Michael Smith Princeton University
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  • Faculty, Princeton University
  • DPhil, Oxford University, 1989.

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About me
I am an Australian philosopher who currently teaches at Princeton University. Except for the papers that are in the collections of papers I've published with Cambridge and Oxford, I am in the process of putting all of my published papers on my website. Papers that are forthcoming can be downloaded from there too. My website address address is: https://www.princeton.edu/~msmith/index.html
My works
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  1. Michael Smith, Schiffers’s Unhappy Face Solution to a Puzzle About Moral Judgement.
    where, according to Schiffer, the concept of an F is pleonastic just in case the concept itself licenses entailments of the form: S ⇒ ∃xFx. These are what he calls "somethingfrom-nothing" entailments and the various practices in which such entailments are made are what he calls "hypostatisizing practices" (p.57). The concept of a proposition is pleonastic, according to this definition, because it licenses the move from a claim like 'Fido is a dog,' a claim containing only the singular term 'Fido' (...)
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  2. M. Smith (forthcoming). Justification and the Truth Connection. Philosophical Quarterly.
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  3. Michael Smith (forthcoming). The Materialist Dilemma: Education and the Changing of Circumstances. Philosophy of Education.
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  4. Michael Smith (2013). The Ideal of Orthonomous Action, or the How and Why of Buck-Passing. In David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking About Reasons: Themes From the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford University Press. 50.
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  5. Michael Smith (2013). Why of Buck—Passing. In David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking About Reasons: Themes From the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford University Press. 50.
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  6. Michael Smith (2012). Agents and Patients, Or: What We Learn About Reasons for Action by Reflecting on Our Choices in Process‐of‐Thought Cases. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (3):309-331.
    Can we draw substantive conclusions about the reasons for action agents have from premisses about the desires of their idealized counterparts? The answer is that we can. The argument for this conclusion is Rawlsian in spirit, focusing on the choices that our idealized counterparts must make simply in virtue of being ideal, and inferring from these choices the contents of the desires that they must have. It turns out that our idealized counterparts must have desires in which we ourselves figure (...)
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  7. Michael Smith (2012). A Puzzle About Internal Reasons. In Ulrike Heuer & Gerald Lang (eds.), Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes From the Ethics of Bernard Williams. Oxford University Press, Usa. 195.
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  8. Michael Smith (2012). Four Objections to the Standard Story of Action (and Four Replies). Philosophical Issues 22 (1):387-401.
  9. Michael Smith (2011). Deontological Moral Obligations and Non-Welfarist Agent-Relative Values. Ratio 24 (4):351-363.
    Many claim that a plausible moral theory would have to include a principle of beneficence, a principle telling us to produce goods that are both welfarist and agent-neutral. But when we think carefully about the necessary connection between moral obligations and reasons for action, we see that agents have two reasons for action, and two moral obligations: they must not interfere with any agent's exercise of his rational capacities and they must do what they can to make sure that agents (...)
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  10. Michael Smith (2010). Beyond the Error Theory. In Richard Joyce & Simon Kirchin (eds.), A World Without Values. Springer.
    Mackie's argument for the Error Theory is described. Four ways of responding to Mackie's argument—the Instrumental Approach, the Universalization Approach, the Reasons Approach, and the Constitutivist Approach—are outlined and evaluated. It emerges that though the Constitutivist Approach offers the most promising response to Mackie's argument, it is difficult to say whether that response is adequate or not.
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  11. Michael Smith (2010). On Normativity. Analysis 70 (4):715-731.
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  12. Michael Smith (2010). The Motivation Argument for Non-Cognitivism. In Charles R. Pigden (ed.), Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Palgrave Macmillan. 105.
     
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  13. Michael Smith & Jada Twedt Strabbing (2010). Moral Obligation, Accountability, and Second-Personal Reasons. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):237 - 245.
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  14. Michael Smith (2009). Kinds of Consequentialism. In Ernest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva (eds.), Metaethics. Wiley Periodicals, Inc.. 257-272.
  15. Michael Smith (2009). And Dearest Objection. In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford University Press. 237.
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  16. Michael Smith (2009). Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection. In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford University Press.
    Imagine that Bloggs is faced with a choice between giving a benefit to his child, or a slightly greater benefit to a complete stranger. The benefit is whatever the child or the stranger can buy for $100 — Bloggs has $100 to give away — and it just so happens that the stranger would buy something from which he would gain a slightly greater benefit than would Bloggs's child. Let's stipulate that Bloggs believes this to be, and let's stipulate, as (...)
