Ned Block New York University
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  1. Ned Block (forthcoming). Consciousness, Big Science and Conceptual Clarity. In Gary Marcus & Jeremy Freeman (eds.), in The Future of the Brain: Essays by the World’s Leading Neuroscientists. Princeton University Press.
  2. Ned Block (forthcoming). The Canberra Plan Neglects Ground. In Terence Horgan, Marcelo Sabates & David Sosa (eds.), Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World: Themes from the Philosophy of Jaegwon Kim,. Cambridge University Press.
    This paper argues that the “Canberra Plan” picture of physicalistic reduction of mind--a picture shared by both its proponents and opponents, philosophers as diverse as David Armstrong, David Chalmers Frank Jackson, Jaegwon Kim, Joe Levine and David Lewis--neglects ground (Fine, 2001, 2012). To the extent that the point of view endorsed by the Canberra Plan has an account of the physical/functional ground of mind at all, it is in one version trivial and in another version implausible. In its most general (...)
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  3. Ned Block (2014). Rich Conscious Perception Outside Focal Attention. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 18.
    Can we consciously see more items at once than can be held in visual working memory? This question has elud- ed resolution because the ultimate evidence is subjects’ reports in which phenomenal consciousness is filtered through working memory. However, a new technique makes use of the fact that unattended ‘ensemble prop- erties’ can be detected ‘for free’ without decreasing working memory capacity.
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  4. Ned Block (2014). Seeing‐As in the Light of Vision Science. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):560-572.
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  5. Ned Block (2014). The Defective Armchair: A Reply to Tye. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):159-165.
    Michael Tye's response to my “Grain” (Block ) and “Windows” (Block ) raises general metaphilosophical issues about the value of intuitions and judgments about one's perceptions and the relations of those intuitions and judgments to empirical research, as well as specific philosophical issues about the relation between seeing, attention and de re thought. I will argue that Tye's appeal to what is (§. 2) “intuitively obvious, once we reflect upon these cases” (“intuition”) is problematic. I will also argue that first (...)
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  6. Ned Block (2013). Seeing and Windows of Integration. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4).
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  7. Ned Block (2013). The Grain of Vision and the Grain of Attention. Thought, A Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):170-184.
    Often when there is no attention to an object, there is no conscious perception of it either, leading some to conclude that conscious perception is an attentional phenomenon. There is a well-known perceptual phenomenon—visuo-spatial crowding, in which objects are too closely packed for attention to single out one of them. This article argues that there is a variant of crowding—what I call ‘‘identity-crowding’’—in which one can consciously see a thing despite failure of attention to it. This conclusion, together with new (...)
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  8. Ned Block & Susanna Siegel (2013). Attention and Perceptual Adaptation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):205-206.
  9. Ned Block (2012). Response to Kouider Et Al. : Which View is Better Supported by the Evidence? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 16 (3):141-142.
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  10. J. Kevin O'Regan & Ned Block (2012). Discussion of J. Kevin O'Regan's “Why Red Doesn't Sound Like a Bell: Understanding the Feel of Consciousness”. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):89-108.
    Discussion of J. Kevin O’Regan’s “Why Red Doesn’t Sound Like a Bell: Understanding the Feel of Consciousness” Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-20 DOI 10.1007/s13164-012-0090-7 Authors J. Kevin O’Regan, Laboratoire Psychologie de la Perception, CNRS - Université Paris Descartes, Centre Biomédical des Saints Pères, 45 rue des Sts Pères, 75270 Paris cedex 06, France Ned Block, Departments of Philosophy, Psychology and Center for Neural Science, New York University, 5 Washington Place, New York, NY 10003, USA Journal Review of Philosophy and (...)
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  11. Naotsuga Tsuchiya, Ned Block & Christof Koch (2012). Top-Down Attention and Consciousness: Comment on Cohen, Et.Al. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 16 (11):527.
  12. Anthony Arak, William Ross Ashby, Francis Maler Bacon, Roger Bakeman, George Berkeley, Ned Block, Wolfgang Bonsiepen, Egon Brunswik, Josep Call & Donald Campbell (2011). Pers onenregister. In Wolfgang Welsch, Christian Tewes & Klaus Vieweg (eds.), Natur Und Geist: Über Ihre Evolutionäre Verhältnisbestimmung. Akademie Verlag.
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  13. N. Block (2011). Response to Rosenthal and Weisberg. Analysis 71 (3):443-448.
  14. Ned Block (2011). Perceptual Consciousness Overflows Cognitive Access. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (12):567-575.
