Pete Mandik William Paterson University
Contact

Affiliations
  • Faculty, William Paterson University
  • PhD, Washington University in St. Louis, 2000.

Areas of specialization

Areas of interest

My philosophical views


blank
About me
I am a philosopher currently primarily interested in neuroscience and consciousness. I am PhilPapers editor for the Philosophy of Neuroscience.
My works
48 items found.
Sort by:
  1. Pete Mandik, Slow Earth and the Slow-Switching Slowdown Showdown.
    The present paper has three aims. The first and foremost aim is to introduce into philosophy of mind and related areas (philosophy of language, etc) a discussion of Slow Earth, an analogue to the classic Twin Earth scenario that features a difference from aboriginal Earth that hinges on time instead of the distribution of natural kinds. The second aim is to use Slow Earth to call into question the central lessons often alleged to flow from consideration of Twin Earth, lessons (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Pete Mandik, Swamp Mary Semantics: A Case for Physicalism Without Gaps.
    I argue for the superiority of non-gappy physicalism over gappy physicalism. While physicalists are united in denying an ontological gap between the phenomenal and the physical, the gappy affirm and the non-gappy deny a relevant epistemological gap. Central to my arguments will be contemplation of Swamp Mary, a being physically intrinsically similar to post-release Mary (a physically omniscient being who has experienced red) but has not herself (the Swamp being) experienced red. Swamp Mary has phenomenal knowledge of a phenomenal character (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Pete Mandik, Transcending Zombies.
    I develop advice to the reductionist about consciousness in the form of a transcendental argument that depends crucially on the sorts of knowledge claims concerning consciousness that, as crucial elements in the anti-reductionists’ epistemicgap arguments, the anti-reductionist will readily concede. The argument that I develop goes as follows. P1. If I know that I am not a zombie, then phenomenal character is (a certain kind of) conceptualized egocentric content. P2. I know that I am not a zombie. P3. Phenomenal character (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Richard Brown & Pete Mandik (forthcoming). On Whether the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness Entails Cognitive Phenomenology or What is It Like to Think That One Thinks That P? Philosophical Topics 40 (2).
    Among our conscious states are conscious thoughts. The question at the center of the recent growing literature on cognitive phenomenology is this: In consciously thinking P, is there thereby any phenomenology—is there something it’s like? One way of clarifying the question is to say that it concerns whether there is any proprietary phenomenology associated with conscious thought. Is there any phenomenology due to thinking, as opposed to phenomenology that is due to some co-occurring sensation or mental image? In this paper (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Pete Mandik (2013). What is Visual and Phenomenal but Concerns Neither Hue nor Shade? In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience.
    Though the following problem is not explicitly raised by her, it seems sufficiently similar to an issue of pertinence to Akins's "Black and White and Color" (this volume) to merit the moniker, Akins's Problem : Can there be a visual experience devoid of both color phenomenology and black-and-white phenomenology? The point of the present paper is to draw from Akins's paper the materials needed to sketch a case for a positive answer to Akins's Problem. I am unsure about how much (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Pete Mandik (2013). This is Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction. Wiley-Blackwell.
    This is Philosophy. In keeping with the mission of the series, This is Philosophy: Philosophy of Mind will be both accessible to the average student and technology oriented, integrating with supplemental online material. Also, while the proposed book will cover all of the topics one would expect in a traditional philosophy of mind course, it will be up to date and cover recent advances that are sadly missing from many competitor volumes. My proposed volume will not be limited to what (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Pete Mandik (2012). Color-Consciousness Conceptualism. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):617-631.
    The goal of the present paper is to defend against a certain line of attack the view that conscious experience of <span class='Hi'>color</span> is no more fine-grained that the repertoire of non- demonstrative concepts that a perceiver is able to bring to bear in perception. The line of attack in question is an alleged empirical argument - the Diachronic Indistinguishability Argument (DIA) - based on pairs of colors so similar that they can be discriminated when simultaneously presented but not when (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Pete Mandik (2012). Mental Colors, Conceptual Overlap, and Discriminating Knowledge of Particulars. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):641-643.
