William J. Talbott University of Washington
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  1. William J. Talbott (forthcoming). Dutch Book Arguments. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  2. William J. Talbott (2013). Consequentialism and Human Rights. Philosophy Compass 8 (11):1030-1040.
    The article begins with a review of the structural differences between act consequentialist theories and human rights theories, as illustrated by Amartya Sen's paradox of the Paretian liberal and Robert Nozick's utilitarianism of rights. It discusses attempts to resolve those structural differences by moving to a second-order or indirect consequentialism, illustrated by J.S. Mill and Derek Parfit. It presents consequentialist (though not utilitarian) interpretations of the contractualist theories of Jürgen Habermas and the early John Rawls (Theory of Justice) and of (...)
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  3. William J. Talbott (2013). Forst , Rainer . The Right to Justification: Elements of a Constructivist Theory of Justice . Translated by Jeffrey Flynn. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012. Pp. X+351. $45.00 (Cloth). [REVIEW] Ethics 123 (4):750-755.
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  4. Angela M. Smith, David Keyt, Ingra Schellenberg & William J. Talbott (2011). Jeremy Fischer. Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (1):96-99.
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  5. W. J. Talbott (2010). Human Rights and Human Well-Being. Oxford University Press.
    The consequentialist project for human rights -- Exceptions to libertarian natural rights -- The main principle -- What is well-being? What is equity? -- The two deepest mysteries in moral philosophy -- Security rights -- Epistemological foundations for the priority of autonomy rights -- The millian epistemological argument for autonomy rights -- Property rights, contract rights, and other economic rights -- Democratic rights -- Equity rights -- The most reliable judgment standard for weak paternalism -- Liberty rights and privacy rights (...)
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  6. William Talbott, Bayesian Epistemology. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    ‘Bayesian epistemology’ became an epistemological movement in the 20th century, though its two main features can be traced back to the eponymous Reverend Thomas Bayes (c. 1701-61). Those two features are: (1) the introduction of a formal apparatus for inductive logic; (2) the introduction of a pragmatic self-defeat test (as illustrated by Dutch Book Arguments) for epistemic rationality as a way of extending the justification of the laws of deductive logic to include a justification for the laws of inductive logic. (...)
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  7. William J. Talbott (2008). Review of James Griffin, On Human Rights. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (11).
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  8. William J. Talbott (2008). Reply to Critics: In Defense of One Kind of Epistemically Modest But Metaphysically Immodest Liberalism. [REVIEW] Human Rights Review 9 (2):193-212.
    In this reply to his three critics, Talbott develops several important themes from his book, Which Rights Should Be Universal?, in ways that go beyond the discussion in the book. Among them are the following: the prescriptive role of human rights theory; the need to guarantee an expansive list of basic rights as a basis for a government to be able to claim recognitional legitimacy; the futility of trying to define human rights in terms of what there can be reasonable (...)
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  9. W. J. Talbott (2007). Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights. Philosophical Review 116 (2):294-297.
  10. W. J. Talbott (2005). Which Rights Should Be Universal? Oxford University Press.
    "We hold these truths to be self-evident..." So begins the U.S. Declaration of Independence. What follows those words is a ringing endorsement of universal rights, but it is far from self-evident. Why did the authors claim that it was? William Talbott suggests that they were trapped by a presupposition of Enlightenment philosophy: That there was only one way to rationally justify universal truths, by proving them from self-evident premises. With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the authors of (...)
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  11. William J. Talbott (2005). Review of David Christensen, Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (10).
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  12. William J. Talbott (2005). Review: Universal Knowledge. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):420 - 426.
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  13. William J. Talbott (2005). Universal Knowledge. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):420–426.
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  14. William J. Talbott (2002). Review: The Case for a More Truly Social Epistemology. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):199 - 206.
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  15. William J. Talbott (2002). The Case for a More Truly Social Epistemology. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):199–206.
  16. William J. Talbott (2001). Making Choices: A Recasting of Decision Theory. Frederic Schick. Mind 110 (439):827-833.
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  17. William J. Talbott & Alvin I. Goldman (1998). Games Lawyers Play: Legal Discovery and Social Epistemology. Legal Theory 4 (2):93-163.
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  18. W. J. Talbott (1997). Does Self-Deception Involve Intentional Biasing? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):127-127.
    I agree with Mele that self-deception is not intentional deception; but I do believe that self-deception involves intentional biasing, primarily for two reasons: (1) There is a Bayesian model of self-deception that explains why the biasing is rational. (2) It is implausible that the observed behavior of self- deceivers could be generated by Mele's “blind” mechanisms.
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  19. W. J. Talbott (1995). Intentional Self-Deception in a Single Coherent Self. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):27-74.
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  20. W. J. Talbott (1991). Two Principles of Bayesian Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 62 (2):135-150.
  21. W. J. Talbott (1990). The Reliability of the Cognitive Mechanism: A Mechanist Account of Empirical Justification. Garland.
    First Published in 1990. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
     
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  22. W. J. Talbott (1987). Standard and Non-Standard Newcomb Problems. Synthese 70 (3):415 - 458.
    Examples involving common causes — most prominently, examples involving genetically influenced choices — are analytically equivalent not to standard Newcomb Problems — in which the Predictor genuinely predicts the agent's decision — but to non-standard Newcomb Problems — in which the Predictor guarantees the truth of her predictions by interfering with the agent's decision to make the agent choose as it was predicted she would. When properly qualified, causal and epistemic decision theories diverge only on standard — not on non-standard (...)
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