     
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  17. Michael Smith (2009). Desires, Values, Reasons, and the Dualism of Practical Reason. Ratio 22 (1):98-125.
    In On What Matters Derek Parfit argues that facts about reasons for action are grounded in facts about values and against the view that they are grounded in facts about the desires that subjects would have after fully informed and rational deliberation. I describe and evaluate Parfit's arguments for this value-based conception of reasons for action and find them wanting. I also assess his response to Sidgwick's suggestion that there is a Dualism of Practical Reason. Parfit seems not to notice (...)
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  18. Michael Smith (2009). Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford University Press.
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  19. Michael Smith (2009). Reasons with Rationalism After All. Analysis 69 (3):521-530.
  20. Michael Smith (2009). The Explanatory Role of Being Rational. In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press. 58--80.
    Humeans hold that actions are movements of an agent's body that are suitably caused by a desire that things be a certain way and a belief on the agent's behalf that something she can just do, namely perform a movement of her body of the kind to be explained, has some suitable chance of making things that way (Davidson 1963). Movements of the body that are caused in some other way aren't actions, but are rather things that merely happen to (...)
     
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  21. Michael Smith (2009). Kinds of Consequentialism. In Ernest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva (eds.), Metaethics. Wiley Periodicals, Inc.. 257-272.
  22. Brennan Geoffrey, Robert Goodwin, Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (2007). BLOM Hans, John Christian Laursen and Luisa Simonutti (Eds). British Journal for the History of Philosophy 15 (4):833-837.
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  23. Michael Smith (2007). In Defence of Ethics and the a Priori: A Reply to Enoch, Hieronymi, and Tannenbaum. Philosophical Books 48 (2):136-149.
  24. Michael Smith (2007). Summary. Philosophical Books 48 (2):97-98.
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  25. Michael Smith (2007). Is There a Nexus Between Reasons and Rationality? Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 94 (1):279-298.
    When we say that a subject has attitudes that she is rationally required to have, does that entail that she has those attitudes for reasons? In other words, is there a deep nexus between being rational and responding to reasons? Many have argued that there is. For example, Derek Parfit tells us that 'to be rational is to respond to reasons' (Parfit 1997, p.99). But I am not so sure. I begin by considering this question in the domain of theoretical (...)
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  26. Michael Smith, Robert Goodin & Geoffrey Geoffrey (eds.) (2007). Common Minds. Oxford.
  27. Philip Pettit & Michael Smith (2006). External Reasons. In Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Mcdowell and His Critics. Blackwell Pub.. 6--142.
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  28. Philip Pettit & Michael Smith (2006). The Truth in Deontology. In R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler & Michael Smith (eds.), Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. Clarendon Press.
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  29. Michael Smith (2006). Environmentalism: Spiritual, Ethical, Political. Environmental Values 15 (3):355 - 363.
    The normative foundations of the environmental movement can be thought of in a range of different ways. The present paper is a commentary on very interesting papers by Thomas Dunlap, Thomas Hill and Kimberly Smith, who take up the spiritual, ethical and political perspectives respectively. Their accounts are described and evaluated.
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  30. Michael Smith (2006). Is That All There Is? Journal of Ethics 10 (1-2):75 - 106.
    I take issue with two suggestions of Joel Feinberg's: first, that it is incoherent to suppose that human life as such is absurd, and, second, that a particular human life may be absurd and yet saved from being tragic by being fulfilled. I also argue that human life as such may well be absurd and I consider various responses to this.
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  31. Michael Smith (2006). Moore on the Right, the Good, and Uncertainty. In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore. Oxford University Press. 2006--133.
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  32. Michael Smith & Frank Jackson (2006). Absolutist Moral Theories and Uncertainty. Journal of Philosophy 103 (6):267-283.
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  33. Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.) (2005). The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy is the definitive guide to what's going on in this lively and fascinating subject. Jackson and Smith, themselves two of the world's most eminent philosophers, have assembled more than thirty distinguished scholars to contribute incisive and up-to-date critical surveys of the principal areas of research. The coverage is broad, with sections devoted to moral philosophy, social and political philosophy, philosophy of mind and action, philosophy of language, metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of the sciences. This (...)
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  34. Michael Smith (2005). Meta-Ethics. In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. Oxford University Press. 3--30.
