David Rosenthal CUNY Graduate Center
blank
About me
I'm professor of philosophy at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, and Coordinator of their Interdisciplinary Concentration in Cognitive Science. Papers of mine are available at http://tinyurl.com/drpubn
My works
121 items found.
Sort by:
  1. David Rosenthal (web). Concepts and Definitions of Consciousness. In P W. Banks (ed.), Encyclopedia of Consciousness. Elsevier.
    in Encyclopedia of Consciousness, ed. William P. Banks, Amsterdam: Elsevier, forthcoming in 2009.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. David Rosenthal, Consciousness and its Function.
    MS, under submission, derived from a Powerpoint presentation at a Conference on Consciousness, Memory, and Perception, in honor of Larry Weiskrantz, City University, London, September 15, 2006.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. David Rosenthal, Reflections on Five Questions: Autobiographical and Disciplinary.
    in Mind and Consciousness: Five Questions, ed. Patrick Grim, New York and London: Automatic Press, forthcoming.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. David Rosenthal, “Replies to Galen Strawson and Ned Block.
    (not intended for publication), Replies to Strawson and Block in Colloquium at the CUNY Graduate Center, December 13, 2006.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. David Rosenthal, The Function and Facilitation of Consciousness.
  6. David Rosenthal, The Mind and its Expression.
    MS., for an Eastern Division APA Author-Meets-Critics Session on Dorit Bar-On, Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge, Baltimore, December 2007.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. William G. Lycan & David M. Rosenthal (forthcoming). Editor's booknotes. Cogito.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. David M. Rosenthal (forthcoming). Philosophy of Mind. Social Research.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Benjamin D. Young, Andreas Keller & David Rosenthal (2014). Quality-Space Theory in Olfaction. Frontiers in Psychology:doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00001.
    Quality-space theory (QST) explains the nature of the mental qualities distinctive of perceptual states by appeal to their role in perceiving. QST is typically described in terms of the mental qualities that pertain to color. Here we apply QST to the olfactory modalities. Olfaction is in various respects more complex than vision, and so provides a useful test case for QST. To determine whether QST can deal with the challenges olfaction presents, we show how a quality space could be constructed (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. David Rosenthal (2012). Higher-Order Awareness, Misrepresentation, and Function. Higher-Order Awareness, Misrepresentation and Function 367 (1594):1424-1438.
    Conscious mental states are states we are in some way aware of. I compare higher-order theories of consciousness, which explain consciousness by appeal to such higher-order awareness (HOA), and first-order theories, which do not, and I argue that higher-order theories have substantial explanatory advantages. The higher-order nature of our awareness of our conscious states suggests an analogy with the metacognition that figures in the regulation of psychological processes and behaviour. I argue that, although both consciousness and metacognition involve higher-order psychological (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Hakwan Lau & David Rosenthal (2011). Empirical Support for Higher-Order Theories of Conscious Awareness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (8):365-373.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Hakwan Lau & David Rosenthal (2011). The Higher-Order View Does Not Require Consciously Self-Directed Introspection: Response to Malach. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (11):508-509.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. David Rosenthal (2011). Awareness and Identification of Self. In JeeLoo Liu & John Perry (eds.), Consciousness and the Self: New Essays.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. David Rosenthal (2011). Exaggerated Reports: Reply to Block. Analysis 71 (3):431-437.
  15. David Rosenthal (2010). Expressing One's Mind. Acta Analytica 25 (1):21 - 34.
    Remarks such as ‘I am in pain’ and ‘I think that it’s raining’ are puzzling, since they seem to literally describe oneself as being in pain or having a particular thought, but their conditions of use tend to coincide with unequivocal expressions of pain or of that thought. This led Wittgenstein, among others, to treat such remarks as expressing, rather than as reporting, one’s mental states. Though such expressivism is widely recognized as untenable, Bar-On has recently advanced a neo-expressivist view, (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. David Rosenthal (2010). How to Think About Mental Qualities. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):368-393.
