Daniel Z. Korman University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, Australian National University
Contact

Affiliations
  • Faculty, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
  • Postdoc, Australian National University
  • PhD, University of Texas at Austin, 2007.

Areas of specialization
  • None specified

Areas of interest

My philosophical views


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My philosophical views

The answers shown here are not necessarily the same provided as part of the 2009 PhilPapers Survey. These answers can be updated at any time.

See also:

QuestionAnswerComments
A priori knowledge: yes or no?Accept: yes
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism?Accept: Platonism
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective?Lean toward: objective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no?Accept: yes
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism?Accept: internalism
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism?Accept: non-skeptical realism
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will?Lean toward: libertarianism
God: theism or atheism?Lean toward: atheism
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism?Accept: rationalism
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism?Lean toward: invariantism
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean?Accept: non-Humean
Logic: classical or non-classical?Accept: non-classical
Mental content: internalism or externalism?Accept: externalism
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism?Accept: moral realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism?Lean toward: non-naturalism
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism?Lean toward: non-physicalism
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism?Accept: cognitivism
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism?Lean toward: externalism
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes?Lean toward: two boxes
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics?Agnostic/undecided
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory?The question is too unclear to answerExperience has propositional content, sensory phenomenology is not determined by representational content, and one is directly aware of qualities of external items in perceptual experience. Perhaps this counts as a weak form of representationalism.
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view?Lean toward: further-fact view
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism?Agnostic/undecided
Proper names: Fregean or Millian?Lean toward: Fregean...but definitely not *descriptive* senses
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism?Accept: scientific realism
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death?Lean toward: death
Time: A-theory or B-theory?Lean toward: A-theory
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch?Agnostic/undecided
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic?Accept: correspondence
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible?Accept: metaphysically possible