Susanna Siegel Harvard University
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  1. S. Siegel (forthcoming). Forthcoming. The Phenomenology of Efficacy. Philosophical Topics.
     
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  2. Susanna Siegel (forthcoming). Epistemic Charge. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.
    I give some reasons to think that perceptual experiences redound on the rational standing of the subject, and explore the consequences of this idea for the global structure of justification.
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  3. Susanna Siegel (forthcoming). The Contents of Experience. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
     
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  4. Susanna Siegel & Alex Byrne (forthcoming). Rich or Thin? In Bence Nanay (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception. Routledge
    Siegel and Byrne debate whether perceptual experiences present rich properties or exclusively thin properties.
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  5. Susanna Siegel & Nicholas Silins (forthcoming). Attention and Perceptual Justification. In Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Festschrift for Ned Block. MIT Press
  6. Susanna Siegel (2016). How Is Wishful Seeing Like Wishful Thinking? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1).
    This paper makes the case that when wishful thinking ill-founds belief, the belief depends on the desire in ways can be recapitulated at the level of perceptual experience. The relevant kinds of desires include motivations, hopes, preferences, and goals. I distinguish between two modes of dependence of belief on desire in wishful thinking: selective or inquiry-related, and responsive or evidence-related. I offers a theory of basing on which beliefs are badly-based on desires, due to patterns of dependence that can found (...)
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  7. Zoe Jenkin & Susanna Siegel (2015). Cognitive Penetrability: Modularity, Epistemology, and Ethics. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):531-545.
    Introduction to Special Issue of Review of Philosophy and Psychology. Overview of the central issues in cognitive architecture, epistemology, and ethics surrounding cognitive penetrability. Special issue includes papers by philosophers and psychologists: Gary Lupyan, Fiona Macpherson, Reginald Adams, Anya Farennikova, Jona Vance, Francisco Marchi, Robert Cowan.
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  8.  5
    John Michael, Anika Fiebich, Susanna Siegel & Zoe Jenkin (2015). Animal Mental Action: Planning Among Chimpanzees. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):745-760.
    I offer an argument for what mental action may be like in nonhuman animals. Action planning is a type of mental action that involves a type of intention. Some intentions are the causal mental antecedents of proximal mental actions, and some intentions are the causal mental antecedents of distal mental actions. The distinction between these two types of “plan-states” is often spelled out in terms of mental content. The prominent view is that while proximal mental actions are caused by mental (...)
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  9.  6
    John Michael, Anika Fiebich, Susanna Siegel & Zoe Jenkin (2015). Cognitive Penetrability and Ethical Perception. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):665-682.
    In recent years there has been renewed philosophical interest in the thesis that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable, i.e., roughly, the view that the contents and/or character of a subject’s perceptual experience can be modified by what a subject believes and desires. As has been widely noted, it is plausible that cognitive penetration has implications for perception’s epistemic role. On the one hand, penetration could make agents insensitive to the world in a way which epistemically ‘downgrades’ their experience. On the (...)
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  10.  4
    John Michael, Anika Fiebich, Susanna Siegel & Zoe Jenkin (2015). Cognitive Penetration and the Tribunal of Experience. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):641-663.
    Perception purports to help you gain knowledge of the world even if the world is not the way you expected it to be. Perception also purports to be an independent tribunal against which you can test your beliefs. It is natural to think that in order to serve these and other central functions, perceptual representations must not causally depend on your prior beliefs and expectations. In this paper, I clarify and then argue against the natural thought above. All perceptual systems (...)
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  11. John Michael, Anika Fiebich, Susanna Siegel & Zoe Jenkin (2015). Cognitive Penetration and Predictive Coding: A Commentary on Lupyan. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):571-584.
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  12.  1
    John Michael, Anika Fiebich, Susanna Siegel & Zoe Jenkin (2015). Cognitive Penetrability of Perception in the Age of Prediction: Predictive Systems Are Penetrable Systems. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):547-569.
    The goal of perceptual systems is to allow organisms to adaptively respond to ecologically relevant stimuli. Because all perceptual inputs are ambiguous, perception needs to rely on prior knowledge accumulated over evolutionary and developmental time to turn sensory energy into information useful for guiding behavior. It remains controversial whether the guidance of perception extends to cognitive states or is locked up in a “cognitively impenetrable” part of perception. I argue that expectations, knowledge, and task demands can shape perception at multiple (...)