    One of the most important issues concerning the foundations ofconscious perception centerson thequestion of whether perceptual consciousness is rich or sparse. The overflow argument uses a form of ‘iconic memory’ toarguethatperceptual consciousnessisricher (i.e.,has a higher capacity) than cognitive access: when observing a complex scene we are conscious of more than we can report or think about. Recently, the overflow argumenthas been challenged both empirically and conceptually. This paper reviews the controversy, arguing that proponents of sparse perception are committed to the (...)
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  15. Ned Block (2011). The Anna Karenina Theory of the Unconscious. Neuropsychoanalysis 13 (1):34-37.
    The Anna Karenina Theory says: all conscious states are alike; each unconscious state is unconscious in its own way. This note argues that many components have to function properly to produce consciousness, but failure in any one of many different ones can yield an unconscious state in different ways. In that sense the Anna Karenina theory is true. But in another respect it is false: kinds of unconsciousness depend on kinds of consciousness.
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  16. Ned Block (2011). The Higher Order Approach to Consciousness is Defunct. Analysis 71 (3):419 - 431.
    The higher order approach to consciousness attempts to build a theory of consciousness from the insight that a conscious state is one that the subject is conscious of. There is a well-known objection1 to the higher order approach, a version of which is fatal. Proponents of the higher order approach have realized that the objection is significant. They have dealt with it via what David Rosenthal calls a “retreat” (2005b, p. 179) but that retreat fails to solve the problem.
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  17. Ned Block (2010). Attention and Mental Paint1. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):23-63.
    Much of recent philosophy of perception is oriented towards accounting for the phenomenal character of perception—what it is like to perceive—in a non-mentalistic way—that is, without appealing to mental objects or mental qualities. In opposition to such views, I claim that the phenomenal character of perception of a red round object cannot be explained by or reduced to direct awareness of the object, its redness and roundness—or representation of such objects and qualities. Qualities of perception that are not captured by (...)
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  18. Ned Block (2009). Comparing the Major Theories of Consciousness. In Michael Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences IV. 1111-1123.
    This article compares the three frameworks for theories of consciousness that are taken most seriously by neuroscientists, the view that consciousness is a biological state of the brain, the global workspace perspective and an account in terms of higher order states. The comparison features the “explanatory gap” (Nagel, 1974; Levine, 1983) the fact that we have no idea why the neural basis of an experience is the neural basis of that experience rather than another experience or no experience at all. (...)
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  19. Blade Runner, Isaac Asimov, Andy Clark, Ned Block & Daniel C. Dennett (2009). Mind: Natural, Artificial, Hybrid, and “Super”. In Susan Schneider (ed.), Science Fiction and Philosophy: From Time Travel to Superintelligence. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  20. Ned Block (2008). Anti-Reductionism Slaps Back. Noûs 31 (s11):107-132.
    For nearly thirty years, there has been a consensus (at least in English-speaking countries) that reductionism is a mistake and that there are autonomous special sciences. This consensus has been based on an argument from multiple realizability. But Jaegwon Kim has argued persuasively that the multiple realizability argument is flawed.1 I will sketch the recent history of the debate, arguing that much --but not all--of the anti-reductionist consensus survives Kim's critique. This paper was originally titled "Anti-Reductionism Strikes Back", but in (...)
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  21. Ned Block (2008). Consciousness and Cognitive Access. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):289-317.
    This article concerns the interplay between two issues that involve both philosophy and neuroscience: whether the content of phenomenal consciousness is 'rich' or 'sparse', whether phenomenal consciousness goes beyond cognitive access, and how it would be possible for there to be evidence one way or the other.
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  22. Ned Block (2008). Phenomenal and Access Consciousness Ned Block and Cynthia MacDonald: Consciousness and Cognitive Access. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108:289 - 317.
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  23. Ned Block (2007). Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh Between Psychology and Neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):481--548.
    How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We can see the problem in stark form if we ask how we could tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their (...)
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  24. Ned Block (2007). Overflow, Access, and Attention. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):530-548.
    In this response to 32 commentators, I start by clarifying the overflow argument. I explain why the distinction between generic and specific phenomenology is important and why we are justified in acknowledging specific phenomenology in the overflow experiments. Other issues discussed are the relations among report, cognitive access, and attention; panpsychic disaster; the mesh between psychology and neuroscience; and whether consciousness exists.
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  25. Ned Block (2007). Wittgenstein and Qualia. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):73-115.