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  35. Michael Smith (2005). Norms and Regulation: Three Issues – Discussion. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 124 (2):221 - 232.
    The five essays in Part III of Philip Pettit’s Rules, Reasons and Norms are a brilliant blend of normative and empirical concerns. Their starting point is the distinction between two sorts of question we can ask about institutions. Institution arrangements bring about certain outcomes: they foster attitudes, cement relationships, and provide certain people with benefits and others with burdens. One question we can ask concerns the justification of institutions; the other concerns the feasibility of institutions, relative to some outcome. Let (...)
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  36. Michael Smith (2005). Review: Norms and Regulation: Three Issues: Discussion. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 124 (2):221 - 232.
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  37. Michael Smith (2004). Ethics and the a Priori: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Meta-Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
    Over the last fifteen years, Michael Smith has written a series of seminal essays about the nature of belief and desire, the status of normative judgment, and the relevance of the views we take on both these topics to the accounts we give of our nature as free and responsible agents. This long awaited collection comprises some of the most influential of Smith's essays. Among the topics covered are: the Humean theory of motivating reasons, the nature of normative reasons, Williams (...)
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  38. Michael Smith (2004). Humean Rationality. In Piers Rawling & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 75--92.
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  39. Michael Smith (2004). Instrumental Desires, Instrumental Rationality. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):93–109.
    The requirements of instrumental rationality are often thought to be normative conditions on choice or intention, but this is a mistake. Instrumental rationality is best understood as a requirement of coherence on an agent's non-instrumental desires and means-end beliefs. Since only a subset of an agent's means-end beliefs concern possible actions, the connection with intention is thus more oblique. This requirement of coherence can be satisfied either locally or more globally, it may be only one among a number of such (...)
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  40. Michael Smith (2004). The Structure of Orthonomy. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55:165-193.
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  41. Distinguish Recklessness & Michael Smith (2003). Rational Capacities, Or: How To. In Christine Tappolet & Sarah Stroud (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 17.
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  42. Michael Smith (2003). Humeanism, Psychologism, and the Normative Story. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):460–467.
    Jonathan Dancy’s Practical Reality is, I think, best understood as an attempt to undermine our allegiance to these two purported constitutive claims about action. If we must think that psychological states figure in the explanation of action then, according to Dancy, we should suppose that those psychological states are beliefs rather than desire-belief pairs. Dancy thus prefers pure cognitivism to Humeanism. But in fact he thinks that we have no business accepting any form of psychologism in the first place; no (...)
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  43. Michael Smith (2003). Neutral and Relative Value After Moore. Ethics 113 (3):576-598.
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  44. Michael Smith (2003). Rational Capacities. In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of Will and Varities of Practical Irrationality. Oxford University Press. 17-38.
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  45. Michael Smith (2003). Rational Capacities, Or: How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion. In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 17-38.
  46. Michael Smith & Daniel Stoljar (2003). Is There a Lockean Argument Against Expressivism? Analysis 63 (1):76–86.
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  47. Daniel Stoljar & Michael Smith (2003). Is There a Lockean Argument Against Expressivism? Analysis 63 (1):76 - 86.
    It is sometimes suggested that expressivism in meta-ethics is to be criticized on grounds which do not themselves concern meta-ethics in particular, but which rather concern philosophy of language more generally. Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit (1998; see also Jackson and Pettit 1999, and Jackson 2001) have recently advanced a novel version of such an argument. They begin by noting that expressivism in its central form makes two claims—that ethical sentences are not truth evaluable, and that to assert an ethical (...)
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  48. L. R. Wheeldon, A. S. Meyer & M. Smith (2003). Incremental Language Production. In L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group. 4--760.
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  49. M. Smith (2002). The Invention of the Restaurant: Paris and Modern Gastronomic Culture. By Rebecca L. Spang. The European Legacy 7 (3):416-416.
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  50. Michael Smith (2002). Exploring the Implications of the Dispositional Theory of Value. Noûs 36 (s1):329 - 347.
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  51. Michael Smith (2002). Evaluation, Uncertainty and Motivation. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (3):305-320.
    Evaluative judgements have both belief-like and desire-like features. While cognitivists think that they can easily explain the belief-like features, and have trouble explaining the desire-like features, non-cognitivists think the reverse. I argue that the belief-like features of evaluative judgement are quite complex, and that these complexities crucially affect the way in which an agent's values explain her actions, and hence the desire-like features. While one form of cognitivism can, it turns out that non-cognitivism cannot, accommodate all of these complexities. The (...)