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  13.  1
    John Michael, Anika Fiebich, Susanna Siegel & Zoe Jenkin (2015). Cognitive Penetrability of Social Perception: A Case for Emotion Recognition. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):617-620.
    Adams & Kveraga argue that social visual perception is cognitively penetrable by extending a top-down model for visual object recognition to visual perception of social cues. Here I suggest that, in their view, a clear link between the top-down contextual influences that modulate social visual perception and the perceptual experience of a subject is missing. Without such a link their proposal is consistent with explanations that need not involve cognitive penetration of perceptual experience but only modifications of perceptual judgments formed (...)
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  14.  4
    John Michael, Anika Fiebich, Susanna Siegel & Zoe Jenkin (2015). Epistemic Akrasia and Mental Agency. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):827-842.
    In this work, I argue for the possibility of epistemic akrasia. An individual S is epistemically akratic if the following conditions hold: S knowingly believes that P though she judges that it is epistemically wrong to do so and Having these mental states displays a failure of rationality that is analogous to classic akrasia. I propose two different types of epistemic akrasia involving different kinds of evidence on which the subject bases her evaluation of her akratic belief. I examine three (...)
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  15.  6
    John Michael, Anika Fiebich, Susanna Siegel & Zoe Jenkin (2015). Focused Daydreaming and Mind-Wandering. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):791-813.
    In this paper, I describe and discuss two mental phenomena which are somewhat neglected in the philosophy of mind: focused daydreaming and mind-wandering. My aim is to show that their natures are rather distinct, despite the fact that we tend to classify both as instances of daydreaming. The first difference between the two, I argue, is that, while focused daydreaming is an instance of imaginative mental agency, mind-wandering is not—though this does not mean that mind-wandering cannot involve mental agency at (...)
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  16.  3
    John Michael, Anika Fiebich, Susanna Siegel & Zoe Jenkin (2015). Is Willpower Just Another Way of Tying Oneself to the Mast? Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):779-790.
    This paper argues against the intuition that willpower and so called ‘tying to the mast’ strategies are fundamentally different types of mental actions to achieve self control. The argument for this surprising claim is that at least on the most plausible account of willpower an act of willpower consists in an intentional mental action that disables the mental agent and thereby creates a mental tie. The paper then defends this claim against the objection that tying to the mast strategies do (...)
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  17.  4
    John Michael, Anika Fiebich, Susanna Siegel & Zoe Jenkin (2015). Mental Activity & the Sense of Ownership. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):881-896.
    I introduce and defend the notion of a cognitive account of the sense of ownership. A cognitive account of the sense of ownership holds that one experiences something as one's own only if one thinks of something as one's own. By contrast, a phenomenal account of the sense of ownership holds that one can experience something as one's own without thinking about anything as one's own. I argue that we have no reason to favour phenomenal accounts over cognitive accounts, that (...)
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  18.  6
    John Michael, Anika Fiebich, Susanna Siegel & Zoe Jenkin (2015). Mental Agency as Self-Regulation. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):815-825.
    The article proposes a novel approach to mental agency that is inspired by Victoria McGeer’s work on self-regulation. The basic idea is that certain mental acts leave further work to be done for an agent to be considered an authoritative self-ascriber of corresponding dispositional mental states. First, we discuss Richard Moran’s account of avowals, which grounds first-person authority in deliberative, self-directed agency. Although this view is promising, we argue that it ultimately fails to confront the empirical gap between occurrent judgments (...)
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  19.  6
    John Michael, Anika Fiebich, Susanna Siegel & Zoe Jenkin (2015). Nowhere and Everywhere: The Causal Origin of Voluntary Action. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):761-778.
    The idea that intentions make the difference between voluntary and non-voluntary behaviors is simple and intuitive. At the same time, we lack an understanding of how voluntary actions actually come about, and the unquestioned appeal to intentions as discrete causes of actions offers little if anything in the way of an answer. We cite evidence suggesting that the origin of actions varies depending on context and effector, and argue that actions emerge from a causal web in the brain, rather than (...)
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  20.  2
    John Michael, Anika Fiebich, Susanna Siegel & Zoe Jenkin (2015). Perception of Absence and Penetration From Expectation. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):621-640.
    I argue that perception of absence presents a top-down effect from expectations on perception, but then show that this cognitive effect is atypical and indirect. This calls into question usefulness of some of the existing notions of cognitive penetrability of perception and generates new questions about indirect cognitive influences on perception.