    It’s often held that undetectable inversion of mental qualities is, if not possible, at least conceivable. It’s thought to be conceivable that the mental quality your visual states exhibit when you see something red in standard conditions is literally of the same type as the mental quality my visual states exhibit when I see something green in such circumstances. It’s thought, moreover, to be conceivable that such inversion of mental qualities could be wholly undetectable by any third-person means. And since (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. David M. Rosenthal (2010). Consciousness, the Self and Bodily Location. Analysis 70 (2):270-276.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Robert B. Talisse, Maureen Eckert, Norman Bowie, Steven M. Cahn, Randall Curren, Alan Goldman, Tziporah Kasachkoff, Peter Markie, John O'Connor, David Rosenthal, Robert Simon, David Shatz, George Sher, Douglas Stalker & Christine Vitrano (2009). A Teacher's Life: Essays for Steven M. Cahn. Lexington Books.
    This is a collection of 13 essays honoring Steven Cahn, presented to him on the occasion of his 25th year as Professor of Philosophy at the City University of New York.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. David Rosenthal & Josh Weisberg (2008). Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness. Scholarpedia 3 (5):4407.
  20. David Rosenthal (2007). Phenomenological Overflow and Cognitive Access. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):522-523.
    I argue that the partial-report results Block cites do not establish that phenomenology overflows cognitive accessibility, as Block maintains. So, without additional argument, the mesh he sees between psychology and neuroscience is unsupported. I argue further that there is reason to hold, contra Block, that phenomenology does always involve some cognitive access to the relevant experience.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. David M. Rosenthal (2006). Experience and the Physical. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):117-28.
    Strawson’s challenging and provocative defence of panpsychism1 begins by sensibly insisting that physicalism, properly understood, must unflinchingly countenance the occurrence of conscious experiences. No view, he urges, will count as ‘real physicalism’ (p. 4) if it seeks to get around or soften that commitment, as versions of socalled physicalism sometimes do. Real physicalism (hereinafter physicalism tout court) must accordingly reject any stark opposition of mental and physical, which is not only invoked by many followers of Descartes, but even countenanced by (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. David M. Rosenthal & Gerhard Preyer (2006). B. Referate Uber Fremdsprachige Neuerscheinungen-Consciousness and Mind. Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger 59 (3):310.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. David Rosenthal (2005). The Higher-Order Model of Consciousness. In Rita Carter (ed.), Consciousness. Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
    All mental states, including thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations, often occur consciously. But they all occur also without being conscious. So the first thing a theory of consciousness must do is explain the difference between thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations that are conscious and those which are not.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. David M. Rosenthal (2005). Consciousness and Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    The first four essays develop various aspects of that theory.The next three essays present Rosenthal's homomorphism theory of mental qualities and qualitative ...
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. David M. Rosenthal (2005). Sensory Qualities, Consciousness, and Perception. In Consciousness and Mind. Clarendon Press. 175-226.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Terry Bynum, Robert Cavalier, James Moor, David Rosenthal & Bill Uzgalis (2004). Daniel Dennett and the Computational Turn. Minds and Machines 14:281-282.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. David Rosenthal (2004). Varieties of Higher-Order Theory. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.
    A touchstone of much modern theorizing about the mind is the idea, still tac- itly accepted by many, that a state's being mental implies that it's conscious. This view is epitomized in the dictum, put forth by theorists as otherwise di-.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. David M. Rosenthal (2004). Being Conscious of Ourselves. The Monist 87 (2):161-184.
  29. David M. Rosenthal (2004). Review: Subjective Character and Reflexive Content. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):191 - 198.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. David M. Rosenthal (2004). Review: The Nature of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Mind 113 (451):581-588.
  31. David M. Rosenthal (2004). Subjective Character and Reflexive Content. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):191-198.
    I. Zombies and the Knowledge Argument John Perry.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. David M. Rosenthal (2004). The Nature of Consciousness. Mind 113 (451):581-588.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. David M. Rosenthal (2003). Unity of Consciousness and the Self. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):325-352.