    (Wittgenstein, 1968) endorsed one kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis and rejected another. This paper argues that the kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis that Wittgenstein endorsed (the "innocuous" inverted spectrum hypothesis) is the thin end of the wedge that precludes a Wittgensteinian critique of the kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis he rejected (the "dangerous" kind). The danger of the dangerous kind is that it provides an argument for qualia, where qualia are (for the purposes of this paper) contents of (...)
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  26. Ned Block (2007). Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume. Oxford University Press.
    The first of a planned two-volume collection of Ned Block's writings on philosophy of mind; this volume treats consciousness, functionalism, and representation ...
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  27. Sid Kouider, Vincent de Gardelle, Emmanuel Dupoux & Ned Block (2007). Partial Awareness and the Illusion of Phenomenal Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):510-510.
    The dissociation Block provides between phenomenal and access consciousness (P-consciousness and A-consciousness) captures much of our intuition about conscious experience. However, it raises a major methodological puzzle, and is not uniquely supported by the empirical evidence. We provide an alternative interpretation based on the notion of levels of representation and partial awareness.
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  28. Rafael Malach & Ned Block (2007). The Measurement Problem in Consciousness Research. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):516-517.
    States of sensory absorption may offer a means to disentangle perception from report. Interestingly, such states lead to an antagonistic relationship between perceptual and cognitive-access networks, suggesting that perceptual awareness does not depend on a read-out by high order cognitive-access mechanisms. Rather, it may emerge internally, through a cooperative coding dynamics, whereby each neuron simultaneously represents and reads-out the perceptual awareness state.
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  29. Ned Block (2006). Max Black's Objection to Mind-Body Identity. Oxford Review of Metaphysics 3:3-78.
    considered an objection (Objection 3) that he says he thought was first put to him by Max Black. He says.
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  30. H. Belloc, J. Bentham & N. Block (2005). Alexander of Aphrodisias 282-93 Mantissa (Book 2 of On the Soul) 282-93 Ethical Problems 284 and Academic Scepticism 287-9. [REVIEW] In Christopher Gill (ed.), Virtue, Norms, and Objectivity: Issues in Ancient and Modern Ethics. Oxford University Press. 287--319.
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  31. N. Block (2005). Review of Action in Perception, by Alva Noë. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 102 (5).
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  32. Ned Block (2005). Area MT/V5 in a Bottle? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (2):46-52.
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  33. Ned Block (2005). Alva Noe¨: Action in Perception. Journal of Philosophy 102 (5).
     
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  34. Ned Block (2005). Bodily Sensations as an Obstacle for Representationism. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/Mit Press. 137-142.
    Representationism1, as I use the term, says that the phenomenal character of an experience just is its representational content, where that representational content can itself be understood and characterized without appeal to phenomenal character. Representationists seem to have a harder time handling pain than visual experience. (I say 'seem' because in my view, representationists cannot actually handle either type of experience successfully, but I will put that claim to one side here.) I will argue that Michael Tye's (2004) heroic attempt (...)
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  35. Ned Block (2005). Review of Alva Noe, Action in Perception. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 102:259-272.
    This is a charming and engaging book that combines careful attention to the phenomenology of experience with an appreciation of the psychology and neuroscience of perception. In some of its aimsfor example, to show problems with a rigid version of a view of visual perception as an inverse optics process of constructing a static 3-D representation from static 2-D information on the retina--it succeeds admirably. As No points out, vision is a process that depends on interactions between the perceiver and (...)
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  36. Ned Block (2005). The Merely Verbal Problem of Consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (6):270.
  37. Ned Block (2004). Consciousness. In R. L. Gregory (ed.), R. Gregory (ed.) Oxford Companion to the Mind, second edition 2004. Oxford University Press.
    There are two broad classes of empirical theories of consciousness, which I will call the biological and the functional. The biological approach is based on empirical correlations between experience and the brain. For example, there is a great deal of evidence that the neural correlate of visual experience is activity in a set of occipetotemporal pathways, with special emphasis on the infero-temporal cortex. The functionalist approach is a successor of behaviorism, the view that mentality can be seen as tendencies to (...)
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  38. Ned Block (2004). Qualia. In Richard L. Gregory (ed.), Oxford Companion to the Mind. Oxford University Press.
    Qualia include the ways things look, sound and smell, the way it feels to have a pain; more generally, what it's like to have mental states. Qualia are experiential properties of sensations, feelings, perceptions and, in my view, thoughts and desires as well. But, so defined, who could deny that qualia exist? Yet, the existence of qualia is controversial. Here is what is controversial: whether qualia, so defined, can be characterized in intentional, functional or purely (...)