    I respond to the separate commentaries by Jacob Berger, Charlie Pelling, and David Pereplyotchik on my paper, “Color-Consciousness Conceptualism.” I resist Berger’s suggestion that mental colors ever enter consciousness without accompaniment by deployments of concepts of their extra-mental counterparts. I express concerns about Pelling’s proposal that a more uniform conceptualist treatment of phenomenal sorites can be gained by a simple appeal to the partial overlap of the extensions of some concepts. I question the relevance to perceptual consciousness of the arguments (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Pete Mandik (2011). Review of Peter Cave's Do Llamas Fall in Love? 33 Perplexing Philosophy Puzzles. [REVIEW] Times Higher Education.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Pete Mandik (2011). Supervenience and Neuroscience. Synthese 180 (3):443 - 463.
    The philosophical technical term "supervenience" is frequently used in the philosophy of mind as a concise way of characterizing the core idea of physicalism in a manner that is neutral with respect to debates between reductive physicalists and nonreductive physicalists. I argue against this alleged neutrality and side with reductive physicalists. I am especially interested here in debates between psychoneural reductionists and nonreductive functionalist physicalists. Central to my arguments will be considerations concerning how best to articulate the spirit of the (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Pete Mandik (2010). Control Consciousness. Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (4):643-657.
    Control consciousness is the awareness or experience of seeming to be in control of one’s actions. One view, which I will be arguing against in the present paper, is that control consciousness is a form of sensory consciousness. In such a view, control consciousness is exhausted by sensory elements such as tactile and proprioceptive information. An opposing view, which I will be arguing for, is that sensory elements cannot be the whole story and must be supplemented by direct contributions of (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Pete Mandik (2010). Key Terms in Philosophy of Mind. Continuum.
    Introduction: What is philosophy of mind? -- The key terms -- The key thinkers -- The key texts.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Pete Mandik (2010). Review of Martin Cohen's Mind Games: 31 Days to Rediscover Your Brain. [REVIEW] Times Higher Education.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Pete Mandik (2010). Swamp Mary's Revenge: Deviant Phenomenal Knowledge and Physicalism. Philosophical Studies 148 (2):231 - 247.
    Deviant phenomenal knowledge is knowing what it's like to have experiences of, e. g., red without actually having had experiences of red. Such a knower is a deviant. Some physicalists have argued and some anti-physicalists have denied that the possibility of deviants undermines anti-physicalism and the Knowledge Argument. The current paper presents new arguments defending the deviant-based attacks on anti-physicalism. Central to my arguments are considerations concerning the psychosemantic underpinnings of deviant phenomenal knowledge. I argue that physicalists are in a (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Pete Mandik (2009). Beware of the Unicorn: Consciousness as Being Represented and Other Things That Don't Exist. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (1):5-36.
    Higher-Order Representational theories of consciousness — HORs — primarily seek to explain a mental state’s being conscious in terms of the mental state’s being represented by another mental state. First-Order Representational theories of consciousness — FORs — primarily seek to explain a property’s being phenomenal in terms of the property being represented in experience. Despite differences in both explanans and explananda, HORs and FORs share a reliance on there being such a property as being represented. In this paper I develop (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Pete Mandik (2009). Review of Catherine Malabou, What Should We Do with Our Brain?. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (4).
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Pete Mandik (2009). The Neurophilosophy of Subjectivity. In John Bickle (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.
    The so-called subjectivity of conscious experience is central to much recent work in the philosophy of mind. Subjectivity is the alleged property of consciousness whereby one can know what it is like to have certain conscious states only if one has undergone such states oneself. I review neurophilosophical work on consciousness and concepts pertinent to this claim and argue that subjectivity eliminativism is at least as well supported, if not more supported, than subjectivity reductionism.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Pete Mandik (2008). An Epistemological Theory of Consciousness? In Alessio Plebe & Vivian De La Cruz (eds.), Philosophy in the Neuroscience Era. Squilibri.
    This article tackles problems concerning the reduction of phenomenal consciousness to brain processes that arise in consideration of specifically epistemological properties that have been attributed to conscious experiences. In particular, various defenders of dualism and epiphenomenalism have argued for their positions by assuming special epistemic access to phenomenal consciousness. Many physicalists have reacted to such arguments by denying the epistemological premises. My aim in this paper is to take a different approach in opposing dualism and argue that when we correctly (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Pete Mandik (2008). Complex Biological Systems:. Icfai University Press.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Pete Mandik (2008). Cognitive Cellular Automata. In Complex Biological Systems:. Icfai University Press.