    The so-called unity of consciousness consists in the compelling sense we have that all our conscious mental states belong to a single conscious subject. Elsewhere I have argued that a mental state's being conscious is a matter of our being conscious of that state by having a higher-order thought (HOT) about it. Contrary to what is sometimes argued, this HOT model affords a natural explanation of our sense that our conscious states all belong to a single conscious subject. HOTs often (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. David Rosenthal (2002). The Higher-Order Model of Consciousness. In Rita Carter (ed.), Consciousness.
    All mental states, including thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations, often occur consciously. But they all occur also without being conscious. So the first thing a theory of consciousness must do is explain the difference between thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations that are conscious and those which are not.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. David Rosenthal (2002). Moore's Paradox and Crimmins's Case. Analysis 62 (274):167-171.
    Moore’s paradox occurs with sentences, such as (1) It’s raining and I don’t think it’s raining. which are self-defeating in a way that prevents one from making an asser- tion with them.1 But Mark Crimmins has given us a case of a sentence that is syntactically just like (1) but is nonetheless assertible. Suppose I know somebody, and know or have excellent reason to believe that I know that very person under some other guise. I do not know what that (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. David M. Rosenthal (2002). Consciousness and Higher-Order Thought. In L. Nagel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.
    The problem of consciousness is to say what it is for some of our thoughts, feelings, and sensations to be conscious, given that others are not. This is different from saying what it is for a person to be conscious or not conscious. Even when people are conscious, many of their thoughts and sensations typically are not. And there's nothing problematic about a person's being conscious; it's just the person's being awake and responsive to sensory input.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. David M. Rosenthal (2002). Consciousness and the Mind. Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 51 (July):227-251.
    Everyone — or almost everyone — was agreed that what is [mental] … has a common quality in which its essence is expressed: namely the quality of being conscious — unique, indescribable, but needing no description. All that is conscious … is [mental], and conversely all that is [mental] is conscious; that is self-evident and to contradict it is nonsense.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. David M. Rosenthal (2002). Explaining Consciousness. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press. 109-131.
  39. David M. Rosenthal (2002). How Many Kinds of Consciousness? Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):653-665.
    Ned BlockÕs influential distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness has become a staple of current discussions of consciousness. It is not often noted, however, that his distinction tacitly embodies unargued theoretical assumptions that favor some theoretical treatments at the expense of others. This is equally so for his less widely discussed distinction between phenomenal consciousness and what he calls reflexive consciousness. I argue that the distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness, as Block draws it, is untenable. Though mental states that (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. David M. Rosenthal (2002). Persons, Minds, and Consciousness. In R. E. Auxier & L. E. Hahn (eds.), The Philosophy of Marjorie Grene. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court. 199-220.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. David M. Rosenthal (2002). The Higher-Order Model of Consciousness. In Rita Carter (ed.), Consciousness. Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
    All mental states, including thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations, often occur consciously. But they all occur also without being conscious. So the first thing a theory of consciousness must do is explain the difference between thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations that are conscious and those which are not.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. David M. Rosenthal (2002). The Timing of Conscious States. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):215-20.
    Striking experimental results by Benjamin Libet and colleagues have had an impor- tant impact on much recent discussion of consciousness. Some investigators have sought to replicate or extend Libet’s results (Haggard, 1999; Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Haggard, Newman, & Magno, 1999; Trevena & Miller, 2002), while others have focused on how to interpret those findings (e.g., Gomes, 1998, 1999, 2002; Pockett, 2002), which many have seen as conflicting with our commonsense picture of mental functioning.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. David Rosenthal (2001). Consciousness and Sensation: Philosophical Aspects. In N. J. Smelser & P. B. Baltes (eds.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Pergamon/Elsevier.
    consciousness. Such unconscious processing always
    Cambridge, UK
    tends to re?ect habitual or strong responses. From this.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. David M. Rosenthal (2001). Consciousness and Sensation. In N. J. Smelser & B. Baltes (eds.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. David M. Rosenthal (2001). Color, Mental Location, and the Visual Field. Consciousness And Cognition 10 (1):85-93.