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  39. Ned Block, Christof Koch & Phil Merikle (2004). Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness (ASSC) The ASSC William James Prize for Contributions to the Study of Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 13:211.
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  40. Ned Block (2003). Consciousness, Philosophical Issues About. In L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group.
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  41. Ned Block (2003). Do Causal Powers Drain Away. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):133-150.
    In this note, I will discuss one issue concerning the main argument of Mind in a Physical World (Kim, 1998), the Causal Exclusion Argument. The issue is whether it is a consequence of the Causal Exclusion Argument that all macro level causation (that is, causation above the level of fundamental physics) is an illusion, with all of the apparent causal powers of mental and other macro properties draining into the bottom level of physics. I will argue that such a consequence (...)
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  42. Ned Block (2003). Mental Paint. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. Mit Press. 165--200.
    The greatest chasm in the philosophy of mind--maybe even all of philosophy-- divides two perspectives on consciousness. The two perspectives differ on whether there is anything in the phenomenal character of conscious experience that goes beyond the intentional, the cognitive and the functional. A convenient terminological handle on the dispute is whether there are.
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  43. Ned Block (2003). Philosophical Issues About Consciousness. In L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group.
    There are a number of different matters that come under the heading of ‘consciousness’. One of them is phenomenality, the feeling of say a sensation of red or a pain, that is what it is like to have such a sensation or other experience. Another is reflection on phenomenality. Imagine two infants, both of which have pain, but only one of which has a thought about that pain. Both would have phenomenal states, but only the latter would have a state (...)
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  44. Ned Block (2003). Searle's Arguments Against Cognitive Science. In John M. Preston & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press. 70--79.
     
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  45. Ned Block (2003). Spatial Perception Via Tactile Sensation. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (7):285-286.
    I’m now looking at a soccer ball and a Nintendo Game Cube, and thus am having a perceptual experience of a sphere and a cube. My friend, blind from birth, (who’s helping me with the cleaning) is touching these items, and is thus having a perceptual experience of the same things. Not only are we perceiving the same items, but in doing so we apply the terms ‘sphere’ and ‘cube’, respectively, to them. Are we, in doing so, applying the same, (...)
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  46. Ned Block (2003). The Mind as Software in the Brain. In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oup Oxford.
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  47. Ned Block (2003). Tactile Sensation Via Spatial Perception. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (7):285-286.
  48. Ned Block (2002). A. G enera. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press. 206.
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  49. Ned Block (2002). Behaviorism Revisited. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):977-978.
    O'Regan and Noe declare that the qualitative character of experience is constituted by the nature of the sensorimotor contingencies at play when we perceive. Sensorimotor contingencies are a highly restricted set of input-output relations. The restriction excludes contingencies that don’t essentially involve perceptual systems. Of course if the ‘sensory’ in ‘sensorimotor’ were to be understood mentalistically, the thesis would not be of much interest, so I assume that these contingencies are to be understood non-mentalistically. Contrary to their view, experience is (...)
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  50. Ned Block (2002). Concepts of Consciousness. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings. OUP. 206-218.
     
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  51. Ned Block (2002). Some Concepts of Consciousness. In D. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. 206-219.
    Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different "consciousnesses". Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state.
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  52. Ned Block (2002). The Harder Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Philosophy 99 (8):391-425.
    consciousness comes about as a result of irritating nervous tissue, is just as unaccountable as the appearance of Djin when Aladdin rubbed his lamp.
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  53. N. Block (2001). Paradox and Cross Purposes in Recent Work on Consciousness. Cognition 79 (1-2):197-219.
    Dehaene and Naccache, Dennett and Jack and Shallice “see convergence coming from many different quarters on a version of the neuronal global workspace model†(Dennett, p. 1). (Boldface references are to papers in this volume.) On the contrary, even within this volume, there are commitments to very different perspectives on consciousness. And these differing perspectives are based on tacit differences in philosophical starting places that should be made explicit.  Indeed, it is not clear that different uses of “consciousness†and (...)
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  54. Ned Block (2001). How Not to Find the Neural Correlate of Consciousness. In João Branquinho (ed.), The Foundations of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1.
    There are two concepts of consciousness that are easy to confuse with one another, access-consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. However, just as the concepts of water and H2O are different concepts of the same thing, so the two concepts of consciousness may come to the same thing in the brain. The focus of this paper is on the problems that arise when these two concepts of consciousness are conflated. I will argue that John Searle’s reasoning about the function of consciousness goes (...)
