Heather Logue University of Leeds
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  • Faculty, University of Leeds
  • PhD, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2009.

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  1. Heather Logue (forthcoming). Experiential Content and Naive Realism: A Reconciliation. In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content? OUP
    In the first section of this paper, after briefly arguing for the assumption that experiential content is propositional, I’ll distinguish three interpretations of the claim that experience has content (the Mild, Medium, and Spicy Content Views). In the second section, I’ll flesh out Naïve Realism in greater detail, and I’ll reconstruct what I take to be the main argument for its incompatibility with the Content Views. The third section will be devoted to evaluation of existing arguments for the Mild Content (...)
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    Heather Logue (2016). Metaphysics of Color 1: Physicalist Theories of Color. Philosophy Compass 11 (4):211-219.
    This entry outlines physicalism about color, and objections to the effect that it cannot meet various desiderata on a metaphysics of color.
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    Heather Logue (2016). Metaphysics of Color 2: Non‐Physicalist Theories of Color. Philosophy Compass 11 (4):220-231.
    This entry outlines relationalism, primitivism, and eliminativism about color and considers objections to each theory.
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    Heather Logue (2015). Epistemological Disjunctivism, Written by Duncan Pritchard. [REVIEW] International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (3):257-262.
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  5. Heather Logue (2013). Good News for the Disjunctivist About the Bad Cases. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):105-133.
    Many philosophers are skeptical about disjunctivism —a theory of perceptual experience which holds roughly that a situation in which I see a banana that is as it appears to me to be and one in which I have a hallucination as of a banana are mentally completely different. Often this skepticism is rooted in the suspicion that such a view cannot adequately account for the bad case—in particular, that such a view cannot explain why what it’s like to have a (...)
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  6. Heather Logue (2013). Visual Experience of Natural Kind Properties: Is There Any Fact of the Matter? Philosophical Studies 162 (1):1-12.
  7.  3
    Heather Logue (2012). IX-WhyNaiveRealism? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (2pt2):211-237.
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    Heather Logue (2012). The Contents of Visual Experience, by Susanna Siegel. [REVIEW] Mind 121 (483):842-849.
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  9. Heather Logue (2012). Why Naive Realism? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (2pt2):211-237.
    Much of the discussion of Naive Realism about veridical experience has focused on a consequence of adopting it—namely, disjunctivism about perceptual experience. However, the motivations for being a Naive Realist in the first place have received relatively little attention in the literature. In this paper, I will elaborate and defend the claim that Naive Realism provides the best account of the phenomenal character of veridical experience.
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  10. Heather Logue (2012). What Should the Naïve Realist Say About Total Hallucinations? Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):173-199.
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    H. Logue (2011). The Metaphysics of Perception: Wilfrid Sellars, Perceptual Consciousness and Critical Realism * by Paul Coates. Analysis 71 (4):780-783.
  12. Heather Logue (2011). The Skeptic and the Naïve Realist. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):268-288.
  13. Heather Logue (2010). Getting Acquainted with Naïve Realism: Critical Notice of Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion. Philosophical Books 51 (1):22-38.
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  14.  97
    Alex Byrne & Heather Logue (eds.) (2009). Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. MIT Press.
    Classic texts that define the disjunctivist theory of perception.
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  15. Alex Byrne & Heather Logue (2009). Introduction. In Alex Byrne & Heather Logue (eds.), Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. MIT Press
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  16. Alex Byrne & Heather Logue (2008). Either/Or. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press 314-19.
    This essay surveys the varieties of disjunctivism about perceptual experience. Disjunctivism comes in two main flavours, metaphysical and epistemological.
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