    Color subjectivism is the view that color properties are mental properties of our visual sensations, perhaps identical with properties of neural states, and that nothing except visual sensations and other mental states exhibits color properties. Color phys- icalism, by contrast, holds that colors are exclusively properties of visible physical objects and processes.
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. D. Rosenthal (2000). Consciousness and the Philosophy of Mind. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):S14 - S16.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. D. Rosenthal (2000). Content, Interpretation, and Consciousness. Protosociology 14:67-84.
  48. David M. Rosenthal (2000). Consciousness, Content, and Metacognitive Judgments. Consciousness And Cognition 9 (2):203-214.
    Because metacognition consists in our having mental access to our cognitive states and mental states are conscious only when we are conscious of them in some suitable way, metacognition and consciousness shed important theoretical light on one another. Thus, our having metacognitive access to information carried by states that are not conscious helps con?rm the hypothesis that a mental state.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. David M. Rosenthal (2000). Consciousness, Interpretation, and Consciousness. Protosociology 14:67-84.
  50. David M. Rosenthal (2000). Introspection and Self-Interpretation. Philosophical Topics 28 (2):201-33.
  51. David M. Rosenthal (2000). Addendum to Introduction. In Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem. Hackett.
    Mind-body materialism is at its most inviting in the context of trying to give a unified treatment of the natural world. And the principle challenge it faces is to do justice to the distinguishing features of mental phenomena, which set them off from nonmental, physical reality. This challenge it not easy to meet. In 1971 I suggested that the difficulty in meeting it makes especially appealing the eliminative materialism of Feyerabend and Rorty. If adopting the materialist view that mental (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  52. David M. Rosenthal (2000). Metacognition and Higher-Order Thoughts. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):231-242.
    Because there is a fair amount of overlap in the points by Balog and Rey, I will organize this response topically, referring specifically to each commentator as rele- vant. And, because much of the discussion focuses on my higher-order-thought (HOT) hypothesis independent of questions about metacognition, I will begin by addressing a cluster of issues that have to do with the status, motivation, and exact formulation of that hypothesis.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  53. David M. Rosenthal (1999). Sensory Quality and the Relocation Story. Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):321-350.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  54. David M. Rosenthal (1999). The Colors and Shapes of Visual Experiences. In Denis Fisette (ed.), Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution. Kluwer. 95--118.
    red and round. According to common sense, the red, round thing we see is the tomato itself. When we have a hallucinatory vision of a tomato, however, there may be present to us no red and round phys- ical object. Still, we use the words 'red' and 'round' to describe that situation as well, this time applying them to the visual experience itself. We say that we have a red, round visual image, or a visual experience of a red disk, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  55. David M. Rosenthal (1998). Consciousness and Its Expression. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 22 (1):294-309.
  56. David M. Rosenthal (1998). Consciousness and Metacognition. In Dan Sperber (ed.), Metarepresentation. Oxford University Press.
  57. David M. Rosenthal (1998). Dualism. In E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge.
    Dualism is the view that mental phenomena are, in some respect, nonphysical. The best-known version is due to Descartes, and holds that the mind is a nonphysical substance. Descartes argued that, because minds have no spatial properties and physical reality is essentially extended in space, minds are wholly nonphysical. Every human being is accordingly a composite of two objects: a physical body, and a nonphysical object that is that human being's mind. On a weaker version of dualism, which contemporary thinkers (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  58. David M. Rosenthal (1998). Introspection. In Robert A. Wilson & Frank F. Keil (eds.), Mit Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences (Mitecs). Mit Press.
  59. David M. Rosenthal, Kinds of Consciousness.
  60. John P. Carriero, Peter J. Markie, Stephen Schiffer, Robert Delahunty, Frederick J. O'Toole, David M. Rosenthal, Fred Feldman, Anthony Kenny, Margaret D. Wilson, John Cottingham & Jonathan Bennett (1997). Descartes's Meditations: Critical Essays. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  61. David M. Rosenthal (1997). Apperception, Sensation, and Dissociability. Mind and Language 2 (2):206-23.