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  55. Ned Block (2001). The Foundations of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  56. Ned Block (2000). Sexism, Racism, Ageism and the Nature of Consciousness. In Richard Moran, Alan Sidelle & Jennifer E. Whiting (eds.), The Philosophy of Sydney Shoemaker. University of Arkansas Press. 71--88.
    Everyone would agree that the American flag is red, white and blue. Everyone should also agree that it looks red, white and blue to people with normal color vision in appropriate circumstances. If a philosophical theory led to the conclusion that the red stripes cannot look red to both men and women, both blacks and whites, both young and old, we would be reluctant (to say the least) to accept that philosophical theory. But there is a widespread philosophical view about (...)
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  57. Ned Block (1999). Jack and Jill Have Shifted Spectra. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):946-947.
    There is reason to believe that people of different gender, race or age differ in spectra that are shifted relative to one another. Shifted spectra are not as dramatic as inverted spectra, but they can be used to make some of the same philosophical points.
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  58. Ned Block (1999). Ridiculing Social Constructivism About Phenomenal Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):199-201.
    Money is a cultural construction, leukemia is not. In which category does phenomenal consciousness fit? The issue is clarified by a distinction between what cultural phenomena causally influence and what culture constitutes. Culture affects phenomenal consciousness but it is ridiculous to suppose that culture constitutes it, even in part.
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  59. Ned Block (1999). Sexism, Ageism, Racism, and the Nature of Consciousness. Philosophical Topics 26 (1):39-70.
    If a philosophical theory led to the conclusion that the red stripes cannot look red to both men and women, both blacks and whites, both young and old, we would be reluctant (to say the least) to accept that philosophical theory. But there is a widespread philosophical view about the nature of conscious experience that, together with some empirical facts, suggests that color experience cannot be veridical for both men and women, both blacks and whites, both young and old.
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  60. Ned Block & Robert Stalnaker (1999). Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap. Philosophical Review 108 (1):1-46.
    The explanatory gap . Consciousness is a mystery. No one has ever given an account, even a highly speculative, hypothetical, and incomplete account of how a physical thing could have phenomenal states. (Nagel, 1974, Levine, 1983) Suppose that consciousness is identical to a property of the brain, say activity in the pyramidal cells of layer 5 of the cortex involving reverberatory circuits from cortical layer 6 to the thalamus and back to layers 4 and 6,as Crick and Koch have suggested (...)
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  61. Ned Block (1998). Conceptual Role Semantics. In Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge. 242-256.
    According to Conceptual Role Semantics ("CRS"), the meaning of a representation is the role of that representation in the cognitive life of the agent, e.g. in perception, thought and decision-making. It is an extension of the well known "use" theory of meaning, according to which the meaning of a word is its use in communication and more generally, in social interaction. CRS supplements external use by including the role of a symbol inside a computer or a brain. The uses appealed (...)
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  62. Ned Block (1998). How to Find the Neural Correlate of Consciousness. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. MIT Press. 23-34.
    same thing, so the two concepts of consciousness may come to the same thing in the brain. The focus of this paper is on the problems that arise when these two concepts of consciousness are conflated. I will argue that John Searle’s reasoning about the function of consciousness goes wrong because he conflates the two senses. And Francis Crick and Christof Koch fall afoul of the ambiguity in arguing that visual area V1 is not part of the neural correlate of (...)
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  63. Ned Block (1998). Is Experiencing Just Representing? [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):663-670.
    The first problem concerns the famous Swampman who comes into existence as a result of a cosmic accident in which particles from the swamp come together, forming a molecular duplicate of a typical human. Reasonable people can disagree on whether Swampman has intentional contents. Suppose that Swampman marries Swampwoman and they have children. Reasonable people will be inclined to agree that there is something it is like for Swampchild when "words" go through his mind or come out of his mouth. (...)
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  64. Ned Block (1998). Review: Is Experiencing Just Representing? [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):663 - 670.
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  65. Ned Block & Neil Manson (1998). Demystifying Consciousness. The Philosophers' Magazine 2 (2):36-39.
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  66. Ned Block & Gabriel Segal (1998). Philosophy 2: Further Through the Subject. New York: Oxford University Press.
     
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  67. Ned Block & Gabriel Segal (1998). The Philosophy of Psychology. In Philosophy 2: Further Through the Subject. New York: Oxford University Press.
     
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  68. N. Block (1997). Flanagan., O., Güzeldere, G. In Owen J. Flanagan, Ned Block & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness. Mit Press.
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  69. Ned Block (1997). Author's Response. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1).
    The distinction between phenomenal (P) and access (A) consciousness arises from the battle between biological and computational approaches to the mind. If P = A, the computationalists are right; but if not, the biological nature of P yields its scientific nature.