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  52. Michael Smith (2002). Review: Which Passions Rule? [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):157 - 163.
    Simon Blackburn attempts to answer these questions in the early part of his wonderful new book Ruling Passions (Blackburn 1998). Unsurprisingly, despite my admiration for his book, I think he fails to identify a special feature of desires and aversions that makes them especially suitable for expression in normative claims. For all that he says the desires and aversions he picks out are much like the addict’s desire to take drugs. There are revisions Blackburn could make which would make his (...)
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  53. L. R. Wheeldon, A. S. Meyer, M. Smith & R. Goldstone (2002). Incrementality. In Lynn Nadel (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.
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  54. M. Lima, M. Smith, C. Silva, A. Abade, F. Mayer & P. Coutinho (2001). Natural Selection at the Mjd Locus: Phenotypic Diversity, Survival and Fertility Among Machado-Joseph Disease Patients From the Azores. Journal of Biosocial Science 33 (3):361-373.
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  55. M. Smith (2001). Sellingem by the Sack: White Castle and the Creation of American Food. By David Gerard Hogan. The European Legacy 6 (6):862-862.
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  56. Michael Smith (2001). Immodest Consequentialism and Character. Utilitas 13 (02):173-.
    The fact that we place the value that we do on the traits of character constitutive of being a good friend, and the acts that good friends are disposed to perform, creates a considerable problem for what I call . The problem is, in essence, that the very best that the immodest global consequentialists can do by way of vindicating our most deeply held convictions about the value of these traits of character and actions isn't good enough, because, while vindicating (...)
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  57. Michael Smith (2001). Some Not-Much-Discussed Problems for Non-Cognitivism in Ethics. Ratio 14 (2):93–115.
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  58. Michael Smith (2001). The Incoherence Argument: Reply to Schafer-Landau. Analysis 61 (3):254–266.
    Russ Schafer-Landau’s ‘Moral judgement and normative reasons’ is admirably clear and to the point (Schafer-Landau 1999). He presents his own version of the argument for the practicality requirement on moral judgement – that is, for the claim that those who have moral beliefs are either motivated or practically irrational – that I gave in The Moral Problem (Smith 1994), and he then proceeds to identify several crucial problems. In what follows I begin by making some comments about his presentation of (...)
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  59. Frank Jackson, Philip Pettit & Michael Smith (2000). Ethical Particularism and Patterns. In Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Moral Particularism. Oxford University Press. 79--99.
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  60. Philip Pettit & Michael Smith (2000). Global Consequentialism. In Brad Hooker, Elinor Mason & Dale Miller (eds.), Morality, Rules and Consequences: A Critical Reader. Edinburgh University Press.
  61. Michael Smith (2000). Moral Realism. In Hugh LaFollette - (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory. Blackwell Publishers. 15--37.
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  62. Michael Smith (2000). Quelques énigmes concernant le contrôle de soi. Philosophiques 27 (2):287-304.
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  63. Michael Smith (2000). The Reality of Moral Expectations: A Note of Caution. Philosophical Explorations 3 (3):232 – 238.
    The actions that agents perform in social situations are often influenced by the moral justifications they are able to provide of their behaviour. Boltanski and Thévenot point out that this fact appears to be in tension with the standard models of social explanation which seek to explain behaviour in social situations in terms of self-interested motivations. In this note I consider this tension, and caution against reading too much into it.
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  64. Michael Smith (1999). The Non-Arbitrariness of Reasons: Reply to Lenman. Utilitas 11 (02):178-.
    James Lenman is critical of my claim that moral requirements are requirements of reason. I argue that his criticisms miss their target. More importantly, I argue that the anti-rationalism that informs Lenman's criticisms is itself implausible.
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  65. Michael Smith (1999). Review: Search for the Source. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196):384 - 394.
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  66. Michael Smith (1999). Search for the Source. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196):384–394.
    The Sources of Normativity is an ambitious and demanding book. It is impossible to do full justice to The Sources of Normativity in a review essay such as this. I shall therefore concentrate on Korsgaard’s partisan goal: her defence of a Kantian view about the sources of normativity. It was evidently this part that most excited the commentators when they first heard Korsgaard deliver her Tanner Lectures. I suspect it is the part of the book that will most excite the (...)
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  67. Philip Pettit & Michael Smith (1998). Freedom in Belief and Desire. In. In J. A. M. Bransen & S. E. Cuypers (eds.), Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 89--112.
