In response to the many-gods objection (MGO) to Pascal’s wager, George Schlesinger has argued that the wager is valid if the God of the theist can be shown to be more plausible than all the possible rival deities which are postulated by the MGO. In this paper, I combine Pascal’s wager and a modified version of Schlesinger’s epistemic requirement into a single formal prudential argument for the rationality of a specifically Christian faith. To that end, I consider the religious views (...) held by philosophers of religion and theologians as evidence for the truth of traditional Christian theism and as evidence for the existence of those rival deities which are postulated by the MGO (in addition to other relevant beliefs). I conclude that if all objections levelled against Pascal’s wager other than the MGO can be addressed, then a good many people who satisfy a number of well-defined epistemic conditions have a prudential reason to become Christians. (shrink)
In this paper, I argue, with the help of a thought experiment, that some people may be acting in a morally inconsistent manner when they partake in the killing of other sentient animals purely for the pleasure of leading a non-vegan lifestyle, or when they encourage certain forms of animal farming which lead to premature animals deaths on the grounds that these farming practices allow countless conscious animals, who would not have otherwise existed, to experience a somewhat fulfilling life.