David Miguel Gray Colgate University
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About me
David Miguel Gray is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Colgate University. His interests are in Philosophy of Psychology, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Race and Racism, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Science, and African-American Philosophy (In particular, the African-American intellectual tradition) http://colgate.academia.edu/DavidMiguelGray
My works
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  1.  11
    David Miguel Gray (2014). Counting-Ish Creatures and Conceptual Content. Mind 123 (492):1141-1146.
    While many animals — pigeons, for example — have analogue magnitude states , it has recently been argued that certain discriminatory tasks provide evidence for the claim that these states are non-conceptual . These states are taken to be nonconceptual in that they cannot meet a test for concept possession such as Evans’s Generality Constraint. I argue that while such animals probably do not have numerical concepts, the evidence suggests that they could have numerical-ish concepts. On what I call ‘the (...)
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  2.  11
    David Miguel Gray (2014). Failing to Self-Ascribe Thought and Motion: Towards a Three-Factor Account of Passivity Symptoms in Schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Research 152 (1):28-32.
    There has recently been emphasis put on providing two-factor accounts of monothematic delusions. Such accounts would explain (1) whether a delusional hypothesis (e.g. someone else is inserting thoughts into my mind) can be understood as a prima facie reasonable response to an experience and (2) why such a delusional hypothesis is believed and maintained given its implausibility and evidence against it. I argue that if we are to avoid obfuscating the cognitive mechanisms involved in monothematic delusion formation we should split (...)
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  3.  20
    David Miguel Gray (2013). How Specific Can You Get? Southwest Philosophy Review 29 (1):163-172.
    Several philosophers have recently advanced the claim that the content of mental states has its own non-imagistic phenomenology. I show that if defenders of cognitive phenomenology are to account for the conscious experience of thoughts, they must actually commit themselves to two different kinds of cognitive phenomenology, which I refer to as ‘general’ and ‘specific.’ Once this distinction is made, we can see how arguments from experience for cognitive phenomenology depend on an ambiguity in ‘what it is like’ talk for (...)
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  4.  23
    David Miguel Gray (2013). Racial Norms: A Reinterpretation of Du Bois' “The Conservation of Races”. Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (4):465-487.
    I argue that standard explanations of Du Bois' theory of race inappropriately characterize his view as attempting to provide descriptive criteria for races. Such an interpretation makes it both susceptible to Appiah's circularity objection and alienates it from Du Bois' central project of solidarity—which is the central point of “Conservation.” I propose that we should understand his theory as providing a normative account of race: an attempt to characterize what some races should be in terms of what other races are. (...)
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  5.  19
    David Miguel Gray (2012). HOT: Keeping Up Appearances? Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (1):155-163.
    David Rosenthal and Josh Weisberg have recently provided a counter argument to Ned Block’s argument that a Higher Order Thought theory of consciousness cannot accommodate the existence of hallucinatory conscious states . Their counter argument invokes the idea of mental appearances: a non-existent intentional object which is to aid in an account of subjective conscious awareness. I argue that if mental appearances are to do the work they are supposed to, we cannot draw a mental appearance/reality distinction. I provide an (...)
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