| Question | Answer | Comments | |
| A priori knowledge: yes or no? | Accept: yes | As an evolved cognitive/behavioral trait | |
| Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism? | Accept an intermediate view | 1) If the formal organization of the world is contingent, materialism is false
2) Strictly speaking Plato himself thinks there is only ONE form, everybody always gets this wrong | |
| Aesthetic value: objective or subjective? | There is no fact of the matter | Same as ethical value - value is value | |
| Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no? | Accept: no | | |
| Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism? | Lean toward: externalism | | |
| External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism? | Accept: non-skeptical realism | Just a big fat pseudoproblem: Wittgenstein on limits of language | |
| Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will? | Accept: compatibilism | You have to be somebody (concrete) to be an agent. No cause, or randomness, does not get "freedom" Freedom is paradoxical this way. Locke | |
| God: theism or atheism? | Accept: atheism | Except that I think the formal organization of the world defeats materialism, but that can be a secular fact I think | |
| Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism? | Accept both | "mind" is a heterogenous concept | |
| Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism? | Accept: invariantism | Only game in town | |
| Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean? | Accept: non-Humean | But I don't think that Hume is a Humean either... | |
| Logic: classical or non-classical? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
| Mental content: internalism or externalism? | Accept: externalism | Intentional predicates are made of whole persons. There is no "mental content" | |
| Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism? | Lean toward: moral realism | But it's true there would be no value if there were no beings that had experiences that are good/bad | |
| Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism? | Accept: naturalism | This is a pseudoproblem | |
| Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism? | Accept: physicalism | With Aristotelean provisos, see earlier answers: all instantiations of types are physical tokens: maybe nonreductive materialism version of functionalism (that's Aristotle, I think) | |
| Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism? | Accept: non-cognitivism | Reason is the slave of the passions | |
| Moral motivation: internalism or externalism? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
| Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
| Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics? | Accept: virtue ethics | Buddhist | |
| Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory? | The question is too unclear to answer | This whole discussion is just deeply confused - see you-know-who | |
| Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view? | Accept: biological view | But see transporter question above | |
| Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism? | Accept: egalitarianism | | |
| Proper names: Fregean or Millian? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
| Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism? | Lean toward: scientific realism | "Anti-realism": pseudoproblem, helloooo | |
| Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death? | Accept: survival | Aristotelean "substance" view of personal identity | |
| Time: A-theory or B-theory? | Lean toward: A-theory | I have materialist sympathies, but I doubt that time is a dimension | |
| Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch? | Lean toward: switch | | |
| Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic? | Lean toward: correspondence | | |
| Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible? | Accept: inconceivable | With apologies to David Chalmers. The pernicious influence of Wittgenstein, again | |