    Recent writing on consciousness has increasingly stressed ways in which the terms.
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  62. David M. Rosenthal (1997). A Theory of Consciousness. In Ned Block, Owen J. Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness. Mit Press.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  63. David M. Rosenthal (1997). Perceptual and Cognitive Models of Consciousness. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association 45.
  64. David M. Rosenthal (1997). Phenomenal Consciousness and What It's Like. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):156--57.
    be realized. Whatever gets access to phenomenal awareness (to consciousness and P-consciousness are almost always present or P-consciousness as described by Block) is represented within this absent together.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  65. David M. Rosenthal, State Consciousness and What It's Like.
  66. David M. Rosenthal (1995). Multiple Drafts and the Facts of the Matter. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. 275--290.
  67. David M. Rosenthal (1995). Moore's Paradox and Consciousness. Philosophical Perspectives 9:313-33.
  68. David M. Rosenthal (1995). Self-Knowledge and Moore's Paradox. Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):195 - 209.
    As G. E. Moore famously observed, sentences such as 'It's raining but I don't think it is', though they aren't contradictory, cannot be used to make coherent assertions.' The trouble with such sentences is not a matter of their truth conditions; such sentences can readily be true. Indeed, it happens often enough with each of us that we think, for example, that it isn't raining even though it is. This shows that such sentences are not literally contradictory. But even though (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  69. David M. Rosenthal (1994). First-Person Operationalism and Mental Taxonomy. Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2):319-349.
  70. David M. Rosenthal (1994). State Consciousness and Transitive Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 2 (3):355-63.
  71. David M. Rosenthal (1994). The Identity Theory. In Samuel D. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
    In Descartes's time the issue between materialists and their opponents was framed in terms of substances. Materialists such as Thomas Hobbes and Pierre Gassendi maintained that people are physical systems with abilities that no other physical systems have; people, therefore, are special kinds of physical substance. Descartes's DUALISM, by contrast, claimed that people consist of two distinct substances that interact causally: a physical body and a nonphysical, unextended substance. The traditional.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  72. David M. Rosenthal (1993). Explaining Consciousness. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings. Oup. 406--421.
  73. David M. Rosenthal (1993). Higher-Order Thoughts and the Appendage Theory of Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 6 (2):155-66.
    Theories of what it is for a mental state to be conscious must answer two questions. We must say how we're conscious of our conscious mental states. And we must explain why we seem to be conscious of them in a way that's immediate. Thomas Natsoulas (1993) distinguishes three strategies for explaining what it is for mental states to be conscious. I show that the differences among those strategies are due to the divergent answers they give to the foregoing questions. (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  74. David M. Rosenthal (1993). Multiple Drafts and Higher-Order Thoughts. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):911-18.
    whatever it is that occurs in between the two. Though superficially tempting, this idea heightens the air of mystery surrounding consciousness. As far..
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  75. David M. Rosenthal (1993). Review: Multiple Drafts and Higher-Order Thoughts. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):911 - 918.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  76. David M. Rosenthal (1993). Thinking That One Thinks. In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Blackwell.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  77. David M. Rosenthal (1992). Time and Consciousness. Behavioral And Brain Sciences 15 (2):220-221.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  78. David M. Rosenthal (1991). The Independence of Consciousness and Sensory Quality. Philosophical Issues 1:15-36.
  79. David M. Rosenthal (ed.) (1991). The Nature of Mind. Oxford University Press.
    This anthology brings together readings mainly from contemporary philosophers, but also from writers of the past two centuries, on the philosophy of mind. Some of the main questions addressed are: is a human being really a mind in relation to a body; if so, what exactly is this mind and how it is related to the body; and are there any grounds for supposing that the mind survives the disintegration of the body?
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  80. David M. Rosenthal (1990). On Being Accessible to Consciousness. Behavioral And Brain Sciences 13 (4):621-621.
  81. David M. Rosenthal (1990). Why Are Verbally Expressed Thoughts Conscious? Bielefeld Report.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  82. David M. Rosenthal & Fadlou Shehadi (eds.) (1988). Applied Ethics and Ethical Theory. University of Utah Press.