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  21.  3
    John Michael, Anika Fiebich, Susanna Siegel & Zoe Jenkin (2015). Relations Between Agency and Ownership in the Case of Schizophrenic Thought Insertion and Delusions of Control. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):865-879.
    This article addresses questions about the sense of agency and its distinction from the sense of ownership in the context of understanding schizophrenic thought insertion. In contrast to “standard” approaches that identify problems with the sense of agency as central to thought insertion, two recent proposals argue that it is more correct to think that the problem concerns the subject’s sense of ownership. This view involves a “more demanding” concept of the sense of ownership that, I will argue, ultimately depends (...)
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  22.  4
    John Michael, Anika Fiebich, Susanna Siegel & Zoe Jenkin (2015). Reply to Macpherson: Further Illustrations of the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):585-589.
    My reply to Macpherson begins by addressing whether it is effects of cognition on early vision or perceptual performance that I am interested in. I proceed to address Macpherson’s comments on evidence from cross-modal effects, interpretations of linguistic effects on image detection, evidence from illusions, and the usefulness of predictive coding for understanding cognitive penetration. By stressing the interactive and distributed nature of neural processing, I am committing to a collapse between perception and cognition. Following such a collapse, the very (...)
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  23.  1
    John Michael, Anika Fiebich, Susanna Siegel & Zoe Jenkin (2015). Social Vision: Breaking a Philosophical Impasse? Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):611-615.
    I argue that findings in support of Adams and Kveraga’s functional forecast model of emotion expression processing help settle the debate between rich and sparse views of the content of perceptual experience. In particular, I argue that these results in social vision suggest that the distinctive phenomenal character of experiences involving high-level properties such as emotions and social traits is best explained by their being visually experienced as opposed to being brought about by perceptual judgments.
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  24.  1
    John Michael, Anika Fiebich, Susanna Siegel & Zoe Jenkin (2015). Social Vision: Functional Forecasting and the Integration of Compound Social Cues. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):591-610.
    For decades the study of social perception was largely compartmentalized by type of social cue: race, gender, emotion, eye gaze, body language, facial expression etc. This was partly due to good scientific practice, and partly due to assumptions that each type of social cue was functionally distinct from others. Herein, we present a functional forecast approach to understanding compound social cue processing that emphasizes the importance of shared social affordances across various cues. We review the traditional theories of emotion and (...)
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  25.  2
    John Michael, Anika Fiebich, Susanna Siegel & Zoe Jenkin (2015). Time and Action: Impulsivity, Habit, Strategy. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):717-743.
    Granting that various mental events might form the antecedents of an action, what is the mental event that is the proximate cause of action? The present article reconsiders the methodology for addressing this question: Intention and its varieties cannot be properly analyzed if one ignores the evolutionary constraints that have shaped action itself, such as the trade-off between efficient timing and resources available, for a given stake. On the present proposal, three types of action, impulsive, routine and strategic, are designed (...)
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  26.  2
    John Michael, Anika Fiebich, Susanna Siegel & Zoe Jenkin (2015). There Are No Primitive We-Intentions. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):695-715.
    John Searle’s account of collective intentions in action appears to have all the theoretical pros of the non-reductivist view on collective intentionality without the metaphysical cons of committing to the existence of group minds. According to Searle, when we collectively intend to do something together, we intend to cooperate in order to reach a collective goal. Intentions in the first-person plural form therefore have a particular psychological form or mode, for the we-intender conceives of his or her intended actions as (...)
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  27.  3
    John Michael, Anika Fiebich, Susanna Siegel & Zoe Jenkin (2015). Why Change the Subject? On Collective Epistemic Agency. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):843-864.
    This paper argues that group attitudes can be assessed in terms of standards of rationality and that group-level rationality need not be due to individual-level rationality. But it also argues that groups cannot be collective epistemic agents and are not collectively responsible for collective irrationality. I show that we do not need the concept of collective epistemic agency to explain how group-level irrationality can arise. Group-level irrationality arises because even rational individuals can fail to reason about how their attitudes will (...)
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  28. Susanna Siegel (2015). Epistemic Evaluability and Perceptual Farce. In A. Raftopoulos (ed.), Cognitive Effects on Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford
  29.  22
    Susanna Siegel (2015). XV—Epistemic Charge. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3 pt 3):277-306.
    It is often assumed that while beliefs redound on the rational standing of a subject, perceptions do not. An irrational belief detracts from the rationality of believers, according to this assumption, but perceptions cannot do the same. I argue that perceptual experiences can have a rational standing, and that their epistemic status can be modulated by other psychological states that help produce them. Drawing on a metaphor from electricity, I call the epistemic status that perceptual experiences can have ‘epistemic charge'.
