justified but not basic. Foundationalists agree that if one has a nonbasic belief, then—at rock bottom—it owes its justification to at least one basic belief. There are justified beliefs (if any) because and only because there are basic beliefs. (...) Such is the genus Foundationalism.1 In this essay I assess Peter Klein’s recent case against Foundationalism, which is centered on the charge that basic beliefs are arbitrary. (shrink) Foundationalism in Epistemology In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: blackwell-synergy.com   | Scholar | More.. Daniel Howard-Snyder (2004). Lehrer's Case Against Foundationalism. Erkenntnis 60 (1). In this essay, I assess Keith Lehrer's case against Foundationalism, which consists of variations on three objections: The Independent Information or Belief Objection, The Risk of Error Objection, and the Hidden Argument Objection. I conclude that each objection fails for reasons that can be endorsed – indeed, I would say for reasons that should be endorsed – byantifoundationalists and foundationalists alike. Foundationalism in Epistemology In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: springerlink.com   | Scholar | More.. Daniel Howard-Snyder & Michael Bergmann (2003). Grounds for Belief in God Aside, Does Evil Make Atheism More Reasonable Than Theism? In Michael Peterson & Raymond Van Arrogan (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion. Blackwell. Many people deny that evil makes belief in atheism more reasonable for us than belief in theism. After all, they say, the grounds for belief in God are much better than the evidence for atheism, including the evidence provided by evil. We will not join their ranks on this occasion. Rather, we wish to consider the proposition that, setting aside grounds for belief in God and relying only on the background knowledge shared in common by nontheists and theists, evil makes (...) belief in atheism more reasonable for us than belief in theism. Our aim is to argue against this proposition. We recognize that in doing so, we face a formidable challenge. It’s one thing to say that evil presents a reason for atheism that is, ultimately, overridden by arguments for theism. It’s another to say that it doesn’t so much as provide us with a reason for atheism in the first place. In order to make this latter claim seem initially more plausible, consider the apparent design of the mammalian eye or the apparent fine-tuning of the universe to support life. These are often proposed as reasons to believe in theism. Critics commonly argue not merely that these supposed reasons for theism are overridden by arguments for atheism but rather that they aren’t good reasons for theism in the first place. Our parallel proposal with respect to evil and atheism is, initially at least, no less plausible than this proposal with respect to apparent design and theism. (shrink) The Argument from Evil in Philosophy of Religion Atheism in Philosophy of Religion In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | More.. Daniel Howard-Snyder & Paul K. Moser (eds.) (2002). Divine Hiddenness: New Essays. Cambridge University Press. For many people the existence of God is by no means a sufficiently clear feature of reality. This problem, the fact of divine hiddenness, has been a source of existential concern and has sometimes been taken as a rationale for support of atheism or agnosticism. In this new collection of essays, a distinguished group of philosophers of religion explore the question of divine hiddenness in considerable detail. The issue is approached from several perspectives including Jewish, Christian, atheist and agnostic. There (...) is coverage of the historical treatment of divine hiddenness as found in the work of Maimonides, St. John of the Cross, Jonathan Edwards, Kierkegaard, and various Biblical writers. A substantial introduction clarifies the main problems of and leading solutions to divine hiddenness. Primarily directed at philosophers of religion, theologians, and scholars of religious studies, this collection could also serve as a textbook for upper-level courses in philosophy of religion. (shrink) Philosophy of Religion In my reading list   |  Discuss this book  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | More.. Daniel Howard-Snyder (2001). Review of David O'Connor, God and Inscrutable Evil. Philosophical Review. 'Orthodox theism' (OT) is "the cognitive core” of mainstream religious belief in the Abrahamic tradition, according to which God is the omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good designer, creator, and sustainer of the world, who made us so that we might develop into morally mature agents capable of choosing freely to love God, on the basis of which we will be judged and our eternal destinies determined (77-79). O'Connor aims to pose a problem for this view, namely, that given the 'standard (...) assumption' governing discussion of God and evil since Hume, a certain fact about natural evil that results solely from natural processes (NERNP, he calls it) constitutes good reason to think that OT is false. The standard assumption is that we can compare by way of thought experiment how things are with how they would be if there were a God and with how they would be if there were no God, and thereby, we can, in principle, ground a justified verdict about whether God exists (39-44). The fact in question is that it seems that, necessarily, NERNP is gratuitous.1 Since God and gratuitous evil are incompatible, it follows that we have fairly strong prima facie reason to think that there is NERNP that is incompatible with God, and consequently that OT is false. (shrink) No categories In my reading list   |  Discuss this book review  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | More.. Daniel Howard-Snyder (1999). God, Evil, and Suffering. In Michael Murray (ed.), Reason for the Hope Within. Eerdmans. Not long ago, an issue of my local paper reminded its readers of Susan Smith, the Carolinan mother who rolled her Mazda into a lake, drowning her two little sons strapped inside. It also reported the abduction and gang rape of an eleven-year old girl by eight teenage members of Angelitos Sur 13, and the indictment of the "Frito Man" on 68 counts of sexual abuse, a fortyfive year old man who handed out corn chips to neighborhood children in order (...) to lure them to a secluded location. More recently, the headlines announced the untimely death of Ashley Jones, a twelve-year old girl from nearby Stanwood, Washington--she was raped and bludgeoned to death while babysitting her neighbor's kids. (shrink) The Argument from Evil in Philosophy of Religion In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | More.. Daniel Howard-Snyder (1998). Transworld Sanctity and Plantinga's Free Will Defense. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 44 (1). It used to be widely held by philosophers that God and evil are incompatible.1 Not any longer. Alvin Plantinga's Free Will Defense is largely responsible for this shift. Indeed, Robert Adams avers that "it is fair to say that Plantinga has solved this problem. That is, he has argued convincingly for the consistency of [God and evil]."2 And William Alston writes that "Plantinga...has established the possibility that God could not actualize a world containing free creatures that always do the right (...) thing."3 You might expect praise like this from Christian philosophers. You might not expect it from William Rowe, one of the foremost atheistic philosophers of our day, but this is precisely what we find. Rowe writes. (shrink) The Argument from Evil in Philosophy of Religion Free Will in Philosophy of Action In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: springerlink.com   | Scholar | More.. Daniel Howard-Snyder (1996). Review of Mark McLeod, Rationality and Theistic Belief. Faith and Philosophy. Many Christians say that, on occasion, God manifests Himself to them as doing something, e.g. guiding, forgiving, or strengthening them, or being something, e.g. wise, powerful or loving. They often describe their experiences in much the way we ordinarily describe our perception of nearby physical objects. They don't infer that God best explains their experience, nor do they indicate that they are merely indirectly aware of Him, say, through the words of a friend or by viewing a majestic mountain. Rather, (...) they take it that they directly perceive Him, that God directly appears thus-and-so. Their description of their experiences leads one to wonder whether such (putative) perception of God can justify such beliefs about Him (call them "M-beliefs") in the way in which we ordinarily think that (putative) perception of physical objects in normal circumstances can justify hum-drum perceptual beliefs. William Alston has recently argued that this is indeed the case. Suppose he's right. One might go on to claim that M-beliefs are as strongly justified as perceptual beliefs. Call this latter claim the parity thesis. (shrink) No categories In my reading list   |  Discuss this book review  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | More.. Daniel Howard-Snyder (1996). Review of Michael Peterson, The Problem of Evil. The Christian Scholar's Review. No other anthology effectively organizes so many previously published essays and excerpts covering such a wide range of philosphical issues on the problem of evil. Classic statements of the problem include Job, Aquinas, Hume, Dostoevsky, Camus, and Wiesel. Three versions of the problem of evil are represented: the standard Mackie and Plantinga pieces on the badly named "logical problem" (the idea that God and evil are logically incompatible), an exchange between Michael Martin and David Basinger over the "evidential problem" (the (...) idea that God and evil are probabilistically incompatible), and two unrelated essays on what is sometimes called "the existential problem", a clever one by Hasker employing the logic of regret and a second, more religiously sensitive, one by Marilyn McCord Adams emphasizing the redemptive value of suffering as modeled in martyrdom. Three perspectives in theodicy are presented and criticized: Augustine's rejection of the claim that there is genuine evil, Hick's contention that the world is a vale of soul-making, and the process theodicist's claim that God (properly conceived) doesn't have the power to prevent evil. The last part of book is devoted to four "hot" topics: Must God create the best world He can? If the free-will defense explains moral evil, can it be extended to explain natural evil?, Must one believe in libertarian freedom in order to affirm Plantinga's free will defense?, and Are theoretical discussions of the problem of evil morally insensitive and should they give way to, say, retelling the stories of victims or working to alleviate their suffering? Peterson closes with a helpful 25-page bibliography. (shrink) No categories In my reading list   |  Discuss this book review  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | More.. Daniel Howard-Snyder (1996). Review of Peter Forrest, God Without the Supernatural: A Defense of Scientific Theism. Journal of Religion. In this sometimes difficult but rewarding book, Peter Forrest aims to defend "anthropic theism," belief in a deity who is sufficiently powerful and knowledgeable to create our physical universe and who has created embodied persons--e.g., humans--chiefly for their own well-being (pp. 8-9). Anthropic theism enables us to understand several familiar facts better than its rivals. What facts? These. No categories In my reading list   |  Discuss this book review  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | More.. Daniel Howard-snyder (1995). Book Reviews. Mind 104 (414). No categories In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | More.. John O'Leary-Hawthorne & Daniel Howard-Snyder (1993). God, Schmod and Gratuitous Evil. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):861-874. The Argument from Evil in Philosophy of Religion In my reading list   |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: jstor.org   | Scholar | More.. Daniel Howard-Snyder (1992). Seeing Through CORNEA. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 32 (1). Philosophy of Religion In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | More.. Daniel Howard-Snyder, Review of Peter Van Inwagen, God, Mystery, and Knowledge. This volume collects nine essays published by Peter van Inwagen between 1977 and 1995. Part I features, among other things, modal skepticism with respect to ontological arguments and arguments from evil. Part II addresses certain tensions Christians may feel between modern biology, critical studies of the New Testament, and the comparative study of religions, on the one hand, and Christian orthodoxy, on the other. Part III deploys a formal logic of relative identity to model the internal consistency of the orthodox (...) doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation. In what follows, we summarize and reflect on five essays. (shrink) No categories In my reading list   |  Discuss this book review  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | More..

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