  83. David M. Rosenthal (1987). Intentionality. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):151-184.
    At the level of our platitudinous background knowledge about things, speech is the expression of thought. And understanding what such expressing involves is central to understanding the relation between thinking and speaking. Part of what it is for a speech act to express a mental state is that the speech act accurately captures the mental state and can convey to others what mental state it is. And for this to occur, the speech act at least must have propositional content that (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  84. David M. Rosenthal (1986). Two Concepts of Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.
    No mental phenomenon is more central than consciousness to an adequate understanding of the mind. Nor does any mental phenomenon seem more stubbornly to resist theoretical treatment. Consciousness is so basic to the way we think about the mind that it can be tempting to suppose that no mental states exist that are not conscious states. Indeed, it may even seem mysterious what sort of thing a mental state might be if it is not a conscious state. On this way (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  85. David M. Rosenthal (1985). Review of Jackson's P Erception: A Representative Theory. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 82:28--41.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  86. David Rosenthal (1984). The Order Indiscernibles of Divisible Ordered Abelian Groups. Journal of Symbolic Logic 49 (1):151-160.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  87. David M. Rosenthal (1984). The Behaviorist Concept of Mind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):643.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  88. David M. Rosenthal (1983). Emotions and the Self. In K. Irani & Gerald E. Myers (eds.), Emotion: Philosophical Studies. Haven.
    Much of the perplexity that motivates modern discussion of the nature of mind derives indirectly from the striking success of physical explanation. Not only has physics itself advanced at a remarkable pace in the last four centuries; every hope has been held out that, in principle, all science can be understood and ultimately studied in terms of mechanisms proper to physics. Seeing all natural phenomena as explicable in terms appropriate to physics, however, makes the mental seem to be a singularity (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  89. David M. Rosenthal (1983). Reductionism and Knowledge. In L.S. Cauman, Isaac Levi, Charles D. Parsons & Robert Schwartz (eds.), How Many Questions? Hacket.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  90. David M. Rosenthal (1980). Keeping Matter in Mind. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):295-322.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  91. David M. Rosenthal (1980). Methodological Behaviorism: A Case for Transparent Texonomy. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):92.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  92. David M. Rosenthal (1980). The Modularity and Maturation of Cognitive Capacities. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):32.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  93. David M. Rosenthal (1978). The Insignificance of Incommensurate Variations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (3):364.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  94. David M. Rosenthal (1976). The Necessity of Foreknowledge. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 1 (1):22-25.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  95. David M. Rosenthal (1976). Mentality and Neutrality. Journal of Philosophy 73 (13):386-415.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  96. David M. Rosenthal (1976). Possibility, Existence, and an Ontological Argument. Philosophical Studies 30 (3):185 - 191.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  97. David M. Rosenthal (1973). Talking About Thinking. Philosophical Studies 24 (September):283-308.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  98. David M. Rosenthal & Wilfrid S. Sellars (1972). The Rosenthal-Sellars Correspondence on Intentionality. In Ausonio Marras (ed.), Intentionality, Mind and Language. University of Illinois Press.
    In response to your kind offer to read through portions of the typescript of my thesis pertaining to your views on intentionality, I am sending you a copy of an introductory section to such a chapter.{1} The enclosed typescript represents a first draft, for which I apologize, but I thought it might be useful to get any comments you might have in at the ground floor, so to speak.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  99. David M. Rosenthal (ed.) (1971). Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem. Prentice-Hall.
    An expanded and updated edition of this classic collection.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  100. David M. Rosenthal (1968). Intentionality: A Study of the Views of Chisholm and Sellars. Philosophy.
