Nathan Wildman Universität Hamburg
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About me
I am a Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter for Prof. Dr. Benjamin Schnieder in the Philosophy Department at the University of Hamburg. I’m a member of the Phlox Research Group, the SNF project 'Grounding – Metaphysics, Science, and Logic', and the Emmy Noether project 'Ontology after Quine: Fictionalism and Fundamentality'. Before coming to Hamburg, I was a PhD student in the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Cambridge. And before *that*, I did my BA at the University of California, Santa Cruz. I muck around, mostly thinking about modality, essence, contengentism, and grounding/fundamentality, though I also have a developing project on interactive fictions, especially video games.
My works
7 items found.
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  1.  67
    Nathan Wildman (forthcoming). How to Be a Modalist About Essence. In Mark Jago (ed.), Reality Making. Oxford University Press
    Rather infamously, Kit Fine provided a series of counter-examples which purport to show that the modalist program of analysing essence in terms of metaphysical necessity is fundamentally misguided. Several would-be modalists have since responded, attempting to save the position from this Finean Challenge. This paper evaluates and rejects a trio of such responses, from Della Rocca, Zalta, and Gorman. But I’m not here arguing for Fine’s conclusion – ultimately, this is a fight amongst friends, with Della Rocca, Zalta, Gorman, and (...)
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  2.  61
    Nathan Wildman (forthcoming). On Shaky Ground? In Ricki Bliss & Graham Priest (eds.), Reality and its Structure. Oxford University Press
    The past decade and a half has seen an absolute explosion of literature discussing the structure of reality. One particular focus here has been on the fundamental. However, while there has been extensive discussion, numerous fundamental questions about fundamentality have not been touched upon. In this chapter, I focus on one such lacuna about the modal strength of fundamentality. More specifically, I am interested in exploring the contingent fundamentality thesis - that is, the idea that the fundamentalia are only contingently (...)
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  3.  50
    Nathan Wildman (2015). Load Bare-Ing Particulars. Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1419-1434.
    Bare particularism is a constituent ontology according to which substances—concrete, particular objects like people, tables, and tomatoes—are complex entities constituted by their properties and their bare particulars. Yet, aside from this description, much about bare particularism is fundamentally unclear. In this paper, I attempt to clarify this muddle by elucidating the key metaphysical commitments underpinning any plausible formulation of the position. So the aim here is primarily catechismal rather than evangelical—I don’t intend to convert anyone to bare particularism, but, by (...)
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  4. Nathan Wildman (2014). The Limits of Realism, by Tim Button. 264 + Xi P., Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013. [REVIEW] Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 68 (3):433-37.
     
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  5.  5
    Nathan Wildman (2014). Writing the Book of the World, by Theodore Sider. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2011, Xiv + 318 Pp. ISBN 978-0-19-969790-8 $55.00. [REVIEW] European Journal of Philosophy 22:e21-e25.
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  6.  66
    Nathan Wildman (2013). Modality, Sparsity, and Essence. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253):760-782.
    Rather infamously, Kit Fine provided a series of counter‐examples which purport to show that attempts to understand essence in terms of metaphysical necessity are ‘fundamentally misguided’. Here, my aim is to put forward a new version of modalism that is, I argue, immune to Fine's counter‐examples. The core of this new modalist account is a sparseness restriction, such that an object's essential properties are those sparse properties it has in every world in which it exists. After first motivating this sparseness (...)
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  7. Nathan Wildman (2012). Familiar Objects and Their Shadows. By Crawford L. Elder. (Cambridge UP, 2011. Pp. Xi + 210. Price £50.00, $85.00 H/B.). [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):195-197.
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