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  68. M. Smith (1998). Nineteenth-Century Literary Realism: Through the Looking Glass. By Katherine Kearns. The European Legacy 3:159-159.
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  69. Michael Smith (1998). Ethics and the A Priori: A Modern Parable. Philosophical Studies 92 (1/2):149 - 174.
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  70. Michael Smith (1998). Review: Galen Strawson and the Weather Watchers. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):449 - 454.
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  71. Michael Smith (1998). Response-Dependence Without Reduction. European Review of Philosophy 3:85-108.
     
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  72. John Bigelow & Michael Smith (1997). How Not to Be Muddled by a Meddlesome Muggletonian. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (4):511 – 527.
    Holton, we acknowledge, has given a good counter-example to a theory, and that theory is interesting and worth refuting. The theory we have in mind is like Smith's, but is more reductionist in spirit. It is a theory that ties value to Reason and to processes of reasoning, or inference - not to the recognition of reasons and acting on reasons. Such a theory overestimates the importance of logic, truth, inference, and thinking things through for yourself independently of any ideas (...)
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  73. Jeanette Kennett & Michael Smith (1997). Synchronic Self-Control is Always Non-Actional. Analysis 57 (2):123–131.
  74. Philip Pettit & Michael Smith (1997). Parfit's P. In J. Dancy (ed.), Reading Parfit. Blackwell. 71--95.
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  75. Michael Smith (1997). In Defense of "the Moral Problem": A Reply to Brink, Copp, and Sayre-McCord. Ethics 108 (1):84-119.
  76. Jeanette Kennett & Michael Smith (1996). Frog and Toad Lose Control. Analysis 56 (2):63–73.
    It seems to be a truism that whenever we do something - and so, given the omnipresence of trying (Hornsby 1980), whenever we try to do something - we want to do that thing more than we want to do anything else we can do (Davidson 1970). However, according to Frog, when we have will power we are able to try not to do something that we ‘really want to do’. In context the idea is clearly meant to be that (...)
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  77. Jeanette Kennett & Michael Smith (1996). Philosophy and Commonsense: The Case of Weakness of Will. In Michaelis Michael & John O.’Leary-Hawthorne (eds.), The Place of Philosophy in the Study of Mind. Kluwer. 141-157.
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  78. Philip Pettit & Michael Smith (1996). Freedom in Belief and Desire. Journal of Philosophy 93 (9):429-449.
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  79. Michael Smith (1996). Normative Reasons and Full Rationality: Reply to Swanton. Analysis 56 (3):160–168.
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  80. Michael Smith (1996). The Argument for Internalism: Reply to Miller. Analysis 56 (3):175–184.
    Alexander Miller objects to the argument for moral judgement internalism that I provide in _The Moral Problem. Miller's objection suggests a misunderstanding of the argument. In this reply I take the opportunity to restate the argument in slightly different terms, and to explain why Miller's objection betrays a misunderstanding.
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  81. Michael Smith (1995). Internal Reasons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):109-131.
    The idea that there is such an analytic connection will hardly come as news. It amounts to no more and no less than an endorsement of the claim that all reasons are 'internal', as opposed to 'external', to use Bernard Williams's terms (Williams 1980). Or, to put things in the way Christine Korsgaard favours, it amounts to an endorsement of the 'internalism requirement' on reasons (Korsgaard 1986). But how exactly is the internalism requirement to be understood? What does it tell (...)
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  82. Michael Smith (1995). Reply to Ingmar Persson's Critical Notice Of: The Moral Problem. Theoria 61 (2):159-181.
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  83. F. Jackson, G. Oppy & M. Smith (1994). Minimalism and Truth Aptness. Mind 103 (411):287-302.
  84. Jeanette Kennett & Michael Smith (1994). Philosophy and Commonsense: The Case of Weakness of Will. In. In John O'Leary-Hawthorne & Michaelis Michael (eds.), Philosophy in Mind. Kluwer. 141--157.
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  85. J. Slomka & M. Smith (1994). Editors' Introduction. HEC Forum 6 (1):1-2.
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  86. Michael Smith (1994). Minimalism, Truth-Aptitude and Belief. Analysis 54 (1):21 - 26.
  87. Michael Smith (1994/1995). The Moral Problem. Blackwell.
    What is the Moral Problem? NORMATIVE ETHICS VS. META-ETHICS It is a common fact of everyday life that we appraise each others' behaviour and attitudes from ...