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  30. Susanna Siegel & Nicholas Silins (2015). The Epistemology of Perception. In Mohan Matthen (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception. Oxford
    An overview of the epistemology of perception, covering the nature of justification, immediate justification, the relationship between the metaphysics of perceptual experience and its rational role, the rational role of attention, and cognitive penetrability. The published version will contain a smaller bibliography, due to space constraints in the volume.
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  31. Susanna Siegel (2014). Affordances and the Contents of Perception. In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content? Oxford 39-76.
  32. Nicholas Silins & Susanna Siegel (2014). Consciousness, Attention, and Justification. In Elia Zardini & Dylan Dodd (eds.), Contemporary Perspectives on Scepticism and Perceptual Jusification. Oxford University Press
    We discuss the rational role of highly inattentive experiences, and argue that they can provide rational support for beliefs.
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  33. Ned Block & Susanna Siegel (2013). Attention and Perceptual Adaptation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):205-206.
  34. Susanna Siegel (2013). Are There Edenic Grounds of Perceptual Intentionality? Analysis 73 (2):329-344.
    This is a critical piece on *The Character of Consciousness* by David Chalmers. It focuses on Chalmers's two-stage view of perceptual content and the epistemology of perceptual belief that flows from this theory, and criticizes his theories of Edenic concepts, perceptual acquaintance, and perceptual belief.
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  35. Susanna Siegel (2013). Can Selection Effects on Experience Influence its Rational Role? In Tamar Gendler (ed.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology volume 4. Oxford 240.
    I distinguish between two kinds of selection effects on experience: selection of objects or features for experience, and anti-selection of experiences for cognitive uptake. I discuss the idea that both kinds of selection effects can lead to a form of confirmation bias at the level of perception, and argue that when this happens, selection effects can influence the rational role of experience.
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  36.  31
    Susanna Siegel (2013). Erratum To: Precis of The Contents of Visual Experience. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 163 (3):817-817.
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  37.  26
    Susanna Siegel (2013). Erratum To: Precis of The Contents of Visual Experience. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):817-817.
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  38.  74
    Susanna Siegel (2013). Precise of The Contents of Visual Experience. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):813-816.
  39.  30
    Susanna Siegel (2013). Precise of The Contents of Visual Experience. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):813-816.
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  40.  89
    Susanna Siegel (2013). Reply to Campbell. Philosophical Studies 163 (3).
    Reply to John Campbell's contribution to a symposium on *The Contents of Visual Experience*.
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  41.  62
    Susanna Siegel (2013). Replies to Campbell, Prinz, and Travis. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):847-865.
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  42. Susanna Siegel (2013). Reply to Fumerton, Huemer, and McGrath. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):749-757.
    Fumerton, Huemer, and McGrath each contributed to a symposium on "The Epistemic Impact of the Etiology of Experience" in Philosophical Studies. These are my replies their contributions.
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  43. Susanna Siegel (2013). Reply to Prinz. Philosophical Studies 163 (3).
    Reply to Jesse Prinz's contribution to a symposium on *The Contents of Visual Experience*.
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  44. Susanna Siegel (2013). Reply to Travis. Philosophical Studies 163 (3).
    Reply to Charles Travis's contribution to a symposium on *The Contents of Visual Experience*.
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  45. Susanna Siegel (2013). The Epistemic Impact of the Etiology of Experience. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):697-722.
    In this paper I offer a theory of what makes certain influences on visual experiences by prior mental states (including desires, beliefs, moods, and fears) reduce the justificatory force of those experiences. The main idea is that experiences, like beliefs, can have rationally assessable etiologies, and when those etiologies are irrational, the experiences are epistemically downgraded.
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  46. Susanna Siegel (2012). Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification. Noûs 46 (2):201-222.
    In this paper I argue that it's possible that the contents of some visual experiences are influenced by the subject's prior beliefs, hopes, suspicions, desires, fears or other mental states, and that this possibility places constraints on the theory of perceptual justification that 'dogmatism' or 'phenomenal conservativism' cannot respect.
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  47. Susanna Siegel (2012). The Contents of Visual Experience. Oxford University Press Usa.