    In this paper I explore the question of how artificial life might be used to get a handle on philosophical issues concerning the mind-body problem. I focus on questions concerning what the physical precursors were to the earliest evolved versions of intelligent life. I discuss how cellular automata might constitute an experimental platform for the exploration of such issues, since cellular automata offer a unified framework for the modeling of physical, biological, and psychological processes. I discuss what it would take (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Pete Mandik (2008). The Neural Accomplishment of Objectivity. In Pierre Poirier & Luc Faucher (eds.), Des Neurones a La Philosophie: Neurophilosophie Et Philosophie Des Neurosciences. Éditions Syllepse.
    Philosophical tradition contains two major lines of thought concerning the relative difficulty of the notions of objectivity and subjectivity. One tradition, which we might characterize as.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Pete Mandik & Josh Weisberg (2008). Type-Q Materialism. In Chase Wrenn (ed.), Naturalism, Reference and Ontology: Essays in Honor of Roger F. Gibson. Peter Lang Publishing Group.
    s Gibson (1982) correctly points out, despite Quine’s brief flirtation with a “mitigated phenomenalism” (Gibson’s phrase) in the late 1940’s and early 1950’s, Quine’s ontology of 1953 (“On Mental Entities”) and beyond left no room for non-physical sensory objects or qualities. Anyone familiar with the contemporary neo-dualist qualia-freak-fest might wonder why Quinean lessons were insufficiently transmitted to the current generation.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Pete Mandik (2007). Shit Happens. Episteme 4 (2):205-218.
    Abstract In this paper I embrace what Brian Keeley calls in “Of Conspiracy Theories” the absurdist horn of the dilemma for philosophers who criticize such theories. I thus defend the view that there is indeed something deeply epistemically wrong with conspiracy theorizing. My complaint is that conspiracy theories apply intentional explanations to situations that give rise to special problems concerning the elimination of competing intentional explanations.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Pete Mandik (2007). Picturing, Showing, and Solipsism in Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Analysis and Metaphysics 6 (1).
    Of all the enigmatic remarks running through Wittgensteinís Tractatus, none are a greater source of puzzlement to this reader than the endorsement of solipsism in 5.6-5.641. Wittgenstein writes ìI am my worldî, but, even though ìwhat solipsism means, is quite correct...it cannot be said, but it shows itselfî (5.63; 5.62). More intriguing still, he writes.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Pete Mandik (2007). Shit Happens. Episteme: The Journal of Social Epistemology 4 (2):205-218.
    Abstract In this paper I embrace what Brian Keeley calls in “Of Conspiracy Theories” the absurdist horn of the dilemma for philosophers who criticize such theories. I thus defend the view that there is indeed something deeply epistemically wrong with conspiracy theorizing. My complaint is that conspiracy theories apply intentional explanations to situations that give rise to special problems concerning the elimination of competing intentional explanations.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Pete Mandik (2007). The Neurophilosophy of Consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. 418--430.
    The neurophilosophy of consciousness brings neuroscience to bear on philosophical issues concerning phenomenal consciousness, especially issues concerning what makes mental states conscious, what it is that we are conscious of, and the nature of the phenomenal character of conscious states. Here attention is given largely to phenomenal consciousness as it arises in vision. The relevant neuroscience concerns not only neurophysiological and neuroanatomical data, but also computational models of neural networks. The neurophilosophical theories that bring such data to bear on the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Pete Mandik & Andrew Brook (2007). The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Analyze and Kritik 26 (1).
    A movement dedicated to applying neuroscience to traditional philosophical problems and using philosophical methods to illuminate issues in neuroscience began about twenty-five years ago. Results in neuroscience have affected how we see traditional areas of philosophical concern such as perception, belief-formation, and consciousness. There is an interesting interaction between some of the distinctive features of neuroscience and important general issues in the philosophy of science. And recent neuroscience has thrown up a few conceptual issues that philosophers are perhaps best trained (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Alex Vereschagin, Mike Collins & Pete Mandik (2007). Evolving Artificial Minds and Brains. In Drew Khlentzos & Andrea Schalley (eds.), Mental States Volume 1: Evolution, function, nature. John Benjamins.