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  70. Ned Block (1997). Biology Versus Computation in the Study of Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):159-165.
    The distinction between phenomenal (P) and access (A) consciousness arises from the battle between biological and computational approaches to the mind. If P = A, the computationalists are right; but if not, the biological nature of P yields its scientific nature.
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  71. Ned Block (1997). Semantics, Conceptual Role. In [Book Chapter] (Unpublished). Routledge. 242--256.
    According to Conceptual Role Semantics ("CRS"), the meaning of a representation is the role of that representation in the cognitive life of the agent, e.g. in perception, thought and decision-making. It is an extension of the well known "use" theory of meaning, according to which the meaning of a word is its use in communication and more generally, in social interaction. CRS supplements external use by including the role of a symbol inside a computer or a brain. The uses appealed (...)
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  72. Ned Block, Owen J. Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere (eds.) (1997). The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. MIT Press.
    " -- "New Scientist" Intended for anyone attempting to find their way through the large and confusingly interwoven philosophical literature on consciousness, ...
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  73. Owen J. Flanagan, Ned Block & Guven Guzeldere (eds.) (1997). The Nature of Consciousness. MIT Press.
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  74. Andrew W. Young & Ned Block (1997). Consciousness. In V. Bruce (ed.), Unsolved Mysteries of the Mind: Tutorial Essays in Cognition. Taylor and Francis.
     
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  75. N. Block (1996). Anti-Reductionism Slaps Back: Mental Causation, Reduction and Supervenience. Philosophical Perspectives 11:107-132.
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  76. Ned Block (1996). How Heritability Misleads About Race. Boston Review 20 (6):30-35.
    According to The Bell Curve , Black Americans are genetically inferior to Whites. That's not the only point in Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray's book. They also argue that there is something called "general intelligence" which is measured by IQ tests, socially important, and 60 percent "heritable" within whites. (I'll explain heritability below.) But the claim about genetic inferiority is my target here. It has been subject to wide-ranging criticism since the book was first published last year. Those criticisms, however, (...)
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  77. Ned Block (1996). [Book Chapter] (Unpublished).
  78. Ned Block (1996). How Heritability Misleads About Race. In Bernard Boxill (ed.), Race and Racism (Oxford Readings in Philosophy). Oxford UP. 99-128.
    According to The Bell Curve, Black Americans are genetically inferior to Whites. That's not the only point in Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray's book. They also argue that there is something called "general intelligence" which is measured by IQ tests, socially important, and 60 percent "heritable" within whites. (I'll explain heritability below.) But the claim about genetic inferiority is my target here. It has been subject to wide-ranging criticism since the book was first published last year. Those criticisms, however, have (...)
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  79. Ned Block (1996). Holism, Mental and Semantic. In Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Mental (or semantic) holism is the doctrine that the identity of a belief content (or the meaning of a sentence that expresses it) is determined by its place in the web of beliefs or sentences comprising a whole theory or group of theories. It can be contrasted with two other views: atomism and molecularism. Molecularism characterizes meaning and content in terms of relatively small parts of the web in a way that allows many different theories to share those parts. For (...)
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  80. Ned Block (1996). How Not to Find the Neural Correlate of Consciousness. In João Branquinho (ed.), [Book Chapter] (Unpublished). Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1.
    There are two concepts of consciousness that are easy to confuse with one another, access-consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. However, just as the concepts of water and H2O are different concepts of the same thing, so the two concepts of consciousness may come to the same thing in the brain. The focus of this paper is on the problems that arise when these two concepts of consciousness are conflated. I will argue that John Searle’s reasoning about the function of consciousness goes (...)
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  81. Ned Block (1996). Holism, Mental and Semantic. In Edward Craig (ed.), [Book Chapter] (Unpublished). Routledge.
    Mental (or semantic) holism is the doctrine that the identity of a belief content (or the meaning of a sentence that expresses it) is determined by its place in the web of beliefs or sentences comprising a whole theory or group of theories. It can be contrasted with two other views: atomism and molecularism. Molecularism characterizes meaning and content in terms of relatively small parts of the web in a way that allows many different theories to share those parts. For (...)
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  82. Ned Block (1996). Mental Paint and Mental Latex. Philosophical Issues 7:19-49.
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  83. Ned Block (1996). What is Functionalism? In Donald M. Borchert (ed.), [Book Chapter]. MacMillan.