    What do we see? We are visually conscious of colors and shapes, but are we also visually conscious of complex properties such as being John Malkovich? In this book, Susanna Siegel develops a framework for understanding the contents of visual experience, and argues that these contents involve all sorts of complex properties. Siegel starts by analyzing the notion of the contents of experience, and by arguing that theorists of all stripes should accept that experiences have contents. She then introduces a (...)
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  48. S. Siegel (2010). The Weak Content View. In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press
     
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  49. Susanna Siegel (2010). Do Visual Experiences Have Contents? In Bence -Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford
  50.  72
    Susanna Siegel (2010). The Contents of Visual Experience. Oxford.
    In this book, Susanna Siegel develops a framework for understanding the contents of visual experience, and argues that these contents involve all sorts of ...
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  51. Susanna Siegel (2009). The Visual Experience of Causation. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):519-540.
    In this paper I argue that causal relations between objects are represented in visual experience, and contrast my argument and its conclusion with Michotte's results from the 1960's.
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  52. Tamar Gendler, Susanna Siegel & Steven M. Cahn (eds.) (2008). The Elements of Philosophy: Readings From Past and Present. Oxford University Press.
    The Elements of Philosophy: Readings from Past and Present is a comprehensive collection of historical and contemporary readings across the major fields of philosophy. With depth and quality, this introductory anthology offers a selection of readings that is both extensive and expansive; the readings span twenty-five centuries. They are organized topically into five parts: Religion and Belief, Moral and Political Philosophy, Metaphysics and Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind and Language, and Life and Death. The product of the collaboration of three highly (...)
     
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  53.  15
    S. Siegel, R. Dittrich & J. Vollmann (2008). Ethical Opinions and Personal Attitudes of Young Adults Conceived by in Vitro Fertilisation. Journal of Medical Ethics 34 (4):236-240.
    Background: Today in vitro fertilisation is a widespread and important technique of reproductive medicine. When the technique was first used, it was considered ethically controversial. This is the first study conducted of adult IVF-offspring in order to learn about their ethical opinions and personal attitudes towards this medical technology.Methods: We recruited the participants from the first cases of in vitro fertilisation in Germany at the Gynaecological Clinic of the University Hospital Erlangen. Our qualitative interview study consisted of in-depth, face-to-face interviews (...)
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  54. Susanna Siegel (2008). The Epistemic Conception of Hallucination. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action and Knowledge. Oxford University Press 205--224.
    Early formulations of disjunctivism about perception refused to give any positive account of the nature of hallucination, beyond the uncontroversial fact that they can in some sense seem to the same to the subject as veridical perceptions. Recently, some disjunctivists have attempt to account for hallucination in purely epistemic terms, by developing detailed account of what it is for a hallucinaton to be indiscriminable from a veridical perception. In this paper I argue that the prospects for purely epistemic treatments of (...)
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  55. Alex Byrne, David Hilbert & Susanna Siegel (2007). Do We See More Than We Can Access? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (5-6):501-502.
    Short commentary on a paper by Ned Block.
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  56. Susanna Siegel (2007). How Can We Discover the Contents of Experience? Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (S1):127-42.
    In this paper I discuss several proposals for how to find out which contents visual experiences have, and I defend the method I.
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  57. Tamar Szabo Gendler, Susanna Siegel & Steven M. Cahn (eds.) (2007). The Elements of Philosophy: Readings From Past and Present. Oxford University Press Usa.
    The Elements of Philosophy: Readings from Past and Present offers an extensive collection of classic and contemporary readings, organized topically into five main sections: Religion and Belief, Moral and Political Philosophy, Metaphysics and Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind and Language, and Life and Death. Within these broad areas, readings are arranged in clusters that address both traditional issues--such as the existence of God, justice and the state, knowledge and skepticism, and free will--and contemporary topics--including God and science, just war theory, vegetarianism, (...)
     
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  58.  55
    Michael Glanzberg & Susanna Siegel (2006). Presupposition and Policing in Complex Demonstratives. Noûs 40 (1):1–42.
    In this paper, we offer a theory of the role of the nominal in complex demonstrative expressions, such as 'this dog' or 'that glove with a hole in it'.
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  59. Susanna Siegel (2006). Direct Realism and Perceptual Consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):378-410.
    In The Problem of Perception, A.D. Smith’s central aim is to defend the view that we can directly perceive ordinary objects, such as cups, keys and the like.1 The book is organized around the two arguments that Smith considers to be serious threats to the possibility of direct perception: the argument from illusion, and the argument from hallucination. The argument from illusion threatens this possibility because it concludes that indirect realism is true. Indirect realism is the view that we perceive (...)