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  88. Michael Smith (1994). Why Expressivists About Value Should Love Minimalism About Truth. Analysis 54 (1):1 - 11.
  89. Michael Smith, Frank Jackson & Graham Oppy (1994). Minimalism and Truth Aptness. Mind 103 (411):287 - 302.
  90. Philip Pettit & Michael Smith (1993). Practical Unreason. Mind 102 (405):53-79.
    Some contemporary theories treat phenomena like weakness of will, compulsion and wantonness as practical failures but not as failures of rationality: say, as failures of autonomy or whatever. Other current theories-the majority see the phenomena as failures of rationality but not as distinctively practical failures. They depict them as always involving a theoretical deficiency: a sort of ignorance, error, inattention or illogic. They represent them as failures which are on a par with breakdowns of theoretical reason; the failures may not (...)
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  91. Michael Smith (1993). Objectivity and Moral Realism: On the Significance of the Phenomenology of Moral Experience. In John Haldane & Crispin Wright (eds.), Reality, Representation, and Projection. Oxford University Press. 235--236.
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  92. Michael Smith (1992). Valuing: Desiring or Believing? In K. Lennon & D. Charles (eds.), Reduction, Explanation, and Realism. Oxford University Press. 323--60.
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  93. Raymond Guess, Gilbert Harman, Richard Jeffrey, David Lewis, Alison Mclntyre & Michael Smith (1991). Mark Johnston. In Daniel Kolak & R. Martin (eds.), Self and Identity: Contemporary Philosophical Issues. Macmillan.
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  94. Michael Smith (1991). Le postmoderne expliqué aux enfants. Correspondance 1982–85. History of European Ideas 13 (4):444-445.
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  95. Philip Pettit & Michael Smith (1990). Backgrounding Desire. Philosophical Review 99 (4):565-592.
    Granted that desire is always present in the genesis of human action, is it something on the presence of which the agent always reflects? I may act on a belief without coming to recognize that I have the belief. Can I act on a desire without recognizing that I have the desire? In particular, can the desire have a motivational presence in my decision making, figuring in the background, as it were, without appearing in the content of my deliberation, in (...)
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  96. M. Smith (1989). Derek Gregory. In Derek Gregory & Rex Walford (eds.), Horizons in Human Geography. Barnes & Noble Books. 67.
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  97. M. Smith (1989). Peguy's Socialist Utopia. Telos 1989 (80):204-207.
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  98. Michael Smith, David Lewis & Mark Johnston (1989). Dispositional Theories of Value. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 63:89-174.
  99. Michael Smith (1988). On Humeans, Anti-Humeans, and Motivation: A Reply to Pettit. Mind 97 (388):589-595.
  100. Michael Smith (1987). The Humean Theory of Motivation. Mind 96 (381):36-61.
  101. Gordon Koch & Michael Smith (1985). Analysis of Development and Differentiation with Tumour Cell Glycoproteins. Bioessays 3 (5):196-199.
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  102. M. Smith (1985). Book Reviews : Psychology and Psychiatry Today: A Marxist View. By Joseph Nahem. New York: International Publishers, 1981. Pp. 264. $15.00. [REVIEW] Philosophy of the Social Sciences 15 (2):216-221.
  103. Michael Smith (1983). Actions, Attempts and Internal Events. Analysis 43 (3):142 - 146.
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  104. Michael Smith (1980). Did Socrates Kill Himself Intentionally? Philosophy 55 (212):253 - 254.
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  105. Robert Elliot & Michael Smith (1978). Descartes, God and the Evil Spirit. Sophia 17 (3):33-36.
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  106. Michael Smith (1978). A Response to Penta. Educational Theory 28 (2):154-155.
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  107. Robert Elliot & Michael Smith (1977). Individuating Actions: A Reply to McCullagh and Thalberg. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 55 (3):209 – 212.
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  108. M. Smith (1931). Group Judgments in the Field of Personality Traits. Journal of Experimental Psychology 14 (5):562.
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  109. Michael Smith & Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Desires…and Beliefs…of One's Own.
    Much work in recent moral psychology attempts to spell out what it is for a desire to be an agent’s own, or, as it is often put, what it means for an agent to be identified with certain of her desires rather than others. The aim of such work varies. Some suggest that an account of what it is for a desire to be an agent’s own provides us with an account of what it is for an agent to value (...)
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