    What is Functionalism? Functionalism is one of the major proposals that have been offered as solutions to the mind/body problem. Solutions to the mind/body problem usually try to answer questions such as: What is the ultimate nature of the mental? At the most general level, what makes a mental state mental? Or more specifically, What do thoughts have in common in virtue of which they are thoughts? That is, what makes a thought a thought? What makes a pain a pain? (...)
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  84. S. Bir, N. Block, P. Bloom, C. Butcher, M. Hare & Y. Kareev (1995). Keil, FC, 129 Kelemen, D., 1 Lacoh6e, H., 31 Marcus, GF, 271 Mylander, C., 195. Cognition 56:285.
     
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  85. Ned Block (1995). An Argument for Holism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95:151-70.
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  86. Ned Block (1995). How Many Concepts of Consciousness? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):272.
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  87. Ned Block (1995). On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
    Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different "consciousnesses." Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state. The mark of access-consciousness, by contrast, is availability for use in reasoning and rationally guiding speech and action. These concepts are often partly or totally conflated, with bad results. This target article uses as an example a form of reasoning about a function of "consciousness" based on (...)
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  88. Ned Block (1995). Reply: Causation and Two Kinds of Laws. In Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Blackwell. 78--83.
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  89. Ned Block (1995). Ruritania Revisited. Philosophical Issues 6:171-187.
    Perhaps you are wondering what I mean by ‘holism’. After all, everyone seems to use the term in a different sense. Even if we restrict ourselves to holism of meaning and content, we have many different holisms. Some take holism about meaning to be the doctrine that if you’ve got one meaning, you’ve got lots of them.2 On other views, to say meaning is holistic is to say that the meaning of each term depends on the meanings of all or (...)
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  90. Ned Block (1995). The Mind as the Software of the Brain. In Daniel N. Osherson, Lila Gleitman, Stephen M. Kosslyn, S. Smith & Saadya Sternberg (eds.), An Invitation to Cognitive Science. MIT Press. 170--185.
    In this section, we will start with an influential attempt to define `intelligence', and then we will move to a consideration of how human intelligence is to be investigated on the machine model. The last part of the section will discuss the relation between the mental and the biological.
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  91. Ned Block (1995). What is Dennett's Theory a Theory Of? Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2):23-40.
    A convenient locus of discussion is provided by Dennett.
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  92. Ned Block (1994). Two Kinds of Laws. In C. Macdonald & G. Macdonald (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Oxford University Press.
     
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  93. Ned Block (1993). Holism, Hyper-Analyticity and Hyper-Compositionality. Mind and Language 8 (1):1-26.
  94. Ned Block (1993). 11 Troubles with Functionalism. In Alvin Goldman (ed.), Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Cambridge: Mit Press. 231.
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  95. Ned Block (1992). Begging the Question Against Phenomenal Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):205-206.
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  96. Ned Block (1992). Le fonctionnalisme face au problème Des qualia. Les Etudes Philosophiques (3):337-369.
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  97. Patrick Hayes, Stevan Harnad, Donald R. Perlis & Ned Block (1992). Virtual Symposium on Virtual Mind. Minds and Machines 2 (3):217-238.
    When certain formal symbol systems (e.g., computer programs) are implemented as dynamic physical symbol systems (e.g., when they are run on a computer) their activity can be interpreted at higher levels (e.g., binary code can be interpreted as LISP, LISP code can be interpreted as English, and English can be interpreted as a meaningful conversation). These higher levels of interpretability are called "virtual" systems. If such a virtual system is interpretable as if it had a mind, is such a "virtual (...)
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  98. Ned Block (1991). Evidence Against Epiphenomenalism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):670-672.
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  99. Ned Block (1991). What Narrow Content is Not. In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.
     
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  100. Ned Block (1990). Consciousness and Accessibility. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):596-598.
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  101. Ned Block (1990). Inverted Earth. Philosophical Perspectives 4:53-79.
  102. Ned Block (1990). The Computer Model of Mind. In Daniel N. Osherson & Edward E. Smith (eds.), An Invitation to Cognitive Science. MIT Press.
  103. Ned Block, Richard Boyd, Robert Butts, Ronald Giere, Clark Glymour, Adolf Grunbaum, Erwin Hiebert, Colin Howson, David Hull & Paul Humphreys (1990). Consensus Institute Staff. In C. Wade Savage (ed.), Scientific Theories. University of Minnesota Press. 417.
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  104. David Pesetsky & Ned Block (1990). Complexity and Adaptation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):750-752.
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  105. Ned Block (1989). Can the Mind Change the World? In George S. Boolos (ed.), Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam. Cambridge University Press. 137--170.