    Edited in hypertext by Andrew Chrucky. Reprinted with the permission of Professor David Rosenthal. Editor's Note: Due to the limitation of current hypertext, the following conventions have been used. In general, if an expression has some mark over it, that mark is placed as a prefix to the expression. All Greek characters (except phi) are rendered by their names. Subscripts are placed in parentheses as concatenated suffixes: thus, e.g., H(2)O is the chemical formula for water. Sellars' dot quotes are expressed (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  101. Theodore P. Zahn & David Rosenthal (1966). Simple Reaction Time as a Function of the Relative Frequency of the Preparatory Interval. Journal of Experimental Psychology 72 (1):15.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  102. David Rosenthal & Charles N. Cofer (1948). The Effect on Group Performance of an Indifferent and Neglectful Attitude Shown by One Group Member. Journal of Experimental Psychology 38 (5):568.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  103. E. M. Anscombe, R. Rhees & David M. Rosenthal, Consciousness.
    One phenomenon pertains roughly to being awake. A person or other creature is conscious when it's awake and mentally responsive to sensory input; otherwise it's unconscious. This kind of consciousness figures most often in everyday discourse.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  104. G. E. M. Anscombe, R. Rhees & David M. Rosenthal, The Mind and Its Expression.
    pain' and ┌I think that p┐ express the pain and the thought that p, themselves. The book is most impressive. It is packed with careful argument, and addresses a remarkable range of important issues about the mind. I have very much enjoyed studying it.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  105. David Rosenthal, The The Poverty of Poverty of Poverty of Poverty of Consciousness Consciousness.
    , encapsulates his deep hostility to Marxist thinking. his deep hostility to Marxist thinking. his deep hostility to Marxist thinking. his deep hostility to Marxist thinking. By contrast, my own allusion is friendly, By contrast, my own allusion is friendly, and is meant to point up a nice parallel and is meant to point up a nice parallel my argument has with a schematic my argument has with a schematic aspect of Marx’s thinking. aspect of Marx’s thinking.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  106. David M. Rosenthal, Consciousness, Plans, and Language: Commentary on Bridgeman on Consciousness.
    There is much in Bridgeman's account that I find congenial and compelling, especially appealing is Bridgeman's application of his thesis to the tie between consciousness and language. Nonetheless, I want to raise some questions about whether the tie he finds between plans and consciousness actually does hold. Not all memory and attention is conscious. Although attention and accessing of memories are required to execute plans, we need not be at all conscious of the relevant states of memory and attention. Nor (...)
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  107. David M. Rosenthal, Explicarea Conştiinţei.
    Dintre fenomenele mentale, nici unul nu pare să reziste atât de bine explicaţiei precum conştiinţa. Parţial, dificultatea se datorează faptului că folosim termenul „conştient” şi alţii înrudiţi să dea seama de anumite fenomene distincte ale căror legături nu sunt întotdeauna clare. Iar acest lucru duce adesea la amestecarea acestor fenomene distincte. De aceea, orice încercare de a explica conştiinţa trebuie să înceapă prin a distinge diferitele lucruri pe care le numim conştiinţă. Un astfel de fenomen este strâns legat de simplul (...)
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  108. David M. Rosenthal, The Kinds of Consciousness.
    I begin by considering Ned Block's widely accepted distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness. I argue that on Block's official characterization a mental state's being access conscious is not a way the state's being conscious in any intuitive sense; that if phenomenal consciousness itself corresponds to an intuitive way of a state's being conscious, it literally implies access consciousness; and that Block misconstrues the theoretical significance of the commonsense distinction. These considerations point to the view that mental states' being conscious (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  109. David M. Rosenthal, Will and the Theory of Judgment.
    Contemporary discussions typically give somewhat sort shrift to the theory of judgment Descartes advances in the Fourth Meditation.' One reason for this relative neglect is presumably the prima facie implausibility of the theory. It sounds odd to say that, in believing something, one's mental affirmation is an act of free will, on a par with freely deciding what to do. In addition, Descartes advances the theory as a way to explain the possibility of human error, which doubtless strikes many as (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  110. David Rosenthal & JeeLoo Liu, The Nature of Consciousness Handout.
    1. To refute this theory: consciousness is intrinsic to being an intentional or sensory mental state; one cannot understand what it is for states to have sensory or intentional character without knowing what it is for those states to be conscious.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  111. David Rosenthal, Aristotle's Hylomorphism.