    We explicate representational content by addressing how representations that ex- plain intelligent behavior might be acquired through processes of Darwinian evo- lution. We present the results of computer simulations of evolved neural network controllers and discuss the similarity of the simulations to real-world examples of neural network control of animal behavior. We argue that focusing on the simplest cases of evolved intelligent behavior, in both simulated and real organisms, reveals that evolved representations must carry information about the creature’s environ- ments (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. John Bickle, Pete Mandik & Anthony Landreth, The Philosophy of Neuroscience. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Over the past three decades, philosophy of science has grown increasingly “local.” Concerns have switched from general features of scientific practice to concepts, issues, and puzzles specific to particular disciplines. Philosophy of neuroscience is a natural result. This emerging area was also spurred by remarkable recent growth in the neurosciences. Cognitive and computational neuroscience continues to encroach upon issues traditionally addressed within the humanities, including the nature of consciousness, action, knowledge, and normativity. Empirical discoveries about brain structure and function suggest (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Daniel Kolak, William Hirstein, Peter Mandik & Jonathan Waskan (2006). Cognitive Science: An Introduction to Mind and Brain. Routledge.
    Cognitive Science is a major new guide to the central theories and problems in the study of the mind and brain. The authors clearly explain how and why cognitive science aims to understand the brain as a computational system that manipulates representations. They identify the roots of cognitive science in Descartes - who argued that all knowledge of the external world is filtered through some sort of representation - and examine the present-day role of Artificial Intelligence, computing, psychology, linguistics and (...)
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Pete Mandik (2006). The Introspectibility of Brain States as Such. In Brian Keeley (ed.), Paul Churchland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Is the Introspection Thesis true? It certainly isn’t obvious. Introspection is the faculty by which each of us has access to his or her own mental states. Even if we were to suppose that mental states are identical to brain states, it doesn’t follow immediately from this supposition that we can introspect our mental states as brain states. This point is analogous to the following. It doesn’t follow immediately from the mere fact that some distant object is identical to a (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Pete Mandik (2005). Action-Oriented Representation. In Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press. 284--305.
    Often, sensory input underdetermines perception. One such example is the perception of illusory contours. In illusory contour perception, the content of the percept includes the presence of a contour that is absent from the informational content of the sensation. (By “sensation” I mean merely information-bearing events at the transducer level. I intend no further commitment such as the identification of sensations with qualia.) I call instances of perception underdetermined by sensation “underdetermined perception.” The perception of illusory contours is just one (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Pete Mandik (2005). Phenomenal Consciousness and the Allocentric-Egocentric Interface. Endophysics.
    I propose and defend the Allocentric-Egocentric Interface Theory of Con- sciousness. Mental processes form a hierarchy of mental representations with maxi- mally egocentric (self-centered) representations at the bottom and maximally allocentric (other-centered) representations at the top. Phenomenally conscious states are states that are relatively intermediate in this hierarchy. More speci.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Axel Dietrich, Christopher Gauker, Noel Hendrickson, Jon Kass, Kenneth Livingston, Dan Lloyd, Peter Mandik, Katie McGovern, Thomas Polger & Teed Rockwell (2003). In Addition to Editorial Board Members, the Editors of Brain and Mind Often Call on External Reviewers to Referee Submitted Manuscripts. For Volume 4, the Following Philosophers and Scientists Lent Their Expertise and Time to Referee Papers: Anthony Chemero. Brain and Mind 4 (399).
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Pete Mandik (2003). Varieties of Representation in Evolved and Embodied Neural Networks. Biology and Philosophy 18 (1):95-130.
    In this paper I discuss one of the key issuesin the philosophy of neuroscience:neurosemantics. The project of neurosemanticsinvolves explaining what it means for states ofneurons and neural systems to haverepresentational contents. Neurosemantics thusinvolves issues of common concern between thephilosophy of neuroscience and philosophy ofmind. I discuss a problem that arises foraccounts of representational content that Icall ``the economy problem'': the problem ofshowing that a candidate theory of mentalrepresentation can bear the work requiredwithin in the causal economy of a mind and (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Andy Clark & Pete Mandik (2002). Selective Representing and World-Making. Minds And Machines 12 (3):383-395.
    In this paper, we discuss the thesis of selective representing — the idea that the contents of the mental representations had by organisms are highly constrained by the biological niches within which the organisms evolved. While such a thesis has been defended by several authors elsewhere, our primary concern here is to take up the issue of the compatibility of selective representing and realism. In this paper we hope to show three things. First, that the notion of selective representing (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Rick Grush & Pete Mandik (2002). Representational Parts. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (4):389-394.
  38. Pete Mandik (2002). Synthetic Neuroethology. In James Moor & Terrell Ward Bynum (eds.), Cyberphilosophy: The Intersection of Philosophy and Computing. Blackwell Pub.. 11-29.