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  106. Ned Block (1988). Functional Role and Truth Conditions. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61:157-181.
  107. Ned Block (1986). Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):615-78.
  108. Ned Block (1983). Mental Pictures and Cognitive Science. Philosophical Review 93 (October):499-542.
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  109. Ned Block (1983). Resemblance and Imaginal Representation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):142.
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  110. Ned Block (1983). The Photographic Fallacy in the Debate About Mental Imagery. Noûs 17 (November):651-62.
    There has been considerable debate among philosophers and psychol- ogists about whether the internal representations of imagery represent in the manner of pictures or in the manner of language. One side, pictorialism,holds that an internal imagery representation of Reagan is like a picture of Reagan. The other side, descriptionalism,holds that an internal imagery representation of Reagan is more like a string of words denoting or describing Reagan. My aim here is to expose a widespread fallacy on the part of the (...)
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  111. Ned Block (1983). Mental Pictures and Cognitive Science. Philosophical Review 92 (4):499--542.
    Such claims are part 0f a viewpoint according t0 which mental images represent in thc manner of pictures. It is very natural t0 think that such claims are confused or nonsensical. One of my purposes here is a limited dcfcnsc of this supposedly confused doctrine, especially against its chief cognitive science rival. But this..
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  112. Ned Block (ed.) (1981). Imagery. MIT Press.
     
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  113. Ned Block (1981). Psychologism and Behaviorism. Philosophical Review 90 (1):5-43.
    Let psychologism be the doctrine that whether behavior is intelligent behavior depends on the character of the internal information processing that produces it. More specifically, I mean psychologism to involve the doctrine that two systems could have actual and potential behavior _typical_ of familiar intelligent beings, that the two systems could be exactly alike in their actual and potential behavior, and in their behavioral dispositions and capacities and counterfactual behavioral properties (i.e., what behaviors, behavioral dispositions, and behavioral capacities they would (...)
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  114. Ned Block (ed.) (1981). Readings In Philosophy Of Psychology, V. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and ... V. Influence of imaged pictures and sounds on detection of visual and auditory signals. ...
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  115. Ned Block (1980). Are Absent Qualia Impossible? Philosophical Review 89 (2):257-74.
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  116. Ned Block (1980). Functionalism. In , Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology.
    What is Functionalism? Functionalism is one of the major proposals that have been offered as solutions to the mind/body problem. Solutions to the mind/body problem usually try to answer questions such as: What is the ultimate nature of the mental? At the most general level, what makes a mental state mental? Or more specifically, What do thoughts have in common in virtue of which they are thoughts? That is, what makes a thought a thought? What makes a pain a pain? (...)
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  117. Ned Block (ed.) (1980). Readings In Philosophy Of Psychology. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    ... PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY is the study of conceptual issues in psychology. For the most part, these issues fall equally well in psychology as in ...
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  118. Ned Block (1980). What Intuitions About Homunculi Don't Show. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):425.
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  119. Ned Block & Sylvain Bromberger (1980). States' Rights. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):73.
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  120. Ned Block & Jerry A. Fodor (1980). They Are Type Identical. 1 One Thing That Currently Fashionable Theories in the Philosophy of Mind Often Try to Do is Characterize the Conditions for Type Identity of Psychological States. For. [REVIEW] In , Readings in Philosophy of Psychology. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1--237.
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  121. Ned Block (1979). A Confusion About Innateness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2 (1):27-29.
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  122. N. Block (1978). (1980). In Ned Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. , Vol. 1.
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  123. Ned Block (ed.) (1978). Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. , Vol.
  124. Ned Block (1978). Straw Materialism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (3):347.
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  125. Ned Block (1978). Troubles with Functionalism. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9:261-325.
    The functionalist view of the nature of the mind is now widely accepted. Like behaviorism and physicalism, functionalism seeks to answer the question "What are mental states?" I shall be concerned with identity thesis formulations of functionalism. They say, for example, that pain is a functional state, just as identity thesis formulations of physicalism say that pain is a physical state.
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  126. Ned Block & Jerry A. Fodor (1972). What Psychological States Are Not. Philosophical Review 81 (April):159-81.
  127. Ned Block (1971). Are Mechanistic and Teleological Explanations of Behaviour Incompatible? Philosophical Quarterly 21 (April):109-117.
  128. Cristoph Koch & Ned Block, Marshall M. Weinberg Conference: The Future of Cognitive Science - Friday Afternoon (Oct. 17, 2008) Session: Christoph Koch and Ned Block. [REVIEW]
    Six leading experts speak about the future of cognitive science.
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