Paul Skokowski Stanford University
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  • Faculty, Stanford University
  • PhD, Stanford University, 1992.

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17 items found.
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  1.  34
    Paul Skokowski (2010). One Philosopher is Correct (Maybe). Australian Journal of Logic 9 (1):1-3.
    It is argued that there may be a philosopher who is correct.
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  2.  35
    Paul Skokowski (2009). Is the Pain in Jane Felt Mainly in Her Brain? The Harvard Review of Philosophy 15 (1):58-71.
    Harvard Review of Philosophy, Vol 15, Fall (2007).
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  3. Paul Skokowski (2009). Networks with Attitudes. AI and Society 23 (4):461-470.
  4.  11
    Paul Skokowski (2007). Is the Pain in Jane Felt Mainly in Her Brain? The Harvard Review of Philosophy 15 (1):58-71.
  5.  23
    Paul Skokowski (2007). Networks with Attitudes. Artificial Intelligence and Society 22 (3):461-470.
    Does connectionism spell doom for folk psychology? I examine the proposal that cognitive representational states such as beliefs can play no role if connectionist models - - interpreted as radical new cognitive theories -- take hold and replace other cognitive theories. Though I accept that connectionist theories are radical theories that shed light on cognition, I reject the conclusion that neural networks do not represent. Indeed, I argue that neural networks may actually give us a better working notion of cognitive (...)
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  6.  22
    Paul Skokowski (2005). Review of Gregg Rosenberg, A Place for Consciousness: Probing the Deep Structure of the Natural World. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (10).
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  7.  48
    Paul G. Skokowski (2004). Structural Content: A Naturalistic Approach to Implicit Belief. Philosophy of Science 71 (3):362-369.
    Various systems that learn are examined to show how content is carried in connections installed by a learning history. Agents do not explicitly use the content of such states in practical reasoning, yet the content plays an important role in explaining behavior, and the physical state carrying that content plays a role in causing behavior, given other occurrent beliefs and desires. This leads to an understanding of the environmental reasons which are the determinate content of these states, and leads to (...)
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  8. Charles R. Twardy, Kevin B. Korb, Ole Rogeberg, Cristina Bicchieri, John Duffy, Gil Tolle, P. D. Magnus, Craig Callender, Joseph F. Hanna & Paul Skokowski (2004). 1. A Criterion of Probabilistic Causation A Criterion of Probabilistic Causation (Pp. 241-262). Philosophy of Science 71 (3).
     
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  9.  9
    Paul Skokowski (2003). The Right Kind of Content for a Physicalist About Color. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (6):790-790.
    Color experiences have representational content. But this content need not include a propositional component, particularly for reflectance physicalists such as Byrne & Hilbert (B&H). Insisting on such content gives primacy to language where it is not required, and makes the extension of the argument to nonhuman animals suspect.
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  10.  57
    Paul G. Skokowski (2002). I, Zombie. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (1):1-9.
    Certain recent philosophical theories offer the prospect that zombies are possible. These theories argue that experiential contents, or qualia, are nonphysical properties. The arguments are based on the conceivability of alternate worlds in which physical laws and properties remain the same, but in which qualia either differ or are absent altogether. This article maintains that qualia are, on the contrary, physical properties in the world. It is shown how, under the burden of the a posteriori identification of qualia with physical (...)
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  11. Paul Skokowski, Daniel J. Simons, Christopher F. Chabris, Tatiana Schnur, Daniel T. Levin, Boris Kotchoubey, Andrea Kübler, Ute Strehl, Niels Birbaumer & Jürgen Fell (2001). Nachshon Meiran, Bernhard Hommel, Uri Bibi, and Idit Lev. Consciousness and Control in Task. Consciousness and Cognition 10:598.
     
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  12.  23
    Paul G. Skokowski (1999). Information, Belief, and Causal Role. In L. S. Moss, J. Ginzburg & M. de Rijke (eds.), Logic, Language, and Computation Vol 2. CSLI Press
  13.  12
    Paul Skokowski (1997). Neural Computation, Architecture, and Evolution. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):80-80.
    Biological neural computation relies a great deal on architecture, which constrains the types of content that can be processed by distinct modules in the brain. Though artificial neural networks are useful tools and give insight, they cannot be relied upon yet to give definitive answers to problems in cognition. Knowledge re-use may be driven more by architectural inheritance than by epistemological drives.
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  14.  7
    Paul Skokowski (1996). Naturalizing the Mind. Mind and Language 11 (4):452-457.
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  15.  38
    Paul G. Skokowski (1994). Can Computers Carry Content "Inexplicitly"? Minds and Machines 4 (3):333-44.
    I examine whether it is possible for content relevant to a computer''s behavior to be carried without an explicit internal representation. I consider three approaches. First, an example of a chess playing computer carrying emergent content is offered from Dennett. Next I examine Cummins response to this example. Cummins says Dennett''s computer executes a rule which is inexplicitly represented. Cummins describes a process wherein a computer interprets explicit rules in its program, implements them to form a chess-playing device, then this (...)
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  16. Paul G. Skokowski (1994). How Do We Satisfy Our Goals? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (2):224.
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  17.  28
    Paul G. Skokowski, Belief in Networks.
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