    In these comments on Bernard Williams's probing and provocative paper, I shall first try to develop a line of response to the pair of problems Williams poses concerning Aristotle's account of soul. I shall then offer some reactions, of a more general sort, to his discussion of hylomorphism (henceforth "HMism"). In particular, I want to suggest that, though HMism is in part a form of inoffensive materialism, it is more than just that. And I want to urge also that HMism (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  112. David Rosenthal, Aristotle on Thought.
    The main goal of Deborah Modrak's penetrating and compelling discussion is to show that Aristotle subscribed "to an integrated model of perceptual and noetic functions" (268). Using Aristotle's phrase (Γ4, 429b13, 21), Modrak describes the integrated model as the view that "the noetic faculty is the perceptual faculty differently disposed" (283). She notes that this interpretation faces certain difficulties, but argues forcefully and incisively that it can nonetheless be sustained.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  113. David Rosenthal, Book Reviews 581. [REVIEW]
    The focus of Mark Rowlands’s admirable, richly argued book is phenomenal consciousness, in particular, how such consciousness arises from processes that are not themselves phenomenally conscious. Rowlands examines several views on this question, arguing that their failures point toward his own intriguing, novel position, which he develops in the final three chapters.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  114. David Rosenthal, Commentaries.
    But there is another reason, equally important. We distinguish among thoughts, feelings, and sensations by virtue of their characteristic representational properties. In particular, we describe thoughts and emotions in terms of the things they are about and how they represent those things. And we characterize sensations by reference to their qualitative properties and the things..
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  115. David Rosenthal, Consciousness and Intrinsic Higher-Order Content.
    PowerPoint presentation at Tucson VII, Toward a Science of Consciousness 2006, session on Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  116. David Rosenthal, 6. Philosophy and its Teaching.
    A striking difference between those fields we classify as humanities and those we regard as sciences is the attitude within each field toward its history. Learning about literature, music, or the visual arts requires becoming knowledgeable about a significant amount of the history of those areas. And education in these fields, at whatever level, invariably involves some study of great accomplishments in the past. By contrast, scientific work and standard scientific textbooks make little reference to the history of the science (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  117. David Rosenthal, V. Consciousness, Interpretation, and Higher-Order-Thought.
    Few contemporary researchers in psychology, philosophy, and the cognitive sciences have any doubt about whether mental phenomena occur without being conscious. There is extensive and convincing clinical and experimental evidence for the existence of thoughts, desires, and related mental states that aren’t conscious. We characterize thoughts, desires, intentions, expectations, hopes, and many other mental states in terms of the things they are about and, more fully, in terms of their content, as captured by a sentence nominalization, such as a clause (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  118. David M. Rosenthal, Consciousness (.
    (1) Most commonly these terms are used to describe people. People and other creatures are conscious if they are awake and responsive to sensory stimulation. Because this is a property of creatures, we can call it creature consciousness. An individual lacks such consciousness if it is asleep, in a coma, anesthetized, and so forth. Creature consciousness demands a mainly biological explanation, as against an explanation in mainly psychological terms.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  119. David Rosenthal, HOTs and Mental Appearance: A Reply to Prettyman.
    There are a few things I’d like to say in reply to Adrienne Prettyman’s interesting paper, “Empty Thoughts: An Explanatory Problem for Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness,” in which she discusses the objection to higher-order theories from the possibility those theories leave open that a higher-order awareness represents one as being in a state that one is not actually in.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  120. David M. Rosenthal, Consciousness.
    One phenomenon pertains roughly to being awake. A person or other creature is conscious when it's awake and mentally responsive to sensory input; otherwise it's unconscious. This kind of consciousness figures most often in everyday discourse.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  121. David M. Rosenthal, The Mind and its Expression.
    pain' and ┌I think that p┐ express the pain and the thought that p, themselves. The book is most impressive. It is packed with careful argument, and addresses a remarkable range of important issues about the mind. I have very much enjoyed studying it.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
Is this list right?