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  60. Susanna Siegel (2006). How Does Phenomenology Constrain Object-Seeing? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):429 – 441.
    Perception provides a form of contact with the world and the other people in it. For example, we can learn that Franco is sitting in his chair by seeing Franco; we can learn that his hair is gray by seeing the colour of his hair. Such perception enables us to understand primitive forms of language, such as demonstrative expressions.
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  61. Susanna Siegel (2006). Subject and Object in the Contents of Visual Experience. Philosophical Review 115 (3):355--88.
    In this paper, I argue that certain perceptual relations are represented in visual experience.
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  62. Susanna Siegel (2006). Which Properties Are Represented in Perception? In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press 481--503.
    In discussions of perception and its relation to knowledge, it is common to distinguish what one comes to believe on the basis of perception from the distinctively perceptual basis of one's belief. The distinction can be drawn in terms of propositional contents: there are the contents that a perceiver comes to believe on the basis of her perception, on the one hand; and there are the contents properly attributed to perception itself, on the other. Consider the content.
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  63. Susanna Siegel, The Contents of Perception. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    This is the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on the contents of perception.
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  64.  75
    Susanna Siegel (2005). The Phenomenology of Efficacy. Philosophical Topics 33 (1):265-84.
    In this paper I argue that certain type of first-personal causal property, efficacy, is represented in perceptual experience.
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  65.  58
    S. Siegel (2004). Review of John Campbell's "Reference and Consciousness". [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 113 (3):427-431.
  66. Susanna Siegel (2004). Indiscriminability and the Phenomenal. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):91-112.
    In this paper, I describe and criticize M.G.F. Martin's version of disjunctivism, and his argument for it from premises about self-knowledge.
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  67.  18
    Susanna Siegel (2004). Review of Reference and Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 113 (3):427-431.
  68.  23
    Susanna Siegel (2004). Reference and Consciousness. Philosophical Review 113 (3):427-431.
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  69.  88
    Susanna Siegel, The Dog and the Zombie.
  70.  24
    S. Siegel (2002). A Theory of Sentience. Philosophical Review 111 (1):135-138.
  71.  52
    Susanna Siegel (2002). Review of A Theory of Sentience, by Austen Clark. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 111 (1).
    First, what it is for a sentient being to sense is for it to employ two distinct capacities: one for representing places-at-times; the other for representing "features" (60, cf. 70). Exercised together, the result is akin to feature-placing, which brings us to the second thesis: what sensory systems represent is that features are instantiated at place-times. Accordingly, sensory systems do not, for instance, attribute properties to objects, such as trees, tables, bodies, or persons (163).
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  72. Susanna Siegel (2002). The Role of Perception in Demonstrative Reference. Philosophers' Imprint 2 (1):1-21.
    Siegel defends "Limited Intentionism", a theory of what secures the semantic reference of uses of bare demonstratives ("this", "that" and their plurals). According to Limited Intentionism, demonstrative reference is fixed by perceptually anchored intentions on the part of the speaker.
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  73. L. G. Allan & S. Siegel (1997). Assessing a New Analysis of the McCollough Effect. Cognition 64:207-222.
     
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  74. S. Petry & S. Siegel (1989). Differential Processing of Subjective Contour Brightness and Sharpness. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 27 (6):518-518.
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  75. Lg Allan, S. Siegel & G. Macqueen (1987). Color Contingent on Words. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 25 (5):339-339.
     
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  76. J. Macrae & S. Siegel (1987). Different Effects of Morphine in Self-Administering and Yoked-Control Rats. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 25 (5):345-345.
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  77.  82
    Susanna Siegel, Dialogue About Philosophy in Spanish.
    This is a compilations of short talks presented at a workshop held at Harvard in April 14 on the life of analytic philosophy today in Spanish. Authors include Susanna Siegel, Diana Acosta and Patricia Marechal, Diana Perez, Laura Pérez, and Josefa Toribio.
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  78. Susanna Siegel, Misperception.
    In discussions of perception and its provision of knowledge, it is common to distinguish what one comes to believe on the basis of perception from the distinctively perceptual basis of one's belief. The distinction can be drawn in terms of propositional contents: there are the contents that a perceiver would normally come to believe on the basis of her perception, on the one hand; and there are the contents properly attributed to perception itself, on the other. Consider the content.
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  79.  50
    Susanna Siegel, The Contents of Consciousness.
    A short overview of the philosophical significance of perceptual contents.
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