Online research in philosophy

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• Faculty, Universitat de Barcelona
• PhD, Universitat de Barcelona, 2010.

• Philosophy of Mind
• Epistemology

• Philosophy of Mind
• Philosophy of Language
• Epistemology
• Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy

My philosophical views

I am enjoying a Beatriu de Pinós post-doctoral fellowship at the Philosophy department of the Graduate Center, CUNY. Before that, I was a Graduate Teaching Assistant (Profesor Ayudante) at the Department of Logic, History and Philosophy of Science, Universitat de Barcelona. I am also member of the Logos research group in logic, language and cognition. I am mainly interested in the philosophy of mind. On the one hand, on naturalistic accounts of mental content and their relation with conceivability arguments against materialism -believe me, there is a relation! On the other hand, I have done some work in representationalist accounts of phenomenal consciousness, and of the painfulness of pain in particular.

4 items found. Sort by: publication yearfirst authorviewingsaddition date Manolo Martínez (forthcoming). Ideal Negative Conceivability and the Halting Problem. Erkenntnis. Our limited a priori-reasoning skills open a gap between our finding a proposition conceivable and its metaphysical possibility. A prominent strategy for closing this gap is the postulation of ideal conceivers, who suffer from no such limitations. In this paper I argue that, under many, maybe all, plausible unpackings of the notion of ideal conceiver, it is false that ideal negative conceivability entails possiblity. Conceivability, Imagination, and Possibility in Metaphysics Hypercomputation in Philosophy of Computing and Information Direct download (5 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Manolo Martinez (2013). Teleosemantics and Productivity. Philosophical Psychology 26 (1):47-68. There has been much discussion of so-called teleosemantic approaches to the naturalization of content. Such discussion, though, has been largely confined to simple, innate mental states with contents such as ?There is a fly here.? Even assuming we can solve the issues that crop up at this stage, an account of the content of human mental states will not get too far without an account of productivity: the ability to entertain indefinitely many thoughts. The best-known teleosemantic theory, Millikan's biosemantics, offers (...) an account of productivity in thought. This paper raises a basic worry about this account: that the use of mapping functions in the theory is unacceptable from a naturalistic point of view. (shrink) Teleological Accounts of Mental Content in Philosophy of Mind Direct download (7 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Manolo Martínez (2011). Imperative Content and the Painfulness of Pain. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):67-90. Representationalist theories of phenomenal consciousness have problems in accounting for pain, for at least two reasons. First of all, the negative affective phenomenology of pain (its painfulness) does not seem to be representational at all. Secondly, pain experiences are not transparent to introspection in the way perceptions are. This is reflected, e.g. in the fact that we do not acknowledge pain hallucinations. In this paper, I defend that representationalism has the potential to overcome these objections. Defenders of representationalism have tried (...) to analyse every kind of phenomenal character in terms of indicative contents. But there is another possibility: Affective phenomenology, in fact, depends on imperative representational content. This provides a satisfactory solution to the aforementioned difficulties. (shrink) Pain and Pain Experience in Philosophy of Mind Representationalism in Philosophy of Mind Direct download (5 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Manolo Martínez (2011). Travelling in Branching Time. Disputatio 4 (31):59-75. Miller (2005) and Miller (2008) argue that the branching picture of time is incompatible with the possibility of backwards time travel. In this paper I show that Miller’s conclusion is based on a hidden assumption which, while generally plausible, is unwarranted if time travel is possible. Branching time is, after all, compatible with time travel as Miller characterises it. Time Travel in Metaphysics Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation

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