There is a growing consensus in both academic and popular reflections on sport that if the accuracy of officiating can be improved by technology, then such assistance ought to be introduced. Indeed, apart from certain practical concerns about technologizing officiating there are few normative objections, and those that are voiced are often poorly articulated and quickly dismissed by critics. In this paper, we take up one of these objections – what is referred to as the loss of the human element (...) in sport – and try to provide a firmer foundation for the disquiet that some feel at the threat of its loss. Briefly, it is argued that the cost of trying to eliminate all error in officiating through technological means is an understanding of sport as a practice through which human beings can reconcile themselves with the fallibilities and contingencies of life, in a forum where such losses can safely be experienced. After considering both practical and normative counter-arguments against the implementatio.. (shrink)
A difficult question in the philosophy of sport concerns how winning athletes should perform in uneven contests in which victory has been secured well before the competition is over. Nicholas Dixon, the protagonist in the ongoing debate, argues against critics who urge following an 'anti-blowout' thesis that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with running up the score. We engage this debate, providing much needed distinctions, and draw on Aristotelian resources to explore a framework by which to understand competing claims found (...) within the literature. (shrink)
We offer a particularist defense of conspiratorial thinking. We explore the possibility that the presence of a certain kind of evidence—what we call "fortuitous data"—lends rational credence to conspiratorial thinking. In developing our argument, we introduce conspiracy theories and motivate our particularist approach (§1). We then introduce and define fortuitous data (§2). Lastly, we locate an instance of fortuitous data in one real world conspiracy, the Watergate scandal (§3).
One way of assessing the philosophical literature on causation is to consider views on the nature of the causal relation. Early theorists were 'monists', taking there to be one causal relation. More recent theorists, however, have turned to pluralism, which holds that the causal relation is only accurately captured by two (or more) relations. I argue that one way of being a pluralist – the way which takes there to be exactly two types of causation – is self defeating, if (...) it promises to handle intuitions about all causal situations. I illustrate the point via neuron diagrams. (shrink)