    Computation and philosophy intersect three times in this essay. Computation is considered as an object, as a method, and as a model used in a certain line of philosophical inquiry concerning the relation of mind to matter. As object, the question considered is whether computation and related notions of mental representation constitute the best ways to conceive of how physical systems give rise to mental properties. As method and model, the computational techniques of artificial life and embodied evolutionary connectionism are (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Pete Mandik & William Bechtel (2002). Philosophy of Science. In Lynn Nadel (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.
    00192001 Philosophy of science is primarily concernedto provide accounts of the principles and processes of scientific explanation. Early in the twentieth century, philosophers of science focusedon the logical structure of scientific thought, whereas in the later part of the century logic was de-emphasized in favour of other frameworks for conceptualizing scientific reasoning andexplanation, andan emphasis on historical andsociological factors that shape scientific thinking. While tracing through the landmarks of this history we note many points of contact between the philosophy of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Pete Mandik & Andy Clark (2002). Selective Representing and World-Making. Minds and Machines 12 (3):383-395.
    In this paper, we discuss the thesis of selective representing –- the idea that the contents of the mental representations had by organisms are highly constrained by the biological niches within which the organisms evolved. While such a thesis has been defended by several authors elsewhere, our primary concern here is to take up the issue of the compatibility of selective representing and realism. In this paper we hope to show three things. First, that the notion of selective representing is (...)
    Direct download (18 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Pete Mandik & Rick Grush (2002). Representational Parts. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (389):394.
    In this reply we claim that, contra Dreyfus, the kinds of skillful performances Dreyfus discusses _are_ representational. We explain this proposal, and then defend it against an objection to the effect that the representational notion we invoke is a weak one countenancing only some global state of an organism as a representation. According to this objection, such a representation is not a robust, projectible property of an organism, and hence will gain no explana- tory leverage in cognitive scientific explanations. We (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. William P. Bechtel, Pete Mandik, Jennifer Mundale & Robert S. Stufflebeam (eds.) (2001). Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader. Blackwell.
    2. Daugman, J. G. Brain metaphor and brain theory 3. Mundale, J. Neuroanatomical Foundations of Cognition: Connecting the Neuronal Level with the Study of Higher Brain Areas.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. William Bechtel, Pete Mandik & Jennifer Mundale (2001). Philosophy Meets the Neurosciences. In William P. Bechtel, Pete Mandik, Jennifer Mundale & Robert S. Stufflebeam (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader. Blackwell.
  44. Pete Mandik (2001). Mental Representation and the Subjectivity of Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):179-202.
    Many have urged that the biggest obstacles to a physicalistic understanding of consciousness are the problems raised in connection with the subjectivity of consciousness. These problems are most acutely expressed in consideration of the knowledge argument against physicalism. I develop a novel account of the subjectivity of consciousness by explicating the ways in which mental representations may be perspectival. Crucial features of my account involve analogies between the representations involved in sensory experience and the ways in which pictorial representations exhibit (...)
    Direct download (13 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Pete Mandik (2001). Points of View From the Brain's Eye View: Subjectivity and Neural Representation. In William P. Bechtel, Pete Mandik, Jennifer Mundale & Robert S. Stufflebeam (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader. Blackwell. 312.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Pete Mandik (2000). Objective Subjectivity: Allocentric and Egocentric Representations in Thought and Experience. Dissertation, Washington University
    Many philosophical issues concern questions of objectivity and subjectivity. Of these questions, there are two kinds. The first considers whether something is objective or subjective; the second what it _means_ for something to be objective or subjective.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Pete Mandik (1999). Qualia, Space, and Control. Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):47-60.
    According to representionalists, qualia-the introspectible properties of sensory experience-are exhausted by the representational contents of experience. Representationalists typically advocate an informational psychosemantics whereby a brain state represents one of its causal antecedents in evolutionarily determined optimal circumstances. I argue that such a psychosemantics may not apply to certain aspects of our experience, namely, our experience of space in vision, hearing, and touch. I offer that these cases can be handled by supplementing informational psychosemantics with a procedural psychosemantics whereby a representation (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Pete Mandik, Fine-Grained Supervenience, Cognitive Neuroscience, and the Future of Functionalism.
    The majority of contemporary philosophers of mind are physicalists. The majority of physicalists, however, are non-reductive physicalists. As nonreductive physicalists, these philosophers hold that a system's mental properties are different from a system's physical properties, that is, they hold that the sum total of mental facts about some system is a different set of facts than the sum total of physical facts about the same system. As physicalists, however, these nonreductivists hold that mental facts are nonetheless determined by physical facts, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
Is this list right?